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Since its foundation in 1921 the Portuguese Communist

Party

(PCP)

has

played

Portuguese history,

decisive role throughout

a

especially after 1929.

Despite

clandestinity it was the major opposition force during the
forty-eight year Salazar/Caetano dictatorship,

emerged as

the most organized party after the 1974 military coup which

restored democracy,

continues to be

and

a

major

parliamentary and extra-parliamentary force.

The bulk of this

study

focuses

on

the

party's

evolution from its foundation by individuals with strong
anarcho-syndicalist tendencies,

during the

1

930'

s

through its Bolshevizat ion

when the party went clandestine,

Stalinizat ion in the 1940'

its

and its continued orthodoxy

s,

throughout the dictatorship and the new democratic regime
v

.

which replaced it in 1974
personalities,
which,

strategies,

.

The focus is on those events,

and organizational

structures

when poured into the mold provided by
Moscow,

left

the PCP with a unique character distinguishing
it from its
fraternal communist parties in Europe and the rest
of the

world

After the 1974 military coup the PCP continued its
orthodox strategy, which included a firm commitment
to
Marxism-Leninism,

the dictatorship of the proletariat,

democratic centralism,
revolution or putsches.
after March 1975,

and the

conquest

of

power via

With the regime's radicalizat ion

the PCP determined that conditions were

quickly ripening for revolution and acted accordingly.
However,

in

November 25,

1975

the

failure of

a

military

coup led by left-wing extremists abruptly ended the

"revolution," ushered in moderate politics,

and

strengthened the liberal democratic parliamentary system.
Faced with the drastic change in the political situation,

the PCP chose to remain Stalinist,
revolutionary gains,

and continue

consolidate the

"dual

a

strategy" of

parliamentary and extra-parliamentary activity
that

revolution would return.

It

in

hopes

concluded that the

Eurocommunist path could never bring socialism to Portugal.

This

study analyzes the PCP'
vi

s

Marxist-Leninist

/Stalinist strategy for power,
system,

and its

its impact on the political

future prospects.

Because case studies

should contribute significantly to the broader
fields of
comparative political parties and comparative politics,

it

also includes chapters on general political party
theory,
the Portuguese political system, and Eurocommunism.
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PREFACE

Although

have always been interested in the
subject
as a result of my nationality, it was
only after studying
I

Portuguese politics under Howard J. Wiarda
(at the
University of Massachusetts at Amherst in 1977)
that

closely followed Portuguese political events.
in the Portuguese Communist Party

Ronald Tiersky's

(a

1979.

I

formally began with

Eurocommunism course in the Spring

the process of writing a research paper

In

the course

My interest

Visiting Professor at the University of

Connecticut in Storrs)
of

(PCP)

I

made two observations.

First,

for

the Portuguese

Communist Party had not been as systematically researched
as

had other Western European communist parties.

cases

a

few articles were

newspapers,

in

(occasionally

a

In

some

scattered in journals and

others there were several pages and
chapter)

devoted to the PCP in books on

Portuguese Politics or European Communism.
that this scattered information did not do

concluded

I

justice to

communist party which was receiving between 15 and
percent of the vote.

The

Spanish Communist Party

a

20

(PCE)

already had entire books written on its behalf despite

a

much lower percentage at the polls.
Second,

I

felt that formal study of the PCP was needed

to explain why this party,

even though

xiv

it

had

a

history

.

similar to that of the
its

neighbor.

pursue

a

In

P CE/

was radically different

other words,

from

why had the PCE chosen to

Eur ocommuni s t path to power while
the PCP

continued its orthodox,

Marxist-Leninist approach?

does the PCP's tactical choice hold for
its future?

what
Can

a

rejection of the democratic road to power
succeed in

a

democratic Portugal?

Do the circumstances

in

Portugal

differ radically from those in Spain to justify
the PCP's

rejection of Eurocommunism?
PCP's continued orthodoxy

Or is the major reason for the
a

result of the leadership's

experiences rather than Portuguese political conditions?
In

answering these and other questions

I

begin with

general chapters which place the analysis of the PCP
context.

in

First a chapter which introduces political party

theory and the varying approaches to the study of the
political party.
history,

Next

a

chapter on Portuguese culture,

and economics followed by

a

chapter on Portuguese

parties
The

its

fourth chapter focuses on the PCP's history from

Anarchist and Anarcho-syndicalist roots to its

formation in 1921 and the fall of the dictatorship in 1974.

The PCP's history has been

continues to be researched.

difficult to uncover and
Nevertheless,

much more is

known today of the PCP's history than has been printed in
English.

For this reason

I

have devoted
xv

a

lengthy chapter

.

to the historical development of the
PCP

The

fifth chapter deals with the April

25,

1974

to

November 25, 1975 revolutionary period and
the role the PCP
played in it, which has been the focus of
most English
language studies.
The sixth chapter analyzes the
PCP's

tactics since the failure of the "Portuguese
Revolution."
It analyzes why the PCP has chosen to continue
its Marxist-

Leninist strategy.

The

seventh chapter is devoted to the

party's organization and leadership.
The eigth chapter and the conclusion analyze why
the

PCP has not become

a

factors are noted,

eurocommunist party.

the most

party's leadership.

Although several

important one focuses on the

Thus,

it

is

not

an

analysis of

eurocommunism in general.
In the

years which it has taken to research and write

this dissertation

I

have incurred a number of debts.

My

scholarly debts will be apparent from the footnotes and
selected bibliography.

members Howard

J.

Special thanks go to my committee

Wiarda

(chairperson)

,

Gerard Braunthal,

Ronald Tiersky, and Eric Einhorn for reading the manuscript

and providing valuable advice.

Thomas Bruneau and Alex

Macleod also provided advice both here and in Portugal.
am also greatful to the Earhart Foundation

for

&

Foreign Policy Analysis for funding

the Institute
a

research

fellowship at the Hoover Institution for War, Revolution,
xvi

I

&

"

.

Peace in Stanford, California prior to my
field research in
Portugal

Across the Atlantic

I

am

greatful to several

Portuguese scholars and citizens of communist,
communist, and other political persuasions for
interviews and advice.

ex-

their

Geographically and especially

intellectually Portugal is

a

very small

country which

complicates the issue of acknowledging my sources.
Although I make references to scholarly articles in
footnote form,
an

have not done so for interviewees.

I

Even

indirect reference might divulge the source because

Portuguese intellectuals will be familiar with their
backgrounds.

(In

some cases

I

was explicitly warned that

complete denials would be issued should their comments be

divulged.)

Therefore,

I

have chosen to list only Jose

Pacheco Pereira because of his invaluable advice and
excellent research on the PCP
period)

.

(especially the pre-1974

The Portuguese are already

familiar with his

views and would not be surprized to see his name mentioned.
Finally,

her patience,

I

would like to thank my wife,
support,

and editorial

Rhonda,

remarks.

reflects her time and effort almost as much as

mine.

for

This work
it

does

Thanks also to my parents who gave me the

opportunity to pursue

a

higher education rather than remain

in subsistence agriculture as a Portuguese

xvii

"minifundista

.

I

remain,

of course,

solely responsible for any errors
of
fact or interpretation.
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INTRODUCTION

On April

1974

25,

military coup ended the forty-

a

eight year old dictatorship in Portugal and
replaced it
with a democratic regime.
Despite right- and left-wing
military counter-coup attempts in 1975, a dozen years
later
democracy continues.

was

the

The Portuguese Communist Party

only party to

dictatorship.

it

(PCP)

survive the authoritarian

emerged from clandestinit y as the best

organized political party

in the

country.

Since then it

has consistently played an important role in politics.

For

this reason,

the

to

fully understand Portuguese politics,

PCP's political strategy must be analyzed.

This study focuses on the PCP's strategy for power

from its

formation in 1921

to

the

present

and

implications for democracy and the party system
Portugal.

However,

its
in

comparatively this analysis'

ramifications reaches beyond an "area studies" domain and
adds to the comparative

study of political parties and

party systems in general and of Western Europe in specific.
For this reason in chapter One we discuss general theories
of parties and party systems.

Even though our focus is on the PCP, the study must be

placed in context of the political system within which
xix

it

operates.

Therefore,

chapter Two provides

analysis of the cultural,

socio-economic,

a

general

political,

anthropological,

and historical background of Portugal.
Chapter Three analyzes the parties with
which the PCP
competes in the political system.
Because we cannot understand the PCP today
or compare
it to other communist parties without
understanding
its

past, the specific analyses of the PCP's strategy
for power

begin in chapter Four which covers its evolution
from 1921

to

1974.

The

PCP

suffered

a

longer period of

clandestinity than most communist parties which profoundly
affected its leaders and added to its Stalinist character;

but

in

other respects,

its

past is similar to that of

other Western European communist parties.

Chapter Five focuses on the PCP's tactics during the
"revolution" which began on April 25,

ended after the November 25,
coup.

1975

1974

and abruptly

aborted ultra left-wing

As this period progressed and politics increasingly

shifted to the left, the PCP's radicalism escalated as did
its analyses that conditions for seizure of the state were

quickly ripening.

Chapter Six focuses on the PCP's

strategy from November 25,

1975 to the present.

After the

revolution lost its momentum and moderation dominated the
political scene, the party's tactics became defensive as it

attempted to protect the conquests of the revolution and
xx

hoped for a new leftward shift in
the future.
Therefore,
chapters Five and Six provide a historical
analysis of how
a

"Putschist"

strategy failed in Portugal and the

ramifications of this failure on the party's
future.

Chapters
approach:

Seven

that of

and Eight

take

a

more thematic

Stalinist communist party and its
strategies for the future.
Chapter Seven describes and
a

analyzes the PCP's organizational structure,

including the

major party leadership and "democratic centralism."
analyzing the PCP's rejection of Eurocommunism,

m

in chapter

Eight we shed additional light on the factors which lead
some parties to become Eurocommunist and others to remain

orthodox.

Although varying conditions from nation to

nation are key

factors,

greater importance in

of

determining party strategy appears to be the leadership of
the parties.
The PCP,
a

as

communist parties were intended to be,

party like no other party.

is

In this study we will address

the question of how it differs from its competitors.

One

example is the PCP's conception of power: whereas the other

major parties see power

as

control of the government

through democratic elections,

the PCP minimizes the

parliamentarian path to power and emphasizes other Leninist
tactics.

How does this diverging view of power affect

democratic politics and the party system in Portugal?
xxi

We will show that the PCP continues
to be an example
of "ordinary Stalinism" as described
by Ronald Tiersky.l
Is the party destined for decay
in the long term?
Can it
change, and if so - how?
This study contributes

to the

field of comparative communism in general
and Eurocommunism
in specific by providing an additional
case study of the
evolution,

or non-evolution,

of communist parties.

Unless

it radically alters the strategy it has
been pursuing since

November 1975,
weaken.
in the

the party's power base will

Because evolution would require

leadership,

a

gradually

radical change

which is unlikely in the short- or

medium-term, major change is unlikely.
As discussed above,

this study contributes to the

field of comparative political parties,

comparative

communism, and comparative government /Western Europe by its

analysis of one party,

the

Portuguese politics.

xxii

PCP,

and its

impact

on

Endnotes

Stalinism

AilenTVnIinrrissV

xxiii

.Boston:

George

.

CHAPTER

1

THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLITICAL
PARTIES

The Portuguese Communist Party must
be analyzed in the
context of the comparative study of political
parties.
To

portray the controversy and dynamism which
still exists in
the field we discuss the evolution of
political parties
as

well as the perpetual difficulty in defining
them.

To

emphasize the absence of and need for

a

general theory of

parties we discuss several reasons why

a

general theory is

still

lacking and suggest some of the steps necessary
to

fulfill this goal.

We also define and discuss

important

terms and concepts which are essential for an understanding
of parties and party systems.

By tracing the evolution of

party studies from the turn of the century to the present
we

survey the various methodological approaches to the

study of political parties.

We conclude the chapter with a

discussion of the approach we use to study the PCP and the
significance it has for the comparative study of political
parties

The Study of Political Parties

-

Its Controversial Nature

The political party is a relatively new form of social

1

.

organization.

its age is debatable,

as some scholars trace

its beginning back further than
others.

Feliks Gross,

for

example,

traces political parties to Republican
Rome's
"factiones."
He allows that these sponsor
groups of

chariot racing in Rome were not parties in
the modern sense
of the term but they were, nevertheless,
the embryo of the

political party which resulted in the
"faction."

familiar term

Beginning with Republican Rome,

Gross follows

the evolution of the political party through
medieval
Italy's Ghibellines and Guelphs, through the Leveller's

of

seventeenth century England,

to the political

eighteenth century France.

Max Weber also refers to the

1

existence of political parties prior to

revolution

-

[e.g.,]

groups of

"the French

the Huguenots or Catholic League or

any of the English parties including the

'Roundheads'

.

"

He

also discusses the Ghibellines and Guelphs of thirteenth
century Italy as parties. 2
Most scholars, disagreeing with Gross and Weber, argue
that the political party is

a

relatively recent creation.

Maurice Duverger, for example, claims political parties did
not arrive on the scene until the middle of the nineteenth

century
We must

not be misled by the analogy of words.
"parties" to describe the
factions which divided the republics of

We

use the word

antiquity, the troops which formed round a
condottiere in Renaissance Italy, the clubs where

s

the members of the revolutionary
assemblies met,
C
ltteeS
pre P ared
elections

%the
hT property
constitutional

Snder
under

^

franchise

of the
monarchies as well as the vast
popular organizations which give shape
to public
opinion in modern democracies...
Obviously

however, they are not the same thing...
1850
no country in the world (except
the United
States) knew political parties in the
modern
sense of the word.'* 3

m

Giovanni Sartori adds that what Weber, and
implicitly
Gross, consider political parties are in
reality only
factions; political parties did not emerge
until the early
nineteenth century with the Jeffersonian Republicans 4
The

.

views of Sartori and Duverger are supported by
Joseph
LaPalombara and Myron Weiner who claim modern political
parties emerged around the nineteenth century when
the

suffrage broadened and mass parties formed.

Specifically

they point to the Federalists and Republicans of the 1790'
in

the U.S.,

to the Liberal which emerge in England after

the reform of 1832, and to the French groups after 1848.

5

That some scholars trace political parties back to the

Middle Ages while others insist they did not emerge until
after the nineteenth century illustrates only one of the

disagreements between them.
and Weiner,

Duverger,

and Leon Epstein,

Sartori, LaPalombara

to name

a

few,

all

agree

parties did not exist prior to the turn of the nineteenth

century,
emergence.

yet
6

each gives
The use

a

different date for their

of the term "modern"

to qualify the

9

8

Epstein notes,

...modern political parties
with the
extensron of the vote to emerged
a
fairly
large
g
proportion
of the populace.

7

According to Sartori,
if m eri politics has something
peculiarly
modern"„ °K
about! it, the novelty derives from
politically active, or politically mobilized,a
society, which is a new resource and also
a new
source of complexities.
if so, modern
politics
requires a party channelment:
the single party
when not, or where not, parties in the plural
.

Although most scholars hold

similar view of what makes

a

political party "modern" their views concerning when

a

a

party becomes modern still differ.

Disagreements also surface on what constitutes a
political party in the 20th century.
LaPalombara and
Weiner state that:
The political party is a creature of modern
and modernizing political systems.
Whether one
thinks of Anglo-American democracies or
totalitarian systems such as the Soviet Union,
Fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany; emergent African
states in their earliest years of independent
evolution or Latin American republics that have
hobbled along for over a century; a mammoth
ex-colonial area such as India groping toward
democracy or an equally mammoth Communist power
such as China seeking to mobilize a population
through totalitarian methods, the political party
in one form or another is omnipresent
.

But the

"forms" that

are rejected by others.

some scholars

accept as parties

Sigmund Neumann,

for example,

.. to call such a dictatorial
organization [the
N.zi party] a "party" is a misnomer
conscious misconception, for the rightand often a
to combine
freely (the basic freedom of choice
to

denied"?^

™

fr ° m)

** '°

e ^entially

iS

Only the coexistence of at least one
other
competitive
group makes a political party real. 11

the

Disagreements also concern parties in Africa;
many of
"forms" which Rupert Emerson or Thomas
Hodgkins
call

parties are not considered such by others.

12

We discuss above the reservations which some
scholars

have when communist parties are considered "parties,"
and
the controversy intensifies when we focus on party
systems.
Can one consider communist political systems,

in which

opposition parties are not allowed,

systems?

to be party

Does not the term "party system" imply that more than one

party is necessary in order to have

a

system?

Neumann

certainly accepts this view:
The dictatorial party's monopoly, which prevents
the free formation and expression of opinion, is
the precise antithesis of the party system. 13

A one-party system is

a

contradiction in itself.

14

the same is true of the critical period of a
By the very definition, "party"
connotes not only the coexistence of different
.

.

.

party system.

competing entities, with their characteristic
partnership, separation, and participation, but
also a fourth feature, most significant and yet
often forgotten - the essential inclusion of
every separate group as "a part of a whole. n1 ^
The number

of

scholars who reject communist political

systems as "party systems" is even
greater. 16

And we have

yet to consider whether the African
one-party

states and

the "fluid" nature of their politics can
allow us to label
these political systems - party systems. 17

Why do some scholars trace the origins
of political

parties back further than others?
cease to be
the

a

a

faction and begin to be a party?

"modern" political party emerge?

party?

When does

What is

What constitutes a party system?

faction

when does
a

political

That controversy

still surrounds these questions and leaves them
without

a

universally accepted answer gives us an insight to the

state

of

political party theory and its highly

controversial and dynamic nature.

The Party Defined

One of the more difficult problems is in defining the

political party.

If

scholars

could arrive

at

one

definition there could be agreement on their emergence and
on the make-up of party systems.

constitutes

party system,

a

parties could be improved.

With a resolution of what

the

comparative study of

A snowball effect might develop

and considerably diminish the controversy which exists in

the

field as

a

whole if we could only standardize the

connotation of the term "political party."

.

Unfortunately,

defining the party is an old
problem.

Definitions proliferated

in

the

last

thirty years as

scholars,

unhappy with the definitions which
existed,
created new ones according to their own views.
in

some

cases they found the pre-established
definitions too broad
and all encompassing.
In other cases they found them too
narrow and selective, omitting what they considered
to be

political parties.

Edmund Burke,

As a result we now have definitions by

Joseph Schumpeter,

Abraham Kaplan,

Kenneth Janda,

Samuel Eldersveld,

So many

that for those seeking
it

has become

Fred Riggs,

Sigmund Neumann,

18

several others.

Harold Lasswell and

a

Kay Lawson,

and

definitions are now available

definition of the political party

"buyer's market."

a

Leon Epstein,

And if scholars are

still unable to find the definition which suits their
purposes they can always create their own (and usually
It

has become vogue to define terms

do)

creatively and

differently when explaining one's methodological approach
in

an

introductory chapter.

definitions

is

creation of

a

a

As

general theory of political parties.
an

extra effort to use existing

long as the drive to be

"creative" continues,
to evade us.

proliferation of

problem if one is interested in the

Scholars should make
definitions.

The

a

"different" or

general theory will also continue

:

Certainly if conditions change and
party systems adapt
to the changes, the definitions, if
they become outdated,
must accompany the evolution. But caution

must be taken to

assure that those definitions already in
existence are not
applicable any longer.
Although conditions may certainly

arise in the future requiring new definitions,

in many

instances the new oefinitions will continue to
emerge as a
result of scholars' unhappiness with definitions
already in
existence.
For others the impulse to be different will

supersede the need to create
a

a

general theory.

Caution is

prerequisite to any attempt to revise definitions.

first

step

is

to

bring to

proliferation of definitions.

a

The

halt

the

The

unnecessary

second is to agree on

only one definition.

Having surveyed the available definitions we will use
Sartori

'

s

A party is any political group identified by an
official label that presents at elections, and is
capable of placing through elections (free or
nonfree)
candidates for public office. 19
,

Sartori's definition is the best available for several

reasons.
with

a

He

approaches the formation of his definition

genuine concern towards the creation of

theory of political parties.

a

general

He closely examines previous

definitions and discusses why all are rejected as
inadequate

.

^0

He

carefully designs his definition to

differentiate the political party from
the faction,
the movement, from the pressure
group,
or

union.

He

also maintains the

from

from the labor

"electoral criterion of

discrimination" without the ambiguity of
many other
definitions,

and includes the dictatorial party

(e.g.,

communist party) under his definition.
Sartori's definition may not be perfect
but can we
ever expect to find the ultimate definition?
Sartori
admits that in trying to compare systems as
different as
the United States, the Soviet Union, and those
of Africa it
is inevitable that country specialists will
be unhappy with

the sweeping nature of his general study
his definition) .21

Nevertheless,

necessary precursor to

political parties.

a

a

(and

implicitly

general framework is

a

general comparative theory of

And in turn,

a

universally accepted

definition of the political party is

a

precursor to

a

general framework.

Approaches to the Study of Political Parties

Ever since the emergence of the modern party scholars

have studied it from various methodological approaches.

Prior to the

fifties most

studies

of

parties were

criticized for focusing on only one nation and taking
historical,

a

descriptive approach rather than an analytical

"

one.

Since the fifties the study of
political parties has
become increasingly comparative and
the range of approaches
for their study has broadened
beyond the

historical to

include the structural,

the

behavioral,

functional-systemic, and the ideological.

the

During the last

three decades scholars have also attempted
to create
general,

a

comprehensive theory of political parties to
bind

these various studies and approaches together.
Today,
despite theoretical advances, this goal remains

to be

fulfilled.
Of the early party studies perhaps only M.
Ostrogorski

and Robert Michels come close to attempting

theory relevant to other nations. 22
from their

a

broader

Their works differ

contemporaries in that they study party

organization and the distribution of power within the party
while moving toward

a

more general comparative theory.

Ostrogorski deals mainly with the similarities between the

American and British parties, but he is also interested in

showing the "consequence of rapid democratization and the

nature

of

the

democratization

.

party

as

a

vehicle

for

rapid

23

Michels focuses on only one political party yet his
analysis is not confined within any geographical border.
He

sees his work as

a

break with historical studies and

a

move toward an "analysis of the nature of the party." 24

Michels is struck by the differentiation
within the
social-democratic parties between the
leaders and
the

followers.

He

concludes that the mass membership
of
large-scale organizations is "incompetent"
and does
not

desire to run them.

its

officers with

The membership,

therefore,

provides

near monopoly of power which the
officers will inevitably manipulate to
pursue their own
interests.

a

Michels' conclusions are reflected in his
"iron

law of oligarchy"

-

that all democratic parties are run by

small groups for their own interests,

and as a result they

are doomed as an instrument of democratic government 25
.

In

1951 Duverger begins a new era

with his contribution toward

parties. 26

He

a

for party

studies

general theory of political

pushes the field into

combining analytical concerns with

a

a

new realm by

systematic treatment.

He wants to standardize the methods and techniques used to

study parties,

to

infuse objectivity into

a

field "where

high feeling and special pleading are the general rule."
According to Duverger, he:
seeks to draw up a general plan of the field
of study by compiling a balance sheet of all the
essential questions and by coordinating them one
with another so as to bring out their interdepen.

.

.

dence and their individual

importance.

This
is
primordial: political science will make no true
progress so long as its investigations are
scattered and individual, empirical rather than
scientific 27

attempt

at

.

methodical classification

He

focuses on the structure of the
party and its
organization more than its members or
electoral numbers.

Duverger provides the field with its
first typology of
political party systems.
After 1951 the number of studies devoted
to political
parties increases. 28
Neumann presents one of the

more

significant volumes of the Fifties,

a

book designed to give

scholars the "theoretical concepts, historical
depth, and
comparative data" which they needed to continue
working
toward a theory of political parties. 29 As Neumann
notes:

Political parties are the main agents of public
affairs. For this very reason they must be seen
within the complete setting of their own
governmental systems.
Only against the
background of historical circumstances,

institutional traditions,

and

national

characteristics can the specific nature, issues,
and contributions of the different party patterns
be fully evaluated.
Each national analysis,
therefore, emphasizes different features (grown
out of long-range experiences of the people's
existence) and adds to the cumulative definition
of modern political parties." 30
His

concluding chapter is an especially useful general

discussion outlining some of the steps necessary to bind
individual nation studies into

a

general conceptual theory

of political parties and party systems. 31

By the Sixties it became evident that Duverger'

was not a definitive study,

to be

one.

His

study

s

of course he never expected it

aim was to divert the

field in

a

new

direction, to break out of:
...a vicious circle:

general

a

theory of parties
will eventually be constructed
only upon the

imi n ry W rk
^'
these studies cannot

many P^found studies; but
be truly profound so long as
there exists no general theory of
parties
The aim of this book is to break
out of the
circle and to sketch a preliminary
general theory
of parties, vague, conjectural, and
of necessity
approximate, which may yet serve as a basis
and a
guide for detailed studies. 32
°

,

H

°f

_

At

the very

least Duverger fulfills his purpose
by
inspiring additional studies of political
parties which

contribute to
In

a

general theory.

1963 Apter concludes,

which followed Duverger, that
parties was
that

still

after analyzing the studies
a

lacking. 33

general theory of political
It

is especially concerned

Western multi-party states,

dictatorial one-party

states,

and emerging one-party states

not being compared.

African)

are

The lions share of research focuses on

Western political parties,
are very

(e.g.

few successful

he claims,

and even then there

comparisons between nations.

Despite the spurt of activity that follows Duverger, the
study of political parties leaves much to be desired.

The study of parties is rather confined to a
description of characteristics obtaining in each
particular party, its relations to government,
its recruitment and leadership, its objectives
and programs, and its electoral performance.
Analysis of political parties has been primarily

concerned with improving representative
government. ...What is
political parties. 34

lacking is

a

theory of

s

Even the studies produced in the
fifties were too abstract
and systematic at the expense of
the rigorous comparisons
which were now necessary.

The general theory which is lacking
must be able to
increase our understanding of all types
of

political

parties.
parties

must

It

seek out those

functions which all

share and compare them on that basis.

suggests one possible method of comparison.
parties whether in democratic,

nations could be studied

at

dictatorial,

three levels:

Apter

Political
or emerging

the party to

state level, the party to community level, and the
party to

party level.

For example, at the party to state level does

the party make the rules

them

(or

level

is

is

it

(is

democratic)?

it

dictatorial)
At

abide by

or

the party to community

the party an organizational weapon or

a

broker?

At the party to party level is the party monopolistic or

pluralistic?35

During the two decades that lapsed since Apter'

criticism,

political party studies

methodological approaches multiplied.
studies,

as well

historical,

as

previous ones

structural,

Lawson divides these

into

behavioral,

from various

five categories:

functional-systemic,

and ideological 36
.

The historical

approach.

According to Lawson there

are four types of studies with in
this approach.
is "case histories of the origins

The first

and development

particular parties."
source material.

of

These studies are very important
as

They are necessary as a base upon
which

to build analyses.

These are the types

of studies that

dominated the field prior to the fifties. 37

Duverger's work falls into the second type
of
historical approach "which examines the kinds
of
circumstances most likely to produce political
parties. "38
He

concludes that political parties emerge in two
ways:
internally from within the legislatures or externally

from

without.

Externally created parties have their origins in

groups such as trade unions,

churches,

ex-servicemen's

associations, and industrial and commercial groups. 39

LaPalombara and Weiner's volume is an example of the

third type,

studies which "link

a

party's origin to the

kind of party it will become." 40

Unlike Duverger,

LaPalombara and Weiner focus on "crisis" combined with

a

certain degree of "modernization" as the impetus which
leads to party formation.

41

As examples

of their theory

the authors claim that parties which emerge under an open

legislative system are more likely to lead to

a

multi-party

system while parties which are repressed and clandestine
(e.g.

in

colonial Africa)

one-party systems.

4^

are

more

likely to

lead to

The

fourth type focuses

party activity.

on

a

"cyclical pattern- of

As examples Lawson cites Charles
Seller's

"equilibrium cycle," Walter Burnham'
(both apply to the Us),

"critical election"

s

and Dankwart Rustow's cycle in

Turkish politics. 43

The

party's

structural approach.

This approach studies the

formal organization and the role and
relationship

of the participants within the party "as these
are revealed
in recurrent patterns of actions."

for example,

is

examined.

did they get it, etc.?
of

The question of power,

Who has it,

at what

Lawson provides Ostrogorski

the British caucus system and Michels'

wiithin

social democratic parties

approach.

level,

Duverger also takes

as
a

'

s

how

study

study of power

examples of this

structural

approach

because of his emphasis on party organization and his
distinction between "mass" and "cadre" parties. 44

The behavioral

approach,

According to Lawson this

approach focuses on "the human actors who influence the
operation of parties, the acts they perform in the process,
and their attitudes and expectations in performing these

acts."

The party is not seen as an independent variable or

theoretical abstraction but instead as
variable,

a

a

dependent

product of human action and interaction.

Attention is focused on the membership
and leadership's
activities.
Rather than focus on one individual
this
approach tends to take one aspect of
human behavior (e.g.,
voting,

leadership, activism) and studies it
in the context
of a large number of individuals.
The behavioral approach
focuses on mid-level theory rather than
individual/micro
theory or general/macro theory.
This approach has been
applied to studies dealing with the US
(especially in the
area of voting behavior) more than those
dealing with
Europe.
The type of activity they may choose
to study,

example,

is

how voters may act in

a

for

given situation,

"the effectiveness of several party leaders in

a

or

particular

elective office such as the presidency." 45

The

functional-systemic approach.

The functional-

systemic approach is one of the more popular approaches to

the study of political parties.

This approach makes an

inquiry into "the relationship between the subject and its

environment

for the effect

one has on the other."

Lawson

names Almond and Coleman's studies on interest aggregation
as

an example of this approach.

portrayed

(e.g.

by Easton,

The party has often been

Huntington,

or

Sartori)

as

a

broker which acts as the intermediary facilitating the
exchange and comparison of political ideas.

Others have

studied why the same type of parties exist worldwide.

.

A common criticism of this
approach is that the
functionalists assume every structure
which exists within a
system performs a maintaining function
for the larger part.

has also been criticized for maintaining
the status quo
instead of trying to understand the change
which is taking
It

place in the world.

Lawson believes these criticisms can

be partly resolved by rephrasing the
types

this approach might take.
the

functions of this

political system)

(e.g.,

change,

(e.g.,

work?"

function does this

(e.g.,

political system)
self-regulate,

if

of questions

instead of asking "What is

party)

in making

that

they were to ask "What,

party)

(e.g.

if any,

reform in making that

operate as it does

(persevere,

perish)?" many of these criticisms

would be reduced. 46

The ideological approach.

This approach

the ideological nature of the party.

stand for?

focuses on

What dees the party

What tactics and strategies does it pursue, and

how important are they to the party?

Are

its

goals

short-term and pragmatic or long-term and ideological?

In

this category are works by party ideologues such as Lenin,
Mao,

or

(in the case of Portugal)

Typologies

from the simple:

Cunhal. 47

Lawson also discusses typologies ranging

Duverger'

s

"mass versus cadre party,"

s

Neumann's

"party of individual

representation"

as

contrasted with "party of integration,"
and Kircheimer'
"catch-all parties,";

to the complex:

Sartori's typology

of party systems.

These are discussed separately from
the
five approaches since typologies,
especially the

complex

draw from all five.

ones,

She sees typologies as the most

promising method of bringing together the
hundreds of
political parties with the five approaches. 48

Sartori:

F rom a General Theory to a Preliminary
Framework

As we have just witnessed from the survey of
political

party studies, the amount of literature which now exists at
all levels of analysis is voluminous.
Nevertheless,

according to Sartori the field
needs the most

-

a

is

still

lacking what it

general theory of political parties.

"...little has followed [Duverger] in terms of broad theory
building.
are

...the more we know about parties,

faced with

a

the more we

proliferation of threads and the less we

seem capable of pulling them together." 49

In attempting to

create the general theory which has been missing for so

long Sartori realizes that the

30

years

of

empirical

evidence is now massive.
but for what theoretical use?
I
tried hard
to substantiate the theory with the findings and,
Over and over
indeed, that added up to nothing.
.

.

.

again,

^^

my efforts were defeated by

^^ P1
rxp^s^i^n^^
expression, coercion,
0

system,

ideology,

at 0

"

a

conceptual

repression

structure, function
culture, participation'
e t0picS that
«• -uU?J

central to tn
centrai
the party topic.

As I
encountered
each encounter most of my time
and energy went into understanding
how the
concept was being used (extravagantly
or
fuzzily),
discussing it, and in having to
justify my own choice of meaning.
I
thus found
myself entangled to no end in preliminaries
miles away from the substance of my subject. 50 and

each of them,

at

m

The ultimate,

was

general theory which he intended to
create

transformed by these preliminary problems into

projected two- volume enterprise,

of which only the

a

first

one has appeared.
In

it,

there

is

a

framework for analysis devoted to

resolving the preliminary problems by focusing on the
fundamentals rather than trying to mold his theory around
the empirical evidence.
...

we have so much empirical evidence to reckon

with.

the task of pulling the threads
... starting from the empirical
evidence, appears by now unmanageable.
We are
thus left to hope that the task of theory
building can be managed the other way around,
from the fundamentals down to the particulars. 51
...

together

He

discusses and clarifies the issues relevant and

essential to the study of political parties.

He wades

through the dozens of definitions of the party and develops
the definition which he hopes will replace all others.

He

discusses the emergence of parties as well as their role in
a

modern society and provides what he believes

is

the

ultimate typology of party systems.

He

discusses the

difference between parties and party
systems and deals with
complex questions such as: Do one-party
nations have party
systems?
Do less-developed countries
have party systems?
If so, can their party systems
be compared with modern
ones ?

Although the first volume

not the general theory

is

which the field is so badly lacking, it is
nevertheless, an
important exercise which has paved the way for
a general
theory to follow.

Almost

a

decade later Sartori's promised

second volume has not yet appeared.

time it took to complete the

Given the amount of

first

volume and the

complexity of the subject this is understandable.

Should

the second volume appear we may expect his general theory

of political parties.

In

subsystem analysis as

a

it

he will

create mid-level or

bridge between

analysis" and empirical studies.

"whole system

Analyses of party systems

and especially party subsystems will be useful as the
building blocks for this bridge.

Sartori considers parties

to be the fundamental units of study.

crucial

Parties are brokers,

"intermediary structures between society and the

government."

Without them,

channelment of societies'

desires to the government would become extremely difficult.

All modern systems,
political parties. 52

including the dictatorial,

need

If

scholars

example,

follow Sartori's prescriptions

if only those

entities defined as parties by

Sartori are studied as such,

are party
theory,

as

if only those entities which

systems are studied as such)

then

a

if it is manageable by only one
individual,

facilitated.

(for

general
can be

The intention here is not to portray
Sartori

infallible.

Some may criticize his bias toward
modern

western democratic parties or his rationale
for excluding
Africa from his typology. His study may not
be
perfect but

it

is

the best, most complex,

and comprehensive to emerge.

For this reason this study of the PCP has been
coordinated,
as much as possible,

with his prescriptions.

Are Parties Necessary?

We discussed what

earlier.
necessary.

a

party is when we defined the party

Our next concern will be whether parties are
What role does the party play in society?

political systems function without them?
Sartori the answer is no,

wants to lock itself into
(if

According to

unless the nation in question
a

"pre-modern" state of existence

that is possible in today's interdependent world)

become

a

Can

military repressive regime which

is

or

anti-party.

As modernization increases even anti-party states tend to

become uni-party states to control society more

"

effectively. 53

He notes that the

"took

reaction to the failure and
alleged

over

in

first uni-party states

shortcomings of party pluralism, as in
Italy or Germany, or
in the face of a very fragile
and shaky beginning, as was
the case in Kerenski Russia. "54
Party pluralism emerges
with the extension of the suffrage
whereas uni-party states
emerge with the "political awakening and
activation of the
population at large." The result is a
politicized society
which "both takes part in the operations of
the political
system and is required for the more effective
performance
of the system.
"...it gradually came to be realized
that

the population at large could no longer be
side-stepped and

discounted

as

an

irrelevant entity. "55

Sartori's

"politicized society" is the combination of what is known
as

the

point

"mass
is

society" and the "mobilized society. "56

that the partyless polity

(whether parties

His

have

been suppressed or have not yet developed) cannot remain so
once the society becomes politicized.

contends that,

He

"The

larger the number of

participants the more the need for

system";

a

regularized traffic

the more the need for "channelment " and

which performs this function, the more the need for

a

party

a

party

which deals with the entry into the system of "mass
publics

.

No parties at all leaves

a

society out of reach,

out of control, [single party
states] need a
pervasively politicized society7 far
more than do
the pluralistic polities.
The one party claims
exclusiveness and is therefore acutely
confronted
with a problem of self- justification
and
••• the fistic polities
cannot
tVol'rt Tr
expect
to acquire legitimacy simply
with the
passing of time; they must show that
they can So
faSter
than the
svstem
?>f society must be P^ralistic
system
...the
mobilized,
persuaded, and asked for trustful,
if not
unconditional, dedication 57
.

'

.

The single-party state needs the party
not only to channel
but to "chain" its people through "compulsive
regimentation

and monopolistic regimentation" to make them
believe that
they are much better off with the one-party system
than the

multi-party system they either had or could have. 58

According to Sartori, among the major functions of the

party are "expression,"
"communication."

"

channe lment

"

as

well

as

All party polities with subsystem

autonomy have the "expression function."
a

,

"Channelment " is

function of all party systems except no-party polities.

All political systems have political "communication."

By

"expression" Sartori refers to the party's function as the

representative or "expressor" of the public demands.

If we

were to define the one-party system on the basis of its

expressive function we would find the party system to be

system of

free

(autonomous)

a

canalization in which

"expression prevails" throughout the political system over
repression.

A party-state system would be defined as

a

system of compulsory

(monopolistic)

canalization in which

"repression prevails" down the line
over expression.
One of the few similarities

which Sartori finds

between the party system and the
party-state system is the
channelment function.
AH parties serve the function of

"conductors"

(channelment or linkage)

conducting the societies' energies.

by capturing or

in a party system the

energy is transmitted to the government
while

in

a

party-state system the conductor captures the
energy and
diverts it according to orders received from
above.

Communication can take on

a

two-dimensional flow.

Messages from below (demands) can be passed on to
the upper
levels of society and messages from above (orders)
can be

passed down as directives to the bottom layers of society.
The

important distinction is communication

whom?

from whom to

Communication at the subsystem level keeps the state

under control while communication at the party-state level
keeps the citizens under control. 59
Expression, channelment, communication

crucial

roles which any modern political

parties to perform.

these are all

system needs

Other studies of the parties have also

focused on the roles of pluralism,
coercion,

-

participation,

mobilization,

representation,
or

linkage.

The

distinction is primarily one of terminology since these are
all encompassed by Sartori'

s

three roles. 60

26

Parties and Party Systems

We now know what parties are, why
they exist,

and how

they developed; but nations can have
several parties to
none.
How can we comparatively study such
distinct
political systems; what are party systems?

According to

Sartori,

although political parties can emerge with

limited suffrage

it

is

only with mass

suffrage by

a
a

substantial section of the community that the
party system
emerges.
The sequence of steps surrounding the
emergence
of such systems

is

not

clear or uniform but there

irreversible order for these three:
government

(as

1)

"reality" of elections,

as

a

subsystem.

3)

an

responsible

opposed to responsive government)

2)

is

61

the establishment of parties

Elections and participation alone without

constitutional and responsible government historically
could not result in the emergence of

a

political party

system 62
.

What is

a

party system?

It

is

the

"whole"

of which

political parties can only be "part" of or "subsystems."

According to Sartori the whole system
sum of its individual parts.

In

is

larger than the

order to have

a

healthy

party system there should not exist too much partisanship
and factionalism,

otherwise the parts could overwhelm the

whole and destroy the system or
one party could dominate
the whole.
For a system to succeed the
parties must
balance partisanship with impartial
governing, loyalty to
the party with loyalty to the
state, and party interest
with the general interest. 63
If as comparativists we are studying
party systems to
what extent can a one-party state in
which other political

parties are not permitted to compete, be
considered a party
system?
Can we compare it to a pluralist party
system? A

party system must "display properties that do
not belong to
a separate consideration of its
component elements."

A

party system also "results from and consists of
patterned

interactions

of

its

component parts

so

interactions are the boundary of the system."
Sartori,
First,

that

the

According to

the one-party system does not do either of these.

the description of the single party coincides with

the description of the

system.

Second,

the

"patterned

interactions that occur are not within but across the

boundaries indicated by the term party."

For

a

party

system to exist,

therefore,

exist within it.

A system results from the interactions of

inter-party competition.

autonomy by parties,

example.

more than one party must also

A party system allows subsystem

pressure groups,

A one-party

autonomy so it cannot be

state does not
a

party system.

or

unions,

for

allow subsystem
The parties

of

?

the party system are created
voluntarily at will by private

citizens,

membership

is

not

compulsory and there are
several types of organizations to
choose from.
The
one-party state does not allow voluntary
organizations.

lacks subsystem autonomy,

whereas

a

it

party system allows

party canalization to serve the
purposes of society,
recognizes dissent and institutionalizes
opposition.
Parties are instruments of expression in
the plural,

when only one is allowed they become
instruments
extraction.
Whereas the society shapes the

but

for

party in

multi-party system, the party shapes society in

a

a

one-party

state. 64

Whether or not the one-party state allows subsystem
autonomy it still continues to use the same techniques
and

organizational structures as parties do in multiparty
systems.

Can we ever expect to create a general theory of

political parties if we exclude studies of the numerous

one-party states

(whether

communist totalitarian,

authoritarian, or fascist)

Sartori provides

a

solution to this problem.

True,

the one-party state cannot be included in the category of

"party system" since it does not allow the free competition
of other parties and one party alone does not comprise

system.

The one-party state,

member of

a

system.

It

nevertheless,

is

still

a
a

is a miniature political system and

.

should be studied as such.

but is instead

a

it is not a "system of
parties"

"party-as-a-system.

"

The most accurate

label for the one-party state has
been provided by scholars
of the communist system - the
"party-state system."
it is
a system in itself.
The party is a duplicate of the
state;

whether the party controls the state
or vice versa
irrelevant

is

65

The Party:

A Miniature Political System

A study of parties and party systems must
include the
party subunit.
Analysis at the subunit level can
be

applied to the "party-state system" or to the
individual
parties which comprise party systems.
Studies which

focus

on only one party are important,

the

party's

especially if they include

relationship to the whole.

A

clearer

understanding of the parties which make up party systems
a

positive contribution to

a

is

general theory of parties.

Eldersveld states that the party is:

miniature political system.
It has an
authority structure. ...It has a representative
process, an electoral system, and subprocesses
for recruiting leaders, defining goals, and
a

resolving internal system conflicts.
the party is a decision-making system

Above all,
...

.66

An analysis of the party subunits can focus on each of the

individual elements which Eldersveld mentions under

"subprocesses."

a complete study of

might analyze the leadership role

a

particular party

(authority structure),

the decision-making process, the
representational aspect of
the party (whether it represents
the voters, the members,
or the leadership), and the recruitment
of its leaders,

cadres,

and members.

It

might

focus

on

the

issue of

intra-party democracy and power distribution
as Michels'
did or on the organizational aspect of
the party as
Duverger did.

Similar types of parties exist throughout the
world
(e.g.,

Christian,

Democratic,

Socialist,

Communist)

yet if

two parties of the same label but of different
countries
are compared, they are undoubtedly different.

Sartori,
"fractions"

the
or

According to

reason similar parties differ is the
"subunits" which exist within them. 67

party can have several types of sub-units.
familiar sub-unit is the "faction,"
organized body,

with

resulting." 68

thus

a

The most

"self-consciously

measure of cohesion and discipline

Sartori is very cautious of using the

term "faction" because it carries

type of factions,

a

a

connotation of the old

predecessors to the party, which are

still very much alive in Africa and Latin America.

the term faction carries with
and

a

The

degree of ambiguity.

specific power group."

To

it

To use

certain value judgments

Sartori

He prefers

a

to

faction is "a
use the term

"

"fraction" for the subunit which is

a

"general, unspecified

category."

Thus when he speaks in general
terms of the
subunits within parties he speaks
of
"fractions."

But

if

he focuses on a specific subunit
within a particular party,
that is a "faction."
The final subunit is the "tendency"
which is a "patterned set of attitudes"

rather than

specific power group.

The "tendency" is a subunit which
is

more diffuse than the fraction (e.g.,

tendency). 69

dimensions

Partie s may be

"the

f ract

organizational,

motivational, or the left /right
Therefore,

a

.

a

left or right party

ional i zed along four

the

ideological,

the

70

the party subsystem and its

subunits are

important units of analysis as complex as the party
system

itself.

Any general theory of political parties must

consider their role.

The Portuguese Communist Party in Comparative Perspective

The

study of parties and party systems has evolved

rapidly since the fifties.

Today studies abound at all

levels of analysis and from various approaches.
on the PCP takes advantage of these studies.

drawn from the

This work
One

lesson

literature is that specific studies and

general studies complement each other.

For the study of

political parties to be accurate it needs Micro, Mid-level,

and Macro theory; all three are
important.
This study,

focuses on only one political
party
Portuguese Communist Party.
Despite its

-

the

specificity,

an

awareness of its relevance to the study
of parties at all
levels of analysis is maintained throughout.

At the micro

level

a

detailed analysis of one of the most
important

participants in the Portuguese party system
is provided.
The research at this level clarifies the
tactics,
function,

and organization of the PCP which in turn,

interaction with other parties,

increases our knowledge of

the Portuguese party system as
systems in general.

through its

a

whole and all party

The analysis of the PCP's subunits not

only increases our knowledge of its internal politics
but
also provides an additional example of the significance
of

subsystem analysis.

By speculating on why the PCP is not a

Eurocommunist party this analysis contributes to theories

which focus on the emergence and success of communist

parties

in-

general and their possible consequences for

democratic systems.

Indirectly this discussion of the PCP

contributes to studies of "party-state systems" since
internally it is run as such and were it allowed to govern

the

"party-state system" would most likely be its model.

Remembering the importance of

parties,

a

general theory of political

Sartori's guidelines are followed and his

terminology is used as much as possible.

The Portuguese

.

party system is also integrated
into his typology of party
systems
This analysis of the PCP also
uses all five approaches
which Lawson discusses because each
one is important to

understand any party.

The historical approach will
be

drawn from in the search for the
origins of the PCP, its
evolution to 1974, and the determinants
of its strategy for
power.
Sartori may be correct when he states
that similar
parties throughout the world are different
because of their
internal fractionsVl (or in the PCP's
case its internal
tendencies); it is only by studying Portugal's
past that we

can

decide how and why those tendencies emerge.
Forecasting the PCP's future is impossible without using
the historical approach.

From

a

structural approach we will discuss the PCP's

formal organization.

How the party works

(according to its statutes)
determine if the PCP is

a

and in

in

reality.

"mass" or "cadre" party.

theory
will

We

We will

study the distribution of power within the party

-

who

holds it, how it is accumulated, how power distribution may
have changed with the party's transition from

a

clandestine

to a legal party.

From

a

Behavioral perspective we will focus on the

results of individual action.

How

activities he or she carries out,

a

leader leads,

what

the role of the cadres

.

and the members,

voters.

the role of the sympathizers

The three

leadership,

forms

activism,

and the

of party-linked behavior

voting

-

-

will be examined to

understand who is doing what and why.

m

using this

approach we will not be focusing on
the compilation and
analysis of large quantities of data
(partially because the
data is a closely guarded secret of

the

PCP

and

inaccessible)

but rather will use electoral results
to
measure the voters appeal for the PCP since
1974.

the

From the Functional-Systemic approach we
will examine
role which the PCP plays in the Portuguese

party

system.

How and to what extent does

it

fulfill the

functions which Sartori attributes to political
parties:
expression,

gets most
peasants,

channelment,

of

its

to what

and communication.

support

Since the PCP

form workers and landless

extent has it improved their lives?

To

what extent is the PCP expressing its members' views or is
it instead expressing its views through its members?

the Portuguese people have gotten more

Could

from the system

without the PCP acting as their "broker"?
From the ideological approach we will

tactics and strategy of the party,
short-term goals,
members

focus on the

examine its

long and

and study the ideological beliefs of its

(especially its leadership)

Each of the five approaches is relevant and essential

.

to the

study of political parties.
To take only one
analytical approach cannot do
justice to their complex
nature
This first chapter has placed the
analysis of the PCP
into the context of general political
party

and party

system theory.

To provide the setting for the
PCP,

the

next chapter will describe the Portuguese
political system.

36

Endnotes

1.

Feliks Gross,

The Revolutionar

Sociology of Polit ics
1974),

4.

Pg.

2-30.

Giovanni Sartori,

(Westport

Parties and pa rty Systems-

Framework For Analysis, Vol.
Press, 1976) ,
3-12, & 24.

1

(NYC

:

A
Cambridge Universityy

pg.

Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, Political par ties
5.
and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1966), pg. 6-8; Lipset and Rokkan mention the use of
the term "party" since Medieval Europe but never refer to
the emergence of the organization at that time.
It seems
they would consider its emergence (at least as national
parties) with the American Federalists and Democratic
Republicans.
Their own work on cleavages (conflicts) and
their translation into party systems also points to party
emergence beginning in the Eighteenth century.
Seymour M.
Lipset and Stein Rokkan, ed., Party Systems and Voter
Alignments:
Cross National Perspectives (NYC:
Free Press,
1967)
especially pg. 3-6; Apter clearly believes parties
began in the 1800s since prior to that time he only
discusses factions.
David E. Apter, "Introduction," (to
Section V - Political Parties) Eckstein and Apter,
Comparative Politics:
A Reader (NYC:
Free Press of
Glencoe, 1963), op. cit., pg. 327-332; Epstein offers a
lengthy discussion of the emergence of parties in Western
Democracies.
Although he clearly believes the US had the
first parties he does not provide a fixed date for their
emergence.
American parties may have begun as early as
,

37

*\^

U

P«t±e

Political

D UV
e
Pg xxii "^vii; Sartori, op. cit
12? V,P?ipg. 33 - 12,
LaPalombara and Weiner, op. cit
f
6_8;
pg
Epstein, op. cit., pg. 19-26.
" na
p'

-

;

ft

*

7.

Epstein, op. cit., pg. 19.

8.

Sartori,

9.

LaPalombara and Weiner, op. cit.,
pg.

op.

cit.,

pg.

22.
3.

Sigmund Neumann, ed., Modern Political
10
Parties
(Chicago:
University of Chicacfo Press, 195
by ther
h ° rS (e
Barker ^Almond,*
Merriam
MerrfaT & Gosnell, or ?Lasswell
ff & Kaplan)
see the citation
by Sartori, op. cit., n. 9, pg. 52.

^"

roSf

6T7~^^7F

Neumann, op. cit., pg. 395.

11.

12.
Rupert Emerson, "Parties and National Integration
in
Airica,
in LaPalombara and Weiner, op. cit.,
267-302
pg
Thomas Hodgkin, African Political Parties (London:
Penguin
African Series, 1961), pg. 15-16, 50 ff. For rejections
of
these organizations as parties see Sartori, op. cit.,
pg
43, 244-266; or LaPalombara and Weiner, op. cit.,
pg. 29.
_

13.

Neumann,

14.

Ibid

.

,

pg.

395.

15.

Ibid

.

,

pg.

3

op.

cit., pg.

370.

96.

The following authors also reject the communist party
16.
system as a system: Frederick C. Engelmann, "A Critique of
Recent Writings on Political Parties," in Eckstein and
Apter, op. cit., pg. 379 (and others citied in Sartori, op.
cit., n. 7, pg. 52; Austin Ranney and Willmoor Kendall,
Democracy and
the American Party System (NYC:
1955), pg.
"
84-87
According to Sartori a one-part6y state cannot be
considered to have a "system of parties" but it is a system
in itself, a party-as-a-system which he labels the
"party-state system." See Sartori, op. cit., pg. 42-47 (to
be discussed further below)
See Lipset & Rokkan, op.
cit., pg. 3-4, for a similar discussion.
.

.

See Sartori for a response, op.
oit., pg. 43, 244-266.

17.

F r

party

N
th; ir

F

cit
cit.,

cit., pg.

SfiM^L that

° thSrS

n0t Carefu11 nationalize
^

S

™yo

Rec ent Writings," Eckstein and Apter'op
cit
DUVerger ° P Cit
Pg XVi and sirtSri?

"

-

'

23.

'

'

op'.

>

Engelmann, op. cit., pg. 380.

Robert Michels,
r

1966), pg.

25.
pg.

63.

StUdieS See E ngelmann, op.
Z
^ Si Neil
T ?\A.theSQ
378-386;
pg. %i*
MacDonald, "Party Perspectives-

?it.' pg
23.

op.

.

Sartori, op. cit., pg. xi.

21.

S

oP

Sartori,

19.

%

f

s°e e

Political Parties

6.

(NYC:

Free Press,

For discussions of Michels see Engelmann, op. cit
and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Introduction" (to

380;

Michels), op. cit., pg. 15-39.
26.

Duverger, op. cit.

27.

Ibid

28.

For a brief reference see Engelmann, op. cit., pg. 382-383.

29.

Neumann, op. cit.

30.

Ibid

.

.

,

,

pg.

pg.

xiii.

4.

31.
Ibid., pg. 394-421.
Also see Engelmann for
discussion, op. cit., pg. 382.
32.

Duverger, op. cit., pg. xiii.

33.

Apter,

op.

cit., pg.

34.

Ibid

.

,

pg.

328.

35.

Ibid

.

,

pg.

330.

327-332.

a

brief

.

36.

Lawson,

op.

cit

.

,

pg.

4-17.

37.

Ibid

.

,

pg.

4.

38.

Ibid

.

,

pg.

5.

39

Duverger, op. cit., pg. xxiv-xxxviii

40

Lawson,

op.

cit., pg.

5.

discussion and

F°r

ciriticism of Duverger on this
(inStl t utional theory of party
development)
u ^ ment
see
T«P«?n
h
LaPalombara
and Weiner, op. cit., pg. 8-13.
i**.

+

,

>

42.

Ibid

43.

Lawson,

45.

Ibid

.

,

pg.

8-11.

46.

Ibid

.

,

pg.

12-14.

47.

Ibid

.

,

pg.

15.

48.

Ibid

.

,

pg.

16-19.

49.

Sartori,

50.

Ibid

,

51.

Ibid

.

52

.

Ibid

53

.

54

55

.

21-33.

pg.

,

op.

cit., pg.

op.

pg.

cit., pg.

x.

pg.

66.

.

pg.

ix.

Ibid

.

pg.

40-41.

.

Ibid

.

pg.

40.

.

Ibid

.

pg.

41.

pg.

52,

,

56.

Ibid.

57.

Ibid., pg. 42.

n.

6.

5.

66.

58.

Ibid

59.

Ibid ., pg. 27-29, 56-58

.

41-42.

pg.

,

Ibid
60.
See also Neumann, op. cit.,
pg. x.
pq 39- Kav
Lawson ed., Political_
Z
Comparative
Perspective (New Haven:
1
YaTe~UnT^eTs~
Pg
3; LaPalombara and Weiner, op. cit
pg

a^^

itVpT^^T^Y^

^

}

'

3

'

62

For the distinction see Sartori, op.
cit., pg. 18-21
Ibid
pg. 21-22.

63.

61

.

,

Ibid

.

,

pg.

63

64

Ibid

.

,

pg.

4

65.

Ibid..

^

4-4 7

66
Sa UQ
J Eldersvel d, Political Parties:
^ (Chicago:
Approach
Rand McNaliy, 1964), pg.
67.

Sartori,

68.

Richard Rose,

op.

cit., pg.

74.

69.

Sartori,

op.

70.

Ibid

,

cit., pg

.

pg.

cit.,

76-82.

pg.

l.

75.

"Parties, Factions,
February, 1964, pg. 37;

op.

.

A Behavioral

'

Britain," PS,

*

74-75.

and Tendencies in
quoted in Sartori,

CHAPTER

2

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PORTUGUESE
POLITICAL SYSTEM

In

this chapter we place the
analysis of the PCP in
the context of the Portuguese
political system.
Despite
the fact that the PCP is an
independent actor, it has an
impact on the rest of the political
system and is itself
affected by that system. As Stammen
emphasizes:

While it is true that the individual
political

party is

a

more or less independent

agent in the
political process of its country,
it
interacts with all the other parties in the also
same
political system in an interdependent way.

...The complexity of the situation suggests
that
is inadequate to study an individual
party in
isolation, that is, without considering its
position and role within this framework.
it
necessary to regard the various parties as isa
complex unit and to treat them as such, taking
into account the social, economic, and political
conditions.
This unit has to be considered as a
frame of reference, even if only a single party
or specific structural feature of a party system
is to be examined. 1
it

Therefore,
the political

to understand the PCP we must understand

system within which

it

acts.

Only after

establishing this basis can we accurately analyze the
tactics and strategies which the party follows.

Only then

can we uncover the significance of the PCP's existence
within the system.

To what extent is the PCP committed to

parliamentarian democracy?
other communist parties?

How does the party differ from
These and other questions which
41
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we focus on in later chapters
require this initial inquiry.

in this

chapter we examine the social,

economic,

and

political conditions which have
molded the Portuguese
political system in the past and
present.
We discuss
subgroups which play or have played
an important part
the Portuguese system (social groups
or classes such as
landed elite, military, church,
...).
this manner
present the setting within which the PCP
must

m

the
in

the

we

act.

Historical Background

Early history.

Portugal is one of the oldest and

geographically most stable nations in Europe.

history as

a

nation-state has led to

a

Its 800 year

high degree of

cultural unity so that today Portugal does not have
a
linguistic, racial, or religious minority of major

significance.
frontiers,

With one of the worlds most

stable

there has been hardly any change to its

boundaries since it became an Iberian nation.

Portugal's

past begins with settlements or invasions by various
peoples

.

Beyond the certainty that
there

is

little additional

it

did exist

in

Portugal

information concerning the

prehistoric southern Mediterranean Paleolithic culture,

3

whose roots
continent.

are thought to be based in
the Afri can
The first major settlements
to
succeed the

prehistoric tribes were those of the
Iberians around 3000
B.C.
The Lusitanians, a branch of
the Iberians, populated
the western most part of the Iberian
peninsula.
From
around 1200 B.C. the Phoenicians,
and by 800 B.C.

later the Carthaginians,

the Greeks explored the western
coast

search of trade.

Lusitania

(the early name

in

for Portugal)

provided very little interest for these early
explorers.
After 900 B.C. the Lusitanians were influenced

by various

waves of Celts migrating west from the Danube
(primarily in
northern Portugal and Galicia). 4

Until the Roman invasions

around

2 0 0

B.C.

the

Lusitanians continued to dominate the western part of
the

peninsula.

Even after the

invasions Roman settlers

preferred southern Lusitania to the northern regions.
Latifundios, large estates, became abundant in the Alentejo

and the Algarve while few Roman settlers ventured up
north.

5

With the fall of the Roman empire in the fifth

century A.D.

the Swabians,

a

kingdom in Western Iberia.

Germanic tribe,

created

Perhaps their major legacy to

Portugal was the system of agriculture they left
north

-

dispersed,

a

in

the

single small holdings which became ever

smaller from generation to generation as the land was
further divided among heirs.

6

To this day this pattern of

.

small

land holding

conservative,

remains

factor

in

the

anti-communist nature of the northern
and

central Portuguese peasant.

of small

ma in

a

The south continued to
consist

'nucleated villages'

and large estates

(this

structure would remain long into the
future providing the
PCP in the twentieth century with
a strong basis

of support
from the landless agricultural workers
of the Alentejo and
the Algarve)

The Swabians continued to control
Portugal until they

lost their autonomy to the Visigoths in
the sixth century,

who were in turn conquered by the Moors
beginning in 712
(by 715 they had conquered all of
Iberia except

for

Asturias).

Not until 938 A D
.

.

was the most northern of the

Portuguese provinces, as well as Spanish Galicia,
liberated
from the Moors and established as an administrative
unit of

Leon called Portucale.

The liberation was gained by local

counts who were left to their own methods and resources
to

end the Moorish occupation.

As a result they developed a

substantial degree of autonomy.

In

the years after King

Afonso VI of Castile-Leon presented Henry of Burgundy the
title to the counties of Portugal and Coimbra as dowry on
his marriage

to the king's daughter Teresa,

the counts

became unhappy with the increasing control which CastileLeon imposed on the counties.

Teresa's son,

As a result,

Afonso Henriques,

they convinced

to depose his mother and

rule in her place.

m

1128

Portugal emerged as an

independent nation under the rule of
Afonso Henrique
(Portugal's first king).

B y 1249 Afonso

III had succeeded

in

completing the expulsion of the Moors
and establishing
the present boundaries of Portugal.
Portugal's borders
with Castille were stabilized in 1295.7

During the Moorish occupation of
Lusitania the
landholding patterns of the north and south
continued.
Portugal's expulsion of the Moors did not
alter the basic

agricultural structures.

In the

south the crown and the

church merely redistributed the vast

latifundios to

aristocrats in return for services rendered during
the
conquests.
As far back as the thirteenth century
the

conditions which would later allow the PCP to develop

a

strong following in the Alentejo were already in evidence.
As historian Robert Rinehart notes,

The land was tilled by sharecroppers, by peasants
contracted to the land (though dependent serfdom
appears to have been rare) and, most numerously,
by wretched masses of itinerant rural laborers
who worked without the protection of a lord or a
manorial contract that would have regulated their
status and assured them of minimal rights. 8

Portugal returns to the sea

.

The privileged feudal

class did not have an interest in profit oriented pursuits
(mainly because it was war-like and parasitic)

,

a

partial

reason why Portugal remained underdeveloped and in many

ways became a colony of other
nations.
de Figueiredo

states,

9

The author Antonio

"...Portugal has been as much an

economic and political colony of
Britain as an intellectual
colony of France and a religious colony
of Rome... "10

By the

fifteenth century,

major European powers,

Portugal was already enjoying

strong sense of national unity;

civil

strife;

and

much earlier than other

it

it

was

was relatively

governed by

institutionalized government.

a

a

free of

strong

Since Portugal had firm

territorial boundaries its militaristic aristocracy
turned
its attention to the sea.
The focus became one of maritime
trade and colonization. 1 !

Because the sea-going ventures were state run

(and

very profitable with returns of at least 100 percent
profit

and often reaching between 400 and 600 percent),

12

the

profits went into the state coffers and were used by the
elites for extravagant life styles.

This was to be one of

the major reasons keeping the industrial

reaching Portugal.

The industrial

revolution from

revolutions of England

and the Netherlands were primarily financed by the middle
or

entrepreneurial classes.

In

Portugal the wealth was

never accumulated by these classes.

It

remained in the

hands of the elites who used the wealth to build expensive

churches and to purchase luxurious goods.
to

import these goods

•

They preferred

from outside rather than to inspire

their production «ithin Portuguese
borders.
sixteenth century Portugal began
to

By the

see a fall of profits

from the colonies.

The combination of a series
of bad
kings and the decrease in revenues
led to
serious foreign

debt problems. 13
As the last heir to the royal House
of Avi Z/ the death

of Cardinal

Henrique meant the simultaneous end
of

Portugal's royal line.

Because Philip II

best claim to Portugal,

and the most power to enforce it,

Spain had the

0f

for the next sixty years Portugal was
governed by him until
the Duke of Braganca declared its independence
in 1640.14

British support had been sought and received
by
Braganca during his struggle to restore Portuguese
independence.

The price,

however,

was

the

Methuen of 1703 which gave the Portuguese

duty on wine exports

in

return

restrictions on British imports.
a

for

Treaty of

a

preferential

the

lifting of

The long term result was

substitution of Spanish political domination for British

economic domination.

Because it could not produce enough grain to meet
domestic consumption, Portugal already had balance of trade
problems, and with increased British imports the balance of

trade worsened.

What

saved Portugal was the discovery of

gold and diamonds in Brazil.

Like the spice boom of years

before, the discovery allowed Portugal to ignore the causes

of its chronic balance of trade
problems.

Also similar to
the earlier spice boom was the
frivolous manner in which
the new wealth was spent.
it was quickly siphoned
off by
England in return for its exports.
A large
amount of the

new wealth was also used to fund
Portugal's baroque era. 15
The Methuen Treaty was a clear
hindrance to Portugal's
industrial development.
The end result was the "old
country's" transformation into a giant
sieve through which

Brazilian gold passed to help England
finance her
industrial revolution.

well

Portugal was left in the periphery

into the twentieth century.

Pombal's restoration period

(he

Even during Marquis of

governed the nation for

King Jose from 1750 to 1777)

little attention was devoted

to Portuguese development.

Through his authoritarian,

highly centralized government Pombal introduced the
Enlightenment to Portugal,

but even these

conditions did

not produce the middle-class Portugal would need to one day

take its place alongside the industrial nations. 16

The

liberal era

.

Until the nineteenth century,

Portugal remained free of the civil unrest and coups
against royalty which had occurred in many other nations.

From the 1820s on, however,

to

(ever since the crowns'

Brazil during the Napoleonic

flight

invasions and its

reluctance to return to Portugal after Napoleon's defeat)

8

the upper middle-class

and military elements
assumed
broader role in Portuguese politics.
Increasingly,

a

liberal

ideas such as democracy, equality,
and popular sovereignty,
began to infiltrate these emerging
political groups. while
the crown remained in Brazil the
English

General William

Beresford ruled the nation.

His

resistance against these

progressive ideas undermined the credibility
of the regime
since it was foreign as well as reactionary.
As a result,

liberals were able to muster wide-ranging
support since

their opposition was not only ideological
but also
patriotic.

A revolution in

1820

succeeded in driving

Beresford out of the country and marked the
beginning of
Portugal's modern political evolution.
These new power groups created

which limited the royal power,

a

17

Constitution in 1822

abolished the inquisition,

and expanded the suffrage to all but the illiterate

latter comprised about
women,

90

(the

percent of the population)

,

1

and friars in the biennial election for a parliament

independent of the crown.

The

drafters of the new

constitution wanted to limit the power of the crown, create
a

representative system,

"create

changes

a

rational,

insure individual rights,

unified legal system."

should not be mistaken for

Portuguese society to its roots.

a

and

The liberal

restructuring of
The

constitution

succeeded in compromising with the traditional forces by

maintaining
and,

a

monarchy that reigned

(yet

did not rule),

according to historian Olveira
Marques,

"preserving
the religious and economic
interests of the church, and
not
imposing social and economic reform
of the landholders."^
At this time,

however,

groups still provided

very small base upon which to
Liberalism was imperiled in Portugal

increase its powers.
for three reasons:

the liberal urban middle-class

a

first,

it represented only nine
percent

of the Portuguese population;

second,

the cities were the

centers of liberal strength and Porto and
Lisbon were just
about the only cities which existed; third,
the flood of
British imports continued to undermine domestic
commerce,

the mainstay of liberal strength.

could lead to the emergence of
independent,

The conditions
a

class of "economically

prosperous townsmen" who could support

democracy simply did not exist.

which

a

new

These conditions were

compounded by divisions amongst the liberal groups and
Brazil's declaration of independence. 20
The traditional

make

a

groups.

forces seized these opportunities to

comeback and rival the radical Jacobin and liberal
The comeback,

however,

was

short-lived since the

liberals ultimately became the victors in the 1832-34 civil
war against the traditionalists.

One consequence

of the

war was the seizure of large southern landholdings
bastion of conservative strength)

.

(a

A decision was made to

auction the property to help
pay the enormous debt incurred
during the civil war.
The result was the passing-up
of an

opportune moment in which to
implement a radical land
reform.
instead, as is so often the
case in Latin
societies, the latifundios of the
old church and
noble

elites were transferred to the liberal
upper and
upper-middle classes

(mainly to

industrialists) making them

did not

a

successful traders

new landed elite.

alter the squalid existence of the

peasants.

Neither did

it

or

The reform

landless

help to eliminate the debt as

intended since the land was purchased by
only 623 families
at below market prices with 60 percent
of the cost covered
by state^ credits.
The liberal class, therefore, was
to

become an avid supporter of the new regime since

it

was

responsible for its newly found elitist position. 21
The year 1851 saw

a

final realignment of the nation's

political structure to accommodate the recent class shifts.
With the collapse of the traditionalists the new political
order was dominated by financial and agrarian oligarchs and

their clients from the upper class and upper middle-class.
It was

during this period that factions, the precursors to

political parties,

factions,

the Regenerators and Historicists

Progressives),
"

first emerged in Portugal.

rot at ivismo

.

alternated in power under
"

a

These two

(later

called

system called

The difference between the factions was

based more on personal loyalties
or local interests than
on
ideological divisions.
After a government took
power

elections were held solely to

legitimize the new

government.

The elections were not
representative of the
general public since only one
percent of the public was
allowed to vote.
By 1880 the inequalities of
the system

were increasingly questioned by many
of the educated,
politically aware, and lower middle-class
elements
(especially the younger generation) who
were prevented from
participating. 22

Although industry
millionaires)

(as

well as the first Portuguese

was beginning to emerge,

economy still lacked domestic capital,
the raw materials necessary to

nation. 23
this day,
(e.g.

Agriculture,

skilled labor,

and

fully industrialize the

which continues to be backward to

had already been causing problems for some time

balance of payment problems,

food imports)

irrigation,
emigration,
yields.

the Portuguese

.

The rural

shortages,

areas

a

result of grain and

suffered from poverty,

lack of chemical

primitive techniques,

fertilizers,

and alarmingly low

Plots were too small in the north (minifundios) to

improve production through modern techniques.
latifundios of the south,

The

where modern techniques would

have worked best, were usually badly run.

Their owners had

little interest in investing to improve production since

they acquired the land as status
symbols. 24

Republicanism began to make inroads
through teachers,
journalists, small businessmen,
clerks and artisans.

1896,

rather late for

a

By

European nation,

these new
political groups were attracting
between 15 to 20 percent
of the population.
The Portuguese Republicans'
proposals

included "complete political freedom
and equality,
guarantees for the rights to associate
and strike,
separation of church and state, and the
elimination of most
indirect, regressive taxes. "25
The rota tivismo system was

increasingly imperiled as elitist solidarity
began to
weaken in the 1890'

s.

Lower middle-class radicals and the

Republicans took advantage of the situation and
were given
an

additional boost with the consolidation of the Third

French Republic

(1876)

monarchy in 1889.

and the overthrow of the Brazilian

Officially the Republican Party had been

created in 1880 but until the 1910 revolution it was

small

a

force drawing its support mainly from an urban

clientele.

Although not strong doctrinally,

federalism,

cooperat ivism, and social reform. 26

it

adhered to

Between 1896 and 1906 the system of rotativismo ceased

to

function as

smoothly as

it

had previously.

Disagreements between the two factions were publicized
rather than settled behind closed doors.

The complexity of

the situation increased as internal splits struck each of

^

the major

»

factions.

The

collapse of

"

r ot

at i vi smo

contributed to the unrest which
preceded the assassination
of King Carlos I and his
eldest son in 1 908 by radical
Republicans and left the monarchy on
shaky
ground.

m

1910

revolution led by the Republicans
with the support of
urban intellectuals and the lower
middle-class created the
first republic in Portugal and
the third in Europe
following the French and Swiss. The
republic was installed
with little opposition due to the
gradual transformation
a

which had been occurring within the
Portuguese system.

The

hierarchy in the military was neither
republican nor
authoritarian and allowed events to unfold.
The landed
elite were not very concerned since land reform
was not

republican goal.

in

short,

because the revolution which

overthrew the monarchy was not

elites

in

a

a

radical

revolution,

the

Portugal were not overly concerned with its

consequences

.

7

The instability which existed prior to 1910 continued

into the newly
personalism was

formed republic.
a

In

a

nation where

dominant characteristic of the political

system no strong leader emerged to head the victorious

Republican Party.

As with many other revolutions,

the

coalition of forces which helped the Republicans come to

power in 1910 quickly began to drift apart.

The vague

doctrine which held the Republicans together also allowed

its

varied supporters to interpret
the doctrine in

different ways.

Once the Republicans were in
power the
supporting groups realized that
their interpretation

of

Republican doctrines were contrary
to the Republicans'
interpretation.

After only one year the
Republicans had
split into three parties: the
Evolutionists, Unionists,
and

Democrats
'PRP'

(the

latter continued to use the
Republicans

initials and inherited its party machine). 28

One of

the major reasons for the split was
controversy over the

government's policies toward the church.

The more

conservative elements were unhappy with
government policies
which separated the Church and state, as well
as with other
measures taken against the Church.
(Figures show that
during this period of extreme suppression of the
church the

institution lost about ten percent of its priests.) 29

Parliament was dominated by intellectual classes
rather than business, worker, or farmer groups.
In
addition,
rejected

the government under the
a

1911

constitution

strong executive and decentralization of power

and opted instead for

a

strong legislative branch.

Because

the parties were plagued with divisions and disagreements,

focusing power on Parliament only exacerbated the
instability which the political system was experiencing,
leading in time to extremely unstable governments.
The economic and social underdevelopment did not help

the situation either.

radical party because

While the new prp was
considered
it

attacked the Church,

it

a

did not

attempt to widen the suffrage to
include women nor did it
help the underprivileged.
The PRP was a radical party
from
a social standpoint but
conservative from an economic one.
Its policies were designed to
benefit the urban lower
middle class that provided most of
its support.
The
radical left was unable to politically
organize the working
class which was spread over many small
industries
and was

more attracted to ant i -political
anarcho-syndicalist
leaders 30
.

The government's decree of 1913 decreased
the recently

expanded suffrage to only literate males
850,000 to only 400,000).

women

,

The decree continued to exclude

urban workers

demagoguery)

,

(who

and most peasants

the reactionary forces)
funds,

decrease from

were allegedly influenced excessively by
the

(who

church)

(a

were easily attracted to
(who were

manipulated by

Political instability,

.

limited

and urban politician neglect of the rural problems

meant that very little change or reform was initiated.

addition,

there was not

a

In

peasant party of illiterate

farmers since they did not have the vote.

The neglect and

instability spawned by the PRP allowed the conservative

elements in Portuguese society to accumulate power once
again.

Portugal still did not have parties

in

the real

sense of the term.

m

their place it had factions.

The instability which
dominated the nation compounded
by the PRP's treatment of
the military eventually l
ed to a
coup in 1917 under Major Bernardinio
Sidonio Pais.
The PRP
had tampered with military
affairs by not allowing members
of the military to run for
parliament and by increasing the
privileges of noncommissioned officers
and sergeants.
addition, upper-level officers
were unhappy with the PRP's
decision to enter WWI while militarily
unprepared. 31

m

Sidonio Pais sought to

usher in a semi-authoritarian

system with the parliament subordinate
to the executive.
He made the PRP illegal and
increased

the role of the

monarchist,

religious,

conservative but not

and business
a

groups.

was

It

a

traditionalist regime which

maintained many of the trappings of the republic.

Portugal

returned to universal suffrage which was included
in the

constitution of 1911 but had been restricted
literate males only.

the upper-class,

Increasingly Pais was

military,

students,

new regime was integralist,
opposed to liberalism,

doctrines which denied God,
traditional concepts.

The

the

1913 to

supported by

and landowners.

traditional

individualism,

in

The

and strongly

socialism,

family,

and other

and

other

integralist movement which was

founded in 1910 was one of the first signs of

backlash against republicanism.

a

right-wing

.

Pais'

assassination in 1918 by

a

radical corporal was

followed by the second republican
regime whrch lasted until
1926.
This regime was extremely
unstable, perhaps even
more so than the first republican
regime which Pais
replaced.
Even though the Democratic Party
continued to be
the largest party during the
republican era it was plagued
with internal divisions which
prevented it from governing
effectively.
Frustrated with their inability to
alter the

floundering political system by legal
means,

rival

republican parties increasingly turned
to violence and
unlawful measures to resolve the dilemma.

became common,

Assassinations

especially by secret societies such as
the

Carbonaria
That Portugal had four governments in 1919
and nine in
1920 are good indicators of the instability which
affected

the regime.

By the

1

920'

s

even urban professional and

middle-class elements were abandoning the parliamentary

system.

Abstentions in parliamentary elections became
increasingly common as voters tired of the political
deadlock and extra-parliamentary violence.

Meanwhile the

PRP's dominance of electoral votes prevented successful

reform movements from either the

right,

left,

or center.

As Republicans from all parties became frustrated with both

the party system and the violence, they retired from public

life.

In

their place they left mediocre,

incompetent

successors often more concerned
with their own political
careers and monetary gain through
corruption than in the
welfare of the nation.
They accumulated giant
fortunes
while the nation was left to
flounder.
Lat i
fundistas,

professionals,

bankers,

merchants,

and industrialists

pursued their own independent goals
yet never gained enough
power to govern on their own.
The groups knew of their
need to reach a solution above
factional
interests,

were unable to reach one. 32

The response was

^

yet

emergence

of several progressive governments
after 1923 which led to
a rise in conservative
opposition.

Whereas previous

governments only fought over the spoils of
government,

the

new progressive governments actually
contemplated
implementing broad-reaching reforms of the
agricultural
sector, of education, of the banking system,

of the tax

structure, and of social welfare.

The Seara Nova group and

the Leftist Democratic Party especially fit
of progressive parties.

into the mold

These were parties which were

committed to their beliefs rather than groups

of

individuals more interested in their own personal
motivations.

These committed parties,

however,

lacked the

parliamentary majorities which were necessary to implement

their programs and provided the

fragmentary

counter-revolutionary forces with the common foe needed to
fuse them.

Up to this time the Right had not been able to

unify because of the monarchist
question.

Once the
regeneration of the monarchy was
dropped as a goal even the
middle-classes were attracted to the
Right. 33
The new radical rhetoric lost
republicans the support

of conservative groups

and

(clergy,

capitalists,

portion of the middle-class)
proposed transformation as too fast.
a

landowners,

who regarded the
They also lost the

support of radical intellectuals and
workers who saw the
evolution as too slow.
They wanted more action and
less
talk.
Upper and mid-ranking civil servants
(including the

military) were displeased with post-WWI
inflation which had
decreased their real salaries by 50
percent.
Bankers,

merchants,

and industrialists were displeased with
high
taxes, economic crises, and the emergence
of socialism
and

anarchism.

reinstate

The

its

clergy favored

lost

influence.

a

regime which would

The

conservative

intellectuals became disenchanted with Republicanism and
looked instead to fascism.
Even the middle and lower
classes of Lisbon and Porto, the Democrats' greatest basis
of support,

were tiring of the constant coup attempts,

street violence,

and interruptions of daily life.

Neither

could the Democrats expect support from the peasants nor

the women for while they comprised two thirds of the
Portuguese population they were extremely conservative and

beyond the PRP's reach.

According to Oliveira Marques,

.
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fascism. 34

aitterent

-

Th *t

something was

As we have seen, the sixteen
years of Republican rule
were as unstable as the final
years of the constitutional
monarchy.
strikes were legalized and became
common affairs
as workers attempted to keep
their wages on par with
inflation which increased 2800 percent
from 1911 to 1923.35

Governments under the republic were short
lived averaging
one every four months (45 governments,
seven parliamentary
elections, and eight presidential elections
were held
during this period)
Political violence, involvement
.

WWI,

budget deficits,

in

bread shortages,

backward agricultural sector,

capital flight,

a

and currency devaluation

added to the instability and to an increasing
unhappiness
with the republican regime.

As time progressed the regime

became decreasingly able to deal with the instability.
found itself isolated.

It

By 1926 a large part of Portuguese

society acquiesced to the need
non-republican solution.

for

a

right-wing,

A general unhappiness with the

Democrats began to infiltrate all sectors of Portuguese
society

The

decrease in liberal democratic
values was
accompanied by an increase in
the formation of
anti-parliamentary groups, most of
which succeeded

in

recruiting the young and drew
heavily from French rightist
ideas.
The upper-bourgeois youth
and the military were
especially drawn to authoritarian
and

integralist

solutions.

Even the press began attacking
liberal

democracy and gave favorable coverage
to the Italian and
German solutions.

more popular.

Calls

Although

for a military coup became
ever
a

military coup failed in 1925

a

second coup attempt in 1926 succeeded
in ending Portugal's
first experiment in liberal democracy. 36

Salazar's "New State"

The coup,

bloodless one.
catholics,

As

as

in the

1910 and 1974

Republicans,

revolutions,

monarchists,

integralists,

and nationalists supported the military's move.

liberal measures were eliminated,

the military regime

led by General Oscar Carmona became more
Initial

was a

repressive.

support came from the public at large which hoped

that authoritarianism would lead to stability and economic

recovery.

The coup leaders seized the reigns of power from

the middle-classes and returned them to the upper-class

conservatives.

Not

since the early liberal era had the

upper classes amassed so much
power. 37
in

1926 political parties which were

involved in an

attempted military coup were made
illegal.
addition the
right to strike was withdrawn.
The economic problems in
Portugal continued as the military
was not experienced in
economic management.
Economic conditions deteriorated
to
the point where many compared
the crisis to the worst
periods of the republic. By providing
Professor Antonio de
Oliveira Salazar with broad budgetary
powers the military
was able to recruit him to manage
the economy.
His
solution was to trim the budget by
cutting the benefits to
the lower and middle-class groups.
The level of military
spending remained untouched despite
bureaucratic

m

waste and

a

23.42 percent share of the budget. 38
By 1930

the military and Salazar had succeeded
in

returning political stability to the nation.

That

same

year Salazar proclaimed the formation of the
National Union

party which would become part of his

"new

state."

Corporatism would replace the political parties,
unions,

a

free press,

and other organizations.

to be focused on the executive.

trade

Power was

The values of God,

family,

and the nation would be given the highest priority.

Change

would be controlled.

Corporatism would be the Portuguese

solution to alien radical transformations such
socialism,

liberalism, or communism.

as

According to Political Scientist
Howard Wiarda
The corporative tradition
implies a
based upon widespread acceptance
Y
elitism, organiclsm, and authority.of
it means a
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and functional
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decision making. 39
In

theory,

social unrest would end since the
"corporation" would represent the clergy,
military,
students, workers, employers, and all other
groups equally.
The central government would guarantee
a

coexistence to all.

in

harmonious

reality the government was biased

toward the employers and traditional elements at
the
expense of the lower classes.

solution towards harnessing,

As a result,

taming,

the Portuguese

and manipulating

radical change failed because the lower classes realized
the government was not mediating between contending classes

but was

instead using corporatism to favor the upper

classes 40
.

Most of Salazar's support in the early years came from

.

"

the Church and other groups
that had the mos t to gain
under
the new regime.
His opposition came primarily
from the
middle and lower classes.
1933, Salazar quickly began
to set-up the formal structure
of his "new state" by
creating a new constitution.
Although basic civil rights
were included, they were nullified
by a clause allowing the
state to restrict them when necessary
for the "common
good.

m

In

1933 all political parties were made
illegal,
including the conservative Catholic
Center party.
The
government was anti-political party.
Because parties were

blamed as the source of Portugal's past
ills, even its own
National Union was considered more of
a
civic association

or movement than a party.

did not allow

a

The structure of the government

very large suffrage.

In

fact,

only 7.8

percent of the population was allowed to vote in
the 1945
elections.
Women did not get the vote until 1968
and even

then there were still many restrictions

imposed on both

sexes

A comparison of Salazar'

s

dictatorship with German or

Italian Fascism shows that Portugal was not
state.

Despite Salazar'

s

anti-communism,

Portugal's dictatorship was not

violent as theirs.

fascist

sharing views with Hitler and

Mussolini on authoritarianism,
hierarchy,

a

as

and

harsh or

One reason is that the Portuguese were

easier to control.

Portugal was primarily comprised
of a
peasant population which was highly
Catholic, politically
unaware, socially quiescent and
conformist in its general
cultural view.
Therefore, large scale coercion
was not
necessary, except in the industrial
sector. 41
in the

early 1900'

develop communist

Portugal was just beginning to
and other radical parties which
had
s

existed in other parliamentary systems
much earlier.
the parties were mainly city oriented,
it

Salazar to dispose of them.

Since

was easy for

Any political instigators

which remained were from the Right and
were eventually
coopted into the system as members of
elite conservative
groups.
Therefore, intervention at all levels of
society

was not necessary,
regime.

allowing for

Portugal never created

a

and Salazar was anti-party anyway

an

low-key authoritarian

a

mass-based fascist party
(his

"association" or non-party).

National Union was

The historian,

Tom

Gallagher seems to think that Portugal compares better with
the 1934 Dolfuss regime in Austria than with Germany
or

Italy.

The "New State" was not fascist but paternalistic,

traditional, and conservative. 42

According to the political scientist Thomas Bruneau,

Salazar'

s

reign

must

be

categorized

as

a

"clerical-conservative" or "corporatist-authoritarian" one.
It was a "conservative and authoritarian regime of personal

rulership."

Salazar purposefully sought
to keep Portugal
underdeveloped.
He used press censorship,
controls on
foreign investment, and other
measures to prevent foreign
influences from infiltrating
Portuguese society.

m

this

manner he hoped to prevent change
or at least retard it to
a pace which he could manage. 4 3
By the late

political

fifties and early sixties
economic and
factors (for example, the African
wars) led

Salazar to initiate measures which
ran contrary to his
"isolationist" policies.
By allowing an increase

in

foreign investment

and joining the European Free
Trade

Association and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade
he was planting the "seeds of change"
which would help
bring about the inevitable transformations
he had hoped to

avoid. 44
In

1968

Salazar suffered an incapacitating stroke.

His successor, the scholar Marcello Caetano, was
rhought to
be

somewhat more liberal.

Changes were expected to bring

Portugal closer to the rest of the European community as
it

distanced itself from dependence on

a

colonial empire.

With time the "seeds" which Salazar had planted began to

sprout.

The

increased foreign investment made Portugal

more sensitive to changes in the world economy.

Foreign

investment increased from 1.5 percent in 1960 to 27 percent
in

1970,

inflation reached the double digits by the early

seventies,
increased.

and unionization

and

labor unrest

also

Emigration,

which for years had solved
the
governments inability to deal with
underemployment and
unemployment, began to have unwanted
repercussions. Not

only did the emigrants return
with the desperately needed
foreign currency but they also
brought undesired foreign
ideas and values which spawned a
desire for change.
since
the change which had been expected
of Caetano never took
place the tension mounted. 4 5
In

1974

officers,

a

military coup was carried out by
mid-level

reflecting their own grievances.

Given the

widespread dissatisfaction with the
Salazar/Caetano
dictatorship,

into

a

popular support

revolution.

soon transformed the coup

A brief summary of the major changes

would include:
1)

2)
3)
4)

5)
6)

the break up of the colonial empire,
the governments increased involvement in the
economy,
the emergence of political parties,
an increase in labor rights and PCP domination
of
unions,
a reorganization of local governments,
a limited agrarian reform.

Of these six changes Bruneau considers only the first
to be

irreversible;

the others could still be altered depending

on the political situation of the future. 46

Because in this chapter we focus on variables which
form the basis of the Portuguese political system, we will

discuss events which occurred
after the 1974 revolution
in
later chapters. 47

The Portuguese

From these historical sections
we should get an
understanding of the Portuguese
political system.
dealing with one of Europe's oldest
states.

We are

We are

also
dealing with one of the most homogeneous
people in Europe.
Today Portugal has a population of
approximately ten
million people. A very proud people who
are proud of
their

past,

their culture,

and their

empire.

The

"Fado,"

literally interpreted as "fate," is one
of the musical
forms unique to Portugal.

It helps convey the Portuguese's

obsession with their past.

The "Fado" portrays in song "a

kind of melancholy longing,

intermingled with sadness and

resignation. "48
existence,

Most Portuguese have always led

a

harsh

yet rather than look to the future and hope for

better times they look instead to the past when Portugal
was

a

powerful nation with possessions encompassing the

globe. 49
areas,

It

is

not uncommon,

to hear peasants exclaim,

still here.

especially in the rural
"But

that Salazar were

Things were never this bad under him!"

Why

the majority of the people would long for the past is

ironic because even during Portugal's "Golden Age" the

general public struggled to
survive.
benefitted the agrarian maj orit

The wealth never

y nut was

instead squandered

on the extravagant lifestyles
of the aristocracy.

Keefe notes that in addition
to pride the Portuguese
are very "family oriented,
generally apolitical, basically
conservative and individualistic ...
intensely patriotic
but not public spirited. ...
phlegmatic but not practical
in ... public attitudes."
Because of the hard life which
the Portuguese have always led
they tend to be more
concerned with survival rather than
politics. 50
The Portuguese overall

people.

are a socially conservative

Their views are more often

a

result of tradition

than an awareness of conservative ideals.

On the whole we

are dealing with an extremely religious
Catholic people (95

percent catholic,

although significantly

practicing Catholics)

important

role

.

influence in politics,
until the late 1700'

s

are

The church has always played a very

Portugal either through

in

less

education,

a

strong

and colonial policy

(up

and during the Salazar dictatorship)

or as the object of criticism and repression

(from the late

1700's to the early 1900's). 51

The society tends to be male-dominated with women
still delegated to an inferior position.

rights are slowly increasing,
the system.

Although women's

many inequalities remain in

Among the most conservative are the peasants

of the

rural agricultural

regions

(especially tn the

north,

For centuries all govern m
ents, regardless of
their
position in the political spectrum,
have neglected these
.

regions.

Insufficient peasant education,

traditional

land-holding patterns,

and religion are all factors
which
help explain the peasants'
conservative nature.
T he

Portuguese are hardworking people.
best job possible at all times.

They strive to do the

They are a people who are

still

strongly attached to the family
both nuclear and
extended.
Parents will go through extreme
hardships to
help provide their children with
a better
life than the one

they have known.
One of the few keys open in the
search for a brighter
future has been emigration.
Emigration for any people is a

difficult choice for it usually means families
will suffer
long periods of separation at worst (if only
the male

emigrates and sends back money)
assimilation at best

(if

or a difficult period of

the entire

family emigrates).

Assimilation usually carries with it the traumas of dealing
with

a

new culture,

discrimination,
the host nation.

learning

a

new language,

tolerating

and accepting jobs rejected by citizens of
It is not an easy process.

Certainly one

cannot ignore the plight of the emigrant which has become
part of Portuguese culture.
face its unemployment

(by

a

Emigration has helped Portugal

providing an escape valve) while

simuitaneously creating a new
source of foreign currency
(through emigrant remittances,
to camouflage its
chronic
balance of payments problems. 52

Regional Diversity

Despite the homogeneity of
Portuguese society,
observers should not conclude that
Portugal lacks
diversity.

territory

indeed,

for its mere

35,510 square miles of

(which includes the Azores and
Madeira)

has a great deal of diversity.

Portugal

The homogeneity stems from

the strong nationalism which all
Portuguese feel for the
patria (homeland).
The diversity is a result of the
various landforms, climatic conditions,
and
soils

which exist in this small nation.

division in continental Portugal

is

Although the major
between the northern

mountainous region and the southern rolling plains
there

is

also variety within these two main topographical
divisions 53
.

The North

.

The Minho,

which occupies the northwest

corner of the country between the Rio Minho and the Rio
Douro is one of the most densely populated regions of

Portugal

(see

figures

1

and

2)

.

favorable with abundant rainfall

The

climate is very

supporting the most

.

intensive agriculture

in

the country.

Centuries of
dividing the already small
land-holdings in the Minho
among
heirs (a tradition dating
back to the Swabian
settlers of
the fifth century) has resulted
in plots so small that
they
are barely large enough to
support
even only one heir.

the

m

last

few centuries this has
resulted in a "newertradition whereby the oldest son
inherits the land while
his younger brothers forfeit
their right to the property
and seek their livelihood elsewhere
even though
by law they

are entitled to their inheritance.

The minuscule plots of

the Minho have

led to the emigration of
landless males
primarily to foreign nations but also
to other

regions of

Portugal

The

northeastern most region

Tras-Os-Montes,

is

an arid and very poor

of

Portugal,

region.

it

is

sparsely populated since the land is not as
capable of
supporting the intensive agriculture which the
Minho
supports.
The harsh life has added to the sparse
demographic figures as the young have chosen to emigrate
in
search of

a

better life.

The Beira region encompasses much more territory than
these two other northern regions.

It

includes all of the

territory south of the Rio Douro, north of the Rio Tejo,
and west of Spain.

three sub-regions:

The Beira region is itself divided into

Beira Alta,

Beira Baixa,

and Beira

Literal.

Its

Of the three, Beira Baixa
is the least populated.

topography resembles the arid,

Tras-Os-Montes region.

wind-

swept

Both of the other sub-regions
are

very fertile and harbor

a

large concentration

of

population 54
.

These northern regions are amongst
the most populated

of Portugal.

Although they are diverse they
are also

similar enough to be distinguished
from southern Portugal.
Poverty is prevalent in the north
as in the south but at
least most peasants own their own
plots of land, no matter
how small, from which they can farm
a self-sufficient

living.

This

self-sufficiency combined with strong

catholic beliefs are major factors behind
the conservatism
of the north.

The north has

also suffered the most from male

emigration so that today women outnumber men.
It is neither
uncommon to find many unmarried women nor to find
more

women integrated into the work force.
figures are unusually high.

The

emigration

When computed for the nation

as a whole Portugal lost 1,033,000 of its people
from 1960

to

1970

1970

resulting in

census. 55

In

a

net

loss of 226, 140 people

in

its

the north social cleavages are not

apparent among the poor.

The basic class

structure is

a

division between the small elite groups which hold most of
the wealth,

a

small middle-class, and the rural peasant

.

Figure
Source: Eugene K.
(Washington: U.S.
xiv

Portugal.
Keefe et al

Districts, 1976
Area Handbook For Portugal
Government Printing Office, 1977)
pT

1.

.

,

,

Figure 2. Portugal.
1933 Provinces
Source: Eugene K. Keefe et al., Area Handbook For Portugal
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977)
P. 62.
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which makes up the largest
group. 56

—

S

°"thern Portugal Is made
up of

a

topographical area remarkably
different from that in
the
north.
The Alentejo, some
divide it between the
(Upper, and Baixo <Lo„er,
Alentejo,

Uf

is

large region of
gently rolling hills which
rarely rise above 600
feet.
It
is sparsely populated
and, l ike the topography,
land
holding patterns are radically
different from the north
While land distribution in
the north has centered
on small
Plots ever since Swabian settlements,
the large estates of
the south can be traced to
the Roman conquests.
The
Alentejo is dominated by large
estates comprising up to
1,000 acres, although the revolution
ushered in a partial
land reform which has since
transformed into cooperatives
some of the larger estates.
These latifundios are
a

often

owned by absentee landlords.

As a result most of the

inhabitants of the southern region are
landless and provide
an abundant source of agricultural
labor.
Unlike their
northern counterparts who emigrated abroad
to seek a better
life, most southerners migrated to the
cities instead.

The Algarve,

the other southern region,

still shows

strong Moorish influences as it was the
last of the
Portuguese regions to be liberated from the
Moors.
Compared to the Alentejo the Algarve is less hilly
and more
of a coastal plain. 57

Politically the south has
when

spared

a

long history of
radicalism

to the conservative
north.

This is partially
result of the landless
existence of southerners.
Most
are totally dependent on
the local landowner
for their
existence and would have very
little to lose if radical
change was initiated.
Every day they worx for
the local
latifundista reminds them of
the uneven distribution
of
wealth.
Even within their own class
the southern poor have
an established hierarchy.
Those who own land have
the
highest prestige, next come the
sharecroppers, at the
bottom are the landless laborers.
In the north the poor
are all "equally" poor.
a

Religiously the south is the least
pious of Portugal.
Illegitimacy, which is common in
the south, is a crude

indicator since the religious peasant
of the north would
rarely allow a child to be born in
such a state (although
in many instances the reason
for illegitimacy is that the
poverty of the landless peasant is so
great that he often

is unwilling or cannot spare the
sum necessary to pay for a
civil ceremony). 58

Therefore,

despite Portugal's small size,

diversity exists and has

Although poverty exists

a

regional

strong influence on politics.

in the

north as in the south,

at

least northern peasants have enough land to
remain self-

sufficient.

The northerners access to property is

a

major

reason behind their
conservative nature.
The southerners
on the other hand, have
been totally dependent
on the sail
of their labor which
has mad e the m muo
h m0 re radical.

Also
important, northerners
migrated oversees while
southerners
migrated internally to the
cities adding to the
radicalism
the labor force.
This helps explain why
the PCP's
regions of strength are in
the
<-ne indn^ri,,
industrial zones and in
the
latifundio south.

m

Social Structure

Portuguese social structure
survived the centuries
with few changes in the class
structure.
Keefe emphasizes,
"ironically the very stability indeed the stagnation - of
Portugal's social structure may well
have been a product of
the country's homogeneity."
At the time of the 1974
revolution the class structure was
still comprised
of a

"small,

class,

wealthy upper class,
and

a

massive,

a

some what

predominantly rural lower class."

The major change has been the
expansion of
an

larger middle

increase in the middle class,

a

working class,

and minor changes in the

upper class. 59

Prestige,

political power,

and economic success in

early Portugal was based on land ownership.

m

the

traditional social structure an elite group made
up of the

aristocracy,

^

the military,

and the church
contrQlled
wealth through land ownership
while the vast raaj orit
y of
the population remained
in poverty.
This social hierarchy

continued until the
mid-eighteenth century when
the
traditional elitist groups
were joined by a small
rae rchant
class which had accumulated
enough wealth to take
advantage
of and purchase the lands
seized from the church
and

aristocracy under the Pombaline
"land reform."

m

,

reshuffling of the elite classes
did not improve the
peasants'

lot.

Even with

a

newly emerging middle class
of

mercantilists and professionals
population)

(nine percent

of the
the poor peasant classes
comprised 88 percent

of the population while the
elites

bourgeoisie,
percent

.

and clergy)

(aristocracy,

dominated with

a

new

mere three

60

Although the rest of Europe faced
considerable
upheaval during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries,
Portugal managed to remain unscathed by
the new ideological
currents emerging beyond the Atlantic
and Pyrenees.
The
peasants were ignorant of the changes occurring
outside of
the nations' borders, while the middle
classes were too
weak to carry out similar social change.
The major
change

in the class structure during the
liberal era was a result

of

changing land ownership patterns

as

mercantilists

purchased additional property seized from the clergy
and

aristocracy and climbed the
social ladder.
C
" ere alS

"°"

°

°«

Many of the

so that the peasants

conditions actually deteriorated
rather than
At the turn of the

i mproved

.

twentieth century the
class

structure re ra ained basically
the sa me
The working class
was still relatively small.
With the ad(Jltion Qf
nouveau riches elements and
the fall f rom grace
of the
clergy and aristocracy, the
elitist classes declined
to
about one percent of the total
population while the middle
class increased to 15 percent.
percent
T h 0 majority
The
of the
population were still poor peasants. 61
.

^

Salazar's dictatorship did little
to remedy the plight

of the peasant.

Since he realized that much
of his
strength lay in the rural,
conservative peasant he had
little interest in educating and
otherwise inspiring change
which might produce an unwanted side
effect - disaffection

with the regime and

a

class consciousness.

Salazar

believed strongly in the "traditional"
model of organizing
an economy and society based on birth.
He believed that
God had given him "the privilege of
being poor" and that
"education, health, and economic reform
'would
not

happiness'."

create

Given these beliefs it is easy to understand

why Salazar tried to prevent change in
Portugal.
The

industrial pace under his leadership was much

slower than that in the rest of Europe.

By the Sixties and

.

Seventies studies had
determined that the sociai
structure
had changed very Uttie
in the previous
century.
The upper
class still com p ri sed only
one percent of the
population
while the middle class
co mpr ised 15 to 25
percent
The
bul, of the Portuguese
were still in the
hotter, layer of
society.
industrialization contributed
to an increasing
.

urban proletariat,

but the major change
was
emergence of an upper-lower
class of clerks,

in

the

lower-level
civil servants, and others
who lived just above the
poverty
line 62
in the years prior to the
revolution the very small

elitist class recognized the
potential threat to its
interests from the rising
lower-middle

class and working

class.

it

tightened its grip on its exclusive
social

position through interclass marriages.

As a result,

at the

time of the revolution the
elites were the largest
landowners, the directors and owners
of the largest
industries, the high-ranking government
officials,
the

leading financiers,

the senior military officials,

members of the Catholic church hierarchy,

professors,

and the professional elites

medical professionals)

.

the

the university
(top

lawyers and

Eighty percent of the economy was

controlled by only eight of these elite families.
Upward
mobility was almost impossible except through
education
which was virtually inaccessible to the lower
63
classes.

to define and describe.

Compared to the middle
class in
other nations it was very
small and encompassed
,
range of income groups if
defined broadly.
The traditional
middle-class was made up of
small-scale entrepreneurs
those in the professions,
and university teachers
below the
level of professors.
On the whole this
class was
better-off than the mass of
the population and found
its
interests closer to the upper
classes.
Beginning with the
industrialization and urbanization
of the 1960<s and

^

1970's

a

lower-middle class began to emerge.

This new class was

composed primarily of skilled
technicians, clerks and
employees in the service sector,
mid-level business
executives, schoolteachers, lower
to mid-level
civil

servants,

small-businessmen, and medium-sized
landowners.
The 75 percent remainder of the
population considered

to be

lower class

lacked

a

mutual bond or class

consciousness to bind it together.

As mentioned previously

the lower classes can be divided
into several types:

small

landholding peasant

(mainly in the north),

the

the

peasant with limited or no access to the
land (mainly in
the south), and the urban worker. In
the northern rural
areas the lower classes owned very small
plots
of land

percent of the farms were less than

4

(78

hectares), and little

social differentiation was apparent within the
class.

In

.

the south the poor were
divided i„ t0 different
SQcial
categories dependent on
their aocess to land
with the
landless peasant at the
bottom
of the scale.
The urban
worker was the third group
which comprised the
lower
64
classes
With the decolonization,
Portugal had to face the
mass
return of 800,000 Portuguese
refugees fro, the colonies
The "retornados", as they
were called in Portugal,
became
both an economic and a political
burden.
The new pressure
group was resentful, angry, and
frustrated. For years they
had been encouraged to
emigrate to the colonies.
Like
their counterparts who left
Portugal for Europe or North
and South America, they had
gone in search of a better
life.
Whereas other emigrants had something
to

show for
all their labor the retornados
now had only the shirts on

their backs.

Both struggled,

yet the retornados were

looked down upon by other emigrants
and by those Portuguese
who never left home in search of a
better life.

Some of the resentment toward the
retornados was
because of the unfounded belief that they
had
made large

fortunes through their exploitation of the
African natives.
This was true for a small number of the
retornados who had

managed to leave Africa with large sums of money
in foreign
bank accounts. But most of the retornados went
to Portugal

and worked as low-level civil servants at the
request and

ln£luence of their

—

Th ey were very
resentful
that they should now
return n ome i.poverished.
After years
of toil in the colonies
they wanted to know
.

where their
„ her e was the upward
ability which other
e m igrants received in
return for their years
of hard work

rewards were.

and suffering,

governs s

They were also resenfcful
Qf

^

rapid decolonization and
its sluggishness in
removing the, fr 0m the civil
strife and fear of
reprisals
by the natives.
Since parh
,h„h
since
each adult refugee was
only allowed
to take USS200 out of
Africa, it is not

dlfficuU

understand why they were resentful.

fcQ

The wealthy retornados

could afford to fly to any
nation that would give the
m
refugee status, hut the poor
could only return to
Portugal 65
.

The Portuguese government made
an effort to meet their
needs with social assistance.
it attempted to direct
them

back to the regions where their
roots lay.
because the retornados had gotten
used to
standard of living,

it

colonial cities.

a

certain

became very difficult to send them

to the underdeveloped rural

the lifestyles to

However,

areas which could not provide

which they had become accustomed in the

Most

preferred to remain in the

Portuguese cities rather than move to the
countryside.
This

is

one of the reasons

why the Portuguese feel

resentment toward the retornados.

The

Portuguese

Un

" Pl0yMnt

situation was

grave

^

p

rior to the

^

decolonization process, but
with
return
and the retornados the
une mployment , itttrtlon
The government preferred
that the retornados
return to
their place of origin so
as to defuse

^

a

potentially

dangerous political group.
support the retornados.

Meanwhile the Portuguese
had to
Their unwillingness to
ra

ove to the
rural areas became a source
of unhappiness and
resentment
to the rural population
(especially up north, who
would
answer the contention of the
unemployment problem with the
following: "Only the l azy don
<t work or Can<t fin<J
There is plenty of land to
plow." The insinuation was
that
the rural peasant had plenty
of work to do and could
never
find enough time to do it in.
The unemployment problem
would be non-existent if the
unemployed were to pick up a
hoe and dig ditches.
in many ways the retornados
have become the scapegoats

for

Portugal's societal ills.

The retornados

are often

accused of being the cause of Portugal's
increase in crime
as well as the increase in drug
abuse.
Evidence has shown

that many retornados have turned to
crime out of
desperation and some would resort to crime even
in the best
of circumstances, but to blame the
retornados

alone for

these problems is not just.

87

Economy

Portugal's econo my
experienced very slow
growth over
the centres.
the seventies the
p rob le ms persisted
because of the colonial
wars, the oligarchy
whi ch
continuously controlled the
economy, the increasing

m

gap

between the rich and the
poor,

and the bacxwa^
agricultural sector which
produced some of the lowest

yields in Western Europe.

The only bright spot

in

the

economic picture was that
Salazar's frugal m0 netary
policies had resulted in large
gold and foreign exchange
reserves.
Largely because of its
development aid to the
colonies, the International
Monetary Fund and the World
Banx labeled Portugal a developed
country.
B y most
other

standards Portugal rates behind
Spain and sometimes Greece
both of which were considered
developing countries by these

bodies in 1975.66
In

many ways Portugal's colonial
empire actually

harmed Portugal's economic development
more than it helped
it.
As Portugal diverted ever increasing
amounts of its

budget to fight the independence movements
in the colonies
this had a significant negative impact
on the
economy.

But

even before the colonial wars Portugal
had begun to suffer
negative effects because of its colonies.
The easy access
to the colonial wealth led the Portuguese
economy to become

dependent on its export-import
trade with the colonies
the expense of Nestle
economic development.
Neglect of
denestic development was
encouraged by the British
whQ
exchangee, manufactured
goods for wine and
agriculfcural
goods.
What little economic
development was carried
out
was in infrastructure
modernization financed
primarii y by
the poor who paid the
brunt of the excise taxes.
Portugal
was a late developer and
by 19X0 only 20 percent
of the
work force was employed in
the industrial sector,
of which
a mere 20 percent worked
in firms which employed
10 workers
or more.
Industrialization was still at
the rudimentary
stages, centering in leather
goods, textiles, and

^

cork and

wine processing.

Over 60 percent of the
work

force was

still engaged in farming and
fishing.

The Republicans were not
devoted to
development either.
The economy

economic

deteriorated as severe

inflation reduced the currency in
1926 to only one
thirtieth of its value sixteen years
earlier.
Bank
failures,

labor unrest,

budget deficits,

and chronic

balance of trade problems exacerbated the
situation. The
economic crisis had

significant role in bringing down the

a

Republican experiment

.

67

After the coup of 1926 the military found
itself
unable to handle the same economic problems
which had

contributed to the Republicans' downfall.

in

1928 Salazar

took over total control
control nof€ the economy.
Keefe, he was a strong
believer in:

According to

••• balanced budgets
and fiscal s ° lvenc
corporate free enterprise
Y and of
within th
llmits
state control.
of strict
His faith 7n
?
standard and in
a stable currency
backed
9
and substantial
foreign exchange reserve! ,b IT,"
""shaken
even in the
worst days of the world-wfrte h
the 1930's and 1940?s
»r during
These
effective in bringing
^untrv^th
Y throu 9h the
depression with only moderate
h
Ptl °" ° f its
stable, albeit static!
economv
It ,uhe end of
J
for example, when the r«t
1933
„? ;>,
from widespread unemployment
9
unem Pl°y™ent
Portugal was less than one
6^
percent
s

^

^

,

^ssion
"hV

^ ™-"y
'

re^eredT ^P""

m

Portugal emerged from WWII
unscathed and in excellent
condition vis-a-vis the rest
of Europe.
Had Portugal
pursued the appropriate measures
it could have become
a
developed
nation along with its European
neighbors,
instead it was left behind as a
backward nation while its
neighbors industrialized.

The primary explanation

for Portugal's backwardness

was rooted in Salazar's economic
philosophies.
states, "His insistence on a stable
currency,
a

balance of payments,

and

a

Keefe
positive

balanced budget and his

suspicion of foreign aid and foreign
investment outweighed
the arguments of those who would
have preferred a more

dynamic attack on the low living standards
and static
economic development."

His critics argue that Salazar did

not exploit foreign aid to its maximum
potential. 69

Although the Portuguese economy did remarkably
well in

»

the

1960's Wit,

a

6, 2

peroe nt

average increase,

the
favorable growth reflected
pri ma ri ly the industrial
and

service sectors of the
urban areas.

Agriculture grew at

only 1.3 percent while
industry grew at
construction at

8.1 percent,

percent,

9

and services at 5.9
percent.

Despite Salazar's forty-year
>-Y year rulf>
rule ;>«
as "economist-dictator,
Portugal continued to be
Europe's poorest nation. 70

Caetano recognized that
Portugal had to initiate
changes to deal with the
economic problems and
implemented
limited liberal policies. Wages
were allowed to improve
at
a faster rate and foreign
investment was encouraged.
The
increase in world oil prices
as well as the onslaught
of a

world-wide inflationary spiral
complicated Caetano's
attempts to improve the economy.

Inflation in 1973 rose to

30 percent. 71

After the revolution the new
government began moving
in

new economic direction.

a

Decree Law 203-74

included

economic and social welfare measures
which were to provide
a preview of the major
changes to occur in the new

Portuguese economy.

As

Keefe describes,

an

income

distribution program was called for in the
decree which:

combined minimum wages with salary
and tax reform to ease the burden on lowerceilings
income
groups and reduce tax evasion in the higher
brackets.
Anti-inflation measures included a
freeze on prices for essential goods, rents,
and
other services.
Labor was to have a stronger
voice in enterprise management and to receive
.

.

.

and transactions i„
sec °

it f„
Fourth development plan wl«
r
new

"°

were closed
The
:
bS shelved
and
a ™°"nced.
These
asSistan
s ,s P ende d.

™
TIT

development priori tie
included more regional c,lLT
to smaller indoles
as
investment in infrastructure
3
proie^t/"
^o^
housing, and education
l°»-cost
'
ihf!
l " atlon of
monopolistic practices and ,„
01" 0
011
«,

,

«
^

L^

cooperative movements and o t
^ °f
marketing
improvements were promised^
Beginning in July 1974 the
second provisional
government announced steps
to deal with inflation
and
increase productivity through
a series of draft
decrees
which curtailed strikes,
controlled prices, prohibited
lock-outs,

promised credits to threatened
businesses, and
offered incentives for low-cost
housing construction and
foreign investment.
strikes could not be initiated
during
a thirty-day mandatory
negotiating period,
lay-offs
were

almost

impossible to carry-out,

the

minimum-wage was

doubled in May 1974 and increased
an additional 20 percent
in July 1975.
Salaries were stabilized with a
ceiling
imposed in June 1975o
Anti-infiaH«n
a
inflationary
measures
=>

imposed,

i

.

mu

were

including restrictions on consumer
credit and

steep surcharges of 20 to 30 percent
on many imports.

Although the new regime did
to nationalize any major aspect

banks

of

issue

(carried out

not.

initially have plans

of the economy except

in

the

fall

of 1974),

for

by

1««

the m ost important
sectors of the economy
had been
nationalized.
The nationalizations
were carried out as
a
reaction to the attempted
ri gh t-„i ng coup of
March
and not as the result of
any well- planned
decision.
The
nationalizations of domestrc ban
ks and insurance
companies
requested by the communist
dominated ban. worker's
union
had a large impact on the
rest of the economy
because large
segments of the maj or industrial
enterprises

^

^

were

m

controlled by them.
steel,

Plants,

railroads,

April and May electricity,

national airline,

shipbuilding,

road transport,

oil,

cement

heavy engineering plants,

wood pulp,
and tobacco industries were
also nationalized.
Most of the nationalizations
were directed at the

family-owned conglomerates which
had dominated the
Portuguese economy prior to the
revolution.
The Companhia
Uniao Fabril of the Melo family
was considered the largest
of these, controlling about 20
percent of all industry and
10

percent of the entire economy through
its 186

subsidiaries.

Other families with huge conglomerates
and

large shares of the Portuguese economy
were the
Champalimaud Group,

the Espirito Santo

Borges Irmao and Quina families.

family,

and the

Intermarriages between

these families meant that between 100 and 200
families held

positions of prestige prior to the coup and a
mere 20
families controlled most of the economy.
Since

these

families owned the banks
and insurance companies
Portugal,

in

the nationalization
of bot h m eant that
with one
swoop the government was
able to control m0 re
than half of
Portuguese industry.
By the end of December
1 975 many
claimed that the Portuguese
state controlled as much
as

percent of the economy.

65

It

controlled U7 nationalized
firms as well as their 201
subsidiaries, not to mention
the

firms placed under government
management because of
financial difficulties.

The purges of management
following the military coup
led to a shortage of necessary
managers to keep these firms
in strong operation.
The nationalizations were
formalized
by the new 1976 constitution
which stated in Article 9 that

among the

fundamental duties of the state
was the

socialization of the means of product
ion 73
.

Salazar's isolationist policies
favored the
accumulation of investment capital from
domestic sources
rather than foreign investment.
with the loosening
of

foreign investment restrictions in
the sixties,

foreign

capital rushed to Portugal to take
advantage of the low
wages and docile labor force.
By 1970 foreign capital had
reached 27 percent of investment as compared
to the 1.5

percent of the

1

960's.

Although the post-revolutionary

governments were cautious not to frighten foreign
capital
away, the political and economic chaos
inevitably
led to

some desertions by for
ei gn

copies

iaVeStMnt

or decreased f0 rei
gn

By 1976 the «o»o*ic
mood had increased
foreigners' desires to invest
in Portugal. 74
'

Portugal had some advantages
when compared to othe
r
nations faced with
post-revolutionary problems and
social

upheaval.

Because of Salazar's
monetarist polici e s

Portugal had amassed very
large foreign reserves
(us 52
billion,
If managed correctly
these
given the country the leeway
necessary to carry out its
policies with minimal foreign
interference.
Unfortunately

^^^^

.

Portugal began dipping into its
reserves so that by 1975
they were down to only US$1.
5 billion.
Another advantage
was that Salazar had not
run a significant budget
deficit
during his reign. 7 5

Conclusion

In

this

chapter we discussed major factors
which
influence the Portuguese political system.
After seeing
the inequalities which dominated the
system prior to the
1974 military coup, it is not surprising that
it gained the

wide-spread popular support necessary to convert
it into

revolution.

a

Our focus on Portugal's background also

enhanced our understanding of the PCP's appeal in
the south
and lack of appeal in the north.
in the next
chapter the

background is completed
P ezea as we
wo focus on
the political

parties with which the PCP
competes for power.
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CHAPTER

3

PORTUGUESE POLITICAL PARTY
We have discussed seve
ral aspects of the
Portuguese
background which are essentia!
for an understanding
of the

Portuguese politica! system,

we

cannot expect to
understand the motivations
behind party strategies
unless

we have at

history,

of

geography.

"

least

Sti11

its

a

momentary knowledge
people

,

Qf

of the nation's

economy

ifcs

^

^

Qf

The historical analysis
has shown that Portugal

f6eling thS

-"-noes

of the

land-holding
patterns left by both the
Romans an d Swabians ,for
example,
the low-productivity of
the agricultural
sector,

have an understanding of the

Portugal

(for example,

i mpor tant

the military,

.

we now

pressure groups in

latifundistas, clergy,

middle classes, peasants, and
workers)

.

We have traced the

political turmoil over the decades
and the paternalistic
nature of Portuguese politics
over the centuries.
And we
have examined the impact of
decades of corporativism and
centuries of neglect on the Portuguese
economy.
with this
essential information now in mind,
we can proceed with an
examination of the Portuguese political
party system in
historical perspective.
We will begin with an analysis
of

the party system's evolution

from its

formation,

through
the Salazar/Caetano dictatorship,
to the post-revolutionary
100

^

alS

°

inte9rate

Sartori-s typology

(dlscussed

^

^

System into Giovanni

^

one)

^

^

contribution to comparative
political P arty studies.

Early_jiistory

According to most scholars
familiar with Portuguese
history and political party
theory, the

modern political
party did not emerge in
Portugal until relatively
late
it
is difficult to pinpoint
an exact date for the
emergence of
the system, although most
would agree that prior
to

1910

the parties which existed
in Portugal could only
be
considered factions at best in
the traditional definition
of the term.

Until the end of absolutism
in 1834, politics was
the
competition between rival elites
for control
of power.

was

it

struggle of "absolutists" supported
by the old
nobility, the Catholic church
hierarchy, and the
conservative peasantry that made up
the bulk of
a

the

population;

against the liberal elite who
preferred
constitutional monarchy and were supported

a

by the emerging

upper commercial bourgeoisie of the
major port cities, the
educated bureaucracy, some of the petty
nobility of
central

and southern Portugal,
the lower clergy.

some of the military officers,

and

As Walter Opello, a political scientist,

102

notes,
1

t 1 CS

o? t h e

Wa S b

s t a t e,

S iC

--5gle
\ t s 1^3tt f tUtxons
t

over the nature

an d sources of
authority carried nnt t
11 gr0Ups of the
elite living xn PortuaaT° n9
Lisbon (thf capital) 9 ands r f^ " Cipal cities
Political
participation, such as
existed
e<
was carried out
through a
?'.
ucd system of
patron-client »l a
t
through mutually benelici^l B * 1 » taln ? d
MSa C tlms
goods,
>

!? n
.

'

H^

services, and
°f
p '
Th
l0Cal
(caciques) arranged the
I
loca l vote
in exchange for -ioh<!
r L%„Z 1 f
taXeS
service
"""ary
exemnt'inn,
f 3
a sis tance!
and the cutting**of red
f
'tape"
franchise
itself was extremely limited
exrl^H'
extending
only to
males 21 Y
years of aae
or owners of lonfiSlraMe
Uterate

L,

patrons

,

'

"

»7„,7

pro^rty?!^

From 1822 to 1852 three
factions competed for
power in
the Cortes (parliament).
The Miguelists represented
the
interests of absolutism and
were opposed to the
development
of a constitutional system.
The Chartists supported
the
principle of moderate constitutionalism
of
the 1826 Charter

which created

a

parliamentary regime.

The Septembrists

advocated the more radical
constitutional order of 1821.
The Chartists and Septembrists
merged in

1852 to form the

Regenerators who supported the revised
liberal constitution
of that year. 2
The Regenerators split into the
Historical Left at
first and later into the Progressives.
The remaining

Regenerators regrouped into
party.

a

constitutional rightist

Until 1910 Portuguese politics was
dominated by the

Regenerators and Progressives under

a

system dubbed

.

"rotativismo"

.

Undpr hhio
Under
this

system each

faction would

alternate governing the
natlon and
nation
anH taking
advantage of the
"3
spoils
.

The Socialist Party
emerged in the mid-1870s
but it
never developed a si gn i fi
cant oasis of support.
In 1881
various Mi g uelis t l ibe ral
elements formed the
Portugese
Republican Party (PRP)
Although durlng
the party was radical
(or socialistic),
with time it
realized that Portugal
lacked the conditions
necessary <a
large worker base, to make
that philosophy a reality.
The
party platform evolved to
include universal suffrage
(later
it limited the vote to
curtail conservative
influence on
the electorate,, a legislative
branch dominant over the
executive branch, limited taxation,
and general

^

^

.

support of

cooperatives.

The Republicans became a
"mass-based party
(to the extent that a limited
suffrage can be considered a
"mass" base, and as it did so
its philosophy became less

coherent and its members more
heterogeneous.
Republicans were anti-Monarchist,

anti-corruption,

The

anti-church and Jesuit,

and anti-oligarchic.

They were highly

nationalistic and favored the consolidation
of the colonial
holdings 4
The basic structure of the Republican
party after 1910
was one in which a large center-left
party, the Democratic

party

(the

original PRP split into various groups but
the

.

^

Democratic party inherited
the pRp iabei
support, was surrounded
by other marglnal
emerged an d taded according
t0

«-u.lly

^
wMch

^

t he

rise and fall of their
leaders>
managed to survive in an
atmosphere

_

ThepRf

Qf unstabie

Parties because it always
remained
person al rivalries and
quarrels
suffered from strong
.

rivalries

^

The

personalistic ie ad ers hip
and intense

5

A fully developed a rty
p
system did not exist
during
the short period of
Portuguese Republicanism.

Except

for

the Republican Perty there
w as little involvement
on the
Part of the masses at the
grass roots level and an
absence

of organizational structure
at the lower levels of
the
society.
Opello states,
The other groupings, were
for the most P r,
cadre parties or factions
restricted
t
k
Porto, and Portugal's larger
towns' without' Sear
ra
and d ° m nated b
?han n,
than
i ideas.y Personalities rathe"
issues and
Both houses „ f f!!
Congress did much to aggravate
the immobility or
the Frrst Republic with
frequent votes of no
3 Vi ° l6nt
tumultuous
meetings, and a failure to deal and
with Portugal's
pressing economic and social problems.
Moreover
larga
rely had an im ? a « °"
legislation"^
legislation; and groups with distinct
ideologies
11
e monarchists, remained outside
;
If
the parliamentary system. 6

^

m

'

•

m^tirgs^dTfT

«

P"""

f

"

,

At the turn of the century the
parties

or

factions

were still based excessively on
personalist ic leaders

(as

"

because

„

the

limlted

-re

^

^

abated

period of Portuguese Re
P u b licanis m
just beginning fco evQlve

^^
^
^
^
^^^^^
,

the parties

iinotabian

Party but never quite
got
Therefore, it is difficult
Portugal had developed

a

opportunifcy

t0

say

party syste m

In the modern sense
of the term perhaps only
Liie fkf
PRP rnnin
k=
could have
y the
been considered
a

Party,

.

but only one party does
not

a

systen, make

Because the PRP was not
dictatorial and allowed
factions to

exist,

this

could not

even be

considered

a

"party-as-a-system.
If Portugal did not have
a party system by
1926 then
not until 1974 can Portugal
really be considered to
have a
one.
if the Republican period
could not be considered a

"party-as-a-system,

one?

can the dictatorship be
considered

Even though Sartori claims
Portugal

"party-as-a-system" classification,
Union

(UN)

is

in

the

can Salazar's National

be considered a party?

Several scholars agree that in
reality the UN cannot
be considered a party.
it was more the voice of the
state
than it was a party. 7 According to
Opello,

The UN was to be an association without

character, independent of the state, partisan
and the
organization that was to implement Salazar's
corporate ideology among the citizenry.
its
objectives were to integrate the nation,
build

"

national consciousness,
el«i„ afo ,,dlssent
combat partisan activity
Th= association and
organized according to thl
was
discipline and the stated Principles of
subdivisions.
11>istrativ «
it
.
di^
municipal
parish branches had
and
and
activities by an executTL dlrected in its
e CO
lttee ' "hose
president »as SaL
„» W
not
a mass movement
ho " CT «not v er ™„ «f,
membership was never
°
inn DM
whom were government more t
of
l'
bureaucrat,
m° ' man
and pay dues as a
obliged
to join
cond H„„ ° f employment,
Outside of the government
Was a lo °se
collection o f lo ca l n
k,
personally loyal to SaYaza
<
S P rin orpal
activity was screeninig
*
candid
r sovernment
positions and elected offTrl.
,?
the citizenry
•

'

•

»„

™

'

hV

M

™

^

T^ThTuN f^MD

Salazar was clearly
anti-party and did not
consider
hrs National Union a
party but instead a
..movement"

"crvic action association...

flaying change

that

or

He was

so

successful in
perhaps Portugal during
his

dictatorship should be considered
at the pre-party stage
of
political development. Nevertheless,
Sartori considers the

National Union to have been
a "one-party pragmatic"
system.

When Caetano took over he
had difficulty using the
state to perform the same tasks.
He found
that he needed a

party to mobilize support against
an increasing opposition
and to support the state.
In 1969 he changed the UN's
name
to National Popular Action in
an attempt

to broaden his
base of support, but he was never
very successful. 9
It is
during this stage that Sartori
refers

to Portugal

as

1

attempting

(unsuccessfully)
iy)

r h «
the

"hegemonic-pragmatic" type of
system.

move

toward

a

10

I^eJdode^i^arty^Sys^em

With the end of the
dictatorship in 1974
Portugal
found itself inundated
with poiiticai gr0 ups
caili ng
themselves parties.
However, by April of
fch . following
year only fourteen of the
m0 re than fifty

initial
"Political parties" were
certified as such for the

elections to the constituent
assembly.
parties were able to get seats

Of these only seven

in the assembly.

Today the number of parties
in Portugal continues
to
hover in the teens but there
are only four major
parties.
From right to left of the
political spectrum these are
the
Social Democratic Center (CDS)
the Social Democrat Party
(PSD,, the Portuguese Socialist
Party (PS), and the
,

Portuguese Communist Party

(PCP).

These

four parties

control approximately 99 perce nt of
the parliamentary seats

and

represent

90

percent of the popular vote

Democratic Renovator Party

[PRO]

(the

which was formed in 1985

behind ex-President Eanes might be
considered
but it is a personalist party and

a major party

sufficient data is not

yet

available to form

permanence)

.

1

a

conclusion concerning its

remalning 10 P

—

° f the vote is

Ba icr parties none
•«
;
;
Parliament
Although

-

-

v ery

divided by

fcen

important

in

this view is generallv
generally .accepted
bv
some scholars, it is
n0t ln <=°nceivable
that some may
disagree.
The latter may critics
the omission o f the
MOP/CO E which has consistently
won seats in Parliament
<at
first alone and for the
last several years
as part of the
.

j

United People's Action

a in
alliance
with the PCP)

aptti
LAPU]
r

most observers would
consider the MOP
the control of the PCP;
therefore

major party.

but

but

front group under

a

it has been omitted
as a

The Popular Monarchist

received five seats in
1980,

,

in both

Democratic Alliance

Party

(PPM)

also

parliament in 19 79 and six
seats in

instances it was

a

member of the

(AD)

coalition with the CDS and
PP D
Given that the PPM has never
been able to win more
than 6

Percent

of

the

vote when it has

parliamentary seats can only be
in the Democratic Alliance
(AD)

also not considered

a

a result

run

alone,

its

of its membership

coalition.

Therefore it is

relevant party.

And some may

disagree with the exclusion of the
Popular Democratic Union
(UDP) which has won a single
electoral seat
in

election up to 1980.

every

Additional justification for these

omissions will be provided below.

If

we

categorize Portuguese parties as either

constitutional or revolutionary we find
the CDS,

PSD,

and

PS are constitutional

whUe

^

pcp
rhetorically while
participating withi „
system.
as Opello notes,

^

^

w
constitutiQnai

The revolutionary
parties
k„ divided
*i
into the
revolutionary right
?
?
1
Party of Christiar
The
Democrlcv
Party ° f the
Portuguese Right
'
re PresP
right.
ary
The revolutionary left
can
e subd ivided
into four cateqories- rVn^ti
(P ° PUlar
Socialist Fron
Movement of
and the United Socialist
s Party)
Pa^rtv ; radical
communist (Marxi at- -t on Worker^
«
^ ^
1
Party of
Portugal); trotskyit
mevolutT"" Y Party of
e
the Workers and International
r/
and maoists (Peasants
9" 6
and
Al
ifa
Allla
nce,
Reorganizing Movement of fhl dWears'
?
Popular Democratic onion) ?lf Proleta a t, and the

or^f

^
an^^
n?^

i

.

.

fc

"

£T^°?
S^ll^^
*

"

4

"

^
'

"

,

•

The Major Partite

Analyzing a party system which
consists of over a
dozen major and minor political
parties is complex and
difficult.
our task can be greatly
simplified if we
analyze only the "important"
parties.

To determine which

parties are "important" we combine
the conventional wisdom
concerning Portuguese political
parties with the guidelines
Sartori provides to distinguish
the relevant from the

irrelevant parties
procedure we find

in

a

party system.

(in order of

Following this

ideological beliefs in the

political spectrum from right to left)

the CDS,

and PCP to be the "important" or
major parties.

PSD,

PS,

110

^

"^^^^^^^iCMK

rounded by Diogo Freitas
do

Melln ° toar
°

^

C ° St

-

*

a

conservative.

The CDS was

professQ ^
The

primarily conservative or
ultra-conservative.

ambers were
The parties

ideology consisted of
intellect,,
,
„
intellectual
conservatism, freemarket capitalism, and
Christian h=
democracy.
Freitas do
Amaral was elected president
of the European
Christian
1

Democratic Union,

with which the party
is affiliated, i„
1981. The CDS is especailly
strong in the rural north. 13
The CDS' role in the
political system is to
represent

the

conservative elements in
Portuguese society.
The
designation which it has chosen
for itself (Social
Democratic Center, is not an
accurate description of the

Party.

Neither the party as

a

collective

(after the

revolution)

nor its individual conservative
leaders (prior
to the revolution) ever belonged
to the political center."
The CDS's primary rival in
the political arena is the
PSD.
in competition for prospective
supporters
the CDS has

two major handicaps. The first
is that the PSD (originally
called the Popular Democrat Party PPD) emerged as a party
earlier, thereby gaining a significant
number of supporters

who might otherwise have backed the
CDS. Second,
has often found that the failure of
its leaders

the CDS

to oppose

the dictatorship has been

a

disadvantage.

Ill

Its strategy has been
to convince voters
that it

rtself.

The 1976 eiections
catapulted the CDS from
f0 urth
Position, behind the
Communists, to third
ahgad
of the,.
The success of the CDS
in more than doubling
its

1975 support assures the
party that it wiU
continue to
hold a significant
position in Portugal
party syste ra
That has been abie to
raa intain
its
indication that

the PSD will

position is an

its

strategy has been
successfui and that
not have the exclusive
exclusi™ *support of the
most

conservative elements in society.

An analysis of its
electoral success positions
the
CDS, as the major party
furthest to the right.
this
position it is virtually
guaranteed the exclusive
support

m

of its democratic, conservative
flank on the right.
To its
left it has and will continue
to experience heated
competition from its major rival
because since the PSD's
right wing is ideologically
closer to
conservatism than
it is to social-democracy.
The CDS holds a comfortable

arena when compared to the PSD.

position in the political
Whereas the PSD must keep

watch on incursions against its
support from the CDS on the
right and the PS on the left, the
CDS need
only keep watch

on

its

left

flank.

As a result its strategy can be
more

aggressive as it tries to wean conservative
voters away

from the PSD.

™
°n

The PSn
SD
'

*.u

thS ° ther h ^d,

defensive rather than
offensive position
steer a nuddle road
between the right

must assume

a

and politically

and the left

A3

long as the CDS can
avoid internal crises
and
maintain an i ma ge of
continuity, it expects
to see
additional voters gravitate
in its direction.

to say that the CDS
need never he defensive.

its

left

flan, and prevent

a

This is not

xt must guard

PSD/PS alli ance

Such an
alliance, if successful, can
erode CDS support.
So long as
the PSD stands alone the
CDS believes it can
profit at its
rival's expense.
i* an alliance on
the left cannot be
avoided, then the alternative
is to for, an alliance
with
the PSD itself.
.

Both alternatives have now
been pursued.
First came
the Democratic Alliance (AD),
a right-wing coalition
among
the PSD, CDS, and PPM
committed to conservatism and
a
revision of the leftist constitution
(especially the
provisions dealing with political
power, the
economy,

individual rights); 15 and next came

a

and

PS/PSD alliance.

Since neither was successful the
CDS managed to maintain
its position, but so long as
the PS and PSD continue to
exist so does the possibility of
another PS/PSD alliance.
In response to this threat the
CDS has followed a strategy
of attack against both the PSD and
PS.
The CDS threat from
the right is also advantageous to the
PS since it forces

its major competitor,

the PSD,

to steer a» more
m„
pragmatic
course in relation to
both parties.

The CDS has

succeeded in converting
an initial

defensive strategy into an
offensive strategy.

at

first

arena but after establishing
itself i t focused insfcead
on
broadening its support.
*. major line of attack has
been
tc take advantage of
the crises faced by
its rivals.
E ven

that the governmental
crises were caused by
divisions
«ithin the PSD and that
the CDS should not be
held
responsible for them.
It
atterapted tQ pQrtray

^

^

&

mediating force without which
the crises within the
AD
would have been exacerbated.

^

This is not to imply that
the CDS has alwayg
consistent or that it has not
suffered from internal
divisions as well.
„ hlle a partner
ln

^

^

were members within the CDS
who preferred to pursue the
initial strategy while others
felt it more important for
the party to concentrate on the
CDS's power in relation to
the governing AD coalition.
Divisions within
the CDS

usually had more to do with individual
rivalries than with
ideological or even strategic concerns.
The split within the PSD,

during 1979,

which became more prevalent

and the unexpected death of Sa Carneiro

(the

^

PSD leader)

enabled the CDS to
present
conservatism
The CDS found

station

which,

if managed correctiy;

clear image of

a

^

&

^

^

cQuid

^eneiit it.

An unsuccessful AD
alUance
to this image by
increasing the psD
_

righfc wlngers
desires
for the pursuit of
more conservative m
easures.
The social

erratic elects

within the PSD would

,

,

in

-re

^^

skeptical of the conservative
wing.
These
lnternal
problems would benefit the
CDS.
On the other hand,
because
the AD was a conservative
coalition, the CDS could
also
legitimize its image of stable
conservatism by forcing the
PSD
into fulfilling its
conservative role in the
party
system.
the PSD refused its
role and disbanded the
coalition that would also
benefit the CDS because
the PSD
would be seen as the cause
of the AD's fall.

„

As

long as

the alliance held together
the political problems
would
continue to intensify.
the CDS could accompany
intensification by further differentiating

^

M

itself from its

partners,

that would show the imperative
of relying on
itself as a necessary alternative
and solution toward

ending the ongoing crises."

Because the PSD

would have
more to lose if the alliance was
broken, so long as the AD
held together the CDS would wield
a disproportionate amount
of power.
As a result the CDS could be
more forceful
concerning its own position. And when
the alliance finally

failed it could pick
up members of the
ne PSD's
PbD s o
conservative
wmg because the only other
Y
alii,
alienee option would be
a
leftward drift toward
the PS.

^^^cia^ocr^Par^^
is

The pgD

.

^

made up of individuals
who were crifcicai

dictatorship.

Party

,P PD)

The party was

until

Democrat Party

<PSD,

tt ,

name

±n

1978

caUed

^

changed

rightist party, but if we
examine

^

popuiar Democrafcic

The ppD

.

&

^

^

_

^

^

^

^^

relationship with other parties
in the Portuguese
system we
find that it leans toward
the oenter.

characteristics which allow it
to other parties.
It has a

a

The PSD has certain

sinoulsrHi-,,
v,
singularity when
compared

strong hase of support

throughout the most important
areas of the country
(cities,
North, center, Azores,
Madeira, emigration zones);
and
it
is not linked with
international party organizations
(although this position is not
of its own
choosing,

of these

factors allow

unavailable to other parties.

it

.

Both

political alternatives

The PSD is also situated in

good position to attract votes
from the political center
and the middle classes.
As a result it is always in
an
a

important political position whether
or not

it

participant in the government of the
day.

the only

Party,

in

a

strict

sense,

to

It

is

is

emerge directly as

a

a

consequence of the April 25
p 1 Zb
Many of the leaders

'

1974 military coup 17

ot the PSD
partioipafced

o«ici.l organs oe th6
previous
dictatorship.

In general

Md

^

^

criticized

their criticisms q£
administration were parallelled
by the officers
the -llit^y coup of
1974
According fcQ
,

^^

coup

^

_
in

.

Parties are at one ti me
or another the foci
of partisan
strength but none better
represents the political

evolution, reflects its
upswings and downturns,
as does the

PSD.

^e

PSD is an example of
an "instant" party
which
qurckly sprouted when given
the
opportunity to do so

did not take long to realize
that the soil
had plunged its roots
could easily erode.

it

i nt0

wnich it

m

order to

survive the PSD found itself
constantly chasing

a

perpetually changing and undefined
basis of support.
The PSD was the creation
of a group of politicians
with an urgent desire to voice
their opinions more than it

was the reflection of

represent

its

views.

a

social class needing

Their vocal

a

party to

opposition,

parliamentary members under the Caetano
dictatorship,
the PPD founders in a very awkward
position.

To

as
left

the

members of the deposed regime they
were traitors, betrayers
of the regime; yet, to the opposition
which did not "play
along with the regime" they were a mere
continuation of the

.

regime,

but in a democratic
for™
f
° rm
to revive the
dictatorship 18

'

Wh ° Se ultimate
goal was

.

The PSD

-gime,

leaders,

while6 still
Stl11 under the
previous
concluded that the must
y
wor k to bring an

organized end to the
dictatorship.
radical political transition
ansition

which

They preferred

a

^

j-o a new
to
regime than the one
the MFA initiated with
its rallitary coup
whereas
.

the

liberals preferred a
gradual transition hased
on the

three

of

decolonization,

first,

develops,

democratization,

and

the military inverted
the transition to

decolonization,

and then democratization
and

development 19

According to Aguiar, two
essential characteristics
are
evident in the PSD's long-term
strategy.
The first
is that

it

considers itself to be the
vanguard of the middle

classes.

It

strives to anticipate the
needs and interests
of this complex class and
to officially represent
them in
government.
It orients its strategies
toward maintaining
their role in society.
The second is the drive to
form a
conservative bloc which will implement
the liberal economic
views of
technocracy, productivity, investment,
private
capital accumulation, and gradual
reform of the economy.
Because many of the the right-wingers
still

prefer to

adhere to the paternalistic ways of the
past, this will not
be an easy task. 20

The Popular Democratic
art „ was
atrc p
Party
formed as

a

reaction to the Portuguese
Communist Party's
strategies.

The goal was tQ

^^

liberal
<P C P,

and the military's
consolidation o f power by
supporting the
liberal Prime Minister
P a ma r
Palma
Ca* rlos, during the
'
first
Provisional government of
1974
The strategy
resulted in a backlash which
increased the military's
hold
on power and neutralized
those forces „ hich would
nave
backed liberalism. 21
i

i

.

^^

The PPD was convinced
that the PCP's
organizational
strength would allow it to
infiltrate and manipulate
the PS
to achieve its own goals
(according to the PPD these
were
the continued erosion of
middle-class interests and
liberal
recuperation and consolidation,.
The prevailing view in
the PPD was that the PS was
acting as a smokescreen for
the
PCP, whether or not it
wanted to do so.
So
long as the PS

continued to act as balancer between
the right and the left
it would spoil attempts
to neutralize
the PCP or strengthen

economic liberalism.

Instability would continue unless
the
PS could be eliminated from
its intermediary role.
The PS

was postponing the

inevitable confrontation between

liberalism and communism and was not
allowing the public to
see the right/left rift within society. 22
The quick

attract,

formation of the PPD was also designed
to
protect, and rehabilitate the conservative
forces

that had collaborated
wlth the previous
regime
in its
rUSh
bSCOme 3 maSS
allowed so large a
diversity
of viewpoints into its
ranksS that
a*.
that- lt:
*
b ecame laden down
with
interna! divisions. 23
Eventualiy

™

"

_

"

^

^

^

^^

^
^

traditionalists an d Uberals
within
same
conf llcts as the groups
maneuvered fQr
For the traditionalists
the way to increase
the right's
power and decrease the
left's would be to tighten
the two
conservative parties (the PSD

^^^^ ^^^^

an d CDS)

as

into a common hloc

was Cone in the AD
alliance.
For the liberals the
answer woul d be to form
a moderating force
which could
succeed in gaining power.
The alteration of the
PPD title
to PSD,

the attempt to enter the
Socialist International,
an d the occasional overtures
towar d a coalition with the
PS
are examples of the liberal
strategy. 24

Leaders of parties will often
determine the strategies
an d tactics which their
parties pursue.
This is especially
true if we look at Portuguese
political history where
in d ivi d ual leaders rather
than ideology usually define a
party's strategy.
I„ the case of the PSD, Sa
Carneiro was
a crucial figure in defining
the future strategies of his
party. After his death the party
reacted to the strategies
of other parties instead of formulating
its own.
This was

partially

a

result of the deep fractions which
divided it

and frequent leadership changes

(recent leaders include

Francisco Pinto Balse.ao
an d Carlos Mota
Pi nto)
certain extent this has
provided the psD
^
valve because its
competitors

^

.

„

To

a
.

a re

the psd wi

n

neve r ent ire i
y sure how
react t0 their own
strateg es
.

_

^i^ciMist^arty^.

Although

^

ps s
,

can be traced bacx to
the 1860's its existence
has not been
continuous.
The party did not
achieve
^
base of support until after
the 1974 revolution.
Before
during the period of the
"new state," the Socialists
found
rt difficult to maintain
a clandestine
existence.
Their
already weak party literally
withered away. 25

^

_

The current Socialist Party
was founded by socialist
exiles (intellectuals, in Bonn
in 1973.
At the ti me of the
974
1
revolution the PS wa^
n fHa more than an elite
was little

faction.

it

had

a

weak organization and very
little

support at the grass roots outside
of the major cities and
large towns.
its organizational apparatus
was not improved

significantly until the campaign for
the 1975 constituent
elections.
To this day the organizational
support remains

less well developed than that of
other parties. 26

The PS is one of the single most

important actors in

the country's political system, but
one should not conclude
that the party is totally in control
of its own destiny.
Its strategies, programs, and proposals
(like

the PSD's)

121

are more

often responses to others'

actions than the

pursuit of its own socialist values. 27
It is difficult to implement
long-term strategies in a

parliamentary democracy since to attract
votes it

more

is

often

important to pursue short-term
objectives.

Nevertheless,

the PS seems to be following

a

long-term

objective which, when it finally emerges,
will convert what
appear to be short-term goals into long-term
ones

The PS

has always been concerned with presenting
an image of
independence.
Already during the 1969 elections it
played
upon this image
by forming the CEUD to contest the
elections rather than joining the CDE which was
communist
dominated.

The emphasis

on

independence became evident

once again following the 1974 military coup.

Despite the

initial solidarity between Soares and Cunhal the PS
again
felt the need to demonstrate its independence by increasing
its distance from the PCP

as

a

It

.

attempted to present itself

vital link in an otherwise polarized society.

This

long-term goal of independence would help explain why in
1978

the PS rejected an alliance with the PSD.

It

had

finally managed to recover some of the losses it suffered
as

a

result of its

"friendship" with the CDS in 1976 and

was cautious of damaging its renewed image of independence.
Its

rejection in 1979 of

a

similar overture from the PSD

led its rival to seek an alliance

on

the right

instead
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which resulted in the formation
of the AD government 28
The PS at times has found
it necessary to form
coalitions.
From its 1 97 6 experience as
a minority
government faced with dual opposition,
the PS learned that
it may be better to risk a
coalition than
.

to face threats

on both of its flanks.

198 3
PSD.

After its victory at the polls
in
it chose not to govern alone
but to govern with
the

Both parties play the

"charneira" role

-

to draw

toward themselves the majority of
voters who hover in the
space between, since that is the real
political center in
the political system.
The strategies
have been different,

for while the PS isolated itself in
1976 for this end,
PSD joined the AD for the same reason. 29

The Port uguese Communist Party

(PCP)

.

The PCP is

criticized by all of the major Portuguese parties.

more

pursues

it

a

cadre

the

The

strategy the greater the

democratic distance between the PCP and power and the
greater the instability in the Portuguese government.

The

party is so organizationally strong that an alliance with
any other party would inevitably result in decreased power

to

its

partner.

authoritarianism,

Democracy to the PCP,
is

only

pursues its ultimate goal

-

a

like

transitional stage as

power.

it

The party wants to be

isolated in the national party system, but it takes premium

123

advantage of this by speaking
out against its "forced
isolationism."
The party's
success can not be derived

from its own effectiveness
alone,

reaction by other parties.

30

but

also

from the

^

since mQst Qf

dissertation is devoted to the PCP,
additional analyses
concerning its role in the party
system will be discussed
in the chapters below.

_S^tem^^

The Portuguese Part
Z

The classification of political
parties to facilitate

cross-national comparisons has been carried
out by various
authors since the I950's.31
In the previous

chapter we

discussed Sartori's work on political party
theory,
includes one of the most sophisticated and

which

complex methods

of categorizing parties.

In

this

section we use his

typology to place the Portuguese party system

in

comparative perspective with other party systems.
To recapitulate Sartori's work on typologies,

he chose

to categorize not only according to the number of parties

which exist in

a

party system but also according to the

ideological and electoral strength of each party.

By

widening the variables encompassed by his theoretical work
he

expected to produce

typology.

He

a

tighter and more accurate

questioned the validity of mere

124

classification as an exercise
and focused instead
on the
variables important to a party
system.

study every party in

To m erely li st and

given system was not
necessary,
since many of the parties
might be irrelevant
a

given the

weakness of their electoral
support.

By integrating the

ideological criterion into his
analysis, Sartori increased
the complexity of his categorization,
yet simplified and

increased the accuracy of the
comparative study
political parties.

Students could now focus

most important parties of

Sartori'
(1)

only on the

particular party system. 32

typology is comprised of seven
classes:

s

one-party,

a

of

(

2

)

hegemonic,

(3)

predominant

,

(4

)

two-party,

(5)limited pluralism,
(7)

(6)extreme pluralism, and
He categorized
the Salazar /Caet ano

atomized. 33

dictatorship as

a

"one-party system" of the third variety

"one-party pragmatic."

-

The

"one-party pragmatic" case

dominates Portugal until 1974.

According to Sartori, this

type of system includes little ideological
content.
also includes less extractive,

coercive,

destructive features and focuses
aggressive features.

on

exclusionary,

it

and

inclusionary and

Policies were more attuned to natural

development rather than imposed political development.

The

pragmatic type had the least amount of coercive power and
some measure of pluralism when compared to other "one-party

systems."

The

"pragmatic" type

could be quite open to

125

"sub-group autonomy and may
also allow room for
some
peripheral subsystem autonomy
(e.g.

subsystem)."

for a pressure group

The pragmatic dictator

is

"bounded by the
constellation of forces with which
he must bargain."
it
"canalizes by absorbing (or attempting
to absorb)." 34
Because the Portuguese case was
still in a state of
flux, Sartori did not classify
post-revolutionary
Portugal.

Given the newness of the parties,

events,

the rapid succession of

the vagueness and uncertainty
of many of the
concerning their position in the
political

leaders
spectrum,

and the delay of the first election
until 1975,
it is understandable that
classification would have been
difficult.
Because in 1986 the party system remains
in the

state of flux even after 12 years,
classification continues
to be difficult.
For instance, in 1985 a new major
party,

the Democratic Renovator Party

(PRD

-

also known as the

"Eanista" party because ex-President Eanes is

a

major

leader), emerged to compete in the party system.

The

political maneuvering which has dominated

Portuguese politics since 1974

is

a

good example of the

instability which still shrouds the party system.
Nevertheless,

12 years is enough time to project

though not totally reliable, forecasts.

that

the

nations,

important,

Sartori emphasized

classification of new states or developing
which might not yet have developed party systems,

would weaken his typology
because these political
systems
were still in a state of
flux
.

Therefore

any

,

classification of evolving systems
based on his typology
must be temporary since most of
these systems were still

too unstable to classify
accurately.

while the Portuguese

case may be more developed than
many newly emerging nations
and lacks some of the problems
which give

them their

instability,

it

is

nevertheless newly developing in
terms

of its dynamic party system.

evolving on the lines of other

Portugal

appears to be

West European political

systems but its dynamism continues
to surprise us with its
own unique methods of resolving
political problems.
It is

important to keep in mind the special
historical
characteristics of the volatile Portuguese
political

system.

Although Sartori did not have sufficient
information
to classify post-revolutionary Portugal,
Aguiar, writing in

1983,

has

classified the Portuguese case according to
various typologies, including that of Sartori.
Aguiar
claims that since 1980 nine parties have had
parliamentary

representation.

However,

initiation of parliament,
PS,

and PCP)

are

tracing representation since the
only four parties

(the CDS,

important enough to be counted.

parties have both an electoral value as well
ideological and locational value.

"Locat ional "

PSD,

These
as

an

signifies
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in this

instance the position of the
party in relation to
others.
Its ideological position
carries with it a certain
weight concerning the alliances
possible in the political
system

Aguiar does not count those
parties which have
received only a small electoral
vote.

Neither does he

consider small parties without an
ideological locational
value.

Even if small parties have forged
alliances with

other parties they are not counted
if that alliance
subordinated them to some larger party
(e.g. MDP/CDE, PPM)
Those parties which only have an
extra-parliamentary value
.

(for example,

through violent action like the FP-25)

remain unclassified.

also

Thus we are left with only four major

parties to consider, those which in some major
way have an
impact on the balance of forces in the
political party

system and which affect the strategies and
coalition
potential.

The

ideological tension and strategies of the

parties are also important in classifying the type
of
system which Portugal has.

Aguiar concludes that in 1983 the party system would
fit

into Sartori's

"limited pluralism"

if one

classifies

solely according to the number of relevant parties (Sartori

allows three to

five parties

Portugal there are four)

.

in

this

category and in

If one classifies according the

ideological divisions in the party system the category

would be one of
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extreme pluralist of the
"polarized
Pluralism variety because of the
h ghiy
..

.

fragmentated;

polarized nature of the parties.
And if one classifies
according to the functional
characteristics of the parties
the category would be "extreme
pluralism" of the "moderate
Pluralism" variety.
Which of Sartori's categories
is the
correct one for the Portuguese
case? The problem with any
typology, and Sartori would be the
first to
agree,

not every nation fits well

However,

is that

into the categories available.

he realized that to facilitate
the comparative

study of party systems some
compromises would be
necessary 35
.

Portugal appears to be one of the
"problem" nations
for

Sartori's typology.

Aguiar concludes that Portugal

does not classify well as "moderate
pluralism" since the
parties do not always act "responsibly."
The coalition
potential, which should spread across the entire
system,

does not exist

since the PCP has been exempted

possible coalition governments

b^

from

the other parties.

A

system in which ideological tensions among the parties
runs
so high

cannot be considered "moderate pluralism."

in

Portugal each party emphasizes the distinctiveness of its

own

ideology making it especially difficult for the

moderation which would be necessary. 36
Aguiar shifts,

therefore,

to

"extreme pluralism" of
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the

"polarized pluralism" variety
which normally includes
at least five major parties.
in this category at
least one
of the parties should oppose
the political system.
Even

though the anti-system party
technically should be
potential coalition member,

it

is

a

never called to align

with other parties; therefore
its role becomes essentially
negative, although it remains a
relevant party (i.e., the
PCP)

This category also includes
bilateral opposition in
which at least one side wants to
change the system.
The
.

real political center should be
occupied by one or more
parties.
This particular category is not
dominated by a

bipolar relationship among the parties
but rather by

a

tri-polar relationship as they juggle for
positions and the
formation of a majority coalition.
Technically the country does not have

a

party in the

political center which makes us question whether
it should
be considered an example of "polarized
pluralism."
This is

not to say that Portugal does not have
political center.

majority in the

The center is in fact positioned between

the PS and the PSD.
bit

a

The Portuguese political center is a

further to the left than would normally be expected.

While the PS rhetoric has always been leftist its policies
have usually been rightist, even when it governed alone
as
a

minority government.

The PSD similarly uses a centrist

language but its policies are also

further to the right

than its rhetoric.

Neither side develops the
center but
instead leans to where it sees
the votes which tends to
be
between them.
since neither of these two
parties are
committed to the center given
their emphasis on ideology,
the center remains relatively
unstable.

Aguiar's conclusion concerning the
Portuguese case is

that

it

remains between the categories of
"extreme

Pluralism" of the "moderate pluralism"
variety and "extreme
Pluralism" of the "polarized pluralism"
variety with a
multipolar structure.
Because Portugal is still
in

period of flux time,

a

will eventually tell in which

direction will evolve.

Since

a

party does not

currently dominate the

political center, even though it exists
electorally,
is

a

possibility that

advantage of the center

party

-

PRD)

.

a

there

new party may emerge to take

(perhaps the newly formed Eanista

As rightist and leftist policies fail,

the

PSD and the PS may gravitate toward the center,

given that

the division is not electoral but ideological.

As the the

CDS on the right

and the PCP on the left

each gain less

than 20 percent of the vote, the ideological debate, as it
intensifies, will gradually push the PS and PSD toward the
center. 37

Until now the parties have avoided the center to

prevent criticism from either of the extremes.

Although

electorally the center is desirable, politically it is not.

Given the recent formation of the
Eanista party, Aguiar was
correct when he concluded that
Portugal either had one
party too many or too few. 38
The primary difficulty in classifying
Portugal is that

the parties are

still

maximalist desires.

relatively immature

Because historical and ideological

positions weaken over time,
is

and harbor

in many

older party system it

possible to rely more heavily on typologies to
help

explain the system.

in

that case one

focuses on the new

positions of the parties, not their historical ideological
beliefs.

However,

history is still

in the newly emergent
a

party systems

very important part of analyzing the

political system and party strategies. 39

The Portuguese Party System: Conclusions

What conclusions should we draw from the Portuguese

political system?

According to Aguiar,

it

is difficult to

analyze the system in the traditional or normal manner.
First,
in

a

because the Portuguese system is still evolving and
state of flux

(not

to mean that

other nations party

systems are static but that they are more stable)

the

Portuguese

system is new

unpredictable and much more dynamic.

it

is

still

Second,

.

Since

highly

many aspects

of the Portuguese system may appear "normal" or similar to
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other systems but are in fact
"abnormal."

Many crises in

Portugal would not be crises given
the same circumstances
in more stable and "mature"
systems.
Relatively minor
issues are blown up into major headlines
and shrouded with
unnecessary publicity.
This is partially because of the
sheer energy
and the personal ambitions behind
partisan
decision-making.
National leaders like to take age old
problems, which in older systems are trivial
and mundane,
and present them to the citizens as if these
problems are
unique to the system when in fact they are quite
common to
all systems and are resolved in other systems
without the

political "turmoil" or "excitement." 40
One of the greatest problems

to be the

in

the nation continues

immaturity of the party system in which each

party seeks

a

maximalist position and is unwilling to

compromise with its competitors. 41

When

a

system has

matured politically it is stable and the relationships with
other parties have been formalized.

developments in

a

The crucial changes or

mature system revolve around politics

rather than the "rules of the game."

Change comes as

a

result of previously unforeseen political occurrences which

were not dealt with in party programs or as
solutions to age old problems.

The central

a

result of new
goal

in these

older party systems is to wean one party's traditional
electorate or the "independents" over to another party.

In

system parties spend more time
defending and emphasizing
their independence and individuality
rather than listening
to and trying to "win over"
potential voters or exploring
coalition potentials. 42
a

Aguiar concludes that the organic structure
of parties
has always received minimal attention
in Portugal.
As

previously stated it is doubtful that the country
can
really be said to have had modern political
parties until
relatively recently. Partly as a result of this
the people
are not used to many of the traditional organic
roles which

conventional parties fulfill such
"canalization."'

as

"communication," or

During the dictatorship,

parties should be allowed

they felt that

merely because they were

elements which signify democracy, but not for any of their
organic or functional roles. 43
The revolution was not the result of a search

for an

organic party system which had been lacking under the
dictatorship.

meet the MFA'
therefore,

The revolution was,
s

instead,

personal grievances.

carried out to

The

did not emerge to provide functions

the Portuguese felt an urgent need.
parties are more concerned

parties,
for which

For this reason the

with the types of questions and

problems which existed at the turn of the century than they
are with the current realities and problems which the new

polity has to face.

At

the turn of the century the

.

.
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ideological barriers were often rigid
and parties were
mere reflection of one strong leader.
The banning

a

of

parties and democracy during the dictatorship
deprived the
Portuguese of a half-decade during which they
could have
expanded and developed a sophisticated party

system.

Without the opportunity to evolve the parties
must today
deal with the trivial and often "childish"
political games

which dominate early party systems.

With time this may

pass
One of the elements of the current system which
will

hopefully diminish is the focus on individual leadership.
The problem in the system is that the division between
the

parties is not great and that many of them are highly
fractionalized.

These are the types of circumstances which

often require strong leadership to hold the party together

and help distinguish it

from

a

rival party.

Although

leaders may act according to early twentieth century

models,

they are measured by late twentieth century

standards which,

The parties,

gives the system an unstable character.

rather than focusing on representation and

other organic functional

concepts,

focus

intensifying their ideological differences vis

instead on
a vis

rival

parties
The

system tends to be made up of fragmented,

highly

fractionalized parties, which makes it especially difficult
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to negotiate bi-partisan

Fortunately the highly

or multi-partisan agreements.

f rationalized

total reflection of the less

party system is not

fragmented electorate,

a

of

which enough remain in the center of
the political spectrum
to provide a shifting majority.
The problem
has been that

the country either has one party too many
or too few, not
that it lacks a stable center on the
part of the
electorate.
The parties are divided more to differentiate

themselves from one another than to reflect society.

Portugal

a

centrifugal society or

a

is

centripetal society?

Although it is still early to come to definite conclusions,

the society appears to be centripetal while
are

centrifugal

(we

will see if the new

resolves this problem by becoming

the parties

"Eanista" party

strong fifth party in

a

the political center and thereby stabilizing the system). 44
In this chapter

(and chapter two)

we have examined the

environment within which the PCP must work
achieve its ultimate goal
government.
cultural,

-

the control of the Portuguese

All of the aspects

etc.)

order to

in

(the historical,

examined here are essential

regional,

if we

are to

understand the variables the PCP analyzes when
formulates its strategy to win

government.

(or

seize)

it

control of the

We have especially focused on the national

party system since it is within this system that the PCP
must struggle if it is to defeat its competitors.

—

..
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CHAPTER

4

THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST PARTY:
BEGINNINGS TO 1974

Introduction

The

first three chapters have been crucial

analysis of the PCP.

The

in

the

first covered the theoretical

bases of political parties and party systems.

By examining

the commonalties which all systems share
we can better
understand where the Portuguese system is headed.
The

third chapter discussed the Portuguese party system
which
is still dynamic and in its infancy.

help us forecast the systems'

Systems theory cannot

future path unless we are

familiar with the socio-political background

(discussed in

chapter two) which distinguishes the Portuguese system from
other national systems.

serves as

national

a

this vein the third chapter

In

transition from the general systems and

analyses to the specific analysis of the

Portuguese Communist Party's role in Portugal.
In this transitional chapter we focus on the evolution

of the PCP

from its

roots

through the undisciplined

and its

years of the twenties,

Bol shevi z at ion of the thirties,

forties,

the years

of

formation in 1921,
the

the Stalinizat ion of the

clandestine existence under the
138
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Salazar dictatorship,

the Maoist and Trotskyite

splinter
groups of the sixties, to the party's
legalization in 1974.
The focus is on those events,
personalities, strategies,
and organizational structures which,
when poured

into the

mold provided by the Comintern

unique

"mask"

PCP's

(the

(IC)

,

left the PCP with a

character as

a

party)

distinguishing it from its namesakes in Europe and
the rest
of the world.

All Soviet

supported communist parties are

made from the same mold but the materials used
for the mask
vary,

dependent upon each party's national characteristics

and past.

Let us examine the ingredients which compose the

PCP's mask by glancing into the obscurities of its past.
For only in this manner can we best analyze its strategy
for power during the seventies and eighties.

On

March

6,

1

98

anniversary which makes

the

6

PCP

its

along with the Masons,

it,

Portugal's oldest political

institutions.

discussions of what constitutes
be difficult to qualify the PCP,

the

celebrated

a

65th
one of

Based on our

political party it would
without reservations,

as

oldest political party in continuous existence in

Portugal since 1921.

including the PCP,
questionable.

often make this claim,

its

its validity is

Throughout its 65 year history,

the party has claimed

despite

Although many political observers,

a

for example,

mass working-class base of support

occasional

reductions in membership,
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activities,

and organization to insignificant

levels

as

a

result of internal problems and
external repression (at one
time it dwindled to less than 50
members)
We could also
question whether the PCP which is currently
active in the
political scene is only forty-five years
old rather than
the sixty-five it claims.
After all, the current PCP
really dates from the reorganization of
1940-41, which
.

differed from its predecessor reorganized in
1929, which in
turn differed from the original party founded
in

1921.

Even the Comintern officially dissolved the PCP in
1939.
Furthermore,

after the reorganization of 1941

there were

actually two communist parties claiming to be "the" PCP.
Are we therefore discussing

a

sixty-five year old party or

instead three or more parties of which the latest,
five year old party,

is

a

a

forty-

third generation relative to the

original PCP?
The party's past

is

full

of many similar instances

which should be considered when making generalizations
concerning the PCP as
the

a

political party.

Since we discuss

reorganizations and historical background of the PCP

below,

let

since 1921,

us

accept that

it

has been a political party

as most political observers do.

In

any case,

the major disagreement centers on the question

when one

begins counting since even if we took 1941 as the birth of
the PCP it would still be,

at

forty-five years,

the oldest
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political party in Portugal.

Another way to avoid the

controversy is to recognize that
regardless of the PCP's
status as

party nearly every individual who was
active in
the opposition to the dictatorship
either passed through
the party's ranks or at least through
its
a

ancillary

organizations.

Almost every action of resistance or

opposition to the dictatorship from 1927 to
1974 was
planned or carried out through the PCP whether
worker
struggles,

electoral campaigns,

military coups were concerned.

armed activity,

or even

The major exceptions were

the terrorist type activities carried out beginning
in the

sixties by leftist PCP splinter groups from which the PCP

disassociated itself.

Despite the long history of PCP activity,
least known of the major Portuguese parties.
is

partially

a

is

the

The mystery

result of the deliberate barricades set up

by the PCP to prevent historians

"official" history.
Soviet Union

it

(CPSU)

from competing with

its

Just as the Communist Party of the

has purged and revised its own history

according to the image which

it

would like to convey,

so

too the PCP allows only its own selective history to be

presented to the public.
Pereira,

a

According to Jose Pacheco

Portuguese expert on the PCP's history,

leadership is very reluctant,

and even hostile,

the

when asked

to provide information or answer questions concerning

its

!

history and organization which
probe beyond the official
line.
Any party, of course, has a right
to produce its own

official history and present

it

correct and only history.

However,

to

the public
as

he

as

the

correctly

emphasizes, what the party does not have
the right to do is
to block access or sabotage projects
designed to study the

available historical documentation and attempt
to arrive at
the truth.
The party has gone so far as to falsify,
destroy, or hide documents; pressure witnesses
to keep
silent; and use its political weight to prevent
the

discussion or criticism of the official history.

free

"l

Pereira's primary difficulty is in gaining access to

documentation following the reorganization of 1929.

The

communist publications were numerous yet they are difficult
to

find.

Access to these materials,

of a second Avante

including the copies

(the official party organ)

published by

the purged leadership following the reorganization of
1940-1941,

would be of valuable importance in writing the

true history of the PCP but,

the major sources

materials are currently inaccessible.

for these

Pereira claims that

the best source of information is found at the PCP's
private archives not only in Portugal but also deposited in

Czechoslovakia,
European nations.

most historians,

the

Soviet Union,

These archives

often not

and other Eastern

are not accessible to

even to historians who are

communist members, and if they were the
accuracy of many of

their contents would be questionable.
PIDE-DGS
files

(disbanded secret police)

on the PCP,

He adds that the

also has significant

but for political reasons they have
not

been open to the public.

Without

access to these major

archival sources significant gaps persist in
the materials
to support an "unofficial" history of the
party because the

long years of clandestine existence and dictatorial
repression make these materials otherwise inaccessible. 2

According to Pereira,

the

1925-39 and 1951-1960

periods are especially shrouded in darkness by the party.

During both of these periods Alvaro Cunhal,
current Secretary-General, was not in

the

PCP's

leading role within

organization which helps explain why they are

secretive.

Prior to the 1940-41 reorganization Cunhal did

not head the PCP,

an

a

the

and during his imprisonment from 1949-60

anarcho-liberal group emerged within the party.

By

keeping these periods of internal upheaval under cover the

PCP

can

continue to proclaim that

serious ideological

divisions have not occurred since the Bolshevizat ion of the
party.

If the truth were known Cunhal would not be able to

control his version of events.

Pereira,

reality,

emphasizes

the party has been plagued throughout its long

history by internal divisions.

of

In

The absence of any mention

rifts which occurred during the numerous

.

3
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reorganizations, the conflicts with the
anarcho-syndicalist

dominated General Confederation of
Workers
thirties,

the

the attitudes of communist
prisoners,

"Group of Disaffected Communists"

Tarrafal,

(CGT)

the criticisms of the

(GCA)

of the

known as

imprisoned in

"personality cult" and

arguments for the "via pacifica" of the
fifties,

and the

extreme-left splinter groups of the sixties,
should make us
question the official PCP account of its own
history.

After all, an essential aspect of democracy
is the freedom
to seek the truth, and to question the
official line.
Even

democratic governments and institutions cannot be
trusted
to always release the truth.
The reluctance and hostility
of the PCP concerning its history should make us
question
its intentions

(as well as

its commitment to democracy)

Communist Currents Prior to 1921

When compared to the paucity of material available on
the PCP prior to the 1974 military coup,

period

the 1921 to 1926

provides abundant evidence to support accurate

analyses of the PCP's organization and activity during the
Republic.

According to Pereira, this is partially

of the party's

legal existence which allowed open,

than clandestine,
well

as

in

a

result

rather

participation in the labor movement as

the political process.

The freedom to publish

4

.
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the official party organ

(

0

Comunista

)

and publicly

distribute propaganda produced bountiful
material
scholars to analyze.
in addition, Humbert
Droz,

representative who played

a

for

an

IC

leading role in the development

of the PCP, provided an invaluable source
of information on
the twenties when he left his detailed
personal papers to

the

International Institute for Social History

in

Amsterdam.
By the time of the Russian revolution
Portugal had

already developed

a

lively labor movement and a political

atmosphere which was uniquely Portuguese.
class was

represented by

a

movements which were engaged

diversity of parties and
in

an

old debate concerning

workers exploitation by the capitalists.

therefore,

The working

did not emerge to

fill

a

The PCP,

void in worker

representation as it claims but emerged instead into

a

field of contenders which had much more in common than in

divergence
But regardless of the successes realized in this
period [1914-1920], the working class is lacking
a revolutionary class party, which defines with
clarity its historical mission, congregates
around itself all the exploited and oppressed and
transforms the popular discontent into consequent
political action.
That step is
stimulated by
the example of the Great Socialist Revolution of
October
.

Today the PCP peers into the past and distinguishes
itself from the anarchists and revolutionary syndicalists

of

5

.

.

5

the

twenties by emphasizing its revolutionary
commitment.
But there was little novelty in
its
revolutionary commitment.
By the time of
the PCP's

formation in 1921 the continuous debates
concerning the
labor movement's pursuit of

a

revolutionary path were not

novel.

Ever since 1913 anarchists and syndicalists
had
been debating whether syndicalism alone
could end worker
exploitation by capitalism. Many concluded that
syndicalism
was a good approach to confront capitalism although
it

was

not the correct method to succeed in its overthrow.

According to Pereira the successful revolution in
Russia had five major impacts on this debate and infused
into it

a

new sense of urgency:

pressures emerge to reevaluate the 'ideas and
1)
practices' of the past while keeping in mind the
experiences of the Russian Revolution (especially
concerning the feasibility of the working class
carrying out

2)

a

revolution)

the infusion of ideological
into an old argument.

fragments and 'new

words'

the varied groups in Portugal whether anarchists,
3)
syndicalists, maximalists, Soviets,
or bolsheviks,
draw from the experiences of the Russian Revolution
and in the process make it very difficult to
distinguish the difference between these various

groups
an increased emphasis is placed on the need for
4)
unity among the working classes (especially by the PS,
anarchists, syndicalists, and maximalists)
an initial support by these groups of the Russian
5)
Revolution and of the 'Reds' versus the 'Whites.'

9
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The Workers League for economic
Expropriation and the
Economic Council of the CGT (the latter
served as the model
for the PCP's own Economic Council)
were two of the
responses to the urgent need for a successful
revolution.
They were formed with the goal of unifying
the struggle

against capitalism and attracting the anti-capitalist
elements which were not represented in the
syndicalist

movement
etc.).

jacket

(e.g.

intellectuals!

non-unionized laborers,

This was the syndicalist response to the straight

which kept

the

revolutionary activity.

But

,

syndical

movement

out

of

7

discussion in the syndical movement was not

limited to these apparently non-revolutionary actions.

In

the light of the 1917 successes in Russia these seemed
insufficient changes,
the general

especially following the failure of

strike of 1918.

8

More

radical measures were

discussed to carry out the revolution through the shortest
path available.
The PCP cannot claim that its emergence and novelty

focused on the need for

a

revolutionary vanguard

nonexistent in the political scene.

After all, the diverse

elements of the syndical movement had been discussing,

in

embryonic stages, the "vanguard" role and the "dictatorship
of the proletariat"

for

could be found

the

at

some time.

The

first bolsheviks

extreme left of the Portuguese

.
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syndical movement.

As a result

Russian revolution,
strike,

of the

of the successes of the

failure of the 1918 general

and of the impasse which the syndical
movement had

reached,

the syndical movement split

in

two with one

section moving toward reformism and the
other moving

further toward

r e vo 1 u t i o n

.

1 0

The

des ire

for

an

organization which was swifter and more flexible,

implying

the need for a cadre membership and homogeneity,

was less

communist than it was "Blanquist."

The

Portuguese Maximalist Federation

(FMP)

especially focused on the need for swifter revolutionary
organizations

the

syndical organisms, while they become
stronger, and more potent, also become more
cumbersome, more immovable, not acting with the
brevity and urgency which
is required of them,
almost always losing the opportunities [for
revolutionary action]
And we do not want to
lose any moment which comes within our grasp.
n
.

The FMP emerged from the anarcho-syndicalist movement

1919.

in

From the start the maximalists were distinguished

from the anarcho-syndicalists because they claimed to be

Soviets and Bolsheviks.

The major difference was in their

concept of the transition of the dictatorship of the
proletariat developed from Lenin,

Stalin,

and others.

The

anarcho-syndicalists were more attached to Marx and Bakunin

and

criticized the authoritarian character of the
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Bolsheviks. 12 The FMP,
°

rgan Bandeira Vermelha

especially through its official
(Red Flag),

emphasized that its

attempts to bypass the lethargic revolutionary
syndicalist
movement was not an attempt to replace
the

syndical

organizations.

What the working class movement needed was

unity among the syndicalists,

The

anarchists,

and maximalists.

FMP would leave to the syndical organizations
the

implementation of the economic reforms while it would
immediately carry out and then defend the revolution.
Their activities would be focused on the political
realm

while the syndicalists would be concerned with the economic
realm. 13

The FMP was committed to an immediate revolution
modeled after the experiences of the Russian revolution for
it

felt that conditions were ripe given the misery which

shrouded the Portuguese working class.

The goal in forming

their extra-syndical organization was to seize the
bourgeois state violently and implant the dictatorship of
the proletariat.

Electoral or other activity which might

lead to participation within the bourgeois

prohibited by its statutes.

The

state was

FMP was primarily

dominated by workers and individuals from the popular
movement and despite the appearance here that
cohesive group that was not the case.

it

was

a

Having emerged from

the ranks of anarcho-syndicalism debates concerning
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reformism or revolution continued within
the FMP and would

later emerge again in the PCP.

Despite all of the

revolutionary rhetoric in Bandeira Vermelha
the FMP focused
on the ideology behind the Russian
revolution
more than the

implementation of revolutionary tactics.

14

The FMP found its niche in the gaps which
divided the

anarchists from the syndicalists.
FMP

was welcomed by the various

The

formation of the

anarchist

groups and

newspapers as one more avant-garde group whose only
distinctive feature, as far as they were concerned, was
its
relationship with the Russian revolution. 15
The novelty which the communists and their

predecessors in the FMP introduced, therefore,

maximalist
was not the

concept behind the "vanguard party" or the "dictatorship of
the proletariat" but instead the application of the theory
into reality.

The concept that conditions were

ripe

for

revolution therefore the party must be ready to act as
vanguard so it could exploit the moment of weakness when
arrived.

It

a

it

viewed the upcoming revolution in Portugal in

concrete terms, even if it did not carry it out, while the

syndicalists viewed

it

in vaguer,

which would happen "some day"

in

more ideological terms

the

indefinite future.

The question of power and how to gain it was the focus of

the maximalists.

vague notion. 1°

That victory was near and not a nebulous,

151

The FMP disbanded in December

1920

arrest of its secretary-general and

is

shortly after the

considered by the

PCP as a transitional party to that
glorious date of which
the PCP is so proud:
On the sixth of March of 1921,

in the home office
of the Association of Office Employees,
in
Lisbon, is realized the Assembly which elects
the
leadership organs of the PCP.
The Portuguese
Communist Party was founded.
Decades of
suffering and struggle of the Portuguese working
class, the lessons of the great victories of
the
international working class, the teachings of
Marx, Engels, and Lenin all converged on it.
With the foundation of the PCP the Portuguese

working class
vanguard.

1

finds

its

firm and secure

'

The PCP is the first to admit that it could have chosen
an

earlier date as the formal beginning of the PCP.

have chosen December 28,

1928

It

could

when the organizational

committee selected the party's name and approved its
political program,

or

it

could have chosen March

when the organic bases of the party were formed.

prefers March

6,

1921. 18

1,

1921

But

Although the FMP had

significant impact on the formation of the PCP,

it
a

the PCP

only mentions it in passing since to acknowledge the FMP's

full

impact would rob the PCP of some of its glorious

image.

Similarly,

the Socialist Party

The

the PCP also downplays the role which
(PS)

played during the PCP's formation.

origins of the party as discussed above show that

unlike most other European communist parties the PCP was

not born from a PS splinter group.

The PCP appears to take

great pride in this fact since it allows
it to stress its
differentiation from the PS.

Contrary to what occurred in most of the
European
nations, the Portuguese Communist Party did
not
form

itself from the Socialist Party but

fundamentally, with militants who came from the
ranks of revolutionary syndicalism, which,
despite its errors, represents that which
most energetic, valid and combative in was
the
Portuguese labor movement.
"29
and
The Socialist Party's influence
disappears from
the Portuguese labor movement, as it develops an
action predominantly parliamentarian, preaches
the conciliation of classes, and is constantly
agitated by internal conflicts. 2 o

The PCP's emphasis on the diminished role of the PS prior
to 1974 and that it had nothing to do with the emergence of

the PCP has become widely accepted in Portugal.

the

PS

existed

in

a

different

ideological

organizational plane that does not mean that
or

Although

a

and

relationship

influence did not exist between the two.

With the

formation of the PCP many PS members transferred their

allegiances to the new party (especially the members of the
Socialist Youth)

which in many
the PS

.

In addition,

the creation of a new party

respects held ideological views similar to

increased the internal ideological confusion which

already plagued the PS.
to external

The PS was constantly vacillating

conditions and pressures

(often

instigated by

.
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the PCP)

Discussions were even held concerning
the

.

dissolution of the PS and its integration into
the PCP.
good example that the PS was not as isolated

A

from the PCP

as it likes to claim is that some of
the first sessions of

the PC were held in the main office of the PS.

At

the time

of

its

2i

founding the PCP was to be

a

federalist and decentralized organization with the
following goals:
1.

The organization of workers on the triple base of
political, syndicalist, and cooperativist
resistance;

2.

Unconditional support to the CGT;

3.

International understanding and action among
communist parties and syndical organizations;

4.

Collaboration of technicians, specialists, and
scientists with the working classes;

5.

Preparation and promotion for the complete
emancipation of the indigenous peoples of the
colonies

The ultimate objective of the party was the socialization
of

"the means

that

the

is,

society into

through
At

FMP

.

a

a

of production,

circulation and consumption,

radical transformation of the capitalist
communist society" which was to be achieved

radical revolution when conditions were ripe. 22

first the PCP did not appear to differ

from the

The articles which appeared in 0 Communista

official PCP organ,

were

,

the

similar to those which had

appeared in Bandeira Vermelha

.

Among the themes were the

usual calls for

a

unitary front of the varied workers

groups and the need for immediate revolution

unitary front to distinguish it

While the former would focus on

(we

emphasize

from the united front.
a

unity of workers for

syndical and revolutionary activity the latter
would imply

an

electoral or formal unity for participation in

"bourgeois" democratic politics)

.

Relations at the start

between the CGT and PCP were fairly good, as they had
been
under the FMP
For several reasons, however, the PCP

and

.

the CGT soon began to drift apart.

A drift which had

already begun under the FMP and had now intensified to the

point of outright rhetorical hostility.

One reason was

that many of the Young Syndicalists joined the newly formed

Young Communists
In addition,

movement.

(JC)

which led to strains with the CGT.

the CGT accused the PCP of dividing the labor

An accusation which especially became common

after the PCP's publication of the 21 conditions in 1921

and its increased accusations that the syndical movement
should reserve

its

activity to the economic sphere and

leave the political arena to the PCP.

The

PCP was

especially vicious in its conclusions that on balance the

syndical movements' political successes were negative and
that

its

leaders were misguiding the workers.

What was

needed was an end to the sectarian air which surrounded the

movement and

a

move toward

a

unitary movement.

The
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movement should be fighting for

a

decrease in the high cost

of living for all rather than trying
to increase workers'

salaries 23
.

Although the FMP had received warm support
from the
syndical movements this was

a

result of the FMP's emphasis

on working alongside the syndical organizations
rather than

trying to undermine them.

The FMP had also benefitted from

the novelty of the Russian revolution which had
subsided by
the time the PCP was

formed.

The

repression of Russian

anarchists had led the anarchist press to push for

distinction between anarchists,
Bolsheviks.

maximalists,

a

clear

Soviets,

and

The acceptance of the PCP as an extra-syndical

organization ended once the party moved toward competition
in the political

arena along with the "bourgeois" parties.

Participation in elections,

in parliament,

in

government,

and in alliances with other parties or groups,

were taboo

for the anarchists and syndicalists.

if the

In

wants to emphasize its uniqueness vis
parties and movements

terminating
the

a

20

fact,
a

PCP

vis other labor

it would have to be in the realm of

year tradition of exclusive devotion by

labor movement to syndical

activity when it began

experimenting with parliamentarian tactics which the
syndical movement considered heresy. 24
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A

fuller discussion of the often
microscopic
ideological divisions which distinguished
the diverse

political parties and movements of the first
republic and
made the Portuguese labor movement unique can
help us

understand the evolution of the PCP which becomes
especially complex in the final years of the FMP and
in the
early years of the PCP.
Perhaps the clearest analysis

of

the uniqueness of the Portuguese labor movement and
the
distinctions between the various parties and movements is

offered by Pereira.

He

insists that the key to

understanding the complex ideological threads which bind
the various movements lies in the organizational sphere
rather than in the ideological sphere.

Because the PCP

and communism in general evolved from grafts of the
indigenous labor movement rather than as
IC;

a

result of the

because communism evolved outside of the spawning

grounds of the social-democratic left from which sprouted

most European communist parties;

the

"original" PCP was

endowed with very singular characteristics when compared to

the

rest

of the

international communist movement. As

communism evolved spontaneously out of the Portuguese labor

movement it found only two organizational vehicles
available through which it could conduct its activities.

One vehicle was the Republican

(bourgeois)

political

organizational model and the second was the anarchist model

-

pursued by several different

Portuguese labor

organizations.

Both options had themselves evolved
internally within Portugal to fulfill
the needs of the

working classes as representational
vehicles vis

a vis

or

"

channe lment

bourgeois capitalism. 25

Reflecting the Portuguese labor movement of
the time,

Portuguese communism was severely

f r act i

onal i z ed

.

communists had their advocates of reformism,
revolutionary syndicalism,

and of bolshevism.

The

of

As a result

early Portuguese communism oscillated between the
two
indigenous vehicles of worker "representation" with the
early bolsheviks forming autonomous groups represented
by

certain magazines and newspapers.

represented by the FMP and PCP,

Early communism as

therefore,

was highly

decentralized and federalist in nature as was still evident
at the first party congress held in 1923. 26

As the anarchists began to distance themselves

the

from

early communists the latter sought to organize

politically and initially chose to form Communist Centers
which were political "clubs" similar to the republican and
socialist centers.

It

is

clear,

Portuguese communism was

a

strains accustomed to

lively

external

a

therefore,

melange of communist ideological
internal debate,

debate with its rivals,

organizational structure.

that early

and

a
a

lively

loose

When Pereira emphasizes the
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organizational sphere of Portuguese communism
his point is

that the

ideological divisions internally were less
important than the organizational since
the early

communists had all evolved from the same
tradition.

The

problems within the movement which underlie
the various
"grands tournants" up until the reorganization

of 1929 are

focused not on the ideological differences but on
attempts
to
all

impose an external Bolshevik type of organization
with
of its trappings

internal,

(e.g.,

democratic centralism)

decentralized type of organization with

a

on

an

higher

degree of autonomy inherited from the early communists"

anarcho-syndicalist roots.
ideological,

tactical,

This

and political

is

not

to

say that

differences did not

accompany the organizational problem but they were not the

major issue. 27

The PCP in the Twenties

No doubt the complexity of unraveling the intertwined

ideological threads which permeate early Portuguese
communism is now more than evident.

The PCP has attempted

to simplify its historical roots especially concerning its

founding.

The PCP only mentions the FMP as

and even then only in passing.
is

its precursor

What Pereira has uncovered

that the early PCP's antecedents are much more complex

than to claim that in 1921 the PCP
is born
"reorganized" FMP

.

in terms

the prevailing belief has

from

a

of the membership of the PCP

been that

it

was made up

predominantly of maximalists from the FMP, but
in fact the
membership is just as characteristic of the
syndicalist
base as it is of the maximalist.
While it is
true that

ex-FMP members composed about 45 percent of the
new party
that is not a majority (and only 19 percent of FMP
members
chose to join the new PCP)
The remaining 55 percent were
.

drawn primarily from syndical activists which leaves the
PCP with a radically different flavor than previously
believed.

The FMP member tended to be more radicalized in

ideological terms since he had originally been drawn from
the anarchist strain of the Portuguese labor movement.

The

maximalist, therefore, was closer to anarchism than he was
to communism.

The syndicalists tended to be more radically

active in the social

sphere

strikes)

(e.g,

political or ideological sphere which goes

than in the
a

long way

toward explaining the internal rifts which would soon
emerge in the PCP. 28

Although the early membership of the PCP was not
dominated by ex-FMP members if we focus on the leadership

and the active militants we find
ex-FMP members than

above.

However,

a

larger influence from

from the base membership discussed

even at this

level the

largest

influence

.

.

comes from old syndical leaders rather
than from anarchists
or anarcho-syndicalists.
it is most likely for this

reason that Bento Goncalves, one of the heroes
or founding
fathers of orthodox Portuguese communism, refers

to the

leadership of the party at this time as dominated
by
bourgeois collaborators.

several,

although not

succeeded in

a

Especially when we consider that
a

majority,

of the

leaders had

small degree of upward mobility placing them

somewhat above the majority of workers which dominated
the

party 29
The PCP leaders,

therefore,

as

militants until the purges of 1926,

well as the active

were old,

seasoned

syndicalists with 15 to 25 years of experiences including
those of the 1910 to 1912 syndical struggles.

Furthermore,

they either participated in or had close connections with
the

republican movements and the "civil revolutionary"

activism,

with the masons,

interventionism,

movements,

"

participated with "anarchist

with the Carbonaria,

and with the Radical Party,

with conspiratorial
or the Democratic

Left 30
To conclude,

of the PCP

in

contrary to the belief that the formation

1921 was

primarily made up of former FMP

members the largest representation of party membership was
drawn instead from syndical activism.

those members with

a

The truth

is

that

background in the FMP brought with

.

them much more radical ideological
rigidity and were closer
to the anarchist movement than
those which were more tied
to syndical activism and social
concerns or
31
changes.

Once again these conclusions emphasize
the divergent
ideological strains which were still active
within the PCP
But the major confrontation came not
from within the PCP
itself but from the JC which had been formed
independently

and attempted to seize and control the PCP's
directive
organs at the first party congress in 1923.
The JC was much more cohesive than its parent the PCP.
The majority of its members had come either from the
Young

Syndicalists or the Socialist Youth and brought to the JC

tradition

of political extremism,

activity such as counterfeiting,

violence,

terrorism,

a

and criminal

bombings,

and

the elimination of enemies. The experiences and views which
the young members

brought to the JC differed radically

from the traditions
accustomed.

to

which the PCP members were

The JC members were not

concerned with the

liberalism and internal democratic debates which the older
PCP members had experienced in the Portuguese

movement and which they felt were
democratic centralism.

democracy,

to the

JC

a

syndical

crucial aspect of

Lacking the concern for internal

"democratic centralism" meant the

ability to expulse members who disagreed with the
leadership.

Because the JC had been officially recognized

by the IC the JC leaders assumed
the recognition gave them

power similar to "judicial review"
whereby their
interpretation of the IC s directives was
the
a

correct

interpretation.
intolerable.

Discussion was minimal and disagreement

To the

JC

the open

debate which still

occurred within the parent was sacrilegious.

was

that

the

party should be

Their view

centralized and

ultraconspiratorial in the mold of the secret societies
or
terrorist groups in which a few individuals were able
to

hold total control of the party.

In

fact,

at

times they

seemed to be more concerned with personal power than even

applying the IC's directives since when their views were
put

in question

they disregarded both the directives

as

well as the rules of democratic centralism 32
.

The confrontation between the JC and the PCP erupted
at the

first party congress of the PCP.

aged they became members of the PCP.

former leader of the

was

JC,

position prior to 1923.

mirrored by Caetano de Sousa
position within the PCP.

Jose de Sousa,

the JC's views were

who was also in a leadership

Toward the end of 1922 Caetano de

Sousa and Pires Barreira

(Secretary of the JC)

Moscow to participate in the Fourth IC Congress.

continued to be

a

a

already in a PCP leadership

addition,

In

As the JC members

left

for

The PCP

decentralized organization with little

evidence of the bol she vi z at i on process which the

IC
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expected of its affiliated parties.

Trips to Moscow by PCP

individuals would usually mean additional
moves toward
bolshevization upon the delegations' return.

Such was the

case upon Caetano de Sousa's and Barreira's
return. 33

By the

time of their departure the confrontation

between the two communist groups had already begun.
According to Humbert Droz,

when Caetano de

Sousa and

Barreira returned from Moscow they had misinterpreted
the
IC's directives as giving them license to purge
the party.
In their excitement to apply their interpretation
of the 21

conditions on
the party.

a

heterogeneous party they risked destroying

On the initiative of the JC a reorganizat ional

committee was formed, but in keeping with the undemocratic

views

of the

JC the committee did its work in

secret

without subjecting itself to the views of the majority of
the party stretching from the directive organs down to the
rank and file.

The Central

Committee which was set up by

the JC "fraction" was rejected by the majority of the party

who regrouped around the leadership of Carlos Rates,

choice for Secretary-General.

As

a

result

disputes Portugal actually had two competing PCPs.

their

of these
The JC

group continued acting as it had always done in the past,

purging any one who disagreed with
it's PCP

(SIC)

(the

it,

and soon found that

JC group attached to the party title

the words International Communist Section to distinguish

itself from what it considered the
illegal PCP)
reduced to abysmal levels.
Because it

had been

was not succeeding

in

implementing its interpretation of the
IC's directives

it

literally disbanded the PCP

by proclaiming that it

would cease its activities until the IC
intervened and
resolved the dispute.
Meanwhile The majoritarian
Rates

group continued the party's activity by
publishing

party organ,

by continuing to analyze the Portuguese

situation through its
directives,

the

interpretation of the

and by continuing to

IC's

strengthen the party

organizationally 34
.

In August

of 1923,

resolve the dispute.

which,

He

Droz

found himself compelled to

sided with the Rates fraction

despite all of its imperfections,

continued party

activity while the JC group lingered waiting for the IC's
intervention.

It

was better to maintain the party's small,

heterogeneous base in tact and attempt to discipline it
later according to the 21 conditions than to risk weakening
the party any further.

because of the

JC

s

Droz

also sided with Rates'

group

terrorist and criminal activities

through its participation in the Red Legion and because
Caetano de Sousa's expulsion of dissenters had reduced his
party to minuscule levels.

Droz

feared that Caetano de

Sousa's and Barreira's heavy handedness would not allow the
IC to

control the group.

The JC was too

intransigent and

sectarian which was

a

major difference from Rates'

group.

Caetano de Sousa was frank when he told
Droz that he had no
interest for the syndical activity which the
IC required of
the communist party and that his major
concern
was in the

political realm.

As a result Caetano de Sousa

found that

his group did not have support nor influence
among workers
or in the syndical movement.

How could one expect him to

carry on the party's work without the support of
the
workers?

With Droz's support the newly reorganized PCP by

passed the

JC

by

organization. 35

forming

However,

a

rival

"official"

JC

this same intransigence on the

part of the younger JC communists and their decreased
emphasis on democracy within the party made them the ideal
group to bolshevize the party.

This would help explain

their gradual reintegration into the PCP and successful
seizure of the leadership positions in 1926 which we will

discuss below. 36
In his December

Droz

1923 speech to the Central Committee

emphasized that the party must

convince the

anarcho-syndicalists that the PCP way was the only way.
Merely seizing the factories and economic base of the
nation was not enough without complementing the seizures
with the conquest of political power.

Neither would

social-democratic methods work because only through
revolution led by

a

a

disciplined PCP which followed the IC's

s

methods would the workers
conquest. 37

succeed in their goal of

Most likely the reason for the speech
was to

emphasize the superiority of the IC's official
tactics vis
a vis the competition from other
worker representational
movements and parties (especially the anarcho-syndicalists
and social-democrats)

convince

a

Droz must also have been trying to

.

highly decentralized and federalist PCP on the

imperatives of following the 21 conditions which meant
steering clear of both the anarchist and syndicalist
traditions which were still strong within the party.

The

fraction which Droz backed in opposition to Caetano de

Sousa was,

as

he recognized,

imperfect in terms of its

adherence to the 21 conditions.
One of the major debates during the first PCP congress

of

1923

revolved around the party's participation in

parliamentary elections.

This was an old,

lively debate

carried on within the syndical movement as well as the FMP

and dating back
parliamentarians

to
(or

the teens.
reformists)

Within the FMP the
because one of the

lost

party statutes clearly stated that participation
bourgeois politics was out of the question. 38

in

During the

preliminary meetings called to form the "organic bases" of

the PCP this topic was once again

a

major concern.

At

first the anti-parliamentarians won the debate when it was

decided at

a

February

1921

meeting that the PCP'

.

activities would be anti-parliamentarian.

Nevertheless the

"provisional organic bases" for the party,
"basis #4"

left the

specifically

field for parliamentary activity open

when it emphasized that the parties activities
would depend
on the conditions within which it must
act. 39
In this case

the parliamentarians vanquished and left the
prohibition of

partisan activity out of the party's formal structure
leaving the road open for

a

move in this direction in the

future
Several decisions in 1923,
of the

including

issue at the First Congress,

a

full discussion

favored parliamentary

activity although Rates was not partial to

it.

The

increased acceptance within the PCP for parliamentary
activity showed that the emphasis within the party on

an

immediate victory or revolution had diminished and that the

party had moved toward social-democratic tactics
participated in the 1925 elections,

e.g.)

(it

contrary to the

years of anti-parliamentarian stance of the Portuguese
labor movement.

In the end the distinction between the PCP

and the other labor groups was the evolution of the party

toward "bourgeois" politics.

This action was unique in

that it moved the party away from anarchism and syndicalism

and delivered

a

final,

fatal blow to the

tendency within the party.
party was made up of

a

It

"maximalist"

should be noted that the

myriad of tendencies and that party
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electoral activity wavered depending on
the tendency with
most influence at a given time. 4 0
The uncentralized nature of the PCP is
evident during

the three years between the first and
second

congresses.

party

(1926)

During these three years the party

participated in various attempted military coups; formed
alliances with the Radical Party,
PS,

and the CGT;

bolshevization;

the Democratic Left,

witnessed an attempt to accelerated

was plagued by internal

conflicts,

the majority of its historical leadership,
short-lived Popular Agrarian Party,

elections of 1925,
participation.

the

purged

created

a

participated in the

and developed active syndical

These occurrences help to explain why the

PCP diminished in strength until it was almost non-existent
in 1927.41

A major reason for the deterioration of the PCP as an

organization which brought

than
Rates.

100

in

1927

it

from 3000 members to less

surrounds the policies pursued under

Rates and the leadership were convinced that the

momentum of the Russian revolution would deliver

the

Portuguese government to the PCP on

All

a

silver platter.

that the PCP need do to create a soviet nation was to issue
the revolutionary decrees and control the government which

would implement them.

When the passive strategy to gain

control of the government failed, Rates turned increasingly

to

"putsch" movements and involved
the PCP
bourgeois "putsch" attempt between
1924
believed Portugal was ripe for

a

"united front"

was

the

every

and 1925.42

Rates

Russian style revolution

but the new Comintern representative,
a

in

Dupuy,

insisted that

correct path since the

"subjective" revolutionary conditions necessary
for

a

successful revolution had not accompanied the
"objective"
in

Portugal. 43

what he meant by Portugal

lacking the

necessary subjective conditions was that the party
was not
yet bolshevized enough for the IC to maintain control

of

the revolution through a disciplined PCP. 44
The excitement which the Russian success had brought
to the Portuguese was slowly diffused by the "united front"

policy imposed on the PCP by the IC.

The

"united front"

sapped the PCP of its revolutionary energy and left it ill

prepared for the approaching years of clandestine
existence.

The "united front" strategy was the final stand

for a group of aged syndical leaders which had been at the

forefront of the Portuguese labor movement.

Although Rates

and his group were forced to pursue "bourgeois" tactics,

they were later stripped of their leadership positions and

were blamed for incorrectly analyzing the Portuguese
situation even though they were following the IC's orders.

Because the bourgeois parties with which the PCP was

competing had similar ideological views, the PCP became

increasingly indistinguishable from
its rivals so that
toward the end of the republic many
of its militants

leaders had rejected the PCP for other

parties

and

(especially

for the Esquerda Democratica and the
Partido Radical). 45

According to Pereira,

Rates does not dominate the

party until 1926 as the PCP would have us
believe.
his return in the summer of 1924 from

a

After

visit to the Soviet

Union his power began to wane, and by the end of
that year
he no longer played a determining role

in the

party.

In

early 1925 he had been replaced as the Secretary-General
by

Ferreira Quartel.

Rates'

If we examine the PCP's

analyses during

leadership we find that the party was giving an

accurate account of the Portuguese situation while avoiding
the

ideological or dogmatic blinds which were biasing the

analyses of the

rest of the labor movement.

Pereira,

views held the worst as well as the best

Rates'

features of the Portuguese labor movement.

According to

He epitomized

the generation of militant workers which emerged from the

1910-12

strikes and disappeared during the

decades of the

the

"new state."

Rates'

first

few

analyses were full of

contradictions which might be expected from

a

self-taught man but they were also free of the dogmatic
constraints which colored others'

analyses.

His was

realistic assessment of the Portuguese situation.

been

a

revolutionary syndicalist,

a

a

He had

maximalist,

a

communist,

and a cooperat ivist

in the major debates

the

.

His influence was evident

surrounding Portuguese communism from

1913 debate concerning the revolutionary
potential

of

the syndical movement to the 1923-24
debate concerning the
need for syndical unity and the role of the

peasant^

the Portuguese revolution.

Rates was purged not

in

only for

his disdain of a centralized and disciplined
party but also

because he thought for himself and was

product of the

a

generation which emphasized the free expression of ideas
and opinions.
He wrote what he thought and felt with
little regard to ideological discipline which helps explain
why the official PCP organ 0 Communista is so lively from
1923-24 and so cumbersome from 1925-1926. 47
By

1926 the same JC members

suspended as

a

who had been purged or

result of the 1923 confrontation finally

succeeded in gaining control of the PCP leadership
positions from their older comrades who had been entrenched
in

the syndicalist tradition.

By

late

1924

the

IC

had

reinstated them with full privileges and by the end of 1925
they already held key positions.

membership of Red Aid

A quick glance at the CC

ancillary organization)

(an

resemblance with the 1923 CC of the JC

changes were clearly
"bolshevize" the party.

a

.

The

shows the

internal

tactical move by the IC to
The

same

intransigence and

sectarianism which had earlier led Droz to back the

expulsion of the Caetano de Sousa

faction was now

valuable asset welcomed by Dupuy and
later Codovilla,
new representatives of the IC. 48
The

"bolshevization" of the PCP,

claims Pereira,

a

the

was

accelerated in the second half of 1925 and its
effects were
already evident at the 1926 Second Congress.
The large

decline in membership which followed the accelerated
bolshevization was largely
on

a

result of the party's emphasis

discipline and centralism.

The reorganization of 1925

imposed certain conditions of membership which many of
the

communists were not willing to accept

(for

example,

like

Rates they preferred the open debate within the party which
they expected of the syndicalist tradition)

the party was

faced with the

.

Furthermore,

contradictions that IC

affiliates faced throughout the world.

In

the course of

applying the directives imposed on the party from above

which were designed to achieve the international goals of
the

IC

the party often neglected its obligations

Portuguese.

The

IC

take precedence,
domestic situation.

to the

directives would often conflict,

over the party's

own analyses

yet

of the

This is apparent when we compare the

First and Second Congresses of the PCP for while the First

discusses many of the national problems of Portugal the
Second merely appears to be

a

translation of the IC's

directives which could have been written for any communist

party in the world.

The original analyses for which
Rates

became known were also cleansed from

Comunista and

0

replaced with ideological arguments that
lacked references
to original Portuguese problems. 49
The reorganization of 1925-1926 created
a party which,
at

the time of its Second Congress,

was alien to the PCP

which emerged from the First Congress.

find any traces of its legacy.

It was difficult to

The Second Congress is

among the most secretive in PCP history.

One of its major

goals was to cleanse its ranks of the contradictions which

plagued the labor movement.

This meant that the purges

which accompanied the bolshevizat ion of the party resulted
in

a

minuscule,

unstructured,

unorganized PCP which was

unable to combat the newly installed military dictatorship
for the coup came before the new leadership had the chance

to rebuild the party it had just destroyed.
account of the

A realistic

Second Congress would show the personal

rivalries which were splitting the party as well as the
increased role which the IC was playing in the party's
organization 50
.

In

1926

a

right-wing military coup ended the first

Portuguese Republic and initiated the regime which would

postpone the second republic until 1974.

According to

the major

factor in the

Pereira,

the 1926 coup was not

catastrophic decline of PCP strength since repression did

.

not

intensify until

few years

a

later.

The coup did,

however,

alter the ideological and political
context
within which the party had to function
which in turn
required new tactics.
The new hostile environment

fed the

"boslshevization process" which created

a

new type of

communist militant that epitomized the militant
of the
thirties.
JC

The new militant was still radical as under
the

but the realities of the day required an increased

discipline,

an acceptance

of political

about-faces,

less debate than even he had been accustomed to.

and

He was

not yet the "perfect" Stalinist which epitomized the party

after the 1940-41 reorganization, but he was, nevertheless,

more disciplined than his predecessors.

He developed

a

better understanding of the value of administrative and

bureaucratic solutions.

Slowly the commitment to the

working-class movement that the members had been
reluctant to ignore in the 1920'

that the
movement.

"party" was

s

so

was replaced by the ideal

"above" or more important than the

The members became much more pragmatic and much

less ideological

After the

1

926 military coup the PCP continued its

activity especially

in

Porto where Bandeira Vermelha

continued to be published without being censured.

participated

in

both bourgeois republican

attempts directed at the newly

The PCP

"putschist"

installed military

dictatorship.

punishment,
resulted in
at

Although the PCP also took its share
of
the

a

first

"putsch"

of early February

1927

wave of repression which was mainly
directed

republicans and the labor movement.

militants were imprisoned and others went

the provinces.

In March

Many of its
into hiding in

1927 the PCP was reorganized

under the leadership of Jose de Sousa and Silvino
Ferreira,
but the party's activities did not change.
PCP participated in

brunt of

a

a

On June 20 the

second aborted "putsch" and bore the

new wave of repression. 52

The Portuguese delegation to the Tenth Anniversary of

the Bolshevik Revolution returned to Portugal

away

from October to November of 1927)

reorganizing the PCP once again.

had been

(it

with the task of

The newly reorganized

party, however, was primarily devoted to the development of

quadres and was inactive and increasingly isolated.
cell

of naval

A PCP

arsenal workers where Bento Goncalves

did not become

a

communist until 1928)

was

a

(who

member

demanded that the party either renew its syndical
activities or face

a

did not receive

response from the CC it decided to

a

new reorganization.

Since the cell

reorganize the party even though the CC had the backing of
the

IC.

The successful

reorganization of 1929 ended the

phase which focused on an immediate revolution.

The second

^

leadership

phase which began under Bento Goncalves'
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focused on defensive tactics as

a

result of the repressive

atmosphere under which it was forced to work.

its new goal

was to work toward partial victories which
would ultimately
lead to the overthrow of the "fascist" regime
through a

"national

and democratic revolution."

required new tactics

which included

The
a

new focus

shift

from the

worker-peasant alliance to the formation of united fronts
and electoral participation whenever possible. 54
The discussions above have introduced the history of

the PCP up until 1929.

It

is

crucial that we understand

the party's past to understand its activities during the

dictatorship.

It

is

crucial that we recognize and

understand the determinants behind its transformation from

the

complex,

chaotic,

republican period when the

heterogeneous PCP was but one representative of the labor
movement to its undisputed role during the dictatorship as
the sole

the

"party"

or

labor representative which continued

struggle to end the dictatorship and bring to the

working masses
leadership

"that which they deserved."

The current

of the PCP has preserved the "official" history

which emerged after the 1940-41 reorganization since they
were the creators of the "official" history.

The

history which we discuss

above is not the

"official" history which is referred to,
debated by the party.

analyzed,

and

The official party history has been

cleansed of any facts or events which
do not correspond to
the image it wants to convey to the
"rank and file" and to

the Portuguese working class.

aware

of

"our"

history.

Most communists are not

When confronted with our

contradictions to the "official" history the
communist's
initial reaction is that only the party knows

what its true

history is while the "rival" history has been
created by

"anti-communists" trying to weaken and divide the party.
Since we can learn as much about the party by analyzing
its

"official" history, by analyzing what
well as what it has excluded,

has

it

our next

included as

focus is on the

official party line with emphasis on the omissions and
changes to the actual facts.

The PCP's early history has

been reconstructed as accurately as possible but there are
still many areas, especially as we approach 1929, which are
not completely clear for lack of evidence.

According to the PCP's official history the internal

divisions which we discussed above are occasionally
referred to but only if they support the party's criticisms
of the pre-1929 leaders.

The discussions we had above

concerning the complexity of the labor movement and the

various ideological threads which divided

it

are usually

replaced in the official communist press with just one or
two paragraphs which focus on only those aspects which they

would like to publicize.

The PCP states,

for example,

that

in

1921

the party published the 21

the Comintern.

This leaves the reader with the impression

that those conditions were

above,

conditions and joined

adhered to yet,

discussed

as

it

took several years to put the conditions into

effect and

they did not begin to receive rigid adherence

until after the 1925-26 reorganization 55
.

According to the PCP after its

formation the party

focused on organizing and channeling the workers'
and activity in the correct direction

strength

(implying that the

CGT which was dominated by anarcho-syndicalists was
channeling it in the wrong direction) and trying to get the

workers movement to accept adherence to the International
Red Syndicate

(which it

(ISV)

rejected since the

counter to many of the CGT'

s

beliefs).

ISV ran

The party

emphasized its activity in the organizational realm by
creating the JC,
forth.

PCP

printing the official party press, and so

The party also

led to

a

implies that the emergence

of the

clarification of the muddled ideological

threads which dominated the movement.

true it is not as

a

result of as

Although this may be

favorable

a

response

toward the PCP as it would like us to believe but because
the PCP was having internal struggles of its own.

The move

by the PCP toward parliamentary activity under IC pressure

had

a

lot to do with the clarification of ideology but in

the opposite direction.

Many members and non-members found

it increasingly difficult to distinguish
the party from its

bourgeois rivals. 56
What we begin to see is that the party
omits whatever

unfavorably affects its

image and includes

only the

information which is favorable, much of it only
half-truths
or implied untruths.

discussed earlier.

Where is the "real" history

A comparison of the "official" history

with the unofficial, but real,

"official" line.
PCP's

which we

should make us question the

During and in the months prior to the

first congress Caetano de Sousa attempted to

control of the party's directive organs.

seize

In the official

history what should be considered one of the most
interesting and lively congresses is reduced to only five

paragraphs none of which mention the reorganizational
attempt or the numerous ideological threads which still
characterized the party.

The PCP prefers to emphasize the

congress's devotion to the agrarian problems

and the image

that the congress was democratic and free of internal
struggles.

The PCP declares that a representative of the

IC was present at the First Congress but never is there any

mention of Droz's full role.

After all the IC was often

deciding not only party policies but even choosing the

members of its directive organs which
during the clandestine era.

mentioned?^

Why

is the

it

IC

continued to do
s

full role not

The

PCP prefers

mention the inclusion of

to

representatives from the First International
in their
Congresses as examples of international solidarity
and the

recognition of their links with the international
working-qlass movement,

but they are not

as

eager to

uncover their full role in the PCP's history.

Although

Droz was the first member of the IC to routinely
intervene
in PCP

internal affairs,

there had been previous informal

links with the IC through Jesus Ibanez and Joaquin
Maurin,

two

Spanish

representatives of the ISV,

influence the PCP with the "Moscow" line. 58

who tried to
As with other

communist parties the PCP's history is marked with IC
interventions which have been
ideological shifts,

purges,

a

determining factor during

and other incidents.

Besides

Droz's role in the 1923 schism, the turnover of 1926 at the

Second Congress in which the previously defeated group of
1923 became the victor was
(Dupuy and later Codovilla)

At

the

a

result of the new IC group's

intervention in PCP affairs.

time the new IC goal was to accelerate the

bolshevization of the party and
with the IC

the

s

international organizations such as the ISV,

International Communist Youth,

International Peasant's Council.

into

increase its relations

the

clandestine era the

Red Aid,

and the

With the party's plunge
IC

became especially

instrumental in influencing the party's direction.

All

indications appear to show that the IC
directly intervened
in the directorship of the party
throughout the thirties
until the PCP was expelled from the
organization
in

1938/1939 (the IC was disbanded in 1943 and the PCP
was not
accepted back into the international communist family

until

its

recognition in 1947 by the Cominf orm) 59

The obvious

.

reason why the PCP would attempt to conceal IC
intervention
is

that it would back critics'

not

arguments

really a national party but

is

that the PCP is

instead

a

puppet of

Soviet international policy. 60
The PCP has purposefully deemphasized the role of the

first party congress

in

1923

and has especially concealed

the participation of Droz and the heated divisions which

surrounded the congress for reasons which will be more
fully developed below.

Carlos Rates'
did not

The party criticizes the period of

leadership as one

go beyond parliamentary

support of radical military coups.

gain

a

in which his

strategies

negotiations and the
The PCP was unable to

firm base among the working class because the party

could not evade .right wing opportunist influences. The
reason the party gives for Rates' incorrect analysis of the

situation

is

"thought that the working class was

that he

condemned to serve as

a

maneuverable mass [bargaining chip]

for the democratic petit bourgeoisie,

since he did not

believe in the possibility of elevating the proletariat to

be the leading and promoting class

of the Revolution of

October."

what the party fails to mention is
that Rates'
policies in the "bourgeois" parliamentary
sphere were as a
result of a direct order from the International 61
.

The

PCP

reduces the dominant

aspects

of

the

inter-congress period into criticisms of Rates' policies
until

1926

1924)

and a discussion of the increased repression directed

(but

he

only led the party until the end of

at the working class.

As far as the PCP is concerned

the

workers could not capitalize on their devotion and struggle

because of the opportunism of the anarcho-syndicalists who

dominated the CGT and were not mobilizing the workers for
revolutionary action.

Because neither the PCP nor ISV were

sufficiently organized nor influential enough to lead the
working classes to victory the party's activity was reduced
to the distribution of propaganda and attempts to organize

worker activity in the correct direction.
It

was

in

midst

the

of

62

this

atmosphere of

disorganization that the Second Party Congress was held but
the party never got much of an opportunity to deal with the

critical problems as
28,

with

a

result of the military coup of May

1926 which overthrew the first republic and replaced it
a

right-wing military dictatorship.

Given the weak

organization of the party and its low influence among the
workers,

the party was not

able to organize resistance to

the coup.

As

far as the party is concerned,

the 1926

congress was insignificant because the
PCP claims that the
congress never really met like other
congresses or dealt
with the crucial issues because it adjourned
early as a
result of the military coup.
The PCP, as we
shall see, has

very important reasons for keeping this congress
in the
dark for the Second Congress is much more important
than it
would have us believe. 63

According to the party, with the prohibition of its
legal activity the PCP was close to ending its existence

because it was not prepared or organized to continue
working in the repressive atmosphere which required
clandestine party.
its

a

The reason why the party was caught off

guard was because of the incorrect

lines of action

which not only the syndicai leaders but even the PCP
leaders prior to the 1929 reorganization carried out.

The majority of the militant workers which
emerged among us after the Russian Revolution,
with few exceptions, disappeared
in the deluge
[wave of repression] of 1926.
The majority of
them rose to the surface of the labor movement as
a result of the emotional state created by the
victory of the Russian workers.
The majority of
these militants, without
any socio-political
tradition behind them, and on top of that
uncultured, remained at the head of the working
masses and of their syndicates [unions] while
that seemed an easy task and not dangerous, in
the expectation that the end of the bourgeois
world was imminent. 54
As

long as they could continue their leadership on the

184

momentum of the Russian revolution all
was well.
So long
as the atmosphere of the imminent
collapse of bourgeois
capitalism continued these leaders did
nothing
to lead the

masses in the revolutionary struggle,

but

once the

repression and difficult times arrived they no
longer cared
to lead.
The labor movement from 1926
to

previously,

1929,

as

was dominated by the anarchist movement which

meant that their activity was insignificant.

Successful

strikes were not held because they were outlawed
and the

anarchists pursued policies of capitu 1 i z at i on and were
still

influenced by bourgeois ideals. 65

The workers were

exploited by these syndical leaders as well as by the
leadership of the old PCP who actually led the party into
its near

liquidation so that by 1929 only 40 members and

two cells remained.
1929.
it

The PCP was led by opportunists until

Then party leader Augusto Machado preferred to play

safe

and not publish the party official

develop political and syndical activity,

members.

He

organ,

not

and not recruit

reduced party activity to occasional

publications of propaganda and the reduction of its
syndical activity to studies and stat ist ics 66
.

By keeping the realities of the Second Congress

its

and

aftermath in the dark the party can continue to make

such comments and prepare the scene for the introduction of

Bento Goncalves as the party's saviour.

With the party's

.

185

role in the workers movement reduced to
abysmal levels and

the

"militant" workers crying out daily for new
forms of
organization adapted to a clandestine existence,
Bento
Goncalves stepped in and worked toward reorganizing
a party
capable of continuing its activity while underground 67
The
only factory cell which still belonged to the party
.

was the

Navy Arsenal cell in which Bento Goncalves was

a

member.

This cell took the initiative and purged the party of its

opportunist members through
party.

68

He wrote

a

a

reorganization of the

letter to the CC emphasizing the

necessity of reestablishing regular connections with the
syndical movement,
a

daily basis,

cells,

the need to analyze political events on

the need to expand the number of communist

and the need to establish a clandestine party press.

Since his letter remained unanswered a meeting was set up
to discuss the problem and the CC was asked to attend. 69

From within the Central Committee

(CC)

Manuel Pilar

also worked toward the reorganization of what was now an
inactive party by criticizing the sectarian spirit which

existed within the party.

As a result a Conference for the

Reorganization of the PCP was held by

14

party militants

who decided to reorganize the de facto non-existent CC
The political views of Manuel

Pilar and Bento Goncalves

replaced the views held by the CC before the
reorganization. 70

According to the analysis made by Bento

Goncalves,

prior to the reorganization the PCP had been

suffering from very serious problems.

The membership of

the party had declined to abysmal levels as had the
CGT's

influence on the workers.

Among the working class, petit

bourgeois ideas were increasingly infiltrating and
corrupting the working-class ideals.
the least bit of influence

The

The PCP no longer had

nor carried out any activity.

Socialists were directly and indirectly playing into

the governments hands.
its power.

The dictatorship was consolidating

The new capitalist economic crisis was ripe and

ready to burst as witnessed by the deteriorating conditions
of the working classes. 71

Bento Goncalves is considered the first "hero" of the
"current" PCP.

He is technically considered the "founding

father" of the party as well as the first "bolshevik", the

model

"Stalinist," and the perfect worker.

party'

s

Among the

few theoreticians only Cunhal can compare in the

crucial analyses which put the party back on track with the

reorganization of 1929,

after years

opportunism by uncommitted leaders,
in

cut

the reorganization of 1941.

Germano Vidigal,

bourgeois

and for his influence

Goncalves is considered

above the party's other heros

Dinis,

of

(for

Catarina Eufemia,

who usually achieved martyrdom as

a

example,

a

Alfredo

Maria Machado) 72

result of their

resistance to the dictatorship or through political

assassination by the PIDE

PCP

is

(secret police)

As

.

far as the

concerned the party did not really begin until

Goncalves reorganized it in 1929. 73

According to Pereira,

the party is based,
writings.

early history of

almost word for word,

This brings us to the

history and why,
distant

the official

so

far,

on Goncalves'

analysis of the PCP's

the party line appears to be so

from the actual history which we discussed above.

The most obvious inconsistencies in Goncalves' writings are

the chronological errors,

a

result of his

lack of access

to historical supporting documentation at the time of their

writing.
polemical.

74

But

Goncalves'

writings

are

also very

His analysis of the party's history until 1929

distorts the reality of the situation.

The party,

in turn,

has accepted his analysis and distorted or purged any of
the

facts which run contrary to the "official" history it

offers the Portuguese.

Goncalves praises the Caetano de Sousa faction, which
he considers the left wing of the party,

and criticizes the

majority of the party behind Carlos Rates'
which he considers the right wing.
the

leadership,

According to Goncalves,

left wing of the party defended the struggle of the

working classes against the bourgeoisie,

even though it

often turned to adventurism and terrorism.
though he controlled

a

majority of the party,

Rates,

even

was playing

into the hands

of the bourgeoisie with his

emphasis on

elections and putsches. 75
Goncalves is just as critical of Droz for his support
of the Rates faction.

As he states:

Rates and Droz

formed an irresponsible and
grotesque duo.
... it was not difficult to see
that^ they were shameless opportunists.
It is
difficult to admit that the I.C. ignored [the
true face] of this horde. Rates continued in the
party despite all. ... it was for the sectors of
the petite and medium bourgeoisie that he worked
with his politics, dragging with him the party.
76
According to Goncalves the PCP does not really have
history as

a

communist party

part of the twenties

(bolshevized)

a

until the latter

and in the official history it

is

Goncalves who saves and gives the party new vitality.

A comparison of the two PCP histories which were

discussed above leads us to wonder why there are so many
factual differences between them.

Why especially

early history based on Goncalves usually

a

is

the

complete

opposite of what really occurred during this period?

The

obvious answer is that the group which has controlled the

party ever since the reorganization of

1

940-41

considers

Goncalves to be the ultimate hero of the party and the
PCP's founding father.

Therefore,

rather than adapt their

views to conform with the historical facts,
chosen instead to alter the historical

the

"sanctity and purity" of Goncalves.

they have

facts to preserve

Because the PCP
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bases its history on Goncalves'

writings,

we

can best

understand the discrepancies in the early history
by
uncovering why Goncalves insisted on reversing the
roles of
the players so that the JC becomes the heroes
and Rates'

majority become the bourgeois right-wingers during
the
disagreements of the twenties. 77
According to Pereira the discrepancies (except for the

chronological mistakes) were purposefully distorted by a
Goncalves faced with a difficult task.
In order to
strengthen the party's discipline to the levels necessary
to make a clandestine party viable and to

the

IC's directives,

he

impose upon

it

found himself compelled to look

into the party's history in a search for the roots to the

policies which he would be pursuing in the thirties.

The

only group he could draw form would be the Caetano de

Sousa-Jose de Sousa faction with the small basis of JC
support behind it.

history,

In order to do this he had to recreate

blaming Rates and Humbert Droz for many of the

organizational problems

responsible.

for which they were not

But according to Pereira,

totally

Rates and Droz

cannot be blamed alone for the parties decrease in strength
to

1929.

Rates'

and Droz'

s

actions were only one of the

factors leading to the loss of membership of the late

twenties.

After all the party already suffered from

internal conflicts as

a

result of the contradictions within

the anarcho-syndicalist worker's movement
from which it had
been formed. 7 ^

Goncalves and the current PCP declare the JC
faction
the heroes and ignore the terrorist activities
they were

carrying out.

They extend Rates'

leadership to 1925/26

when by the end of 1924 his power within the PCP
was
already waning.

They keep the truth of the 1923 conflicts

and the reorganizations of

1923,

24

,

and 25 undercover.

They even try to pass-off the Second Congress as not having

dealt with any major issues because of the military coup,
but this is all far from the truth.
is most

The second congress

likely secretive to preserve Bento Goncalves'

role

in the reorganizat ional crisis of 1929. 79

As

we

discussed earlier,

Pereira argues that the

majority of the rifts within the party until 1929

(the

Rates/Caetano de Sousa rift, the agreement between the PCP
and the International Red Syndicate, the return at the end
of 1924 of members purged in 1923,

with the

relationship

radicals and social- democrats,

reorganizations of 1923,

organizational
divisions.

the PCP's

24,

25

)

were based more

lines than on political

The major

and the

or

on

ideological

factors behind the PCP's disastrous

decline in membership from 3000 members in 1923 to only 40
members in 1928 can not be laid only at Rates'

doorstep.

It

is

true that Rates'

turn to

and Droz's

putschist
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tactics with the bourgeois republicans
led to a decline in
members as did the "united front"
policies imposed on the
party by the IC beginning in 1924.
The membership figures
show a clear decline in the size of the
party from

1921 to

1929.

1921

400-1000 pep members and 260 Young

Communists
1922

1923

2900 members
(early)

(1702 paying membership fees)

3000

(November) 500

1924

700

1928

70

1929

49

(the PCP

claims there were only 40

members)

With each reorganization the party lost large numbers of
its members through voluntary termination of membership or
as

a

result of expulsions.

As Rates

led the party closer

to the Democratic Left or the Radical Party, whether it was
in

the politics of putsches which he preferred or the

"United Front" policies forced upon him by the
result was the same.

IC,

the end

In either case the party became less

distinguishable from the bourgeois parties which led
members to abandon the party for the anarcho-syndical

movement or for the rival parties. 80
Immediately after its formation in 1921 the
JC did not
lose as many members to rival movements
and parties

as did

the PCP because of its greater militancy.

in

its

early

days the JC's involvement in the Red Legion's

terrorist

activities made it distinguishable

least an

equal to its rivals.

members as
it

from or at

But although the party did not lose

result of similarities with the other parties

a

was considerably weakened by the terrorist activities

which sapped its membership through "death,
and deportation."

imprisonment,

An example of the JC's militancy was its

attempt to takeover the PCP in 1923 but it was subsequently

weakened as members abandoned the JC and as
creation of

a

a

result of the

new youth organization parallel to the JC by

the PCP. 81

Another

important

factor behind the declining

membership of the party was the increasingly repressive
atmosphere which followed the military coup of 1928.

most

important

factor,

however,

appears

to

be

The

the

accelerated bolshevizat ion policies which were implemented

beginning with the reorganizations of

1924.

The

conclusions based on abundant information are that the
struggle which Goncalves described between the worker
"left" and the bourgeois "right" was not an ideological one

but

instead -one based on the decentralized nature of the

PCP.

Two nuclei existed

(JC

versus ex-syndicalists)

with

different origins struggling to control the
organization.
Based on class there is no basis to Goncalves'

distinction

between

a

bourgeois group and

a

worker group because both

factions had similar class backgrounds.

JC was

too

Caetano de Sousa's

small to be considered an equal to Rates

majoritarian group.

This organizational

struggle was the

result of the bo 1 shevi z at i on process.
concludes,

As

Pereira

ideologically both groups were "Blanquist

.

"

We

could venture to say that the JC faction was composed of
"leftist" Blanquists
with their interpretation of

democratic centralism and attempts to achieve power via

terrorist activities while the PCP was composed of
"rightist" Blanquists who focused instead on putsches and
alliances with the bourgeois republicans. 82

Armed with this analysis of the party's early history
it becomes easier to uncover the reasons behind the party's

falsification and manipulation of its history.

If

Goncalves is the "hero" of the PCP, then either his truths
must be accepted and the realities of this history altered
to back them up,

or the party must recognize that Goncalves

erred and alter his history so it is supported by the
facts,

or Goncalves must be rejected as a hero altogether.

The latter is unthinkable for he is too close to the hearts
of the Stalinists who reorganized the party in 1940-41.

To

renounce him would be similar to renouncing
themselves.

Similarly the PCP prefers to keep Goncalves'

inaccurate

analyses of the early history because they support their
own analyses which follow the 1940-41 reorganization.

The

only option which remains, therefore, is to conceal, alter,
or destroy the vestiges of the real history from Portuguese

society or at least from its militants.
The complexities of the early period are covered with

white or black paint because militants have an easier time

determining what is "good" from what is "bad" when the
complexities have been obscured.

This is true in any type

of propaganda whether it comes from

from an administration

of

a

communist party or

any country.

It

is

more

difficult for propagandists to successfully manipulate the

real,

complex aspects

of

the

truth

(the

everything is reduced to blacks and whites.
with us or against us.

The complex,

grays)

so

You are either

real history is

not

recognized in the official PCP history or by Goncalves
because to do so would mean to recognize that Goncalves'
heroes within the JC were already in control of the party

prior to the 1929 reorganization and that the decimation in

terms of membership was
bo 1 shevi z at i on

process

largely

a

result

the

rather than the other more

convenient reasons which the party provides
Droz's errors)

of

(Rates'

and
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Structur e and membership

.

According to the official

PCP history based on Bento Goncalves'

PCP was

analyses,

in 1923 the

"bourgeois" while the JC was "proletarian."

Although the distinctions between worker,

employee,

and

intellectual are vague and difficult to determine, the
party appears not to be bourgeois,

as

the reorganizers

would like us to believe, because both the JC and the PCP
were dominated by workers.

This is especially true of the

JC which only after the thirties began to register a larger

enrollment of students

(intellectuals).

We

can

say,

however, that when compared to the anarcho-syndicalists

(of

which the JC at the time was more representative because

a

majority of its members came from the Young Syndicalists)
the PCP's "workers" were based in sectors which were more

"conscious of class divisions" or "enlightened"
rather than leather workers,

(cashiers

for example) .84

Pereira has only found limited data for the membership
of the PCP and JC during the

first republic but based on

the information available for 554 members he reaches some

conclusions on the organization and membership of both.
The major difficulties in analyzing the data surrounds,

example,

for

how to determine the class make-up of the party

based on the limited employment information available.

The

membership of the PCP appeared to be drawn primarily from

railroad,

arsenal,

civil construction,

and similar positions.
individuals as worker,
questionable.

and metal

workers,

The

classification of many
employee, or intellectual is

Railroad office employees were considered

workers equal to those that worked in construction
and
maintenance. Self-employed barbers (or even those with
one

apprentice)

were

considered workers as were many of the

ex-syndicalist leaders,

like Carlos Rates,

who had been

workers but had climbed some rungs of the social

ladder.

Most likely the reason the Caetano de Sousa faction and
Goncalves labeled the PCP bourgeois was

"empregado" sector

(office workers

a

and so

result of the
forth)

and the

recently upward mobile members. 85
The PCP was

a

predominantly male organization with

minuscule female participation of

.7

percent

a

(and even that

participation is questionable given the sexist society
which existed in Portugal)

.

During the latter part of the

clandestine years the party would make

a

strong effort to

widen the role of the woman beyond the traditional
"housekeeping" mentality under which they were categorized
by the males. 86
The PCP during its early years was weak in grass root

membership and was basically

a

"notable" party.

The party

was primarily an urban one centralized in Lisbon.

not

yet

It

was

strong in either the Alentejo or the Setubal

district which later became among its most
important
regions of strength.
Until the 1923 reorganization

as

demanded by the Comintern,

the PCP was based on Communist

Centers which were political clubs.
initiated the

"commune."

In

1925,

The reorganization

the party was again

reorganized into "cells" with special emphasis on factory
cells, but in reality most were local block or street cells

because Portugal was not very industrialized at the time.
This remained the case until 1930. 87

Until 1929 the party

was directed by a Central Commission

(CC)

party congresses.

elected at the

In the party's early years the CC was an

equal partner with other directive organizations

such as

the National Junta or the General-Commission of Education
and Propaganda as was the tradition in the Portuguese labor

movement.

Slowly,

especially after the accelerated

bolshevization of 1925-1926,

the leadership

of the party

drifted toward greater centralization. 88

The PCP in the Thirties

1926 military coup the PCP was the only

After the

party able to resist fascism and continue its activities
underground.

The PCP's transition from a legal party to a

clandestine party was the major
reorganization.

Bento Goncalves,

focus

of

the

1929

according to the PCP,
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played a decisive role in the reorganization of
1929.
struggled to decrease the anarchist tendencies which

existed within the PCP,

working classes,

form the

organizations,

still

to connect the party with the

and to bolshevize the party.

directive

He

organs,

the

He helped

ancillary mass

and the diversified clandestine press

necessary to implement the party's clandestine strategies.
The PCP's successful transformation to a clandestine party

eventually attracted the confidence of the working class

and catapulted the party ahead to become the workers'
vanguard. 89

The reorganization of 1929 found the party in dire
straits in terms of its clandestine experience, in terms of

its

ability to combat repression,

terms

in

of

its

ideological preparation, and in terms of its finances.

The

few members that remained in the newly reorganized party
were mainly militant workers with long years of experience

within the syndical movement. When it became evident that
the

fascist regime supported by the military and police

forces could only be overthrown by
movement led by strong well organized,

a

strong popular

combative political

organizations the party worked in that direction.

Some of

the unitary or partisan organizations which it set up were
the Revolutionary Organization of the Armada,

Red Aid,

League of Friends of the USSR,

International

and League against

.
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War and Fascism.

90

In order to improve its links with the working
classes

the PCP

focused on leading strikes and demonstrations

favor of the workers

(especially during 1931-32).

91

in
in

September of 1930 it set up the Inter-Syndical Commission
(ISC

-

a

relative of today's Inters indical

government attempts to control the unions.
the PCP the
the major

)

to counter

According to

ISC quickly contested and replaced the CGT as

representative of the revolutionary syndical

movement which had been exploited for decades by the
anarchists. 92
syndical

By

1934

the PCP praised its successful

strategy by declaring that the membership in the

Intersindical had increased to 25,000 as compared to 15,000
in the anarcho-syndicalists CGT and 5,000

FAO

93

in the

socialist

This meant that the PCP increased the membership in

Inter-Syndical by 67% in only one year since at the XII

congress of the Comintern the PC claimed to have only
15, 000. 94

The official party organ 0 Communista had been closed

down by the government since 1926,

so

the PCP began using

the national and legal 0 Proletario as its major vehicle
for

communication of the official party line.

Initially

the paper was printed in Porto where the censors were more

lenient than in Lisbon,

was

but by the mid-thirties the paper

moved to the capital city and became more openly

.

!

!

!
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communist.

Goncalves

credited with writing many

is

important analyses in the paper concerning the reformism
of
the PS and the radicalism of the anarchists who

were

pursuing the wrong path and serving the interests of the
bourgeoisie rather than the revolutionary working class.
The

crackdown and imprisonment

editors,

the papers'

of

Bento Goncalves and Jose de Sousa,

shutdown in late 1930

(it

95

major

led to its

reissued later as the

was

clandestine organ of Intersindical

96

)

By 1931 the presses were running again but this time

clandestinely as the first series of Avante
presses in February.

rolled off the

Although the paper had planned to

publish bi-weekly it only managed to publish about nine
issues

(most

in

1931)

up until

Under the wave of

1933.

repression which began in 1932, Avante

Frente Vermelha
returned in 1933

(Red Front)
(most

replaced by

issues before

official party organ,

.

97

to

The PCP proclaims Avante

one

be

clandestine newspapers in the world.

of

It

expanding the party's influence,
"reviralhistas "

was important in
in

and in battling the

(putschists)

sapping the popular movement of its strength.
Avante!

,

the greatest

strengthening the internal organization of the PCP,

anarchist and the

it

indications are that only one issue

was produced in that year)

the

two

for

was

the party conveyed the "correct"

that were
Through

ideological and

!

tactical methods to fight fascism. 98 with the formation
of

clandestine press the party's abilities to implement
its
analyses improved tremendously.
The party was now able
a

to

communicate with the masses regularly since the press
provided a vehicle of party propaganda directed at their

enlightenment and organization.

Avante

was the major

party publication but the PCP also printed

a

number of

affiliated publications for various trades and
syndicates 99
.

In

1933 the PCP's

"Antonio"

outlined the party's

progress and evaluated its deficiencies at the XII Plenary
Session of the

IC.

The reason for the major difficulties

within the party was that its organizational strength

was

much weaker than its actual influence in Portugal.

The

party's cadres were primarily young,

inexperienced

individuals who still harbored anarchist tendencies and
occasionally resorted to terrorist activity.
major tasks in
1

.

2.

The party's

1933 were:

to purge the anarchist tendencies which remained
within the party,
to strengthen the bonds between the agricultural
laborers and the industrial workers by creating a

strong unitary organization.
3.

to shift the basic organizational unit to the
factory cell from the neighborhood cell.

4.

to continue to strengthen its activity in the

syndical movement.
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to devote more time to dealing with the problems
of
the agrarian poor.

5.

Antonio went on to criticize the IC for not being more
supportive of the PCP because Portugal,

although small,

played an important role in terms of international
communism. 100
In

the mid-thirties

the major

role

of

the PCP as

dictated by the IC was to entrench itself in the society as
a

clandestine organization and,

if possible

without

imperiling itself, to enlighten and prepare the masses for

the inevitable revolution. 101
admit

it,

Although the PCP will not

the action at the time

focused on propaganda,

especially through large runs of the clandestine press.
The goals of the PCP and the FJCP

Communist Youth or JC

)

(Portuguese Federation of

were to continue the

struggle

against the bourgeoisie at the fascist dictatorial "front"
and at the socialist and anarcho-syndicalist "front."
PCP emphasized that

it

The

would not align with any of the

other parties or movements since that would endanger the
revolutionary and working class base.

PCP's

Neither would

the party cooperate in bourgeois putschist tactics because

bourgeois

fascism was as bad as any other danger which

would emerge from the bourgeoisie.

In battling fascism the

party was battling only one facet of bourgeois capitalism.
If

fascism ended but bourgeois liberalism continued

.
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the party's

struggle would also continue because the

ultimate goal, to socialize the means

of production and

change private ownership into collectives,

would run

counter to liberal interests. 102
Social-democracy,

the bourgeois

a

label which was

"collaborators"

(the

also applied to

anarchists),

was

considered to be the primary obstacle toward developing
revolutionary movement especially during 1929-1933.
PCP,

in

keeping with the IC's views,

considered "social-fascism"
must be against us.

a

To the

social-democracy was

for those who are not with us

The solution which the PCP chose to

combat social fascism was the workers'

unitary front in

which the PCP would attempt to wean socialist workers away
from

their social fascist leaders. 103

the PCP's

These policies were

interpretation of the Comintern's

"class versus

class" tactics which dominated PCP strategy from 1928

Sixth IC Congress)

to

1935

(the

(the

Seventh IC Congress)

.

Under the class versus class tactics the deteriorating

economic conditions would increase the number of

proletarians and decrease the
capitalists.
to

The latter

number of bourgeois

would have to increasingly resort

force to repress the masses as the balance of power

shifted toward the working classes but in the long run the

masses would rise and overthrow the yoke of their
oppressors 10 ^

In

theory the party preached the class versus class

strategy but in reality the Portuguese proletarian base was
small and the party often worked along side the bourgeois

elements.

the

Although the party was against participation in

bourgeois putsch movements which

"reviralhista"

it

it

labeled

was evident that despite the party's

efforts many communists continued to participate in the

putsches

(as

is

evident

from the number of communists

imprisoned after their participation

in

the

1931

putsch) .105

The increased repression of 1932 and the arrests of
several

leaders of the PCP

output of the party press.
to

shift

its

and JC led to

a

decrease in

About this time the party began

emphasis from mere agitation to political

action through the organized class movements such

as

general strikes in the move to fulfill workers economic and

political demands and to end the repression under which the

Portuguese lived.

The

shift of emphasis

from mere

agitation to organization of the masses became especially
evident after Bento Goncalves'
In

return from prison in 1933.

this manner the party moved closer from the mere

theoretical discussion of action in propaganda and the
party press to organization and preparation for action.

1° 6

A comparison of the tactical shifts discussed above

s
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with the decisions made at the XII Plenary Session
of the
IC's Executive Committee in 1932 shows a close
correlation
and will help reveal why the transition began when it
did.

Throughout Europe class struggles for economic and
political reasons were numerous as the great depression

approached its most difficult years.

The grave crisis was

reflected in the polarization of the classes which was

paralleled by the increasing strength of fascist and
communist parties.

The IC analyzed the increasing turmoil

throughout Europe and concluded that the communist parties

needed to organize the workers;

they needed to strengthen

the unity of the working classes especially between the
employed and the unemployed;

the

and they needed to

fulfillment of workers demands even if

fight
it

for

meant

expulsion of sectarian tendencies within the party. 107
This helps explain the party'
in
18,

s

increased involvement

syndical strikes and activity such as that of January

which attempted to block the dictatorship,

1934

efforts to replace free unions with state dominated ones

(similar to Mussolini's actions) .108
"Queiros,

"

According to

after the June 1933 attempt to do away with free

unions and replace them with national
the ISV attempted to set up

government's moves.

a

(fascistic)

unions

unitary front to combat the

This attempt succeeded in bringing

together the central organizations of anarchist, communist,

206

reformist,

of these

and independents under the first unitary
front

organizations in Portugal.

The unitary front's

call for general strikes and demonstrations throughout
the

major points of the nation led to the protests of
January
18,

1934

against the fascistic decrees of the government.

In Marinha Grande the demonstrations and a two-day
general

strike moved beyond demonstrations to

attempts.

insurrectional

With the support of the populace the

insurrectionists were able to seize control of the city and
overpower the police forces for

a

few hours.

These errors

which the PCP claims were committed by the anarchists as
well as anarchist tendencies within the PCP undermined the

policies

of

the

united front.

The

move beyond

demonstrations to action combined with other anarchist
errors destroyed the campaign to stop the

the unions.

However,

it

of

did show the masses that they

could demonstrate against
maintained unity. 109

f ascist izat ion

fascism so

long as

they

The PCP also concluded that it should

focus on organizing partial strikes since total strikes and

insurrectional attempts could lead to backlashes from the
government .HO

One

result

of

the

repression which followed the

January 1934 demonstrations was that all activities of the

PCP moved into the clandestine arena for the first time.
Prior to 1934 the party was able to continue legal and

!

quasi-legal

!

(in

addition to clandestine)

activities partly

as a result of the disorganization of the repressive
organs

(censors and police)

with Avante

'

s

.

During this period, which coincided

second series

(June

1934

to

1938),

the

communist press and its affiliated organizations published

more material than during any other period of its
clandestine existence.

The publication of Avante

one

of the party and by

of the major duties

being published weekly.

In

fact,

1

937

became
it

was

toward the end of the

decade the printing presses became almost the only activity

which the party was carrying out.

The party's almost

exclusive devotion to the printing presses sparked

criticism within the party's ranks.

The

criticism

eventually led to internal divisions and the chaos which
followed the 1941 reorganization of the party. 111
In

the discussion by

Congress

(1935)

Queiros to the Seventh IC

following Dimitrov'

s

speech,

the PCP was

already suggesting the need to attract petit bourgeois

intellectuals who were dissatisfied with the dictatorship,

republicans who had turned their backs
attempts,

on

putschist

and the need to build up a united anti-fascist

popular front which would include the anarchist and
syndicalist movements.

Participation in the

united front

did not mean allowing members of those groups

party since the discussion,

into the

in addition to the emphasis on
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building

a

united front,

also emphasized cleansing the

party of sectarian and opportunistic views and of
increasing,

reinforcing,

and widening

party strength in

the working-class by defending working class interests.
The party was especially concerned in developing stronger

links with the peasants, the unemployed, the women, and the

youths who had received relatively little attention up
until then. 112

The major shift to come out of the Seventh

IC Congress was the abandonment of the "class versus class"

strategy for the "popular front" strategy. 113

According to the party,
400 members.

in

1935

it

already numbered

The PCP was recognized by the workers as the

only party which represented its interests.

It was at this

point that it began to make inroads into the Alentejo,
Algarve, and Marinha Grande.

The

Goncalves stated that:

Prior to 1929, when the masses spoke of
communism, they referred to the French
communists, for example.
After 1929, they
referred to us.
In the space of three years,
we have built a party recognized by and dear
The correlation of forces in
to the workers.
the syndical movement has shifted in our
We have had many activities in
favor.
intellectual and student circles. We created
We began
a strong organization of sailors.
being taken seriously ± 4
.

]_

As a result of the party's

increased activity during the

thirties and its increased ancillary organizations the
fascist state became increasingly vigilant of the PCP and

focused its repression and propaganda on the communist

i
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threat.

With the arrests of the secretariat members (Bento
Goncalves, Jose de Sousa, Julio Fogaca) in the mid-thirties

the

activities of the party were profoundly affected

because the organization of the party was centered on the
Secretariat.

forming

a

Nevertheless the PCP continued its activity

central committee in 1936 which included Alberto

Araujo and Manuel Rodrigues da Silva
the secretariat)

(who

also belonged to

as well as Alvaro Cunhal and Pires Jorge.

Avante began being published weekly until 1938.

The party

supported the republican forces in Spain and many members
of

the

organization

joined the

fighting.

One

of

the

landmarks of history of which the PCP is proud is its
involvement in 1936, through its ancillary organization the

Revolutionary Organization of the Armada

(ORA)

,

in the

mutiny aboard three Portuguese war ships to prevent them
from helpirig Franco's troops. 115

The increased repression

with more sophisticated methods

learned from Nazi

specialists forced the party to be more cautious while
under clandestine conditions.

Party activity began to

wither although many of the party's roots remained intact
and sprouted

as

a

large national party with a more solid

base after the reorganization of 1940-41.

1 ^

By 1939 most

of the leaders of the party had been arrested bringing the

party to

a

virtual standstill.

The discovery of two of the

clandestine presses in 1938-1939 ended the publication of
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the second series of Avante! until

the presses were again

started two years later. 117
As we have seen,

with the reorganization of 1929 the

PCP began its metamorphosis as

it

spun the cocoon within

which it would continue its clandestine existence.

An

essential element in the parties clandestine operations was
a

well

organized,

bolshevized party.

The

first

unsuccessful attempts at the bolshevizat ion of the party
began at the first party congress of 1923 although it was
not until

1925-26 and the Second Congress that the PCP

became seriously engaged in the party's bolshevizat ion; by

the

1929 reorganization,

the Bolshevik

influence was

decisive and after the 1934 insurrectional strikes it had
an

incontestable hold over the party.

The bolshevizat ion

process helps explain why it is difficult to find pre-1929
PCP members

among the party ranks at any level after the

reorganization of 1929
the 1940-41

(and this

reorganization)

.

In

is

especially true after

effect the party of

1929

was a different party than that of 1921.
For the most part, the historical account of the party

discussed above

is

based on the party's official history

which when compared to the real history inevitably results
in

contradictions needing explanation.

Unfortunately,

unlike the republican era little is known of the party's

clandestine existence,

especially during the periods when

.

Cunhal was not heading the party (1929-1940 and 1949-1960)

Nevertheless, enough information is available upon which to
base some conclusions.

As

clandestine activity progressed in the
the party went through a long period of

its

thirties,

instability in its directive organs as
repression,

imprisonments,

a

result of

and disorganization.

Every

indication shows that during this period of hardship the
IC played a determining role in the directive organs until

it

broke relations with the party in 1939.

Central Committee

(CC)

was

The title of

only begun to be used in the

thirties and it coexisted with other directive organs such
as

the Executive Central Commission,

In

reality it is often difficult to determine which of the

organs was running the party at

because after waves of repression

a

and the Secretariat.

given moment in time
it

was not uncommon to

find the quadres or even militants of the party directing
the organization since there were times when they were the

only ones to escape the repression.

During 1929,

for

example, the momentum behind the party's reorganization was

not

in

the

hands

of

individuals

in

positions of

leadership .119
Despite the special position which the PCP holds for
its martyr Bento Goncalves,

Pereira claims that the real

individuals credited with the reorganization of the party

!

into a clandestine party in 1929 were

Jose de Sousa and

Julio Cesar Leitao.120 According to Francisco
Ferreira, an
ex-PCP member, Goncalves was a bad organizer
with little
initiative or motivation, although he was very
intelligent.
When compared to the activity which was pursued
by Jose de
Sousa who was in charge of the syndical sector,
Goncalves'

activities,

who was

in charge

of the party,

are dwarfed.

The differences which would emerge by the end of the
decade

between the two leaders began to be apparent at this time.
Jose de Sousa
the syndical

focused more on propaganda and agitation at

level while Goncalves

centralized hegemony on the party.

even be seen

focused on imposing

These differences could

the party press.

in

sectarian group had to make

the 3000 copies of

a

tremendous effort to publish

Avante

appeared to have

a

more numerous

party-aff

While Goncalves'

on

schedule,

Jose de Sousa

much easier time publishing the much
i 1 i at e

d

,

syndical

related

publications .121

Bento Goncalves' masterwork, Duas Palavras

,

of which

the PCP is so proud was written in the Tarrafal detention

camp in the Cape Verde Islands.

We have already discussed

some of the major analyses of the PCP's early history which

Goncalves included in the work and have seen their
contradictions with the "real" history.

An understanding

of the period during which the book was written will give

us considerable insight into the
problems facing the PCP at

the end of the thirties.

Palavras was written as

We should understand that Duas
a

series of dispersed notes in

reaction to texts highly critical of the parties
activities
from 1929-1935 which were being circulated within
the

prison walls by the "Group of Disassociated Communists"
(Grupo dos Comunistas Afastados

GCA). 12 2

-

According to Perreira, the edition of Duas Palavras
which is now available from the PCP press has been
"censored" by the party to present

a

favorable image of

Bento Goncalves and the PCP's early history.

Tarrafal'

s

A split among

communist prisoners resulted in the expulsion

from the PCP of the GCA by Goncalves'

Tarrafal Communist Prisoners.

Organization of

The major impetus

for the

split appeared to be the resentment by the GCA toward
Goncalves'
-

collaborationist policies with prison officials

the so called "politica nova"

(new politics)

.

Jose de

Sousa was

one

Goncalves'

support came from ORA to which most of the

of

the members

prisoners at Tarrafal belonged.
traced back to Goncalves'

of the

GCA.

Most

of

The division could be

attempt to impose IC directives

on the party after he returned to Portugal from the Seventh
IC Congress

in

1935.

At that time he moved to disband the

clandestine Int er-Syndical Commission through which the
party channeled most of its syndical activity and replace

it

with activity within the corporative
syndicates

controlled by the government.

His attempts infuriated the

more radical members within the PCP

syndical activity.

Goncalves'

centered around

imprisonment after his

return from Moscow prevented him from carrying
out his
policy so that the divisions remained within the party.

As

the "inter-syndicalists" or "anarchists" were arrested
from
1935 to 1937,

they took with them to Tarrafal the vestiges

of an internal split which was never resolved until these

two views confronted each other in prison. 12 3
The

final break revolved around the

pursued by Goncalves within Tarrafal,

neutralidade"

"politica nova,"

and the "politica de

(politics of neutrality)

reorganized PCP of 1941.

pursued by the

Both of these "politics" revolved

around the official PCP position toward WWII.

WWII was

categorized by Goncalves as an inter-imperialist struggle

similar to WWI

Goncalves,

was

The party's

.

to

position,

according to

place Portugal's independence above

partisan differences and to maintain
neutrality in the war.

a

position of

Goncalves went so far as to present

the Tarrafal prison officials with a document

outlining

these views and offering the PCP's collaboration toward
achieving both goals.
to

the

The collaboration was

unacceptable

"syndicalists" who distanced themselves from

Goncalves and became increasingly critical until they were
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expelled from the party in 1941.124
The divisions were not

limited to Tarrafal.

At home

the PCP was also struggling to break free
of its internal

splits.

The

official leadership of the party

Grilo-Vasco de Carvalho)

(Velez

also found itself confronted by

a

reorganized PCP in which Julio Fogaca and Alvaro
Cunhal

played leading roles.

The indications are that the PCP

aligned with the GCA while the reorganized PCP sided
with

Bento Goncalves.

The

reason little is known of the

"politica nova" is that the reorganizers vanquished and
took control of the PCP.

References to Goncalves' position

were extinguished since after the USSR's entrance into the

"imperialist" struggle Goncalves' martyrdom would have been
dealt

a

black mark.

The reorganized PCP, which is the same

PCP we know today, has used all of its powers to maintain

favorable image of its two "cults of personality"

-

a

that of

Goncalves and that of Cunhal, the new PCP leader. 12 5
The incidents

of

the

surrounding the 1940-41 reorganization

party are not completely known for lack of

information but some initial conclusions can be drawn until
more of the missing pieces to this puzzle are discovered.
We know that in 1939 the IC broke relations with the PCP so

that in terms of an IC affiliation Portugal did not have

communist party.

a

Indications are that relations were cut

with the party because of the PCP's position during police

!
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arrests

(especially concerning Pavel's escape).

m

any

case,

from 1939 to 1941 two communist parties
struggled to
attract the support of the IC criticizing
each other of
revisionism. 126
The Grilo grQup immediately followed
the
IC's directives and declared the need for
national unity

after Hitler attacked the Soviet Union while the
"reorganizers" continued their policy of neutrality

127

.

Despite the "reorganizers" having wrested control of
the
party from the Velez Grilo group, the Grilo group continued
to publish its own Avante

until 1945 when the group faded

away 128
.

The years of 1939 to 1941 were difficult ones for the

party not only because of increased domestic repression but
also because of problems within the party spurned on by the

Nazi-Soviet pact and other foreign actions.

129

The

reorganization began in 1940 with quadres recently released

from Tarrafal.

Julio Fogaca was one of the most active

"reorganizers" after his release.

He had been

in

the CC

beginning in 1935 and would return to the Secretariat
the

fifties. 130

it

was at this point that Alvaro Cunhal

began to advance in the party hierarchy 131
.

the party,
1934.

According to

Cunhal was the Secretary-General of the JC in

Already in 1939 Cunhal was showing himself to be

Stalinist.

in

When asked to write

a

a

manifesto for the CC

explaining the Nazi-Soviet Pact Cunhal came up with

a

document unacceptable to the CC which
was hardline and

doctrinaire

(also proven by

an article he published in 0

Diabo which supported the pact) .132

The membership figures

for this period are highly

variable ranging from 40 to 50 in 1929 to
between 50 and
in 1 933 depending on whose information
7 0 0
is used.
Pereira, who has always been a reputable source,
provides
the following membership figures:
1928

70

(50

1929

49

(29 in Lisbon)

1935

400+ 133

in Lisbon and 20 in Porto)

The PCP in the Forties

The reorganization of

1940-41

finally brought the

party under firm control of orthodox communists who viewed

socialism from

a

perspective similar to the Soviets.

Although Soviet support was denied the newly reorganized
party at first,
Stalinization

.

the new leaders

continued the party's

The enforcement of "democratic centralism"

and insistence on the "dictatorship of the proletariat"

became entrenched in the party.

The orthodox

leaders

became so dedicated to the preservation of "socialism in
one state"

(the Soviet Union)

and so committed to Stalinism

that they ultimately rejected Khrushchev's critique at the

"

XX

PCSU Congress

personality

The

(in

1956)

of

Stalin's

"cult

of

.

PCP's

link

to

the

Comintern during the

reorganization of 1940-41 was through the
American
Communist Party.

Julio Fogaca described in his letters
to

the Comintern the reasons behind the PCP's
reorganization

which included the arrests of cadres, a lack
of
conspiratorial work, and suspicions that even the
leadership of the party had been infiltrated.

The

Comintern had been aware of these problems as early as
1939
when it cut off relations with the PCP.
Once reorganized
Julio Fogaca was upset that the Comintern abandoned the PCP

despite the party's attempts to get IC recognition 134
.

The reorganization

of the party had not been easy

because the former leaders
Francisco Sacavem)
positions.

Vasco de Carvalho and

had been reluctant to give up their

In addition,

the best militants
Nevertheless,

(e.g.

the suspicious arrests of many of

complicated the reorganization.

the party tried to continue its work.

With

information from its imprisoned leaders and members,

uncovered and purged suspected informers.
PCP,

the newly reorganized party was

militants

(including Julio Fogaca)

.

it

According to the

formed from the best
The reorganization was

carried out so secretively and successfully that many of
its

leaders only learned of it when the newly reorganized

PCP

denounced them as unworthy of the support
of the

masses .135
As additional proof of the successful
reorganization,

Fogaca emphasized that after one year of activity
the party
had not suffered from any new imprisonments.
According to

Fogaca,

the party had not

influence among the masses
but

it

yet

reached

significant

a

(especially of the peasants),

had gained the confidence of the

"revolutionary

proletariat" and the party leadership was primarily working
class.

Despite the legacy which the new PCP inherited it

was making daily gains among the workers.

The new party

was made up of disciplined revolutionary militants

and

leaders devoted to the principles of international
communism.

Even if the IC had never given the party much

attention or support before

or

after this

reorganization (for which Fogaca delivered

criticism of the

IC)

a

long,

scathing

the new party would show it the PCP's

commitment through its future successes.

committed to

a

latest

The new PCP was

bolshevized party and was doing all in its

power to uncover its enemies and to make it

a

mass party.

If errors were made it was only for lack of experience and

not for lack of

revolutionary spirit. 136

Fogaca gave us an understanding of the conditions
surrounding the reorganization.
Have you considered our situation at the start?
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When we were but a dozen comrades, most
freshly
released from prison, we lacked direct links
to
the masses.
Confronting us and our work was the
fascist police which had liberated us after
long
years of detention, and an organization full
of
provocateurs calling itself the PCP.
And,
meanwhile, we arrive without contacts with the
IC
leaders, without a clear understanding of their
decisions, without money, without direct links to
the masses.
During the fascist terror, we
decided to reorganize the party, leading to the
disappearance of those remnants still known as
the party.
We denounced the provocateurs before
the workers, and building all which exists today,
so that, even though it is still not much, it is
already a testimony of our past work and a hope
for greater activity in the future.
137

Amidst the external environment

of WWII

and the

internal problems of repression in Portugal of which the
PCP bore the brunt,

the party was

years of limited activity.

The

resurrected after two

reorganization of 1940/41

created a new clandestine organization based on the hard
learned lessons of the past.

The new party was capable of

eluding the police and maintaining stable activity as

a

result of its new directive organs and its mobilization of
the masses. 138

Julio Fogaca discussed in his letter to the IC the
hardships of beginning and maintaining

a

clandestine press

without the necessary funds, because the economic hardships
of the workers made

party's activities.

it

difficult for them to fund the

Fogaca asked the IC for money although

he emphasized that the party would continue the presses and

the struggle whether or not the help arrived. !39

j

n

August

!

1941 the printing presses were started up
again after a two

year absence of Avante!

which was forced upon the party

after successive waves of repression which began
in 1936
and continued until several clandestine
presses were
discovered by the police in 1939.
The party claims
that

its past experiences provided the reorganized PCP
with its

new strength and allowed Avante
"wisdom."

to

!

be

a

source of

The reorganized party was:

a politically mature party, armed with a secure
orientation, and tactics able to guarantee the
continuity and development of mass action, and
organizational bases able to resist the hard

conditions

dictatorship. 14°

imposed by

the

fascist

The party conveniently omits any reference to

PCP

a

second

headed by Velez Grilo which competed with the

"reorganizers"

for the official

recognition of the

Neither does the PCP mention that
published by Grilo'

s

PCP until

a

1945,

rival Avante

nor the

IC.

was

"zig-zag"

policies pursued by both "PCPs" as they mirrored Soviet
policy shifts concerning WWII,

nor of the reorganizers

adherence to the "neutrality" politics even after one year
of Nazi attacks on the Soviet Union.

The "official" history, which we have discussed so far

and will continue to discuss,

is

a

product of the 1940-41

reorganizers that had firm control of the party by the
Third PCP Congress held in 1943.

They controlled the
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release of information concerning the
party's history so
that those periods during which Alvaro
Cunhal was not in a

position of leadership,

and during which the party tended

to pursue lines which he was not happy
with, are especially
left in the dark.
Therefore, more official information is

available from the PCP for the forties and sixties
than the
fifties or thirties when Cunhal was not in charge. 14 !
At the Third Congress

in

1943 the party began to

pursue policies of "national and international unity"
or
"united front" which were directed against fascism.

Under

this strategy the PCP worked with other anti-fascist
forces

including republicans, socialists, and even masons.

One of

the major vehicles was the National United Anti-fascist

Movement

(MUNAF)

which lasted until

Democratic Movement

(MUD)

was

1949. 142

The United

created in 1945 as

a

semi-legal unitary organization to complement the
clandestine activity of the MUNAF.

The MUD was composed of

anti-fascists from various groups who participated in legal
means to publicize anti-fascism.

One of these vehicles was

the opposition's campaign of Norton de Matos for president.

Norton de Matos withdrew from the race at the last minute

after the Salazarist regime refused to meet three of the
oppositions'

conditions:

freedom to campaign openly,

honest voter registration,

an

and opposition surveillance at

the polls to insure free elections.

In

1946 the Youth MUD

.

4

was formed to expand the anti-fascist
tactics to encompass
the youth movement 1 3

With the disappearance of Grilo's PCP
in 1945 the
"reorganizer party" was able to continue
its activities
virtually free of internal opposition for
about

decade.

a

The party moved to reopen or strengthen
its links with the

international communist organizations which replaced
the
IC.

With the reorganization of 1940-41 the party,

first time in its history,

succeeded in creating

leadership which maintained

a

for the
a

stable

hegemonic organization and

pursued coordinated party policies.

Until

new wave of

a

repression began in 1949 the PCP was able to maintain the

reins

power in the hands of

of

functionaries.

As Pereira declares,

a

few

clandestine

"For the

first time

since the beginning of the clandestine period one can speak
of an effective Central Committee and

directing the party,

with

a

a

Secretariat truly

definite composition."

It

is

for this reason that the "real" history of the PCP has been

difficult to uncover because the new control by the
"Stalinist"
benefit.

martyrs

reorganizers altered the history in their

The history of the PCP is their history,

are those they chose as martyrs,

and the

with many

individuals who would otherwise have deserved their place
in

history thrown into the rubbish heap of "traitors."

Those names would for ever be extinguished from the

'

"official" history making it difficult

for

outside

observers to uncover the "real" history. 144
At the Fourth Congress in 1946 the
PCP reaffirmed its

commitment to the MUNAF

.

The congress was held in an

atmosphere of success given the increased
activity of the
anti-fascist movement.
The fall of the dictatorship
was

seen as a certainty.

Organizationally the reorgani zer s

unquestionable domination of the party was strengthened
with the emphasis on the principles of democratic
centralism.

The forties were years of increased growth for

the party and it was

during this period that the party

reached its membership apex of the clandestine era.

The

1943

1200 members

1946

4800

(approximate)

1947

7000

(approximate) 145

party's popularity was

a

result

of

the

anti-fascist alliance between the western democracies and
the Soviet Union; the shortage of food as

a

result of grain

speculation and grain sales to both sides of the war which
caused unrest

regime;

at

home and serious difficulties

for the

the party's collaboration with the anti-fascist

forces within Portugal;
the reorganized party.

the tide had turned.

and the organizational strength of
By the end of the decade, however,

The food shortages ended;

the Allies
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supported rather than chastised the Salazar
dictatorship

thereby smashing the hopes of the anti-fascists
that
Portugal's dictatorship was bound to collapse
under Allied
criticism (for example, Portugal was accepted
into NATO in

1949 and the UN in 1955);

the cold war broke the ties

which bound the communists and other anti-fascists
united opposition;
and increased repression by

in

a

the

government against the communists and other intellectuals
drastically reduced the renewed anti-fascist activity of
the forties. 146

The PCP in the Fifties

If the

forties was the decade of hope

(hope that the

dictatorship would crumble), the fifties was the "end of

illusion"

(ending the

decade). 147

"illusions"

the previous

of

Many of the anti-fascist personalities and

groups were disbanded,

including the MUNAF

.

The emphasis

changed from mass movements to the occasional participation
in "elections,

propaganda.
was

"

coup attempts, and

Although

a

a

newly revived focus on

National Democratic Movement

(MND)

formed which supported the candidacy of Professor Rui

Luis Gomes for President,

it

did not get anywhere near the

support that the anti-fascist movements had attracted

years

earlier.

The

MUD

Juvenil

continued but

a

few

its
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anti-fascist mass basis was greatly
reduced until its
membership was comprised primarily of
communist youths.

PCP

activities were also reduced as successive
members of

the party's organizations fell into the
hands of the
police.

In 194 9 two of the three Secretariat
members were

arrested

(Alvaro Cunhal and Militao Ribeiro)

leaving Jose

,

Gregorio alone in the directive organization.

Soon after

the addition of Sergio Vilarigues and Manuel
Guedes to the
Secretariat in 1952 the latter was arrested. A
decade of
stable rule under a cohesive Secretariat came to
a

The Secretariat
Pires,

developed
for

a

fell on hard times

infiltrators,

informers,

fifties.
a

and spies at all

It

"witch
ranks

The lower membership figures which followed

"united anti-fascist" period were reduced further

through expulsions of the "traitors."

the

the

in

bad case of "paranoia" which led it on

of the party.

the

include Joaquim

Octavio Pato, and Julio Fogaca. 148

The party

hunt"

was expanded again to

close.

party is

During this period

accused of executing three suspected

"traitors" whom it considered responsible for the police
crackdown. 149
1 0 0 0

By

members. 150

suspicious,

the party had been reduced to only

1951
j

^

became

a

closed,

and paranoic organization,

sectarian,

with diminished

strength in almost every sector except in the Alentejo
where the party, through propaganda and ideology, more than

organizational strength,

was

able to mobilize strikes of

landless peasants in the early fifties. 151
approached the mid-fifties it attempted
to

As the PCP

reinvigorate by

concentrating on its previous success with
alliance
politics,

by renewing its organizational

increasing its activities.

To

strength,

and by

achieve this end

it

disbanded the MND and the MUD Juvenil and
substituted for

them the National Liberation Junta

(JNL)

which never

achieved great success but focused instead on
imposing the
PCP's views on dissident JNL members. 152

Although in 1954 the party was still publicly
emphasizing the need for

a

mass uprising to overthrow the

dictatorship, by the Fifth Congress of 1957 the tactics had

altered considerably.

The PCP

focused instead on small,

contained uprisings for specific gains, which would attract
the anti-Salazar forces and lead to
to democracy.

a

peaceful transition

The obvious reason for the shift in tactics

was the Twentieth CPSU Congress of 1956 which stressed
peaceful coexistence and criticized the cult of personality
as

well as Stalinist crimes.

Julio Fogaca,

one of the

major activists and leaders of the PCP since the thirties,

was

strongly influenced by Khrushchev's criticisms and

proceeded to apply these views to the party at the Fifth

Congress. 153

The shift

in the Soviet Union invigorated

tendencies which had already begun to emerge within the PCP

in

response to its decreased influence
among the working
classes and to the growing isolationism
which it
faced in

relation to the anti-fascist forces.
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Because of this

"rightward shift," the Fifth Congress has been
enveloped in
secrecy by the "Cunhalists" who controlled
the
party.

The

current PCP only refers to the Fifth Congress
concerning
its role in delineating the PCP's criticisms
of Portugal's

colonialist policies

and the need for the

liberation of the colonies.

The

congress

recognized as having approved the first

program of the party.

But

immediate

no mention

is

also

is

statutes and
made of the

"right-wing anarcho-liberal shift" which dominated the
Fifth Congress and reflected the changes occurring in the
Soviet Union. 155

The PCP's attempts to patch together an anti-fascist

united front a la 1940'

to

contest the 1958 presidential

elections were unsuccessful.

Several observers argue that

s

the party could not have reproduced the united

front

policies given the changes discussed earlier that were
compounded by the cold war,

by the increased knowledge of

real conditions in the Soviet Union as well as of Stalin's
crimes,

and by Portugal's improved economic climate as it

shifted toward development.

Nevertheless,

the PCP still

tried to mimic the successes of the forties. 15 ^
time,

however,

the party made several analytical

At

the

errors.

It

lost touch with the desires of the rank
and file and of

the Portuguese in general.

The events of May and June 1958

were similar to the party's discarded strategy
"national anti-fascist uprising."
Never before

for

a

had the

Portuguese been so close to an insurrectional
movement as
when led by the opposition candidate General
Humberto
Delgado.

The PCP had gone out of its way not to
support

him because they distrusted his

sincerity;

instead it

rallied around alternative opposition candidates.
party's policies,

however,

The

did not stop its militants from

disregarding party directives

and

joining in the

spontaneous strikes and armed revolts which followed the
fraudulent elections.

The party

later attempted to take

credit for mobilizing the strikes although the revolts were

criticized as "putschist tactics." 157

The PCP in the Sixties

On January

prisoners

3,

1960 Cunhal

(of which

and nine other political

all but one were communists)

made

a

spectacular escape from the Peniche prison and fled the

country. 158

Soon after his escape Cunhal regained the

leadership of the party through his election as
Secretary-General

exile)

.

(the top

leaders directed the party from

Cunhal did not waste time in correcting the

.
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"anarcho-liberal shift"

shift")

(also

known as the

which Fogaca had implemented.

"rightward

Through the

reorganization of 1960-1961 Cunhal returned the
PCP to what
he considered the correct ideological
path to end the
dictatorship

(so

After the opposition's successful electoral campaign
successful that Salazar ended
direct presidential

elections because even by altering the results he came
close to losing control of the electoral process)

Salazar

tightened the government's repressive control of the
opposition.

In

1959 the regime had begun

a

new wave of

repression against the anti-fascist forces.

This

intensified the tactical crisis confronting the opposition.
The belief that

fascism would inevitably fall led some to

focus on constitutional or peaceful solutions while others

turned to violence and putschist solutions. According to
the newly reorganized PCP the real

was

the building of

a

revolutionary perspective.

solution to the crisis

strong political
The masses

force with

harbored

a

a

strong

combative spirit following the elections of 1958 and it was
important to keep this spirit alive rather than allow its

continued deterioration through collaborationist or violent
solutions.

The PCP had to regain its role as the vanguard

of the masses. 159

Cunhal'

s

escape from jail brought new life to the
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party.

The major change was

"anarcho-liberal shift" with

the

replacement of the

new strategy focused on the

a

dismantling of the fascist regime and the
gaining of
political liberties.
The reorganization also

included

minor changes concerning the

structure of the party,

formation of quadres,

the

the wisdom of maintaining the

entire leadership within the nations borders,

and the

reorganization and distribution of the party press. 160
The beginning of the

independence movements and

guerrilla wars in Portuguese Africa produced the weak spot
in the regime for which the PCP was looking.

1961

and continuing into 1962

to protest the African wars.

a

Beginning in

series of strikes occurred
In

keeping with its new

strategy the party participated in the organization of many
of these strikes. 161

The party does not devote much attention in its
official history to the Trotskyite and Maoist

which emerged within the party beginning

in

fractions

the sixties.

Confronted with mass street demonstrations which had
achieved unprecedented heights under the dictatorship
terms of the number of participants)

the more

(in

radical

elements within the PCP analyzed the events differently
than did the Cunhalists.

The extreme

left

the time was ripe for putschist attempts.

concluded that
These attempts

had already started although the party prohibited its
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members from participating in them (for example,
assault of

the Beja military base in which many communists
were
involved)

The spontaneous strikes by students showed
that

.

opposition could be carried out without the
participation
of the PCP which helps

became

a

explain why extreme-left groups

strong force at the universities.

fractions were also

The

leftist

strengthened by the ideological

developments in the international communist movement such
as

in China and Cuba.

The PCP would not tolerate dissent

or leftism and began purging the extreme left fractions. 162

Despite the Cunhalists criticisms of the "anarcho-liberal"

shift

and Fogaca'

democracy,

the

advocacy of

a

s

policies of peaceful transition to

only alteration under

"military-liberal" uprising with mass support

to overthrow the regime.

dedicated to

Cunhal was the

a

In principle,

peaceful transition.

It

the party remained

ventured as far as

to downplay its theoretical commitment to the "dictatorship
of the proletariat" and criticized dogmatism.

1963

it

Beginning in

became increasingly orthodox and bureaucratic as

more and more of its cadres returned from their Moscow

training sessions

to

take up positions

as

party

functionaries .163
In 1965 the PCP held its Sixth Congress.

It

reinforced

the analyses and tactics put

forth by Cunhal during the

reorganization of

The tactical

1

960-61.

focus was on a
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united front of anti-fascist

proletariat

forces to include the

(defined as industrial workers and rural

salaried agricultural

workers),

the

peasantry

("campesinato" or small and medium-sized landowners),
employees

(workers

in

the service sector),

intellectuals,

the urban petit-bourgeoisie, and some sectors
of the medium

bourgeoisie.

The party advocated the use of political

force through strikes and demonstrations because

it

was

with the use of force that Salazar stayed in power.

At

this congress the party officially approved the eight-point

party program for

a

"Democratic and National Revolution":

1.

Destroy the fascist state and install
democratic regime.

2.

Liquidate monopoly power and promote general
economic development.

3.

Implement an agrarian reform, delivering the
land to those who work it.

4.

Elevate the standard of living of the working
classes and of the people in general.

5.

Democratize instruction and culture.

6.

Liberate Portugal from imperialism.

7.

Recognize and affirm [our support for] the
people of the Portuguese colonies.

8.

Pursue a [foreign] policy of peace and
friendship with all peoples.

Success in achieving

a

a

"Democratic and National Revolution"

6

.
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would require not only overthrowing the
dictatorship and
granting liberties but altering the
"substructure" of the
fascist system which was dominated by
monopoly capital
associated with foreign imperialism and large
landholding
interests

(

latif undistas

)

Destroying fascism would not

.

solve the problem unless the political reaction's
basis of
support was also changed. 164

According to the PCP, under its guidance

as

the

vanguard of the masses, the anti-fascist struggle continued

throughout the sixties
continued,

as

as

strikes and demonstrations

the economic situation deteriorated,

as

the

independence wars in Africa intensified, and as the regimes
national and international

support waned.

estimated PCP membership in 1967 was only
continued its act ivities

1968,

1

5

Although the
2,

000,

the party

with the death of Salazar in

Marcello Caetano attempted to

continue the

dictatorship and resolve its contradictions through the so

called "liberalization."

The goal was

to

broaden the

regimes national and international basis of support,
attract the wavering sectors of the opposition,

popular struggles,

halt the

and generally give the impression that

the regime had the strength to maintain itself;

yet

all

this was done without actually changing the policies
pursued under Salazar.

pursued fooled some

The new "image"

which the regime

(here the PCP takes

a

crack at the

Socialists considering them among the
fooled) but not the
party which saw the maneuvers for what
they were.
The PCP
warned the workers not to be bought.
The fact that the
regime was changing its tune proved that
it had reached a
crisis and by maintaining the struggle
the regime would
soon collapse. 166
The PCP intensified its control of the
labor movement

after eased syndical

election regulations

allowed

communists to work their way up to positions of
leadership
within the corporative unions. The struggle
intensified as

strikes and demonstrations became ever larger and
more
numerous.

threat

The PCP claims that

(extreme left)

the pseudo-revolutionary

and the

"constitutionalists" saw

their strength diminish while the PCP's support continued
to

increase.

(CDE)

legal

was

In

1969 the Democratic Electoral Commission

formed to carry out opposition to the regime by

(electoral)

general unrest as

means when possible.
a

By 1973 there was

result of the deteriorating economic

conditions brought on by the colonial wars.

The number of

strikes increased consistently until the liberation of the

Portuguese in April 25, 1974. 167
Despite the party'

s

inferences that it was somehow

behind the military coup of April
of a surprise to the party

observers.

as

it

25,

the coup was as much

was to most political

The military was never expected to play the
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dominant role in the overthrow of the
dictatorship.

At the

Third Democratic Opposition Congress held
in Aveiro

in

the PCP reaffirmed the need to continue
the united
front of anti-fascist forces but nowhere on
the
1973,

list of

these

forces was the military mentioned as part
of the
"united front."
The struggle by the "popular masses" was

to be the

"engine

of revolution"

which would lead to

national uprising and popular insurrection.
solutions would not end the dictatorship,

neither could

a

a

Putschist

implying that

coup by the military achieve the same end.

A mere month prior to the revolution

after the

(and

military uprising in Caldas the Rainha)

the Executive

Commission of the CC declared that the regime would neither
fall

on

its

soldiers.

own nor

from the actions

of

a

handful

of

Only a national uprising and an armed "popular"

insurrection could bring down the regime.
the regime was not expected,

but

result of hard work and

long,

a

struggle by the "united front."

A quick end to

rather would come as
continuous,

a

widening

Putschist solutions would

only rob the movement of its strength and provide false
illusions 168
.

Although in the post-revolutionary era the PCP has
tried to hide its previous analysis of the military's role
it

is

clear that the party did not expect an Armed Forces

Movement

(MFA)

to end the regime. When the national popular

uprising took place it was expected
to neutralize

percentage of the military forces and
attract
number of soldiers to the peoples'
the people

in

large

a

small

a

side who would then aid

overthrowing the regime.

Never did the PCP

expect the opposite to occur with the MFA
leading the
overthrow and succeeding with the help of the
169
people.

The PCP

implies that the people set up the necessary
preconditions for the MFA' s success through

decades of

continuous opposition and strikes which when
combined with

military preoccupations surrounding the colonial wars
led
the MFA to organize and carry out the coup. 17 0

Summary

An understanding of the PCP's clandestine years are

essential if we are to understand the party
post-revolutionary period.
of the

The anarcho-syndicalist

in

the

roots

communist party made the bol shevi z at ion process

extremely difficult.

For more than

a

decade after its

formation the Portuguese "Bolsheviks" and the IC struggled
to extinguish a "democratic"

centralism" and replace
interpretation.

In

interpretation of "democratic
it

with their own "correct"

many ways the military coup of 1926

actually helped the party to become

a

more disciplined,

bolshevized organization because only that type of

238

organization would be able to survive in
the underground.
Towards the end of the 1930' s the
bolshevization process
had been completed and the "Stalinization"
of the party
began.

Increasingly the PCP's policies were tied
in with
the international concerns of Moscow, as
was evident

from

the policies surrounding the Nazi-Soviet Pact
and WWII.
The "official" history of the PCP is a
"Stalinist"

history

in

that

has been edited and spliced together by the

it

reorganizers of 1940-41,

of whom Cunhal

is

presently the

best known.
It

is

the contradiction between the "Stalinist"

in

history and the "real" history that we can best understand
the evolution of the PCP to the present time.
to

face many of the

same

"events"

(at

least

It

in

has had

terms of

international communism) which led the Spanish Communist
Party

(PCE)

,

Italian Communist Party

Communist Party

Eurocommunism;

(PCF

yet

-

it

to

has

a

(PCI)

,

and French

more limited extent)

chosen to remain

an

toward

openly

Stalinist organization rejecting the view that socialism
may be achieved through democratic means.

why the PCP has not

A major reason

"democratized" itself is that the

"Stalinists" have been able to retain control of the party
ever since the reorganization of 1940-41.

Under Fogaca,

especially from 1956 on,

the party had

begun to move toward "Eurocommunism" in its emphasis on the

.

democratic road toward overthrowing the dictatorship.

The

conditions necessary for the "united front" which
Fogaca
wanted to capitalize on were not ripe given the

situation

discussed above.

In

1960,

Fogaca's democratization was

given its final blow when Cunhal and other
Stalinists
escaped from Peniche (could it be that their escape

from

jail was especially urgent in 1960 to return the
party to

the correct path?)
In

the

1960's the party was again threatened by
internal dissent from the "pseudo-revolutionaries" or
extreme leftists, but the party handled that crisis without
serious problems.

What has especially allowed the party to

remain Stalinist has been its ability to avoid the
contradictions raised by the WWII shifts of policy,

Hungarian invasion of 1956,
Czechoslovakia in 1968,

and the

the

invasion of

because all occurred while the

party was still functioning in the underground.

Thereby it

minimized the impact and the open debate which occurred in
many of the other communist parties.

The Polish crisis led

to the first real open debate within the PCP and even that

did not have

chapters.

a

large

But

impact,

as

why would the

we will

discuss in later

Spanish party pursue

Eurocommunism when faced with many of the same conditions
as the PCP?

later,

the

Although

a

fuller discussion will be presented

initial answer appears to be because of the

leadership differences.
An understanding of the party's past
is essential if
we are to understand its future. 171 A close
reading
Qf the

party press will also emphasize the importance
which it
places on its own "Stalinist" past.
It capitalizes

on its

historic role as the only party which survived the
"fascist" era.
of clandestine

In many ways its emphasis on the hardships

life,

underground press,
martyrs,

the difficulties

the prison terms,

and the neo-realism

the Portuguese

of maintaining an

-

the torture,

the

all this is in keeping with

fatalistic nature which often seeks its

solutions in the glories of the past

possibilities of the future.

It

is

rather than in the

to an analysis of the

PCP after the "Portuguese revolution" that we will turn in
the final chapters of this study although our analysis will

often return to the dark reaches of the past because that
is where explanations will often be found.
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I also use official PCP historical sources
to compare
the party line with the "reality."
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CHAPTER

5

THE PORTUGUESE REVOLUTION: APRIL 25,
TO NOVEMBER 25,

The

1974

1975

revolutionary period in Portugal began with the

military coup of April 25, 1974 and ended with the aborted,
ultra left-wing military coup of November 25,
19

1975.

This

month revolutionary period can be divided into major

phases.

The first opened with the coup of the Armed Forces

Movement

(MFA)

against the Marcello Caetano dictatorship

and ended with President Spinola's attempted "march of the

silent majority" on September

28,

1974.

During this

initial phase,

the Portuguese Communist Party

cautious as

it

(PCP)

was

analyzed the political situation,

strengthened its organization, and presented an image of an

organized,

disciplined party which favored democracy and

close adherence to the MFA program.

The

attempted march

initiated the second phase which continued until an aborted

right-wing coup of March

11,

1975.

The major differences

between these first two phases were an increase
revolutionary rhetoric and the struggle
"unicidade,"

a

sole labor confederation,

for

in

syndical

through the PCP

dominated Intersindical
The third phase began with the backlash to the aborted

coup and culminated with the
254

formation of the sixth

provisional government in September of 1975.

As the MFA

nationalized major sectors of the economy,

the PCP

developed an increasingly revolutionary strategy which
brought the nation to the brink of civil war.
The final
phase commenced in September and ended with the
aborted

left-wing coup of November.

in the

final phase,

realized that the opportunity
diminished,

at

least temporarily,

the divided forces

of the

the party

revolution had

for

and attempted to reunite

left.

As

it

focused on

consolidating gains rather than extending the revolution,
its strategy became cautious once again.

We discuss each phase from four perspectives.

we examine the party's official

events,

its major themes,

we discuss

Second,

line:

its

First,

analysis of

and its rhetorical arguments.

organizational problems.

Third,

we

place the "official" description in context with major

events of that phase.

strategy and tactics.
intentions?

actions?

Fourth,

What

we

analyze the party's

were the party's

How closely did the party's rhetoric match its

Did the party alter its strategy during each

phase or was the strategy coherent throughout all
phases?

real

four

Did only the tactics change?

The

fourth perspective implies

that the party's

actions and rhetoric mask an ulterior motive or master
plan.

In the

conclusion we argue that,

after the initial

phase of the revolution,

the PCP opted for a

transition to socialism rather than
Eurocommunist transition.

Phase

I

-

a

"putschist"

democratic or

1

April 25,

1974 to September 28,

Following the April 25,

1974

1974

military coup,

the PCP

became the best organized political party in the nation.
Because the party consisted of less than 3000 members prior
to the revolution and most of the leadership was in exile,

the strength of the PCP was especially noteworthy.

was able to make

The PCP

quick transition to the new political

a

situation and profit from the power vacuum.
the old regime progressed,

As purges of

the PCP infiltrated the unions,

the press, the civil service, and the local governments.

The party's
Communist Party

Forces Movement
rest

success did not mean the Portuguese

(PCP)

was involved in the coup.

(MFA)

of the world,

surprised the PCP,

as

The Armed

well

when it launched the successful

as

the

coup.

The MFA was initially comprised of approximately 200 junior

officers who wanted to remedy specific professional
grievances,

democratize Portugal,

wars in the African colonies.

chapter,

and end the independence

As discussed in the previous

the PCP had always mistrusted the military.

Although officially it would not admit

it,

the party did

not

expect the military to be the major force
behind the
dictatorship's fall. 2

Because the officers belonged to the bourgeoisie,
which Cunhal criticized in Q_R_adi calismo Pequeno-Burgues
De

Fachada Socialista ,3

to

many political

observers PCP

support

for the MFA was

however,

if we focus on the party's analysis of the Chilean

ironic.

The

irony disappears,

experience from which it drew many lessons.

A major lesson

concerned the key role which the military played in the

1973 overthrow of Salvador Allende's government.

Even

though the PCP was suspicious of MFA motives from the start

and proceeded with caution,

advantages could be reaped from
organization.

also

it

For this reason,

a

realized that

left-wing military

while the newly formed

parties were often quick to criticize the military, the PCP
rarely did so.

It preferred to improve

its links with the

MFA to demonstrate its discipline and organization

which soldiers understood and valued)
MFA'

s

,

(traits

and to gain the

confidence so that it might influence the officers'

policies.

The PCP was aware that dangerous schisms divided

the military,

so

it

advocated strengthening the MFA to

guard the revolution from counter-revolutionaries.
strong MFA,

With

a

the revolution need not be endangered by the

military as it had been in Chile.
One of the pillars

of

4

the PCP's

strategy to push

!

^

!

258

forward the revolution became,

alliance."

in

therefore,

the quote below,

the

"people-MFA

for example,

states that the revolution would result

from

the party
a

movement

"supported by force of arms" not led by force of arms.
Although with time the PCP became less cautious when
referring to the military's role in the revolution,

in the

initial months the party played it safe by supporting
the

MFA whenever possible.

Avante

wrote:

Radicalized by decades of struggle against
fascism and by the circumstance of a long and
unjust colonial war, the patriotic soldiers

understood that only a movement
force of arms would be able

supported by
to remove the
anti-popular and a n t i - n a t i ona 1 regime of
Salazar/Caetano/Tomas and
open the nation to
democracy, independence, and liberty.
... an
essential condition for the democratization of
Portuguese life ... is the alliance of the
popular movement of the masses and democratic
forces with the Armed Forces Movement. 5
.

.

a

.

.

.

Forced to recognize the officers'

party implied that

.

unexpected role,

the

military victory could not have

occurred without the people's support.

In addition,

and in

keeping with its claim to be the vanguard of the working
class,

the PCP insisted that only under its guidance could

the coup be transformed into a socialist revolution.

party press was, and still

is,

The

inundated with declarations

that the PCP and the masses played the key role in
liquidating "fascism"^ and restoring liberty to Portugal.
Avante

often printed statements such as:

9

°
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The fascist regime was defeated on the
April because it never had roots in the
because it was debilitated by decades of
struggle for bread, peace, and democracy

25th of
peoplepopular
as well

as by the struggle of the peoples of
Guine-Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola for their
national independence.
It was finally defeated
because a profound patriotic and democratic
sentiment influenced its major supporter armed forces - and transformed them fromthea
bulwark of the reactionary forces and fascism to

one of the most serious guarantors of democracy
in Portugal.

According to Cunhal,

the nation was

problems in three general areas:
colonial,

and the political.

As

the

facing major

economic,

to the economic,

the
the

working class had the lowest standard of living in Europe;
so

was

it

"urgent,

necessary,

indispensable" that workers

struggle to improve the conditions
However,

of their

lives.

Cunhal emphasized that economics could not be

isolated from politics.

Although in the short term workers

deserved wage increases,

a

successful revolution was of

greater importance and could only be reached in the long
term.

Because the unity of all workers was more important

than the improvement of conditions for individual workers,
this meant they would have to moderate their demands.

Cunhal the freedom to strike was an important gain,
was a right to be used in moderation.

used as

a

To

but it

The strike should be

threat during negotiations, yet only resorted to

after every possible alternative had been explored.

Among the party's major concerns throughout the

H

revolutionary period, and especially during the
first three
phases of the revolution, were the moderation
of workers'

demands and the avoidance of strikes.

In keeping with

its

cautious nature, the party preferred partial assured
gains,
such as work slowdowns or stoppages, to total
strikes

that

risked defeat.

The PCP rationalized its calls for minimal

strike activity by appealing for worker solidarity
with

other workers.

Only in this manner,

it claimed,

long-term goal of socialism be achieved.

could the

Workers should

not strike or make unreasonable demands of management since

that would strengthen the reactionary forces. 10
to Cunhal,

one of the best weapons the

had was

to

encourage

its

u

According

reactionary forces

1 t r a - 1 e ft i s t

allies

(pseudo-revolutionaries) to make unreasonable demands.

The

demands would ruin Portugal's delicate economy and allow
the return of dictatorship to insure political and economic

order

.

Cunhal warned the workers that they should be
especially wary of pseudo-revolutionary cries for the
immediate achievement of long-term goals,
now.

for socialism

Those were the cries which the reactionary

wanted to hear.

forces

The PCP would eventually achieve long-term

goals but every action had to be carefully analyzed in the

context of short and medium-term goals.

pseudo-revolutionaries know what was

in

How could the

the workers'
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interests when they didn't support them
during the long,
repressive dictatorship as the PCP had?12

The PCP

insisted that

working class meant

it

its

could

long dedication to the
be trusted to

draw the

correct conclusions and analyses from the unfolding,

complex situation.

Conditions were far from ripe to

achieve the long-term goal of

initial goal
liberty.

was

a

socialist society.

The

should be to consolidate democracy and

Despite the workers'

low standard of living,

it

important that they realize the limitations of the

economy.

It

was unrealistic to think they could achieve

wage increases, work hour decreases, and paid vacation time

increases simultaneously.

The demands transgressed the

nation's economic capabilities.
The policy was expected to prove that the PCP

control its members,
-

the workers,

could

and the "popular masses"

all essential to complete the revolution.

A disciplined

party would hopefully attract not only MFA support but also

additional workers and democrats to the party while
decreasing the appeal of the ultra-left.
PCP time to assess
MFA'

s

the new political

It

would give the

situation and the

intentions.
The initial caution and moderation of workers' demands

drew scathing attacks from ultra-leftists,

who pushed for

increased labor demands and the seizure of unoccupied

.
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apartments by squatters.

become

a

They criticized the PCP of having

bourgeois party;

continues to

a

criticism which the party

face although the extreme-left was
only

a

threat to it in the initial years of
Portuguese democracy.
The party diminished ultra-left support
among the workers
by claiming it was allied with the reactionary
forces,

a

vaguely defined group of undesirables which
initially was

comprised of monopoly capitalists,
collaborators of the previous regime,

latifundistas,

and extreme-leftists

(especially the Maoists of the Movement for the
Reorganization of the Party of the Proletariat

According to Cunhal,

The goal was the

independence of the colonies as they were
They were robbing it

back economic development,
low standards

workers.

of

living,

MRPP)

the second major problem facing

the nation was the colonial problem.

for the nation.

-

a

heavy burden

of lives,

creating inflation,

holding

continuing

and generally exploiting the

Until the peoples under Portuguese domination

were liberated, the Portuguese themselves could never truly

be

free.

independent.

The Africans

had to be self-autonomous

and

A quick resolution to the conflict had to be

pursued. 14
Such a resolution of the colonial problem would have

favored the communist national liberation groups.
it

was

Because

the richest of the colonies and interested the

Soviets the most,

the PCP was especially interested
in
resolving the Angolan conflict. A quick
resolution favored
the Movement for the Liberation of
Angola (MPLA)
The
.

timely independence of the Portuguese
colonies,
allowed communists to take power,

which

is considered one

of the

PCP's greatest contributions to international
communism.
The third problem confronting the nation
concerned the

new freedoms and liberties brought to the people
"courageous and decisive action" of the MFA.

freedoms,

a

established.

by the

Despite the

"truly democratic regime" had not been
Cunhal declared that the danger of

drift

a

back to the dictatorship was real because of the alliance

between the ultra-left and the reactionary right.

reminded

the

He

people that the nation was still in

transition despite the recent gains in democracy and
liberty.

The revolution was not irreversible.

It

took

Chilean reactionary forces one year to begin serious
counter-revolutionary activity after Allende's victory and

three years to succeed in his overthrow.

15

The

counter-revolution was alive in Portugal and its strategy
was six-fold:
1.

divide the popular movement and break its alliance
with the MFA,

2

create economic problems which would lead to
government crisis and popular unrest,

.

3.

a

provoke problems within the working class and the

!

4.

5.

middle-class to create instability and
anarchy,
increase political provocations,
infiltrate the new regime to slow democracy,

6
'

couple

The PCP,

3 right-win<?

PS,

government or lead

right-wing

Portuguese Democratic Movement

Movement of the Socialist Left,
Movement,

a

(MDP)

,

Democratic Women's

and Young Worker's Movement were considered key

organizations in the revolution and were expected to
act

alongside the people in alliance with the MFA.

The PCP

declared that the elevated consciousness of the working

classes would keep them vigilant and prevent the
reactionary forces from returning Portugal
to
dictatorship.

The workers had to help strengthen the PCP's

organization since only

a

strong PCP could insure

a

democratic regime. 17
The three major problems discussed above were not the

PCP's sole concerns.

workers

a

The party also tried to give the

feeling of superior intelligence and analytical

abilities through Avante
In many ways

sectarianism

,

rallies,

and so forth.

the party was responsible for creating the

which it criticized in August

especially after November 1975)
revolution.

posters,

It

fed the workers'

Portuguese workers,

in

general,

as

1975

(and

detrimental to the

egos by declaring that the

were aware of the complex

political situation;

they were aware that they could
rely

on the PCP to weigh the alternatives and
make the difficult

analyses for them. 18

The PCP also claimed that

its vigilance within the

government as an equal partner insured and
protected
democracy and workers' rights.

provisional governments not,
argued,

The PCP participated in the

as

the pseudo-revolutionaries

because the party sold-out to bourgeois politics,

but because

interests.

its participation was

in

the workers'

best

Only with the PCP in government could the

nation continue on

a

party's participation,

democratic course.

Without the

the workers risked upsetting the

political balance and losing an essential democratic
element within the government.
"worker/peasant" government,

government of the "left."

a

The government was not a

"popular front,"

or even

a

Each party still preserved its

own positions. !5

The PCP
crisis,

but

claimed it had the solution to the economic
for

its

implementation it was necessary to

create profound social reforms which would affect the
monopolist groups and the large latifundistas

emphasized that the government was
agreed to create

a

a

.

The party

large coalition which

democratic regime but not to implement

the necessary social reforms.

Reforms,

therefore,

could

only come after free elections were held and fascists, who

.
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remained at various levels of the political,
economic,
social organization of the country, were
purged. 20
The party preferred to present

and

complex problems in

terms of black and white choosing to avoid the
subtleties.
In

this case,

for example,

either the party participated

within the government in the worker's interests,
or
risked allowing the restoration of the dictatorship.

it

The

party insisted there were not any other choices; the
correct decision had been made.

were only interested in

a

Critics of this position

victory of the reactionary

forces

According to the PCP,

after the military coup the

pseudo-revolutionaries continued their collaboration with
the right and had a negative impact on the revolution.

The

ultra-left tried to ruin the democratization process,
worked against the popular masses and the MFA, chose as its
primary enemy the PCP rather than the reactionary forces

and fascist

forces,

and in this manner worked with the

reactionary forces either consciously or unconsciously 21
.

The

calls

for

a

stronger party organization to

withstand reactionary forces and pseudo-revolutionary
attacks

to democracy

imply that the PCP suffered from

similar psuedo-revolutionary attempts within its own
organization.

Further evidence is

found in the party's

constant struggle to curtail worker involvement

in

pseudo-revolutionary strikes.

The quick increase in party

membership allowed many inadequately disciplined
militants
into the party's ranks.
The inability of the party

to

control its militants at the grass-roots level
was evident

throughout 1975.

They often disregarded the party's

directives and took matters into their own hands.
The PCP's concern with pseudo-revolutionaries
was not

new one.

a

As discussed in the previous

chapter,

the

threat to the party from pseudo-revolutionaries had
begun
in

the

the PCP.

1960's as Trotskyites and Maoists broke away from
By 1970,

the concern with the extreme-left was of

sufficient concern to warrant Cunhal's authorship of

Radicalismo Pequeno-Burgues de Fachada Socialista

(Social

Fascist Petit Bourgeois Radicalism) published in 1971.

the introduction to the third edition

(1974)

0

As

emphasizes,

although many of the conditions under the dictatorship had

changed,
not.
a

the threat

from the pseudo-revolutionaries had

The editors wrote in the preface that the threat was

result of the ultra-left's:

inability to analyze political events and develop

appropriate policies, repulsion for struggles
with immediate concrete objectives, eagerness to
'jump stages' [of revolution], insistence on
violent forms of struggle, disdain of the working
classes and of the masses, boasts
attributing
to small petit-bourgeois 'active minorities' the
dynamics of the revolutionary process ...22
The ultra-left

remained

a

major concern during the

revolution for it kept the left divided
and sapped the
party of much of its strength, especially
among youth.
So
long as the PCP had to compete with
"revolutionary" rivals
on the left,

the party had

a

difficult time controlling the

popular masses and the direction and pace
revolution.

of

the

The PCP criticized the ultra-left's
analyses

for advancing to the socialism/capitalism axis
when they

should still have been on the democracy/fascism axis. 23
The' analyses

had to be based on the realities of the day

not on abstract theories.

Only marxist-leninist scientific

methods could produce accurate analyses of the national
situation 24
.

To

succeed in its design for

a

socialist Portugal the

party needed time to correctly assess the revolution's

progress.

The ultra-left

robbed the party of time and

produced an image of the PCP as

a

conservative party

holding back the revolution rather than leading

it.

The

party often found itself dragged into activities it would

have preferred to avoid.
always

For this reason the PCP was

antagonistic to the pseudo-revolutionaries.

To

discredit them the party insisted that they were aligned
with the reactionary forces.
At

a

plenary session of the CC on June 20,

1974,

the

PCP summed up the Portuguese situation after two months of

democracy.

As a result of the actions by the MFA and the

provisional government, fascism had been
overthrown and the
PIDE (Portuguese secret police) dismantled;
the corporative
organs and the fascist organizations had been
disbanded;
initial purges had been carried out at state,
local,

and

national industrial sectors; fundamental liberties
had been

restored,

censorship had ended,

political parties had

emerged along with syndical movements;

had become legal and

a

freedom of assembly

provisional government had been

formed;

there had been some improvement in working
conditions; negotiations had begun with the colonies;
relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist nations

had begun;

and the CC thanked the MFA for April 25 and

looked forward to the constituent

elections.

It

congratulated the working classes, popular masses, and

democratic forces

for

their role

in

democratizing

Portugal 25
.

According to the CC certain tasks had to be carried
out

immediately in the political and economic realm.

the political realm,

the need to institutionalize civil

liberties and civil rights,

organs worked,

In

to

assure that new governing

and to end the colonial war were crucial.

Although it had insured the continuation of democracy, the

provisional government had not reformed corporative
structures to their roots.

The government,

therefore,

should not attempt to solve long term
problems until the
more immediate ones were solved.
The new freedom

of

association,

of assembly,

of the press,

and of syndical

organization had to be used wisely, not abused. 26
The tasks in the economic realm included
the need to

improve the
classes,

insure

living standards of the masses and middle
to stabilize and develop the economy,
and to

financial equilibrium domestically and

balance of trade.

The

CC

in

the

sharply criticized monopoly

capital for the capital flight

it

was instigating,

which

was at the root of many of the economic problems that
Portugal faced.

The MFA was not overseeing the management

of national banks or the major industries but

have to if economic sabotage continued.

they might

In short,

the PCP

was giving the MFA its approval for further intervention in
the economic affairs of the nation. 27
The environment

for

small

and medium enterprises

farms was of special concern to the party.

and

Another of the

lessons the PCP had drawn from Chile was that the party

must not lose the support of the middle classes,

because

they had been a major factor in the defeat of Allende.

The

government must take measures to help the middle sectors
such as the expansion of the domestic market,

credit availability,
socialist nations. 28

-

increased

and increased trade with the

With the return of liberties to
Portugal,

warned

that they were being abused,

reactionary forces and the ultra-left.

the party

especially by the
It implied that the

MFA might have to curb the liberties if
the reactionary
forces continued to use them to destroy
democracy through,

for example,
strikes.

the

instigation of unnecessary political

At times,

extreme abuses.

regulation was necessary

The party

to

curb

also announced that the

liberties which were given to the people after the
revolution should be officially written down as rights
and
institutionalized. 29

Although this statement appears straightforward,

in

context with its other positions the party appears to
remind the MFA that until rights are institutionalized, the

MFA has

a

free hand to curb them if it deems necessary.

It

is clear that the party accepts some restraint liberties,

preview of its position if it were to reach power.

a

When

conflicts arise between society and the individual, the
individual's rights can be expected to suffer.

are

"The people

conscious and responsible and will drown out the

individuals and small groups. "30

After April 25,

one of the party's major themes was

the need for unity if the revolution was to be successful.
"0 povo unido jamais sera vencido!"

never be defeated!)

(The people united will

became the rallying cry.

Cunhal

.

emphasized that the solution to the problems
which faced

the nation could not be
faction.

implemented by any party or

The

solution lay in the actions of all those
forces interested in a democratic Portugal.
Unity
between

the working class and the popular masses,

democratic organizations,

the parties and

and the popular movement and the

MFA,31 was necessary to solve Portugal's problems
and
institutionalize democracy.
Communists had not only to
speak of unity but live, breathe, and portray it at
public

demonstrations and in contacts with the people.

"We must

select our words very carefully when dealing with subjects

which the party considers of priority.

...

The party today

has the conditions to implant itself in the firms,

farms and rural areas,

and in the cities."

in the

The conditions

were such that the party could unite and lead the masses
and the working class. 32
The need for

a

Chilean experience.

strong unitary group was drawn from the
The disunity of the parties

and the

various classes was decisive in the fall of the government.
For this reason the PCP was especially critical

of the

ultra-left which kept the people, and especially the left,

divided
In the interests of unity the PCP attempted to broaden

its

discussions and contacts with other parties and

democratic groups.

The discussions were to focus on what

unified and divided the groups and were
to be held behind
closed doors to facilitate negotiations.
The reason for

closed sessions was, more likely,

to keep the negotiations

secret so that the extreme left would
not criticize the
party for selling out to bourgeois politics
at

the expense

of the workers. 33

The PCP's
did not have
outside),

a

insistence throughout this period that
dual

strategy

(one

in

it

government and one

was meant to reassure its supporters that it
was

working in their best interests even when negotiations
were

behind closed doors. The party wanted its members
understand this;

Avante
!

that

it

it

to

repeated it in almost every issue of

throughout 1974

The reason

.

was indeed pursuing

discuss in the conclusion,

a

dual

for

its

strategy,

concern was
as

we will

and because other parties were

criticizing its dual strategy.
In

late August the PCP provided one

of the most

comprehensive analyses of the Portuguese situation since
the military coup.

The PCP's

focus was

the strategies

on

and tactics used by the reactionary forces to undo the
conquests of April 25.

As early as May,

it

reactionary forces began instigating strikes
postal workers and bakers)
the ultra-left.

claimed the
(for example:

by infiltrating and exploiting

(Because it does not blame them directly,

the PCP was easier on the pseudo-revolutionaries than in

the months afterward)

The

PCP

.

34

had been

included in the fragile,

new

government by President Antonio de Spinola in
hopes that it

would diminish labor unrest.
PCP's participation;

it

The PS

also supported the

believed that its rival and

potential ally was committed to democracy;

want the PCP to remain outside

of the

and it did not

government to

capitalize on the unfavorable measures which the government

would be forced to impose to deal with the economic and
political problems.

Throughout most of 1974, unlike 1975,

the PS and PCP agreed more than they disagreed on the
direction which the revolution was to pursue. 35
In keeping with its cautionary policy,

was

member

a

(Aivaro Cunhal was

a

and because it

Mini ster-Without-

Portfolio and Avelino Pacheco Goncalves was Minister of
Labor)

,

the PCP rarely criticized the First Government

while it was still in power.

Once out of power,

the PCP became more critical of the government.
to the PCP,

with the resignation on July

Carlos Government

(First

8

however,

According

of the Palma

Provisional Government),

reactionary forces attempted

a

the

different tactic to break

the path toward democracy and halt the decolonization
process.

labeled

The
a

reactionary forces launched what the PCP

"constitutional coup" to disband the MFA.

The

goal of Palma Carlos was to decrease the collegiality
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within the government and begin

democratic process.

In the end,

directive body of the MFA)
for more power.

a

rapid regression in the

the Council of State

rejected Palma Carlos'

Instead it created

a

(the

demands

Second Provisional

Government which was unfavorable to the reactionary
forces
and which "consolidated the forces of democracy,
peace,

and

social progress. "36

The resignation of the First Provisional Government

was

a

result of Palma Carlos'

elements'

and other right-wing

dismay at the pace with which the PCP was

infiltrating the civil service and local governments.

Palma Carlos'

When

demanded that the MFA increase his powers,

and the MFA rejected the demand, the government resigned.

According to the PCP,
differed from the

the new Provisional Government

First in two major ways: members

of the

MFA participated in the government for the first time, and
conservative elements who placed the democratic process in
question were distanced from the government. 37

The Second

Government would only be able to resolve the crisis created
by the First Government because the PCP continued to be

member.

a

(Although in the Second Government only Cunhal

retained his position.) 38
The PCP emphasized that it accepted participation in
the government because it consisted of

coalition of the

PS,

MDP,

a

broad political

and PPD which was

in

the best

interests of democracy.

Because it was not

cohesive

a

whole and was made up of various individual
parties with
varying opinions and solutions, decisions
would be

difficult to reach.

The PCP insisted that as

long as

government collegiality was affirmed and the
MFA program

was

firmly applied,

government

.

it

would participate

in

the

39

The party reminded the people that the political
situation was full of "originalities" and contradictions

which had to be considered in defining the proper
solutions.

"The government

coalition of forces with

election of

a

is

an expression of a broad

major objective

a

constituent assembly."

-

to lead to the

To

resolve the

crisis, the government would have to institutionalize ample

liberties and rights of citizens, to assure their exercise,

and
war;

to.

defend the democratic order; to end the colonial

and to take urgent measures to confront the grave

economic problems. 40

Despite all

of

these problems,

the

participating in the government were pursuing
course to assure democracy and end colonialism.

a

forces
favorable
The party

warned that quick solutions and decisions would not be

product of the government.
complex,

and occasional.

The solutions would be

Those that preferred an

a

slow,

"all

or

nothing" strategy did not understand the complexity of the

.

!

situation and would not contribute to
the defeat of the
reactionary forces, the creation of a
democracy, or peace
in Africa. 41

Avante

wrote:

"The current government is not a
government' but it is serving the 'popular
people
Despite

the large coalition and the occasional
decisions favoring the reactionary forces, on
balance, the provisional government's measures
have been democratic and progressive.
The
government has an important role despite what
'demagogues and ultra-leftists' claim.
alternative at this time could only beThea
government of the reactionary right not a popular
government " qz
"The current situation calls for malleability,
serenity, evaluation of forces, a correct
definition of objectives.
In a revolutionary

process as irregular as the current one, it is
necessary to know how to advance and retreat. to
know how to consolidate one's successes, to know
how to find the correct solutions of the day to
day problems, to insure that the path to a
democratic regime continues" [which implies that
the current regime is not yet democratic]. 43
It

was

enemy,

important to be able to distinguish between an
friend,

and ally.

This meant that the people had

to remain vigilant of the right,

which was where the real

threat was coming from.
In

were

a

the economic realm the party claimed the problems

result of:

1)

the unfavorable alliance between Portuguese
economic interests and world capitalism,

2)

the heavy legacy left by the dictatorship,

3)

and the absorption of the colonial and African

,

.

problems

The budgets which the previous governments
under the
dictatorship presented as balanced had been
fictitious; the

state had used its power to help many large
companies which
were otherwise unprofitable (an ironic
statement

because

the PCP's preferred model of economic development
is the
East European, which also protects large, often
inefficient

companies);

and the colonial wars aggravated the economic

problems by diverting funds which could have been
applied
to economic development. 44

The PCP added that a new government could not correct
the problems with one swoop and maintain

a

healthy economy.

Purges similar to those applied to the government after
April 25 were necessary in the economic sector,

would take longer to implement.
was still strong and threatened

Because monopoly capital
democracy,

the purges had

to be carried out if democracy was to survive.
In

its efforts

but they

4^

to return the nation to dictatorship,

the reactionary forces were using economic sabotage by

blocking credits to small and medium enterprises,

closing

factories,

cause,

dismissing workers without

just

paralyzing shipment orders, ending further investment

4 6

burning grain fields, demonstrating against the provisional
government,

instigating "artificial" strikes,

paralyzing services,

occupying or

and creating general insecurity.

47

.

The goal was to intensify the economic
crisis and create

a

social crisis which would end the people's
trust in the
provisional government.
The capitalists were willing to
take on immediate losses because they could
recoup

them

later.

48

According to the PCP, the struggle against economic
sabotage was crucial to preserve democracy.
still

lay in the reactionary

use it. 49
sabotage,

As

in Chile,

forces'

Economic power

hands and they would

the CIA was also involved in the

as was foreign monopoly capital such as ITT. 50

Although the PCP agreed that economic stability was an
important goal,

austerity for the workers was unacceptable

unless it was shared by the large financial groups.

"It is

not

fitting for the workers to remove the chestnuts from

the

fire

them." 51
as

so that

they will be eaten by those who exploit

The party recommended that banks be nationalized

called for in the MFA program,

and that government

representatives should be placed in all credit institutions
to

regulate their activity with efficiency.

Measures had

to be taken to help those sectors which were in crisis such
as civil construction.

Credit had to be provided for small

and medium-sized enterprises
did not provide

a

5^

Although the MFA program

socialist solution,

the PCP

emphasized

through its economic program the current and more urgent
problems could be resolved.

5^

As

the months progressed,

the PCP

rhetoric against the reactionary forces,

increased the
claiming that

their activities were on the rise and that their
links with
ultra-leftists were intensifying 54 The party even
claimed
that the reactionary forces were at work in
.

France

spreading rumors of cholera outbreaks and violence in
Portugal to decrease tourism. 55
The reactionary forces,
the PCP claimed,

were carrying out

a

conscious effort to

restrict the freedoms recently gained and to blame
democracy and the working class for the difficulties which

had arisen since April 25.56

It

was trying t0 diminish

worker strength by creating parallel unions and by
preventing alliances between workers and peasants. 57
The PCP warned that the ultra-left was very active;

but it was unfair,

and unwise,

to curtail only its actions

while allowing the reactionary forces to continue operating

freely.

The real danger was the reactionary forces,

were using the ultra-left as

a

who

smoke screen for their own

activity.

The counter-revolutionaries were recruiting,

conspiring,

and preparing

a

coup to suppress the newly-

gained liberties and create
people,

forces,

a

new dictatorship.

The

along with the state organs and the democratic

had to increase their vigilance.

They had to

quickly inform the military authorities, the PCP, and other

democratic forces if they suspected any abnormal

developments,
forces,

whether it be

a

meeting of the reactionary

contacts in hidden places,

anti-communist posters,

and so forth. 58
The party reminded the state that the
people had the

power to identify and stop the reactionary forces.

If the

reactionary forces succeeded in their plans chaos would
result and many Portuguese would be killed.
The
reactionary forces' strategy was similar to a wolf's in
sheep's clothing.

They gave the appearance that they were

accepting the rules of the game when
using the press,

in

creating false parties,

anti-communist policy. 59

fact they were

and pursuing an

The decisive victory between the

reactionary forces and the democratic forces still remained
to be fought. 60

The PCP

insisted that additional purges of the state

apparatus and the economic sector had to be carried out.

The calls

for the purges

According to the PCP,

intensified by August of 1974.

the reactionary

forces were still

using the formal state apparatus to their advantage.

Although the PCP and MDP had begun to purge local
government organs of ex-fascists who used and manipulated

the

workers

completed. 61
level.
it

and people,

the

purges had not been

"The people can sow change at the local

But before we discuss what we will sow or how to do

we must take care of the soil which until now has been

in the hands of the people's enemies.

weeds,

clean it

[the

soil],

We must pull out the

prepare it,

bring to it the

initiative and interest of all that must
really work it."
This was a task which affected all of the
people, so

unitary action was needed by the masses not
only by
political organizations.
The political organizations

had

to

work together through the base

neighborhood committees,

and so

governments to serve the people,

local governments."

organizations,

forth,

to

"win

local

win the people to build

The masses could not wait for the

government to take all measures.

They could help

themselves and take the initiative to improve their own
conditions 62
.

Organization

.

organizational terms the party was

In

burdened with immense amounts of work after the April coup.

With

its

legalization,

transformation from
clandestine members to

the

PCP

began the

quick

cadre party of less than 3,000

a

a

mass party.

The party claimed

that since April thousands of Portuguese had "sympathized
with,

shown confidence

in,

and

joined the

Portuguese

Communist Party. "63
In keeping with the party's methods,

this was

way to announce the party's increase in membership.

was not an obvious distinction between

a

a

vague
There

"sympathizer,"

"confident,

or "member"

»

("militant").

Did the party mean

that thousands had followed this
progression to become
members, or were the thousands made up of
three separate
groups?
The

level

"sympathizers" are individuals from any class or

of

education,

who

consciously support

it

although not PCP members,
at

least

in

spirit.

The

"sympathizer" might also be an individual not yet
officially

a

member but in the process of becoming one.

The PCP member is considered the

"militant."

(Sometimes

"militant" distinguishes the active member from the member
that rarely participates in party activity.

The only way

to be certain of the distinction is from context.)

Party

"functionaries" or "cadres," whose lives are devoted to the

party and who are nominally paid bureaucrats
levels of the party organization,

are also

at

various

"militants" but

with higher commitments to the party.
The boundaries

clearly defined,
one.

for

these categories are not always

and many individuals fit

into more than

Classification becomes even more complex if we

discuss other categories which the PCP often mentions, such
as "the students,

and so forth.

the workers, the women, the technocrats,"

Among this terminology,

find the term "confident."

however,

we do not

Most likely the party just used

the term in passing since it is rarely used on other

occasions.

Although the confusion

the party manipulates

long term,

language,

it

sheds some light on how

does not matter in the

because it is evident the party's membership

exploded to high levels when compared with its cadre
status
prior to the coup.
Other distinctions that the PCP usually makes include

"reactionary forces," from the bourgeois right, who reject

the party and the revolution to the extent that they
attempt to stop it and return politics to its dictatorial

past.

The

"ultra-left" or -pseudo- revolutionaries " are

also considered bourgeois.

Their wild,

rhetorical,

idealistic views of socialism are labeled unrealistic and
dangerous to the revolution if not openly reactionary.
party often claims there is an alliance

bourgeois groups.

Next,

there is

between

The

the two

large group of

a

individuals who are referred to as the "people."

They are

not necessarily counter-revolutionary or anti-communist in

spirit but,

lack of education and freedom,

for

still live

in a pre-revolut ionary environment and continue to believe

whatever arguments the reactionary forces feed them.
the "people" also refers to the Portuguese as

the context of

a

socialist nation.

unified group seeking

a

a

"

nation in

common goal

-

a

It is often difficult to distinguish the

"people," when used in the latter context,
"popular groups,

Often

as described below.

The

from the

"democrats" are

unconnected to the PCP;

they are usually middle-class

members of other democratic parties who
also believe
democracy and the revolution

considered democratic).
workers,

peasants,

the time the PS was still

(at

The

in

"popular groups"

students,

include

and other groups

not

affiliated with the party but also in favor
of the
revolution and democracy.
People gravitated toward the PCP for various
reasons.

While other parties were just beginning to
organize and
formulate a program, the PCP was already organized
and had

a

clearly defined program.

For many who

had been

sympathizers during the clandestine years, membership

in

the party was the logical next step when the party became

legal.

For others,

the belief that only the PCP could

bring socialism to Portugal led them to seek membership.
Despite the lack of
saw a chance to

internal democracy,

finally work "for"

something

after years of struggling "against"
dictatorship)
party.

,

but because they

(socialism)

something

(the

many who quit prior to April 25 rejoined the

Because the PCP had always protected and supported

the workers during the difficult years of the Portuguese

dictatorship,

some

joined from

a

sense of duty.

especially after the revolution intensified,
opportunist reasons.

Others,

joined for

They believed that commensurate with

the party's new power and lack of cadres,

it

would be

.
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relatively easy to benefit in the spoils of
power
distribution at the local level,
and so forth.

as

public functionaries,

These and other reasons often combined in

varying degrees to bring the individual to the
party
either

a

as

militant or sympathizer.

Since the forties, the PCP had been strongly organized

and disciplined, but the new influx of members weakened
its

organization.
often faced

a

With the infusion of new blood,

the party

chaotic situation as it attempted to keep the

new membership in line with its directives.

The new

complications affected the party for several years before
it

sufficiently trained additional functionaries

to

maintain control.
The

large increase in party membership required the

streamlined formation of new cadres.

The party initially

encountered sectarianism between the "old

and those who

guard" members

joined the party after April 25.

The

leadership insisted that new cadres who "in only two months

developed years of revolutionary experience" be promoted

swiftly.

They were given an abbreviated indoctrination

consisting of the minimum required information to make good

cadres of them.

This

history of the party,

indoctrination included the basic

its political

orientation,

principles of party organization
statutes)

(the

and the

program and

The PCP's desperation

for new

cadres

further

is

evidence of its limited membership at the
time of the April
coup.
it was desperate enough to

risk integrating

relatively "unknown" individuals into
positions of
responsibility.

The inevitable result was cadre
mistakes,

and deviations from the official line.

The damage of such

an action would especially become evident

with the ultra-left.

64

in the

struggle

*

The PCP restructured its organization beginning
in
July to accommodate the

flood of new members.

The new

structure was to correspond more closely
administrative divisions of the nation.

Regional Organization

(DORs)

to

the

The five Boards of

and the large Regional

Committee would continue to be at the top of the
geographical hierarchy, followed by the 22 District

Committees,

the Municipal

Concelhias),
Freguesia)

,

the

Parish Committees

and the various

existed below this level
organization)

.

It

Committees

was

just begun because only

(Comissoes

(Comissoes

de

other organizations which

(see

chapter

7

for details

on

clear that the restructuring had
four District Committees and tens

of the hundreds of possible Municipal and Parish Committees

existed.

The new geographical center of organizational

activity would become the Municipal Committee

(probably

because the party was expanding into new regions where it
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did not

have

Committees)

.

enough members

to

support Parish

65

Despite the flood of membership applications,
party was having

a

the

difficult time integrating new members

and issuing them cards.

To do so,

biographical data on the

applicant had to first be collected from colleagues,
neighbors, and acquaintances.
This was a slow process,
especially because the party had
shortage did not, however,

shortage of cadres.

The

halt recruitment activity.

The

a

party emphasized that even though it had built dozens of

"Labor Centers," communists could not rely on prospective
members to approach the centers on their own.

It

was the

militant's duty to recruit individuals who would make good
members 66
.

The PCP also emphasized that militants had to actively

participate in

work cell.

a

party organization,

The

which should be their

organizations and cells should elect

directive organs once they had enough members.

They had to

meet regularly, make resolutions, and put them into effect.

Organization was essential because that was what
distinguished the PCP

as

a

Marxist-Leninist organization

from the other parties of the left. 67

The PCP

emphasized that the Municipal Committees

should create cells in every important company
jurisdiction.

in

If a Municipal Committee did not exist

their
in a

municipality then it should be created as
soon as possible.
This was a difficult goal but it could
be achieved if
members used their relationships with
friends in those
regions to attract new members and eventually
start

a

Municipal Committee.

Members who returned to their

homelands during vacations could be especially useful
this task.

in

The Municipal Committees should include members

from the most important companies in the area. 68

Parish committees were also important because many

agricultural workers were organized at that level.

If

necessary the Parish could be subdivided into subordinate

Local Cells.

Cells

for

intellectuals,

domestic servants,

and miscellaneous sectors also had to be organized or
expanded.

Working youths should be attracted to the party

and organized at that level even though their primary

activity would be in the Movement of Young Workers.

For

students all activity should be in the Union of Communist

Students

(UEC)

the unions,

.

Party influence should be strengthened in

peasant

associations,

unitary movements

(Movement of Democratic Women, MDP, and so forth)

governments,
organizations.

cooperatives,
The

collectives,

,

in local

and all mass

creation of workers committees in the

"labor centers" to organize propaganda,

fund drives,

and

other activity was essential. 69
The restoration of discipline took time. The party was

!

!
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concerned with eradicating the "sectarian
spirit," the
feeling that communists were somehow superior

to other

Portuguese.

Sectarianism was especially undesirable when

communists mixed with the workers,

independent democrats,

and other "non-aligned" groups which the party
wanted to

attract as sympathizers and possibly members.

The party

was often responsible for creating the sectarianism
itself

because it spoke to communists and sympathizers as if they
had analytically superior intellects. 70
From Avante

and the rest of the party press we get an

understanding of how the party operates.
from the omissions

instances

it

is

as

We learn as much

from the printed words.

In

many

clear that the party is responding to

criticisms from the left

(for

example,

attacks on its

participation in bourgeois politics and the government),
but it rarely lets the reader know what the criticisms are.
In

this manner it exposes those who have experienced the

criticisms and provides the official response should they

confront similar arguments again.

repeated in Avant e

,

Because they are not

the reader who has never heard the

criticisms remains safe from their negative influences.
The PCP concluded that the traditional areas of party

support

(Lisbon industrial belt and Alentejo) were the same

areas where workers implemented the party's recommendations

accurately when confronted by "pseudo- revolutionary

.

adventurism" and other attempts from the
reactionary
forces.
The regions where the party had

not established

strong roots were those where democracy was
endangered and
the workers were being led in the wrong
direction.
it was

in

those areas that the party had to strengthen
its

support 71

One of the strengths of the PCP is its ability
to
mobilize support and a higher degree of devotion and

commitment from its members.

Every communist,

what his position in the party,

is

no matter

expected to be an

organizer and propagandist.

It

"enlightenment"

increase the masses'

sessions

to

his

is

duty to hold

consciousness and inform them of the official party line.
As important as informing and enlightening is the role of

the militant as the "ears" of the party.

The militant must

listen to the masses' problems, to their responses to party

positions and daily events,
party.

and relay these back to the

The militant must identify with the masses. 72

Conclusions

.

During the initial months of democracy,

the PCP's warnings of an attempt by the reactionary forces
to overthrow the new regime seemed to encompass everything.

However, because the threat allowed them to follow
of mediating labor demands,
force,

justifying

and cautioning discretion,

it

a

a

policy

disciplined work

was also welcomed by

the party leaders.

The threat

allowed the party to

emphasize the long-term over short and
medium-term goals.
Only by moving slowly would the party be able

to assess the

situation and outline its future strategy.

with time it

could move into the recently purged local
government,
expand its already dominant position in the unions,

and

continue the formidable organizational task of becoming

a

mass party with disciplined members.
In addition,

a

party which moved cautiously would gain

the respect of the MFA and hopefully the Portuguese people,
as a party committed to a democratic Portugal.

The respect

of the MFA would also give the party more leverage in

influencing

a

peaceful resolution of the colonial wars

according to its plans for the new African nations.

For

all of these reasons the party preferred to move cautiously
in the initial stages of the revolution.

As September 1974 approached,

reactionary force attempts and

the party's warnings of
of

the extreme

alliance with the reactionary forces
Meanwhile,

the PCP

left's

intensified.

continued its assessment of the

situation and its slow penetration of local government and
the press.

Phase II

-

September 28, 1974 to March 11, 1975

After the MFA coup, moderates within the
military and

the political groups,

like President Spinola and Prime

Minister Palma Carlos,

emerged to contest the nation's

drift to the left.
left

The rifts between the moderates and the

intensified as

a

result of several

the major one was the colonial problem.

issues,

of which

Arguing that the

colonies were not ready for independence, President Spinola

preferred to hold

a

referendum which would incorporate them

into a federation of equal states. On the other hand,

the

which at this time included the PPD, PS and

PCP,

left,

contended that the colonies were ready for independence.
Other issues intensified this basic division and led to
Palma Carlos' resignation in July.
to shift to the left,

As the nation continued

Spinola organized a "silent majority"

of conservatives and moderates to contest the left in what

was

to be a massive demonstration in Lisbon on

28,

1974.

This demonstration marked the end of the
of PCP activity.

September

first phase

The party portrayed the demonstration as

another attempt by the reactionary forces to move its
"conspiratorial counter-revolutionary activity"
streets of Lisbon.

The massive amount of time,

into the
money,

and

organizational infrastructure which the reactionary forces
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devoted to the demonstration proved this.

was

it

a

coup

attempt to destabilize the nation so that
Spinola could
increase his powers by declaring

a

"state of emergency."

Having portrayed the demonstration as
it was

a

coup attempt,

inevitable that the party would call

for vigilance

and mobilize the "democratic forces," including the
state
security forces, to confront the reactionary forces.

(Transportation workers obliged by refusing to transport

demonstrators from the countryside to Lisbon)
declared

a

73

The PCP

great victory for democracy when the road blocks

they set up with the "unity of the MFA, the popular masses,
and other democratic

succeeded.

for

the

forces" to stop the demonstration

The party insisted that those found responsible

reactionary attempt had to be

reactionary forces,

it

warned,

jailed.

The

had only been partially

defeated so vigilance and purges of those reactionary
elements still active in Portugal were necessary. 74

Frustrated with his inability to check the left's

increasing power,

Spinola resigned as president two days

later and was replaced by chief of staff General Francisco
de Costa Gomes,

also a moderate.

One of the major events during this
the PCP's VII Congress
1974.

(Extraordinary)

According to the PCP,

a

Second Phase was

held on October 20,

congress was necessary to

revise the party's program and statutes.

Many of the

.

existing program's conditions had been fulfilled
statutes were designed for

a

and the

clandestine cadre party, not

a

growing mass party which already numbered
30,000
militants 75

According to the PCP, of the eight conditions approved
at the previous

Congress in 1965, the major condition,

(VI)

on which the others were based,

had been fulfilled

destruction and fall of the fascist state.
of peace

the

condition

and friendliness with all nations had also been

fulfilled.

the

The

-

The remaining conditions would be completed as

democratic and national revolution evolved.

Decolonization,

for example,

progressed significantly even

if the pace had been slower than the party preferred.

improvements in living standards
workers,

for

Many

the Portuguese

such as a national minimum wage of 3,300 escudos,

were achieved despite the deteriorating Portuguese economy.
In

the

syndical realm,

activity was lively; workers

discussed their problems and demands openly and went on
strike,

if necessary.

Purges progressed within the state

and military organizations, although they were not complete

and needed to be expanded to other sectors.

Basic human

rights were achieved and political parties allowed to

function freely.

This progress,

claimed the PCP,

the accuracy of Marxist-Leninist scientific analysis.

showed
7^

At the VII Congress the party approved a three point
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program in keeping with the new political
situation:
1.

the strengthening of the democratic state
and
the defense of the new liberties,

2.

the defense of economic and financial
stability with emphasis on development,

3.

the continuation of decolonization.

To achieve these goals the party continued to
espouse unity

of the peasants,

the artisans,

small and medium business and agriculture,

the intellectuals,

and the workers.

As the

representatives of the popular masses, they made up one of
the essential motors of the revolution;

the other motor

being the MFA.
The party became one of the first communist parties to

drop reference to the "dictatorship of the proletariat"
from its program.

Cunhal emphasized that it was merely

a

rhetorical adaptation to the drastic changes which had
occurred since April 25.

had

a

In Portugal the word dictatorship

negative connotation resulting from 48 years of

dictatorship.

For this reason it was being dropped but the

party had not changed ideologically 77
.

Since it was an extraordinary congress, the agenda did
not

include the election of new members but it did reveal

for the first time the names of the 36 full

members of the Central Committee

(CC)

.

and alternate

To emphasize their

connection with the working class, the party declared that
75

percent of the CC were workers

(white

collar workers

.

included)

and that combined,

they had lived 755 years

clandestine members and 308 of those years
under the dictatorship

as

as prisoners

78

After the congress, the party's major concern
became
"unicidade," which it defined as the unity
of syndical

representation through

a

sole labor confederation.

The

party's

goal was to continue its domination of the
unionized workers through Intersindical at a time
when

other parties

(especially the PS and ultra-leftists)

were

attempting to create parallel unions and their own
confederations.

The PCP argued that parallel, politicized,

partisan unions would weaken and divide workers and reverse

their recent conquests. 79

Since the PCP controlled

a

majority of the more than 180 unions, its rivals complained
that it would also control Intersindical.

"Unicidade" was the first major issue which split the

PCP and PS.

When the MFA approved Intersindical as the

sole confederation of Portuguese workers, the PCP organized

various rallies to celebrate the great victory.
the blow,

the PCP called for

a

PCP-PS alliance.

To soften

The call

was often repeated as constituent elections approached but
was disregarded by the PS.

The

centrifugal forces which

pushed the two major parties of the left apart had begun.

80

Since the PS and the PPD convinced the MFA not to make

membership in Intersindical compulsory and to allow review
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of the legislation after one year,

the PCP victory was not

total.

Although many political observers warned
that the
communists had control of the MFA, the conditions

imposed

on

Intersindical indicated that this was not the
case.

Most MFA leaders were aware of the party's
intentions and
did not follow PCP recommendations blindly.
However,
the

party's strategy of discipline to maintain good relations
with the MFA was succeeding.

The MFA welcomed its support

and recommendations and resented PS and PPD eagerness
to

push the military back to the barracks.
Once the MFA approved "unicidade" in January,

focused on other issues,
agricultural sector.
the

the PCP

such as the plight of the

Avante elaborated on the problems of

landless peasant of the south,

peasant of the north,

of the

of the

self-sufficient

medium land-owners;

it

criticized in great detail latifundista economic sabotage.
It

also advocated agrarian reform while assuring the small

landowners of the north that their properties would not be
affected. 81

The PCP also became concerned with the role of the

catholic church.
support,

It

realized that without Catholic

large-scale communist influence could not spread

beyond Lisbon and the Alentejo.

The Catholic Church was a

powerful force in the conservative north.

hold the revolution back.

For this

It

continued to

reason the party

.
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attempted to divide the Church leaders at
the top of the
hierarchy from those at the bottom who
understood the
peoples' conditions and problems and might
be able

to

mobilize support in the party's favor.

that

The party announced

knew all Catholics were not working with
the
reactionary forces.
It emphasized that it would continue

to

it

accept and recognize Catholicism even under socialism.

Catholics could also be Communists.

PCP criticism that the

church supported the reactionary forces was not to be taken
as anti-religious,

but merely ant i-react ionary 82
.

The party began early preparations

scheduled for April 25,

1975.

for the elections

Because it suspected

it

would not do as well in the elections as it hoped for, the
PCP prepared itself for

a

loss of power in electoral terms.

Although it wanted to maintain its democratic image,

the

party also down played the importance of the elections
whenever possible.
MFA intensified.
postpone,

or at

nullify the MFA'

The strategy of close alliance with the
It

least
s

tried to convince the MFA to cancel,
insure that the elections would not

key role in politics. 83

Meanwhile,

the

party tried to gain as many pro-communist measures as
possible (for example, Intersindical
As early as November,

for the constituent

)

when the electoral procedures

elections were drawn up, the party

warned that the revolution had not reached many regions of
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the nation.

Unless purges of conservative government

officials were carried out,
possible.

free elections would not be

With the approval of voter registration rules in

March 1975, the rhetoric intensified and the party insisted

that

elections would not be

Nevertheless,
candidates

for

it

free

In that

could not be free.

many

regions.

accepted the challenge and provided

every region,

representatives.

in

sector,

except

for

it claimed,

emigrant's
the election

When asked why the party did not also

abstain in other regions where it claimed elections could
not be

free,

it

side-stepped the issue by claiming that

circumstances were different there. 84
The PCP continued its calls to maintain the unity of

the popular masses and MFA amid talk from its right to send
the military back to the barracks after the elections.

The

party emphasized that both the MFA and the popular masses

had been necessary to create
25,

a

democratic Portugal on April

and that both would be necessary to continue

1974

democracy.

The two forces complemented each other and were

inseparable,

so

the MFA'

s

role had to continue after the

elections 85
.

As election day approached,

support

of the

the PCP increased its

MDP/CDE as an organization composed

primarily of individuals who were independent democrats.
The PCP

supported the MDP's application for party status
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because its role in "Unicidade,

-

unity,

and alliances would

be necessary in the struggle for free elections,

constitution,

for a new

and for a democratic Portugal. 86

The Portuguese Democratic Movement
formed as a unitary movement

(MDP)

had been

soon after April 25,

attract individuals sympathetic to the PCP but,

various reasons, would not become militants.

1974 to

who

for

It was hoped

to especially attract members of the middle-class as well
as

individuals in the north where the PCP was weak.

MDP was

a

The

reorganization of the Democratic Electoral

Commission

(CDE)

created in

anti-government opposition.

1969

to

unite

the

Like most opposition movements

during the dictatorship it was dominated by Communists; so

after the 1974 coup,

both the PPD and PS quit the

organization complaining that it was
The party also

criticized

a

communist front.

what

it

claimed was

a

growing an t i - c ommun i s t sentiment among the bourgeois
parties,

which,

including the PS,

were grouped together.

They helped the reactionary forces by fighting the
principal enemy

-

the PCP.

The

reactionary forces'

goal,

under the guise of social democracy, was to halt the
democratic process.

The party

claimed that even forces

which considered themselves liberal and democratic were
participating in the anti-communist wave.^ 7
hand,

On the

other

the anti-communists claimed the PCP controlled the
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unions through
elections,

"unicidade," wanted to prevent

and controlled the media. 88

criticized the anti-communists,

it

the

Although the PCP

also exploited the

situation to portray itself as the persecuted
underdog, an
image with which the Portuguese had been

bombarded

throughout the clandestine years.
The party analyzed the political situation at
the end

of January as

approaching

a

decisive period,

so

it

was

imperative that all political forces clarify their
positions.

The upcoming elections were only constituent

elections and should not,

under any circumstances,

be

considered legislative elections because that went beyond
their authority.

Clearly the PCP,

concerned that

not going to have a good showing in the elections,

it

was

did not

want them to be weighed more heavily than agreed upon.

89

The PCP contended adamantly that democracy as based on

Western European conservative, bourgeois, social-democratic

governments could never work in Portugal because they
allowed monopoly capital to continue in operation.
support

for bourgeois

democracy formed the basis

PS

for the

PCP's major criticisms against its rival's strategies.

The

government had to be antimonopolistic and antilat ifundista
if Portugal was

to be

a

truly independent nation.

Its

solutions had to be geared to its own individual problems

rather than following models developed for other nations.

.

!

303

The only accurate path to democracy in
Portugal was via the

revolutionary path with mass popular support
The party announced that Avante
daily during the campaign.

9°

would be printed

it was the duty of every member

to know what the party's position was on the
issues by
reading the newspaper.
it was also important that the

party not rely on the commercial distribution of the paper.
To insure that it reached the masses,

distribute it themselves.

the communists would

91

The emphasis on distributing and reading the paper

daily

is

especially important to

organizationally strong enough,
are,

to make

strategy.

last minute

has

party which is

as most

communist parties

reversals in its electoral

The press is a vehicle to mobilize its militants

and sympathizers.

PCP

a

As we will see in later elections,

successfully shifted its support on

a

the

moments

notice to a different candidate with the help of the press
on several occasions.

Increasingly,

the party discussed the economic

problems which plagued the nation.

Because the PCP was

participant in the provisional governments,
show that the economic situation was not

government policies.

it
a

a

tried to

result of

The policies of the dictatorship,

combined with the worldwide inflationary spiral caused by

international capitalism, were to blame.

The PCP called
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for the nationalization of the banks
to control

capital

flight and help develop the economy. 92

Although the PCP continued to criticize
strikes
without

just

cause,

it

also emphasized that workers could

not be expected to carry the full brunt of stabilizing
the

economy;

the PCP

accepted more strikes as just cause.

It

criticized those who blamed economic hardship on declining

productivity 93
.

The

"Day

of

Popular Defense of the Democratic

Conquests," which the PCP organized on October

was

6,

a

Sunday of national volunteer work in which workers showed

their support for the revolution.

It was

also intended to

prove that workers were not interested in decreasing
productivity.

According to the party,

the

spirit

and

devotion which workers felt on that day were similar to the
feelings workers had everyday in
the

first time in Portugal,

a

socialist society.

"For

the salaried masses felt that

the product of their labor was not destined to benefit an

insignificant minority,
the sixth of October was

but the collective.
a

In that sense

window open to the future."

showed that the workers wanted democracy and that

it

It

was

the reactionary forces which were interested in decreasing

productivity.

The Portuguese voluntarily contributed one

billion escudos worth of work to the nation.

demonstrated that work could be

a

"festival

full

It

of

happiness and pride. "95

The party addressed many other issues
during the
second phase of PCP activity.
The youth's role in the

revolution was considered important enough to
create a
separate organization - Uniao de Juventude
Comunista
(UJC).96
The party also devoted more attention to the
reform of the education system,

and reorganization.
controlled the media,

especially through purges

denied accusations that

It

especially television

.

97

it

The party

continued to warn of reactionary attempts and of the need
for vigilance.

local

It

issues,

discussed housing problems and other

emphasized the need to strengthen the

alliance between the workers and the peasants and continued
to pressure for decolonization.

The PCP

also ran stories

praising the achievements of the socialist nations,
implying that Portuguese society would be similar to them
after the transformation to socialism was complete.

Organization

.

During this second phase of activity

the party continued to grow.
30,000 after only six months.
to

its

It

claimed

a

membership of

The increase was attributed

struggle under the dictatorship which attracted

waves of new members.

claimed it was

a

By the end of the year the PCP

mass party,

its members were workers.

and that

a

high percentage of

Sixty percent were

industrial

.
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and agricultural workers,

well as

as

percent were white collar employees.

fisherman,

and

18

To the party the low

percentage of peasants (small, self-sufficient
landowners),

young workers,

and women was unacceptable

(the

women

composed 15 percent of the militants but figures
were not
provided for the peasants or young workers)
New members
had to be enrolled in these three categories:
peasants (in
.

order to advance in the north),

women

(because they

composed more than fifty percent of the population),

youths

(because they might be attracted to ultra-left

tendencies)
(so

and

that

It

.

especially wanted to recruit young workers

intellectuals would not dominate its youth

organizations)

.

9^

A majority of militants were in the older age groups.
Twenty percent of the militants were above the age of
45 percent were between 30 and 50,

aged less than 30.

50,

and only 35 percent were

The party argued that

older members

joined because they remembered the party's historical role

better.

This was another

especially workers,

reason why younger members,

needed to be recruited to the party

(a

party also needs to add young members to maintain active
militants since older members eventually become less active
and die)

99

The geographical organization of the party continued
to

expand.

At

the top were

seven Boards of Regional
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Organization

(DORs)

where previously only five existed:

Regional Organization of the North,
Ribatejo,

Lisbon,

Adjacent

Islands.

Setubal,

Beiras,

West

Alentejo and Algarve,

and the

Next were District Commissions

of the 18 districts in continental Portugal;

and

in each

only the four

District Commissions of the Adjacent Islands remained
to be

established. 100

Significant advances had been made in

expanding the organization to the municipalities although
much work remained to be done at that level as well as in

the parishes.

The Parish Commissions were

especially

important in the urban areas because it was at that level

that professionals and employees of small
actively participate in the party.
also played an important role

firms

could

The parish commission

in distributing the party

press .101
The executive organs elected by the assemblies were to

number between eight or ten members,
often larger.

although they were

The party insisted that the executive organs

be kept to ten members or less.

If necessary,

a

larger

organ could be created to discuss general questions but the

executive organs had to remain small and should deal with
specifics.

For the Municipal Commissions and organizations

which did not meet at least monthly, Executive Commissions
or

Secretariats had to be created to make the daily

decisions 102
.
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The party claimed it especially
needed to expand in
areas where the reactionary forces were
strong, where the
majority of Portuguese did not understand
what freedom and

liberty were.

Only

reactionary forces.

a

strong party could defeat the

Strength was to be measured not only

quantitatively but also qualitatively.
formation of additional cadres.

required the

It

Each militant had to

participate in the enlightenment sessions,
recruitment of new members,

prescribed.

and so

forth,

in

as

the

Lenin

Each militant had to be given tasks to

fulfill which were to be evaluated by party organizations.

This

required regular meetings

at

the bottom of the

organizational hierarchy to discuss the political
situation.

The party emphasized that

all

regardless of when they entered the party,

communists,

were equal

(a

declaration which was to be repeated in the future implying

that within the PCP there was distrust and

a

division

between the pre-1 974 members and the post-1974 members).
Discipline was required within the organization to have

a

strong party in qualitative terms. 103

Conclusions
phase,

.

During the five months of the first

the party had proceeded cautiously as it assessed

the political

situation.

The

failure of President

Spinola's massive street demonstration emboldened the PCP

during the second phase.

its

cautionary policies

continued, but for different reasons.

One

Whereas during Phase

had moved slowly to buy time to analyze
the
political situation, by Phase Two the initial
it

analyses had

been completed and the conclusions drawn.

As the party

progressed toward the Constituent Elections,
that it would not do well.

it

realized

Combined with the party's

analysis that Portugal did not have the conditions
necessary to support bourgeois democracy, and the fact that
the PCP

leadership was Stalinist to begin with, the party

rejected bourgeois democracy or Eurocommunism in Portugal
and prepared cautiously for revolution and

a

power struggle

according to more traditional Marxist-Leninist lines.
the time being,

For

the PCP continued its links with the MFA,

tried to weaken the impact of the elections,

and continued

to work toward fulfilling other Communist goals.

PHASE III

The

-

MARCH

1975 TO SEPTEMBER

11,

Third Phase

revolutionary phase.

party

of
As

it

1,

1975

activity was the

progressed the party

increasingly acted as if conditions were ripe

for

revolution in Portugal.

March

11,

1975 became

another historical date in

Portuguese revolutionary history;

on

that

date

former

president General Antonio Spinola led

a

military group of

conservatives and moderates in an attempted
coup.
According to the PCP,

the MFA with the support of the

people stopped the attempt.

The party called for vigilance

by the popular sectors to prevent the
reactionary

forces

from unleashing further attempts against the
revolution,
call which the party continued throughout this
phase,

especially in August.

a

and

Because in previous cases of

counter-revolutionary activity laxness had allowed the
reactionary forces to regroup and strike again, the PCP
emphasized that the reactionary forces had to be punished.

Additional purges within state organs
military)

were necessary,

(civilian and

the military had to reorganize,

anti-monopolistic measures had to be implemented, and price
freezes and salary increases were necessary to meet some of
the economic problems facing the workers. 104

measures were later implemented,

Most of these

including purges

in

the

military and the arrests of more than 1500 individuals who
were charged with complicity in the coup.

The attempted coup had several repercussions which
favored the PCP's political goals.

institutionalization of the MFA.

A major victory was the
Through the creation of

Supreme Revolutionary Council as the MFA'

s

a

executive organ,

the military would continue its role in politics to direct

and defend the revolution.

The MFA also forced all parties
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to sign the MFA/ party pact as a condition
for running in
the constituent elections. The pact stated
that the Council

would maintain veto power on all government
decisions for
three to five years and that presidential candidates

had to

be military men.

Like the three previous governments,

government was

Government,

a

broad coalition.

however,

previous governments.

ministerial posts.

was

the newly formed

The Fourth Provisional

further to the left than the

For the first time the MDP was given
The PCP and MDP,

with two posts each,

had representation equal to the PPD and PS.

Goncalves

continued as Prime Miniaster and officers held several of
the ministerial positions.

Because of the changing political situation and its

inability to restrain the reactionary forces,

the PCP

claimed that the previous government had outlived its
usefulness.

The

fourth provisional government would have

to correspond to the more dynamic political situation which

followed the thwarted coup.

an

ant i -democrat i c

Because it considered the PPD

party,

the

PCP

criticized the

participation of the PPD in the government.

The party

emphasized that the reactionary forces had not been totally

defeated.

It

was

still

a

force to be reckoned with.

Because the coup failed in its early stages,
reactionaries hid to emerge later.

many
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The right-wing
to the

coup attempt gave the forces furthest

left within the MFA the upper hand.

As

the revolution moved to the left with the
MFA'

s

a

result,

decision to

nationalize domestic banks and insurance companies.
Because many of the banks controlled the assets
of other

enterprises,
sectors.

the repercussions went beyond these two

Through the nationalizations,

for example,

the

state also gained control of many of the newspapers.

After the nationalizations,

the PCP declared that

measures against monopoly and latifundio power were finally

beginning to succeed.

The revolution was

attacking the

roots of the problems in Portugal rather than wasting its

energies on secondary concerns.

moving toward socialism,

The

nation had begun

toward the collectivism of the

means of production, toward agrarian reform, and toward the

improvement of workers' conditions 106
.

With the institutionalization of the MFA and its
nationalization of 24 major firms in the basic sectors of
industry and energy,

the PCP became more confident of the

destruction of monopoly capital and Portugal's progress

toward socialism.

It

called

for

vigilance

nationalized sector to prevent economic sabotage
Cunhal

the

in
.

1

07

later stated that without the nationalizations and

other revolutionary measures,

the economy would have

collapsed and the liberties would have been dismantled

s

1

.

within a short period of time.

10 8

The party insisted that the elections

scheduled for

April 25 had to be free; they could not undo
the gains of
the revolution.
It emphasized that democracy in Portugal
would consist of the broadest freedoms and liberties

but it

would not be bourgeois democracy as in Western Europe.

In

Western Europe monopoly capital continued to rule using the
veil of freedom to mask its exploitation of the workers.

Because monopoly capital would be destroyed
bourgeois democracy would not work. 109

in Portugal,

By continuing its

claims that the revolution had not reached many regions of

Portugal,

the PCP was creating a scenario to

justify its

rejection of the elections as fraudulent and unreliable. 110

According to the PCP,

the

elections

for

the

constituent assembly showed voter support for the MFA/party
pact as well as

Curso

-

for the PREC

(Processo Revolucionar io Em

Revoulut ionary Process In Progress).

The PCP

praised the MFA/party pact which it insisted would limit
the election's impact to the formation of
assembly as intended.

a

constituent

The pact would also insure that the

new constitution would remain consistent with the MFA'

program and that it would not alter the revolutionary
process

1 1

After the elections,

the PCP tried to downplay the

importance of the PS's victory (PS-38%, PPD-26%, PCP-12.5%,
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MDP-4%)

According to the PCP, the votes received
by the
PS were not accurate measurements
of its
.

support;

many

individuals voted for the socialists believing
that the
MFA's program was connected with the Socialist
Party, which
it was not. Many voters associated socialism
with the PS
and communism with the PCP without realizing that
before
communism could be reached a transitional socialist
phase
had to be traversed. Even the Soviet Union had not
reached

communism yet.

As a

result,

many who voted for the PS

would have voted for the communists had they realized that
the PCP was also in favor of socialism.

In fact,

the PS's

brand of socialism was not pure socialism but bourgeois
socialism in which monopoly capitalism still dominated.
Social democracy or bourgeois capitalism was not what the
PCP or MFA envisioned.

the PS

in the

The PCP declared that the votes for

south were in reality anti-revolutionary

votes while the votes for the socialists in the north were

cast by voters who were opposed to

fascism but too

repressed to vote for the PCP .112
The electoral results,

according to the party, proved

only that the Portuguese wanted to participate in the
elections, that they supported the revolution, and that the

reactionary forces and the right did not have as much

support as they claimed.

The PCP

did well

in

the

industrial zones and the southern agricultural regions.
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The party declared that it did less
well in the north and
in other regions where the
anticommunist bias, a legacy
from the previous regime, was magnified
by the undemocratic

atmosphere created by
television,

a

"holy alliance" composed of

high-level religious leaders,

foreign sources.

the Vatican,

and

Those that considered the percentage of

votes to be the only measure of party strength
were
mistaken; because of its mass influence, its ability
to
mobilize support,

and its role in the revolution,

was much stronger.

the PCP

Despite their limited accuracy in

measuring party strength,

the constituent

assembly

elections were still important. 113

After the elections,

the new goal was to consolidate

the revolutionary gains and expand the revolution to other

sectors.

In

the agricultural

sector,

for example,

the

party encouraged the MFA to pass major agrarian reform
measures.

Although they lacked "de jure" control,

February agricultural workers

in

the

since

south had been

assuming "de facto" control of the land through land
occupations.

The PCP also advocated the absorption of

medium and small

farmers

into

the

revolution,

the

fulfillment of agricultural workers' wage concerns,
vigilance to prevent economic sabotage in the fields,
an

and

increase in production through collectivism and the

formation of cooperatives. 114

On May

Day the party analyzed the

socialism in Portugal.

transition to

For the transition to occur the

democratic revolution socially led by the working
class and

politically led by the vanguard of the two motors of
the
revolutionary process - the MFA and the PCP - required
that
the workers quickly become conscious of their revolutionary
role.

Because the MFA was neither

party,

force

a

class nor a political

the working class was the most important social
in

the

revolution.

The

rhetoric implied that

conditions were quickly ripening for the final assault. 115

By

June

it

was

clear to the party that

revolutionary process was underway.
25 military

coup,

the

Ever since the April

the party had often referred to the

evolution in Portugal

as

the

"Democratic Process

In

Progress," but as early as May the party began referring to
the evolution as the "Revolutionary Process In Progress."

According to the PCP,
revolution had pursued

a

after the nationalizations,

different course.

The workers had

to be conscious of this and pursue a new line.

warned the workers not to expect an improvement
conditions overnight.

The

the

The party
in their

economic situation of the

country was very delicate as

a

result of years of

mismanagement and exploitation by monopoly capital and
latifundistas

.

Although the workers should expect

a larger

role in the management of the economy through worker self-

!
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management, they should also work harder
because the fruits
of their labor would be used for national
and their own

interests rather than
capital.

for the

interests of monopoly

They could not expect revolutionary change
only

from above but also had to increase their commitment
to the

revolution from below by increasing productivity.

The

productivity improvements had to be quantitative and
qualitative through diversification and the elimination of
products which had

a

low demand. 116

The party's commitment to the productivity campaign

was

reinforced by the coverage in Avante

of productivity

increases in the industrial and agricultural sectors.

117

The campaign included

the

a

day of voluntary work

for

revolution on June 10 which, like the previous day in 1974,
was praised and given great coverage. The PCP had begun the

"productivity battle,"
of the summer.

a

major concern throughout the rest

H%

Some measures were taken to improve the conditions of

the workers,

such as an increase

in

the minimum wage to

4,000 escudos, a freeze of all salaries over 12,000 escudos

per month with

a

maximum wage ceiling of 49,900 escudos,

and an end to dismissal without just cause.
however,

call

To the party,

the ripening of the revolutionary process and the

for

the masses

to

be

aware of the changing

circumstances was more important. Most of all,

the workers

were not to be enticed by the reactionary

forces'

push to

strike

for unreasonable demands which were
designed to
create instability. 119
By the end of May the PCP increasingly
criticized
PS.

PS

the

Rather than working to bring socialism to Portugal
the

was working against the MFA,

declared the PCP.

The

controversy over freedom of the press and the occupation of
the pro-Socialist Republica newspaper by communist workers

had escalated.

press,

The PS accused the PCP of controlling the

and the PCP

Republica

12
.

government,

The

Q

an

accused the PS
PS

PCP

left

action which the PCP

the PS

controlling

threatened to resign from the

strengthen the reactionary forces.

the

of

claimed would

Despite the criticisms,

room to maneuver by proposing

discussions between the two. 121

The PCP claimed that links

between the Republica affair and PCP antipluralism were
erroneous.

The party had nothing to do with the affair.

The Republica incident had to be worked out between the

workers and the newspaper's editors.

The answer to the

occupation of the Catholic Church's Radio Renascenca was
similar.

The problem was not religious; it was between the

workers and the administration. 122

According to the PCP,
process,

during any revolutionary

when the attempt is made to replace one social

system with another, an inevitable confrontation emerges as
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the class doomed to extinction
attempts to hold on to
power.
Because Portugal was still at this
stage,

it

was

because
still moving toward the destruction
of monopoly

power and the end to exploitation of
man by man,

it

was

especially important that careful analyses
be produced.
MFA moves toward socialism had dashed the
hopes of monopoly

power.

The MFA was

pluralism. 123

committed to

socialism via

The PCp reminded its rival parties that
when

they signed the MFA pact they agreed to abide
by the MFA
program and could not change it now or try to create
social

democracy instead of socialism.

The PS was

attempting to

transform an assembly restricted to debate constitutional
issues into a forum for bourgeois democracy. 124
The PCP had become concerned enough with the pace of

the revolution and the reactionary forces'
throughout Portugal,

especially in the north,

attacks

to make

a

special plea for vigilance and readiness for mobilization.
The contradictions

in

the revolution were beginning to

emerge as the forces against it and those for it drew
sides.

The only alternatives

revolution or reaction.

left to the Portuguese were

Portugal,

truly independent and continue

a

insisted the PCP, to be
national revolution,

to avoid foreign pressures and prescriptions.

The rhetoric

which the party used became more radical than before.

party especially focused on the Alentejo.

had

It

The

encouraged
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the MFA to include agrarian reform in
its program hoping it
would do for agriculture what it did for
the basic
industries of the nation. 125

The revolution,

according to the PCP,

turning point once again.

be

was

at

the

The alliance with the MFA had to

continued or the revolution would be endangered.

Apparently,

the PCP

approaching.

felt that the showdown was quickly

The fact that the PCP called rallies of

support throughout the nation was an indication of
its

concern.

The PS and PPD resigned from the government in

July over the Republica affair,

would

an

action the PCP feared

destabilize the political situation.

called on its militants to remain vigilant,
sectarianism, and spread the warning.

of the PS,

The party

put

aside

It was very critical

warning PS members that their leaders were

working with the PPD and the reactionary forces, that they
were dragging the PS toward the counter-revolution,

and

that the PS resigned from the government to destabilize
it. 126

The

PCP

claim that the PS attempted to bring

reactionary forces to Lisbon to create

a

right-wing

government shows that relations between the two had
deteriorated to the point where the PCP labeled the PS

reactionary and anti-communist.

The PCP claimed that,

aided by the recent moves of the PS and PPD,

the

.;;
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reactionary forces were once again
on the offensive.
The
reactionary forces had learned lessons
from their previous
attacks and had become more cautious and
imaginative.
T icy

had emerged from behind the facade of
democratic parties
where they had been active since the
revolution 127
.

During the new anti-communist offensive,
in

which began

July and included violent attacks against
party

headquarters and Communists in general,

cautious.

the PCP was less

called for improvements in the workers'

It

standards of living, rather than seeking patience
from the
workers; it increased its support of worker self-management

through seizures
administrations;

replacement

an-id

called for

it

unitary governnulent which

a

would work toward resolving the nation'

than

factory

of

problems rather

s

coalition government in which each party

a
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had

very close relationship with
Goncalves,

a

but the

summer of 1975 was the high point of
communist strength
partly as

a

result of its access to the Prime
Minister.

Goncalves formed

a

Fifth Provisional Government which

was

further to the left than any of the
previous
governments because the PS refused to participate.

Although the PCP and MDP each held two ministries,

the

government was primarily composed of military officers
and

independent

leftists.

The

PCP

insisted that the new

unitary government reinstate the democratic order,
strengthen liberties,

end the instability by centralizing

authority, begin additional purges within the state organs,

and implement measures to improve the economy. 12 9
As September approached the PCP saw Goncalves'

wane,

power

ant i -communist attacks throughout Portugal continue

(especially in the north)
to the moderates.

and power within the MFA shift

,

Realizing it was losing control of the

revolutionary situation and that the nation was on the
brink of civil war, the PCP offered its militants
self-criticism.

It

a

limited

declared that it had committed errors

of sectarianism and over-confidence in the revolution.

sectarian attitude of many of the members had to end.

Another phase in the revolution was ending.
party'

s

The

1-30

The

declarations that the MFA had been weakened by

internal divisions,

that

the

PS

was

allying with
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international

forces

against the revolution,

that

a

disinformation campaign had been launched abroad
as well as
at home, and that the economic problems
continued
to mount,

were proof of this.

Although several African nations were

given their independence

(Mozambique,

Sao Tome and Principe Islands),

Cape Verde Islands,

decolonization was slowing

down in the case of Angola. 131

According to the PCP,

revolution was blamed

on

the immediate threat to the

conservative members of the

military and on the PS which strengthened the reactionary
forces.

Normally,

the Fifth Provisional Government would

have been able to defuse the threat to the revolution;

it

was unable to do so for lack of support and because the
divisions within the MFA proved too strong.
the PCP claimed,

It

was not,

that some individuals within the MFA were

against the revolution but that they did not have the

political maturity necessary to analyze the situation
correctly 132
.

The divisions within the MFA were allegedly caused by

the "Nine" who were officers supporting Major Melo Antunes.
He had written the MFA program as well as most of the MFA

documents, and favored moderate socialism.
1975,

Earlier, during

the MFA had split into various factions including the

Antunes

faction,

the faction surrounding General Vasco

Goncalves which was pro-PCP,

and the

faction surrounding
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General Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, which
was extreme-left.
As if prophesying the events of November
25, the

PCP asked

the

factions within the MFA not to use

force to resolve

their rhetorical differences but to save their
strength to
protect the revolution from the right.
Merely ending

the

political differences which emerged

the surface would

at

not solve the problems which were rooted much deeper.

if

the reaction succeeded they would curtail the rights of
all

Portuguese,

not only those of the communists.

Only unity

and the consolidation of the strength on the left would be
able to resolve the problems. 133

ORGANIZATION
to

the

.

During Phase Three,

strengthen its organization.

party reintroduced

0

the PCP continued

To help it

in this task,

Militante in June,

organizational and theoretical journal,

its

in which the party

discussed various organizational problems.
The PCP criticized members who attended the meetings

and discussed the policies yet neglected the rest of their
duties.

All members had to put party policy into effect.

Many militants had to be careful that their political
immaturity did not lead them to discuss events impulsively

and to distort the party's positions.

Some cadres had

neglected the recruitment of new members,

fearing that it

would increase the organizational problems even more.

Many

.
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cells had been holding meetings of all of
its members to
make decisions rather than electing
members to the

executive organs which were to make the day-to-day
decisions.

Without leadership,

decisions could not be

implemented and meetings would not be orderly.
These
temporary problems would be resolved as the party's

organization strengthened.

They could be resolved by

placing cadres with the minimum training necessary

in

positions of responsibility 13 4
The party stated that the initial task to strengthen

the

organization was for present members to hold

enlightenment sessions which would attract prospective
members.

Once a cell was organized, it had to hold regular

sessions to discuss the positions of the party.

The PCP

emphasized the need to quickly act on applications for
membership.

provided

a

It

set down standard operating procedures and

general criteria which cadres could refer to

during the application process.

Cadres were not to make

value judgments of new applicants.

Only with time could

the applicants grow to be good members,

so they

should be

allowed into the party if all the criteria were met. 1 -^
The party's organization continued to develop.
15

the membership surpassed 100,000

of UEC or UJC)

.

(not

By May

including members

This was a tremendous organizational feat

compared to the membership figures the year before.
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Despite the increase the party claimed
that class, age, and

sex make-up remained the

same.

it

created District

Commissions in the four districts of the
Adjacent Islands
which lacked them.
The original goal, a commission

in

every municipality,

was

almost

realized.

Most

of

the

commissions which remained to be organized were on
the
Adjacent Islands and

a

few areas

of the north where the

party had always lacked support.
organization,

All other levels of

including the "labor centers," continued to

grow. 136

The PCP remained concerned with internal sectarianism,

contending that communists had to end the sectarian views

which isolated them from the masses.

Although socialism

could not be created without the communists,
not be created without the masses.

it

also could

Because the technocrats

played an important role in the transition to socialism,

bias toward white collar workers and public functionaries
had to end.

The politically

immature small and medium

peasants of the north, the Beiras, and the islands, had to
be attracted to the party rather than alienated.

Unless

the party could attract the small and medium peasants of
those areas,

it

would never increase its following there.

Because they were allies during the initial phase of the
revolution;

the bias

domestics,

artisans,

against intellectuals,

technicians,

and small and medium merchants and
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industrialists also had to end.!37

CONCLUSIONS

During this Third Phase,

.

the party

assessed that conditions were ripe to advance the
revolution.

Although the party had moved cautiously ever

since April

25,

it

became less cautious after the MFA

nationalized the banks,

the insurance companies,

the basic industries.

and later

The party pressed the workers to

increase productivity in the nationalized sector.

The

increase would demonstrate to the MFA the success of
nationalizations and encourage it to nationalize additional
industries and proclaim
the question,

a

of the industries.

top

Strikes were out of

especially in the nationalized sector.

workers were to also play

at

land reform.

levels

a

larger role in the management

The party continued to call

of

The

industries,

state

for purges

organs,

local

government, the military and other important sectors.

Its

hope was to infiltrate these various positions with
militants or sympathizers who would improve their operation

and demonstrate that the communists were honest and
effective administrators.

Although

a

broad land reform according to the PCP's

desires was not implemented,

additional

latifundios were

forcefully seized and became "de facto" nationalized.

As

the revolution intensified, groups to the right of the PCP
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attempted to bring the revolution to

would never admit

it

halt.

Although it

controlled either,

the party's

a

infiltration of the press and of the unions gave
it
tremendous power.
Increasingly, even moderate leftists
were pushed to the right as they found the revolution
shifting in directions of which they disapproved.

As

the

nation

drifted toward

civil

war,

counter-revolutionary attempts and anti-communist rhetoric
increased.

The party found the nation dividing between the

conservative north and the more liberal Alentejo and Lisbon
regions of the South.

As the

revolution lost steam,

party drew some initial conclusions.

the

The agricultural and

industrial worker base was not enough to complete the
revolution, especially without the support of the MFA which
was torn by internal divisions.

For the revolution to

the party had to make inroads in the northern

succeed,

agricultural regions by altering decades of peasant anti-

communism

.

Throughout Phase Three,

therefore,

The PCP focused on

intensifying its relationship with the MFA and minimizing
the

influence of the elections and the bourgeois parties.

Its

dominance in the unions,

in

the media,

and within

certain sectors of the military moved the nation closer
toward the communist view of the ideal socialist society.
However,

the strength of the PCP and the direction of the
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revolution divided not only the political
Portugal,

but also the MFA.

forces

in

The rifts within the military

affected the PCP's plans because it could no longer
rely on
a cohesive MFA to continue its socialist
prescriptions

for

the nation.

Instead of influencing a cohesive,

military organization holding
it

a

strong,

monopoly of armed strength

found itself influencing only one faction which could be

checked by other MFA factions.

As

deteriorating revolutionary climate,
PCP realized that the revolution

a

result of the

during Phase Four the
had ended and began to

act accordingly.

PHASE IV

The

-

SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER 25,

1975

substitution of Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo for

Goncalves'

as

Prime Minister,

the

shift

of

the

Sixth

Provisional Government back toward the political center,
and the renewed influence of Antunes and the "nine" within
the MFA were among the factors which ushered in phase four

of the

revolution,

a

three-month period during which the

revolution ended.

After losing control of the revolution during Phase
Three,

the PCP became more cautious.

The recurring themes

of Phase Four were similar to those of the previous phase.

These were the need to maintain unity between the people
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and the MFA, the warnings of counter-revolutionary
activity
throughout the nation, the calls to increase
productivity,
and the progress of agrarian reform in the
Alentejo.
The

party continued to emphasize the important roles
of the
youth, intellectuals, women, small and medium
farmers,
Catholics, and other popular forces in the revolution.

parallels with Chile continued,
glorifying life in the Eastern Bloc.
an

important sector,

as

The

did the articles

Education, considered

required reforms and purges.

the problems the PCP witnessed in the north,

it

Given
devoted

increasing attention to that region by comparatively

analyzing its agrarian problems with that of the south.
The party also intensified efforts to unify the workers and

the peasants.

It

emphasized the power which unions and

popular organizations,

such as neighborhood cells,

could

wield. 138

By September,

the revolutionary climate in Portugal

had cooled as chaos and division ruined the unity which the

PCP

saw as

essential to

instal

revolutionary fervor lessened,

socialism.

As the

the counter-attacks by the

reactionary forces also became less intense.

Cunhal,

who

had limited his public speeches and appearances during the

revolutionary phase, began making public appearances again.
His

rhetoric

was

less

revolutionary and more cautious.

Whereas previously the party discussed the socialist
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revolution offensively,

as

if

it

were imminent,

rhetoric had become more defensive.

The PCP

the new

focused on

consolidating gains rather than extending the
revolution.
It

often supported strikes and work stoppages,

unheard of

example,

a

a

few months

earlier.

it

an action

supported,

for

major strike in the building construction

industry even when the workers surrounded the constituent

assembly hall and forced the representatives to remain
there overnight 139
.

The PCP even criticized

(cautiously)

the military

occupation of radio and television stations.

The military

should defeat the reactionary forces not allow them access
to the media.

The PCP claimed that

in the north many

officers and soldiers had allowed and even helped the
reactionary forces attack party offices and labor centers.
The party evoked the lessons of Chile to emphasize its
point. 140

Because the ministerial posts were distributed
according to the results of the elections,

had rejected,

the new Sixth Provisional Government was

unfavorable to the PCP.
officers,

It

included five moderate military

four seats for the PS,

for the PCP.

which the PCP

Once

in power,

two for the PPD,

and one

the new government moved to

weaken the PCP by regaining control of the media and
restructuring the military.

.

The communist and ultra-left response
was immediate as

they maneuvered to maintain their hold on
power.
the military,

Within

discipline deteriorated as soldiers often

refused to accept and obey their new officers.

The

situation in general deteriorated toward anarchy as
grass-

roots

organizations armed themselves,

paramilitary

organizations were formed, and revolutionary cells

emerged

within the military such as the pro-communist Soldiers
United Will Win (SUV)
Because the political atmosphere was delicate, and the

MFA remained

a

member of the new government,

mildly supportive of the new government.

the PCP was

The PCP claimed

that it was not participating in the government officially,

although it would support policies that it considered
favorable.

This was

a

strange announcement because

a

communist held the unimportant Minister of Public Works
post.

Nevertheless,

the PCP

labeled this

compromise

a

rather than a coalition, and from the party press there is
no

indication that

a

communist participated in the

government .141
The party also criticized the government,
the PPD's

inclusion,

its

shift to the right,

especially

its

austere

economic program, the attempts to cut support to newspapers

which did not share the government's right-wing perspective
(for example,

Diario de Noticias and 0 Seculo both heavily
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subsidized by the government but controlled
by communist
workers) ,142 the rumors that the economy was
bankrupt when
Portugal had one of the largest gold reserves in
the world,

and the abandonment of the previous government's
policies.
It

also criticized alterations of domestic policies
to

please

foreign nations and attract aid.

arrived it was always miniscule,

worth

When the aid

conditional,

and hardly

prostituting national independence. 143
The PCP claimed that the PS, the parties to its right,

and the pseudo-revolutionary parties had abandoned the

revolution and contributed decisively to the
"politico-military" crisis.

The "military" crisis began as

ideological divisions within the MFA developed into purges
of

several progressive and revolutionary officers

example,

General Vasco Goncalves),

(for

and escalated to

imminent armed confrontation between the factions.

The

solution to the increasing disciplinary problems within the

military was to purge the right-wing rather than the
left-wing elements. 144
The

"politico" crisis was the reactionary forces'

attempts to block the revolutionary process and drag the

nation,

via the government,

to the

right.

They had not

succeeded for lack of strength, so they attempted to weaken

the revolution first.

increased

its

To

counter the crisis,

warnings

of

the party

reactionary

and
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pseudo-revolutionary activity and of attempts to
instal
bourgeois democracy.
It was time for the various

factions

of the left to drop the polemics and rhetorical
differences

and discuss how to save the revolution,
unity could the reaction be stopped.

Despite its calls for unity,
alliances with the PPD; it was not

a

for only through

14 5

the party dismissed
democratic party.

The

PCP by-passed the PS leadership, which it claimed had been

working in alliance with the reactionary forces,
appealed directly to the rank-and-file.

The PCP

and

also

discussed the formation of the Revolutionary United Front
an alliance with extreme-left parties. 146

(FUR),

the PCP

argued that it never

Although

joined the FUR but only

participated in the advisory committee, most political
observers claimed it joined the FUR for three or four days.

The party's break with the alliance resulted from its

proposal that the PS be included in discussions to end the
crisis.

Because the

other members of the FUR considered

the PS a bourgeois party, they rejected the proposal.

The proposal

indicated that the PCP had an ulterior

motive for participating in the front.

Why would it have

proposed an alliance with the same PS it had been labeling
reactionary?

tell

By participating in discussions the PCP could

its militants that it had tried to reunify the left

but its calls for unity had been rejected.

In this manner

the party could defuse internal pressures
for an alliance
with the extreme-left without having to give
up some of its

positions to create an alliance.

in

the aftermath,

the

party increased popular rallies to show the strength
of the
people when they acted in unison. 147

The PCP praised its
political situation.

It

own accurate

claimed the analyses had prepared

and mobilized the popular masses,

and other democrats,

analyses of the

in alliance with the MFA

for their defeat of the

latest

counter-revolutionary offensives during the summer.
grave economic problems,
The government's

economy.

however,

The

still needed resolution.

shift to the right would not help the

Discussions among the parties were imperative to

avoid civil war,

improve the economy,

and stop the

ward shift caused by PPD and PS policies.

right

The parties

should be consolidating the revolutionary conquests,

trying to undo them.

not

Because the parties to the right were

attempting to roll back the conquests of the revolution
through the new constitution,

the PCP criticized them for

breaking their pact with the MFA.

It

also criticized the

PS's warnings that the extreme left was planning to seize

power.

Through such warnings the PS was helping to

increase reactionary activity against the revolution.

could the PS call for peace,

the PCP asked,

How

when the PS

repeatedly tried to instigate problems during the Fifth

.
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Government and continued to do so? 14 8

The

retornados,

Portuguese living in the African

colonies who were expelled (especially from Angola)
a

new issue in Portuguese politics.

,

became

Because they were

a

potential basis of support for the reactionary forces,
the
PCP was very concerned.
It warned that the number

of

retornados would increase as the date for Angolan
independence

(November 11)

approached.

The retornados had

to realize that the Portugal they were returning to was not

the country they remembered.

Portugal,

It

was

revolutionary

a

and they had to work to fit in.

If they so

desired, they could be absorbed into the revolution 14 9

As

November

11

approached,

the PCP

increased its

warnings of new reactionary activity to try to stop
independence.
a

The activity was especially centered around

new coup attempt. 150 When the independence of Angola

became a reality,

the PCP devoted considerable time

and

effort toward glorifying the new nation and its struggle
for independence.

The final phase of the revolutionary period terminated

after the failure of the attempted left-wing military coup.
The coup attempt was led by extreme-left soldiers opposed
to Antunes and the moderates plans to consolidate military

power and weaken General Carvalho's

(Otelo)

Although the PCP claimed it was not

power base.

involved,

most
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observers believe it was at least marginally
involved even
if it cut all ties with the coup when
it realized it
was

doomed to fail.

The repercussions from the coup pushed
the

nation's left-ward shift back toward the right and
moderation.

For the PCP this development required new

analyses and tactics in the changed political atmosphere,
the topic of the next chapter.

Organization

.

Organizationally,

with some serious problems.
conservatives

during the summer,

the

According to the party,

its

membership neither increased nor decreased.

principles of

a

faced

After the severe attacks by

(mostly peasants)

party's growth stabilized.

the party was

The greatest

Leninist party were cohesion,

and connection with the masses.

As noted,

structure,

the PCP argued

that sectarianism was holding back membership in the party.
The PCP emphasized the need to increase its influence among

groups most influenced by the right
workers,

technocrats,

workers

-

the white collar

living in backward regions,

and especially small and medium peasants who were

volatile group and could be attracted to the party.

a

highly
It was

also unhappy with the confusion and disorganization
demonstrated by many members during reactionary attacks.
It

emphasized that the disorganization resulted from

insufficient meetings by the local cells or inadequate
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attendance by many members.

The only solution was

to

increase the meetings and attendance. 151
The party also emphasized the need to
instill

members

a

sense

individualism.

by bourgeois

of

collectivism as

in

new

opposed to

Individualism was ingrained in the people

societies.

The workers,

percent of the party's militants,

who made up eighty

had the least amount of

individualism and the most collectivism. 152

During the Fourth and final Phase,

the PCP

realized

the revolution had been lost and it no longer had control

of the

situation.

It

maintained its dual strategy of

participation within the government and activities outside
the government as it struggled to consolidate the gains of

the

last

nineteen months.

A major

pillar of its

revolutionary strategy had crumbled as the MFA split into
rival factions.

The PCP was also struggling to harness the

extreme-left which was largely responsible for the chaos

and revolutionary activity at the grass-roots level and
divisions within the PCP.

widely dispersed,

With the strength of the

left

the PCP did the best it could to keep

abreast of the political situation, which meant it also had
to

disperse its resources,

further weakening its control.

The coup of November 25 abruptly ended the revolution but
it

also provided some advantages to the PCP which we will

discuss in the next chapter.

!

,

!

!
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6

PICKING UP THE PIECES: THE PCP'S UNITED FRONT
STRATEGY IN
POST -REVOLUTIONARY PORTUGAL
After the November 25,

1975 aborted,

and the resulting backlash,
new political situation.

several

"quick steps

the PCP

left-wing coup

swiftly analyzed the

During 1975, the party had taken

forward" but the political

shifted toward the center after the coup attempt.

realized that the revolution was "over"

situation
The PCP

(temporarily)

and

that its new goal should be to consolidate the gains of the

revolution: the nationalizations,

the agrarian reform,

new liberties, and worker-self management.

Meanwhile,

the
the

party could hope that the "step backward" was only
temporary and that the revolution would get underway again;

after all,

the MFA would still be the watchdog of the

revolution for the next three to five years.

In

this chapter we discuss the party's new strategy

after the drastic change in the political situation.

The

party took advantage of the new political atmosphere to

strengthen its organization.

Its

tactics

focused on

consolidating the revolutionary conquests and advancing in

any sector which allowed it the opportunity to do so.

Although at first the PCP was not openly anti-government or
anti-PS,

over the years it became so.
348

Having been offered

349

new opportunity to embrace Eurocommunism
after the
November fiasco, the party decided to continue
its
a

Stalinist structure and Marxist-Leninist strategy
for
power.
if the political situation shifted again in the
short or medium-term, the party would get
to compete for power.

If,

a

new opportunity

however, the political situation

did not change over the long-term,

failure and

a

the PCP was doomed to

decline in electoral strength unless it

altered its tactics.

Since the party's strategy in the years following
November 1975 was basically the same, we analyze in detail

the PCP's tactics

during 1976 and examine the party's

tactics since 1977 broadly.

The PCP in 1976: Electoral Politics

The PCP considered the political change which followed

the November attempted coup
of the right and
It

a

a

major victory for the forces

major defeat for the forces of the left.

warned anew of the danger to democracy from the

reactionary forces.

It

boasted that it had foreseen the

dangers of the PS and the MFA moderates'

right,

as

well

as

divisionist tactics,

the ultra-lefts'

overtures to the

adventurous and

long before November 25.

The PCP

claimed that it had tried to reunify the forces of the left

2

and the MFA to prevent the crisis' escalation.!
The shift

in the

revolutionary situation toward the

center and the repercussions to the left occurred
result of the backlash which followed the aborted
coup.

portray the backlash as unjustified,

neither

coup nor even an

a

November 25.

"It was a

of purges to the

as

a

To

the PCP claimed that

insurrection occurred on

convergence of revolts over

left which surrounded

a

a

wave

dispute over

leadership positions among various sectors of the MFA and

Armed Forces."
rather than

a

Although its references were to revolts
coup,

it

is doubtful that the party believed

this statement.

Because

the

revolutionaries as
attempt,

its

the coup's

party

implicated the pseudo-

largely responsible for the coup

attacks on the extreme-left increased after

failure.

The PCP claimed that the extreme-

leftists had "closed organizations" and considered
themselves superior to the popular masses.

that

The PCP argued

although extreme-leftists considered themselves

vanguard groups, they had,

in reality,

they were supposedly leading.

betrayed the masses

Once the extreme-leftists

placed themselves above the masses, they became sectarian.

The desire to destroy capitalism when confronted by

repression combined with the mispercept ion of masses'
strength led these pseudo-revolutionary groups to turn to

!
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violence.

The violence exacerbated the

sectarianism so

that members bureaucrat ically isolated
themselves within
their own party and lost touch with the
realities of

the

day

.

3

According to the PCP,
left's

a

mistakes was that

a

major lesson from the extremeparty could not move too

far

ahead of the masses or it would lose their support, become
sectarian,

and resort to violence.

The strategy could not

be to only push ahead but to occasionally step back, assess

the situation,

and then proceed.

The left should not yell

attack even while it was retreating.

4

Clearly the party was not only criticizing the
extreme-left but also militants within the PCP that held
similar views.

To

reinforce its criticisms,

the PCP took

advantage of an historic date in its past: the glass
workers'

strike in Marinha Grande of January 18,

commemorate the anniversary of the uprising,

excerpts

from Jose Gregorio's

Associacao

e

o

Glass Workers'

it

old analysis

1934.

published

"Sobre

Movimento do Operario Vidreiro"

Association and Movement)

Gregorio concluded:

that the uprising

in

To

(On

a

the

Avante

.

failed because

anarchists chose to resort to an armed struggle without
considering

a

mass struggle or strike, that the action by

a

minority resulted in more severe repression than might
otherwise have occurred,

that the conditions had not been

.

ripe for an uprising,

and that the PCP had been penetrated

by anarchist and putschist views. 5
The implied parallels with the political

after November 25 are indisputable

.

T he

6

situation

party in 1976 was

repeating its calls of 1942 for unity of all workers
and
anti-fascists. Because the PCP had many years of experience
as

a

vanguard party,

the article implicitly

reminded the

workers that the PCP was more qualified to lead them than

the

recently formed extreme-left parties.

examples from the past were,
thousand words.

like

The publication

a

picture,
the

of

Concrete
worth

a

article also

emphasized the correctness of the party's rejection of
violence in the sixties and seventies.

A

major goal during the consolidation of the

revolutionary conquests was to keep the post-revolutionary
purges of the extreme-left from weakening the party.

The

PCP disassociated itself completely from the leftist groups

involved in the coup.^
Melo Antunes,

a

With unexpected help from Major

moderate within the MFA who played

role in curtailing the communists during 1975,
continued to function as

allowed

a

a

legal party.

minor post within the

a

key

the party

The PCP was even

Sixth Provisional

Government

Major Antunes was concerned that elimination of the
PCP would allow post-revolutionary

Portugal to shift

8

further to the right than he found acceptable.

Although in

the summer of 1975 Antunes had found himself
to the right
of the MFA political spectrum, after the
military purges
which followed November 25 he found himself to the
left of
the MFA mainstream.

The dominant

forces within the MFA

preferred to return to the barracks and leave politics to
the politicians
In

.

defense of its continued participation in the

government,

the PCP

reminded its militants that

its

role

was minimal and preferable to a government which was openly

rightist.

Although the party did not support the wage

freezes imposed by the government, neither did it instigate
a

crisis which might have ended the government.

The PCP

argued that the government's fall could have led to

rightward shift.

9

a

Having narrowly escaped the purges of

the extreme-left after November 25, the PCP was not willing

to

ruin its public image any further by confronting the

government.

By participating in the government,

the party

tried to show the public that it did not have
strategy for power,

as

many claimed,

a

dual

but was committed to

democracy rather than adventurous schemes. 10
Several themes dominated the party's

November 25.

The

reactionary forces,

rhetoric after

party warned of terror from the
especially in the north,

and of its

economic and political consequences for the nation; the PCP

emphasized the importance of maintaining the
nationalizations and agrarian reform;

it

contended that if

the MFA reunified it would still be possible
to stop the
shift to the right; it voiced its concern for the
small and

medium farmer and the need for unity to safeguard
democracy;

and it continued to advocate friendship and

cooperation with other nations including the ex-colonies.
In

short,

11

much of the rhetoric after November 25 mirrored

the rhetoric before it.

Because it would help consolidate the institutions and
the regime at a time when the right was

increasing its

counterrevolutionary measures, Cunhal announced that the
PCP

favored the elections

scheduled for April

25,

for the Legislative Assembly
1976.

However,

the PCP was

concerned that elections would still not be free in the
north or the adjacent islands, where the PPD and CDS would
continue to dominate,

and that the emigrants'

votes would

be falsified. !2

Cunhal claimed that neither the PS,
party,

would get the

alone.

The outcome,

nor any other

fifty percent required to govern

in his view,

would depend on whether

the PS would ally with the left or the right.

He urged the

PS to announce, prior to the elections, what its intentions

were so that the voters would know whether they were voting
for a leftist or rightist government. 13

As the electoral campaign got under way the
rhetoric

intensified around the usual themes of unity, alliance
with
the MFA, and vigilance of the reactionary forces.
Cunhal

criticized the capitalist recuperation measures of the
PS/PPD Sixth Provisional Government, the PCP's limited

access to social communication,

and the

thousand PIDEs (ex-secret police)

The continuation of the

MFA'

.

release of

a

institutionalized role was praised as necessary to

s

protect the conquests of the revolution. Because those who

obeyed would further weaken the left,

the PCP also

criticized the extreme-lefts' call for the casting of blank

ballots in favor of "popular power." 14
the reactionary forces'

Cunhal warned of

conspiracy with foreign powers to

destroy the new regime as occurred in Allende's Chile.
right

Party

-

Social Democratic Center

(PPD)

,

(CDS)

Popular Monarchist Party

Democratic Party

-

,

The

Popular Democratic
(PPM)

,

and Christian

would not be content with an electoral

defeat but only with the reinstallation of fascism.
claimed that the rights'

He

pseudo-revolutionary allies were

helping them achieve this goal, especially the Association
of

Workers and Peasants,

Party /Marxist-Leninist

the

(PCP-ml),

Portuguese Communist
and the Movement

for the

Reorganization of the Party of the Proletariat.

At

its National

Conference of March

14

organized

exclusively to formulate party policy toward the elections,

356

the PCP announced its electoral program:
''de fended

^

°f

lib6rtY and democ ^cy.

It

freedom of the press and of assembly, free
political parties, freedom to organize, free
unions and the right to strike, a free
constitution, freedom of religion;
a

democratic regime free of chaos and

terrorism;

the elimination of crime, corruption,
pornography, and prostitution;

drugs,

respect for the democratic order;
and a continued military role in politics.
The PCP was the party of the workers.
defended:

II.

It

equal pay for equal work regardless of sex or

age,

collective

contracts

and

their

enforcement, dismissal only with just cause,
increased employment, price stability, decent
housing for all, worker commissions, and a
National Health Service.
The PCP was the party of Agrarian Reform and
small and medium agriculture.

III.

The PCP was the party for
path toward socialism.

IV.

The PCP was the party of
and culture.

V.

VI.

a

a

new economy on the

democratized education

The PCP was the Party of National Independence 15

According to the PCP,

.

for

the

elections to be

democratic four conditions were necessary:
1.

liberty and individual rights throughout the
territory,

police measures against violence and terrorism,

2.
3.

the need to publicize the government's new
which were creating a new politico-military measures
crisis,

4.

and the severe punishment of campaigners who
used
"mud-slinging" and lies. 16

Cunhal announced that the party's major goal was to
defeat
the right

and create

a

leftist democratic alliance in the

Assembly of the Republic (Parliament)

.

He argued that the

people knew the PCP was committed to its leftist program,
and he encouraged them to vote

for the PCP;

a

vote for

other parties would not insure that the First
Constitutional Government would be

a

leftist government.

Because votes would be scattered among many different
parties and not result in additional representatives, votes
for the extreme-left would be wasted.

Because the PS might

align with the right, votes for it would be uncertain. 17
Since the parties of the left won a majority,

insisted that the
results,

PS,

in

order to abide by the electoral

form a United Front with the PCP

fantasies of creating

the PS not

to

a

minority government.

and drop its
Cunhal warned

expect the PCP to imitate the

Communist Party.
Swedish government,

the PCP

Swedish

Although party was not included in the
it

did not vote against the Social

Democrats for fear that the government's fall might bring
the right to power.

Conditions in Portugal were different

8

from those in Sweden, and the PCP would
not play that role.
The only alternative to a United Front
of the left was a
Holy Alliance of the right, which was
unacceptable 1
.

In the aftermath of the elections,

that

a

the PCP proclaimed

majority of the left had won and that conditions

were ready for

government of the left.

a

The right had

been defeated and the people had reaffirmed their
commitment to the spirit of April

25,

1974.

PCP

The

declared that the CDS increase to 16 percent from 7.6
percent the year before was at the expense of the PPD which

had polled 24.3 percent as compared to 26.4 percent in
1975.

1975
in

In turn,

many individuals who had voted for the PS in

(the PS received 37.9 percent in 1975 and 34.9 percent

1976)

voted for the PPD in the latest elections.

rationale for the shift,
many voters in

1

according to the PCP,

was that

had been conservatives but

975

The

their

support for the revolution and the MFA led them to vote for
the PS.

Since 1975,

a

clearer distinction between the PS

and the parties to the right emerged.
exploited the bourgeois

The

PPD had

fears of conservative PS voters

through the media and drawn them further to the right.

1 9

The PCP congratulated itself for being the only major

party to have increased its vote.
of the vote

in

1976

It

received 14.4 percent

and 12.5 percent

in

1975.

If

we

consider that the MDP did not run in the 1976 elections and

that most of its votes went to the PCP,
the communist vote

actually decreased from

a

combined 16.6 percent in 1975.

The PCP was also rejecting the CDS as a
major party;
all,

after

its increase was even more spectacular than
the PCP's.

Cunhal announced at

center

a

(bloco central)

press

conference that

political

a

did not exist in Portugal and that

the electorate was either on the left or on the right
with
a

majority in the former. 20
In

preparation for the Presidential elections

scheduled for June 27, which the party considered one more

step toward the institutionalization of democracy and the

preservation of the revolutionary conquests,

the party

presented four goals:
1. work toward the consolidation, stability,
continuation of the democratic process;

and

prevent the renewal of the "holy alliance"
against the communists and work toward the unity
of the working class and a rapprochement of the
socialists and communists;
2.

3. continue the alliance between the people and
the MFA with the Spirit of April 25 in defense of
the constitution;

4.

create the conditions which would allow

a

leftist majority in the Assembly of the Republic
and the formation of a leftist government with
communist part icipation 21
.

The PCP emphasized that the presidential

not become
civilians.

a

campaign should

struggle between the military and the

Because an officer would be best qualified for

the commander-in-chief role,

candidate

for president.

partisan but
institutions,

to

the PCP

supported

a

military

The candidate was not to be

stand for the constitution,

and the democratic order.

the

He had to receive

the support of the popular movement, the PCP/PS
majority of

the left,

and be able to stabilize democracy.

If

the

candidate could not muster the backing of the Council of

the Revolution,

of the PS

and PCP,

and of the popular

masses then the PCP reserved the right to present its own

civilian candidate,

whether communist or not, who would

clearly define and present the PCP position. 22
The party set so many conditions for the acceptance of
a

military candidate that

it

support a different candidate.

inevitably would have to
Rather than the Council of

the Revolution supporting one candidate,

several military

candidates entered the presidential race.

Explaining that

it

did not wish to divide the MFA by supporting or

criticizing any military candidate,

nominated Octavo Pato,

a

the party eventually

Central Committee member since

1949 and leader of the party's parliamentary deputies
(representatives), to be its candidate for the elections.
The party's campaign was

an unusual

beginning the rhetoric was very cautious.
his

candidacy would weaken the left,

one.

2^

From the

Claiming that

the only candidate

whom the PCP criticized was Major Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho

(Otelo,

as he is known to the Portuguese,

had been demoted

from general after November 25), who
had the support of the
extreme-left and was not considered a military
candidate by
the PCP.
The party emphasized that it entered
the race to
delineate problems and propose solutions.
Because none of
the candidates represented the left or the
workers, it was

up to the

party to voice their interests and the PCP

perspective.

run

Its campaign was one of "enlightenment" not a

for the presidency 24
.

Because it had achieved its

objective by making the representation of the left its

primary motive for entering the race, the electoral results
could be downplayed, especially since Pato was not expected

to

do

well.

Winning electorally became

a

secondary

concern, at best. 25
The elections were

PCP as even

its

massive electoral defeat for the

own militants

Averting the need for
Eanes,

a

a

refused to vote for Pato.

run-off election,

General Ramalho

who was supported by the three major non-communist

parties, won an overwhelming majority of 62 percent.

Otelo came in second with 16 percent,
14 percent,

The

Admiral Azevedo won

and Otavio Pato received only

new President

Major

8

percent.

General Eanes was the slightly

left-of-center chief of staff who played an instrumental
role

in

ending the left-wing coup the year before.

Although his political views were similar to Major

Antunes',

General Eanes

role in politics.

favored decreasing the military's

He played a key role

in

restructuring

the original MFA-Party Pact transforming
the military role
to an advisory one and implementing other
measures which

decreased the military's political role. 2 ^
The party tried to avoid criticism of its
massive

defeat by emphasizing that its goal in the elections had
not been to win.
It argued that despite the party's
inability to attract

a

large percentage of the vote,

it had

played an important role by providing the workers and the

popular movement with an input which they would not have
had otherwise.

The PCP also emphasized that the party

derived valuable lessons from the experience which would
help it continue the popular struggle.

that

its

The party claimed

candidacy enlightened the public regarding the

political situation,

the

correlation of forces,

consolidation of democracy,
government,

the need for

a

the

leftist

and the maintenance of cohesion and militancy

within the PCP. 27
As a result of its poor showing in the elections, the

party faced several internal criticisms:

should have backed

a

that

the PCP

non-communist candidate, that the

party waited too long to announce Pato as its candidate,

that the party should not have gone all the way in the
elections,

that the party was excessively optimistic.

The

.

Central Committee

responded that it made the best

(CC)

decision possible given the complexity of
the situation, an
unsatisfactory answer to such profound questions. 28
As consolation,

the CC told its militants not to take

the elections to be an indication of future results.
the future,

less military candidates would run and the

issues would not revolve around military concerns.
Eanes victory,

claimed the CC,

downplayed the impact of its militants'
the elections and analyzed Eanes'

terms.

The

strengthened democracy and

ended two years of provisional governments.

in

In

The

CC

lack of discipline

victory in partisan

The CC declared that it was a defeat for the right,

and that the PCP was not the only party that lost votes to

Otelo.

It

specified in detail the amounts the other

parties lost to the left.
CC,

The votes for Eanes,

claimed the

were less than the total which the three parties to its

right received in the legislative elections.

support for Eanes,
losses

in the

it

claimed,

government with the PS,

victory,

The right's

was a ploy to defuse their

legislative elections.

capitalize on Eanes'

2^

The right wanted to

and create

a

coalition

and prevent a United Front of the

left 30
The party declared that the votes which Otelo received

were not votes for the ultra-left.

The PCP

insisted that

Otelo received votes for various reasons but they were not
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permanent votes because

would regain

it

its

previous

percentages in the next legislative elections.

The lack of

militant support for the communist candidacy,

claimed the

PCP,

showed "a deficient evaluation of the masses'

feelings,

and subjectivity in analyzing the situat ion

Because they were not partisan elections,

that the electoral results
partisan terms.

This was

partisan analyses above.

.

"

31

the PCP argued

should not be portrayed in

contradiction to the PCP's own

a

The PCP also emphasized that,

in

the aftermath, the elections showed the potential for unity
of the left. 32

The party could have decided to run Pato in the
elections for several reasons.
be

a

Because Eanes was known to

moderate and the PCP's three competitors on the right

were backing him,

the PCP

threat to the presidency.
mobilized to prevent

a

confront

did not

a

right-wing

Because the PCP would have

right-wing victory if the right had

presented its own candidate, the party would have had less
flexibility. But with Eanes'

victory virtually assured and

his announcement that he would refuse PCP support if it was

offered,

the party was

desired.

Although

his will,

not

to

it

do

free

to

back any candidate

it

could have supported Eanes against
so

would help defuse left-wing

criticism that the PCP had become

After months of participation

a

"bourgeois" party.

in

the provisional
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governments often holding back worker demands,
the PCP
could prove its commitment to the workers
by presenting
its

own candidate to allegedly promote workers'

interests.

The party could have supported an independent
candidate,

Azevedo,

such as former premier Admiral Jose Pinheiro
de

but presenting its own candidate had advantages,

such as access to radio and television time for
propaganda

purposes.

The PCP

also hoped that

a

communist candidate

would increase the party's leverage by forcing the election
into a second round.

Support

question.

for any candidate to its left was out of the

One of the advantages which the PCP reaped from

the November 25 coup was

from the

left.

To

considerably weakened threat

support Otelo would have helped

strengthen enemies which
reactionary forces.

a

it

considered as bad as the

Because the party's

destroy the pseudo-revolutionary threat,

goal was to

not to aid it by

making it the only opposition on the left,

Otelo's

candidacy destroyed the party's option to withdraw Pato
prior to the first round.
The party took

so

long to decide which option to

pursue that many militants became restless.

The party

wanted to see who the other candidates would be and to
carefully analyze every possible alternative.
for

Pato to run until the finale,

The decision

rather than support

another candidate as the elections drew
near, had definite
disadvantages, such as his receipt of only
eight percent of
the vote.
Politically it appeared that the party
had lost
half of its support and that it suffered
from
internal

dissent; however, the PCP knew it had control
of the party

apparatus and correctly concluded that the loss
of votes
was only temporary.

Not under any circumstances would it

support the ultra-left and there were not sufficient
reasons for it to support

a

candidate other than its own.

The election allowed the party to see which regions
and
sectors of its militants were least "disciplined" so that
it

could focus on bringing them into line and enforcing

"democratic centralism."

This would explain the party's

renewed calls to strengthen the organization.

It

also

occurred at an opportune time since the Eighth PCP Congress
was to be held in mid-November and the organizational and

other lessons could be discussed as it approached.

Despite sharp criticism from the PCP, the PS formed

minority government after the elections.
its confrontation with the PCP during 1975,

PS

a

memories of

and the desire

to prevent pushing its more conservative members toward the

PPD,

made

unacceptable.

a

united front government with the PCP
Faced with

a

disastrous economic situation

after two years of economic and political instability, the
PS

saw little alternative but to propose tough austerity
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measures to improve the economy. 33
The PCP was quick to label the government's
program

and policies as rightist.

Nevertheless, the PCP announced

that it would support any measures which
corresponded to

the workers'

interests,

defended the liberties and

revolutionary conquests, preserved the institutions as
put

forth by the constitution,

struggled for

independent democratic Portugal,

a

free

and moved

and

toward

socialism. 34
Local elections and the Eighth Party Congress were the

last major

events

on

According to the party,

the

party's

agenda

for

1976.

the Sixth Congress of 1965 was

important because documents were approved tracing the fall
of fascism and pointing out the objectives for the working

class and for political development.

many of the party's goals for

a

Revolution" had been fulfilled.

been installed,

later

"Democratic and National

A democratic regime had

monopoly power had been destroyed, many

industries had been nationalized,

had been

Eleven years

initiated,

the

an

agricultural reform

colon i al wars had ended,

independence had been given to the colonies,
conditions had improved,

living

and friendly relations with all

nations had been established.

In the

international arena,

conditions had also changed from the cold war to peaceful
co-existence.

As

a

result of these developments

a

new
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congress was necessary to bring the party's
program and
statutes into line with the changes. 35
The

Seventh Congress

(Extraordinary)

of 1974

had not

been a normally scheduled one.

Because there had not been

enough time to organize

congress to deal with the

a

full

drastic changes that occurred immediately after April

25,

it had been necessary to hold an extraordinary
congress to

address specific concerns.
November,

was to be the

The Eighth Congress,

first ordinary congress

party went clandestine in 1926.

held in

since the

The members

formally

approved the party's analyses of the political changes
since the revolution and its policies for the future.

only significant

The

change at the Eighth Congress was the

increase in the size of the Central Committee from 36 to

90

full and alternate members, which was a quantitative change

rather than

a

qualitative or ideological one. 36

After the congress, the PCP became the first party in
the nation to form an electoral front when

United People's Electoral Front
December 12 local elections.
created to allow MDP,

(FEPU)

it created the

to

run

in

the

Officially the front was

Popular Socialist Front,

and other

partisan or independent individuals to run on the same
ticket. 37

m

reality,

the

front was primarily created to

increase PCP votes and influence in areas where it was
weak.

FEPU also gave the party influence over many of its

.

non-communist partners.

The elections were considered

important enough for the party to run the FEPU
ticket
throughout the nation with the exception of two

municipalities and one parish where the local members
missed the deadline for the submission of candidates. 38

Now that the party had returned to

a

strategy of

attrition in post- revolutionary Portugal, expanding its
power base at the local level became very important.

By

dealing with concrete problems at the local level and
producing tangible results over time,

the party hoped to

gain the support and respect of local residents, especially
the peasants in northern and central Portugal.

According to the CC, the local elections were
victory for FEPU and
for FEPU,

it

a

claimed,

big defeat for the right.

the

The vote

The PCP announced that,

.

to

great

reflected the people's unhappiness

with the PS minority government 39
in proportion

a

legislative elections,

the party

percentage of the vote in this election increased to 17.7
percent.

In reality,

because FEPU was an electoral front

and many votes went to the PCP's co-partners, the party did
not get that high a percentage of the vote but FEPU did win
40

more than 250 municipal assemblies

According to the PCP,

as

a

result of the three

elections of 1976 and the implementation
constitution on April 25,

the

of

the

institutionalization of
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democracy had made considerable progress.

The party's

goals continued unchanged: to end the
threat to the

democratic regime

from the

reactionary and

pseudo-revolutionary forces and to solve the crisis
which

confronted the nation.

through socialism,

The

solution could only come

agricultural reform,

and the

nationalized sector, not through bourgeois democracy.

The

existence of bourgeois democracy controlled by monopoly
power was incompatible with free parties,

assemblies,

protests and strikes.

would only result in repression and
The party added that

it

the military.

Bourgeois democracy
a

new dictatorship.

interests.

A government of the
PCP,

The party was especially

People's Democratic Unity

4!

considered contrary to

should be composed of the PS,

left

worker

would work within democratic

it

means against any measures
democracy or the workers'

unions,

(UDP)

trying to divide the people. 42

,

independents,

and

critical of the

which the PCP claimed was
Because the UDP had been

the only Maoist group to get representation in the Assembly

and had been crucial in supporting Otelo's candidacy,
was

a

real threat

and was

it

singled out by the PCP for

scathing attacks.

The PCP was

also concerned with the "retornado"

(Portuguese-African refugees)
to exclude

communists

issue and foreign pressures

from future governments. 43

The PCP
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argued against indemnification for
landowners as a result
of the land reform because of the
years of exploitation to
which the workers had been subjected. 44
Cunhal criticized
the national media as biased, declared
that democracy had
not reached all regions, criticized balance
of payment
deficits and austerity measures, opposed the law which
set

the criteria for managerial purges,

sabotage and capital

foreign policy,

flight,

criticized economic

blasted the government's

supported the freedom to strike,

and

criticized government alterations to the laws governing
strikes,

collective contracts, and unions. 45

Post 1977: the Dual Strategy Continues

We analyzed in detail the PCP's

tactics throughout

1976 as an example of the party's post-revolutionary
strategy.

Although shifts and oscillations occurred from

on,

the party continued to pursue the same basic

strategy.

A few individuals favored its transformation to

1977

Eurocommunism but they were not in positions of power and
were easily dealt with.
The party analyzed the political situation in Portugal

after the 1976 parliamentary elections as entering

a

new

period in which the "counter-revolutionary conspiracy"
combined with the "antiworker and antipopular"

stance of

the PS government.
a

The PS faced a deteriorating economy as

result of the improvement of workers'

revolution,

salaries after the

the accompanying increase in consumption,

the

decrease in productivity, the decline in investment, the
downturn in tourism, the

decrease in emigrant remittances,

the fall of agricultural production,

and the absorption of

almost 500,000 refugees from Africa.

The deterioration was

exacerbated by

the

increase in oil prices,

stagnation throughout the world.

and economic

Because the PS

implemented unpopular austerity measures in its efforts to
improve the faltering economy,

it

was accused of working

with the reaction. 46
As long as the PCP was not included in the government,
it

would make it as difficult as possible for the PS to

deal with the crisis if the measures were contrary to the
workers'
PS

interests.

Although it was committed to leave the

in power to prevent a

further shift to the right,

would only support those measures
workers.

However,

it

which favored the

since measures which the PCP opposed

were usually supported by the PSD

(PPD changed its name to

the Social Democrat Party at its October Congress in 1976)

and CDS, the PS minority government was able to continue in

power for 16 months.
government on

a

A majority was required to defeat the

vote of no confidence which required both

the communists and the parties to the right of the PS to

vote together.

Meanwhile,

the PCP continued to criticize

the government's measures which often intensified
the
divisions within the PS,

major rival that had potential

a

PCP supporters within its ranks.
The PCP

continued its indirect support for the PS

government until August 1977.

passing

a

series

of

counterrevolutionary,

At that time the government,

laws

which the

prepared to pass

PCP

labeled

law dealing with

a

agrarian reform that was unacceptable to the PCP.

party's lukewarm support vanished,

and

it

The

called for the

ouster of the government and new parliamentary elections. 47
Increasingly, the PCP insisted that the PS was allying with
the right against the workers.

calls

In October it continued its

for new elections and presented an

government of "platform," to include the

alternative:
PCP,

a

that would

move the nation back to democracy rather than the
capitalist recuperation policies which were unraveling the
conquests of the revolution 48
.

After the First Constitutional Government's

December of 1977,

the PCP

fall

in

insisted that the PS form

government of the left as it had been elected to do.

a

The

PCP was willing to negotiate as long as the new government

created

a

platform which would respect the constitutional

institutions,

maintain the balance between the public and

private sectors,

and respect the workers'

rights. 49

The

.
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PCP

rejected the Second Constitutional Government,

the PS did not call

coalition government,

a

one which included CDS

or

a

instead,

"personalities," as incapable of

solving the nation's problems.

participate in

but

which

The PCP was ready either to

PS government,

an independent government,

government with PCP "personalities" to provide

a

a

democratic solution. 50

After the collapse of the Second Constitutional
Government in October 1978, the party again called for new

elections or

a

new government of "platform" based on the

ten-point program which the PCP had presented

in May. 51

Faced with the prospects of creating another unstable PS
government, President Ramalho Eanes, to the surprise of the

political parties, chose instead to create

a

government of

independents headed by Prime Minister Alfredo Nobre da
Costa.

The PCP was

cautiously critical of the Third

Provisional Government which

it

considered rightist.

Nevertheless, the party claimed that to prevent helping the

reactionary
government

5^

forces,

it

did not

vote to

defeat the

The real reason was that the government had

been created by the president and the PCP wanted to keep in

good terms with him. 53

When the Third Constitutional

Government's program was not approved,
government was dismissed.

the Nobre da Costa

5^

President Eanes attempted the same strategy when he
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appointed Carlos Alberto de Mota Pinto to head
the Fourth

Provisional Government.

Claiming that his program was

further to the right than the previous government,

rejected Mota Pinto from the start.

It was more

the PCP

critical

of the Fourth Government than of any predecessor ones.

It

also criticized the PS for accepting the program of

rightist

government. 55

a

called for the government's

It

dismissal and insisted that the president schedule new
elections and appoint

a

the four major parties.

caretaker government consisting of

5^

After Mota Pinto's resignation

June

in

1979,

president scheduled special elections for December

the
An

16.

independent caretaker government under Prime Minister
Lourdes Pintasilgo was appointed to govern until the

elections.
policies,

Although the PCP disliked her "rightist"
it

accepted her government to prevent

a

government standing further to the right. 57
The PCP declared that the local elections of December
2

were

a

great victory for the new coalition ticket

United People's Alliance

of FEPU.

5^

The party

(APU)

,

which was

claimed that

its

electoral votes climbed to 20 percent. 59
in

the

a

reincarnation

percentage of

Two weeks later,

special parliamentary election,

the

PCP was

surprised to see the rightist Democratic Alliance
consisting of the CDS,

PSD,

-

(AD),

and the Popular Monarchist

.

Party

(PPM)

gain

,

a

majority of seats in the Assembly.

The

PCP declared that the AD was successful because
it fooled
the people into voting for it and because the Union
of the

Left

for Social Democracy

left. 60

It

(UEDS)

divided the votes on the

criticized the AD for intensifying the

capitalist recuperation measures and creating

a

new cold

war in its foreign policy toward the USSR. 61
By the summer of 1980,

the PCP began preparations for

the regular parliamentary elections scheduled for October.
It continued to emphasize the need for unity of the left to

break the strength of the AD, and for not wasting votes to
the People's Democratic Unity (UDP) or other parties on the
left. 62

September the party intensified its criticisms

In

of the AD government and called for its

PCP was

resignation.

especially critical of the AD'

s

The

abuse of its

governmental powers to brainwash the voters.

It

was

sharply critical of the AD's control of the media and of
its

increase

elections
In

in

the minimum wage

just

6^

the aftermath of the elections,

stronger

prior to the

victory for the AD,

faced with

the CC made

a

a

new,

general

assessment of the results. It concluded that the AD impeded
free elections by remaining in office during the campaign.

Rather than focusing on the AD victory,
that the APU stopped the right

the CC emphasized

from doing better in the
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elections.

decrease

APU received 16.76 percent of the vote,
a
from 47 to 41 parliamentary seats.
The AD's

majority increased from 128 to 134

seats,

while the PS

maintained its 74 seats in the 250 member assembly.

The CC

criticized its own mi spe rcept i on of the strength of AD

propaganda,

and its declaration of the AD's inevitable

defeat prior to the elections.

But it also announced

the elections provided valuable lessons.

that

The AD's policies

would justify the party's warnings of its capitalist
recuperation policies.

As

long as the left continued

divided the AD government would govern for four years.
After the legislative elections,

64

the party's emphasis

shifted to the presidential elections scheduled for
December of that year.

If the AD candidate Antonio Soares

Carneiro won the election,
be complete.

the victory on the right would

The PCP declared that an AD presidential

victory had to be prevented at all costs. 65

Although the

PCP insisted that Eanes was in the best position to defeat

Soares Carneiro,

it

presented the head of the PCP's

parliamentary group, Carlos Brito, as its own candidate of

"enlightenment."
democrats,

Because Eanes was not supported by all

and Otelo and Aires Rodrigues ran as candidates

to the left of the PCP,

the party declared that it did not

have an alternative but to withdraw Brito'

prior to the first round.

s

candidacy just

Instead it threw party support
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to Eanes to prevent

a

victory of the right.

66

Because

Eanes won with 57 percent of the vote in the
first round,
the PCP declared that the presidential elections
were a
victory for the left.
The right's candidate received

only

40 percent of the vote and Otelo only 1.5 percent. 67

With the elections over,

the party intensified its

criticism of the government's counterrevolutionary
activities.
to

The party especially blasted the AD's attempts

revise the constitution.

presidential power,

The AD wanted to decrease

end the Council

constitutional veto,

of the Revolution's

place the military under civilian

control by shifting the appointment of military heads from

the president to the government,
industries,

denationalize the

and undo the agrarian reform.

Because the

revisions could not be accomplished without PS support, the
PCP was especially critical of the PS. 68

To

increase its

opposition to the right and preserve the conquests of the
revolution,

the PCP

supported

a

new wave of strikes.

The

party insisted that the conditions for change were ripening

and that the government be dismissed and replaced with

a

democratic one. 69

After Prime Minister Francisco Balsemao resigned
August and President Eanes again selected him to form
government,

the PCP became extremely critical that

a

a

in

new

great

opportunity to end the AD government had been lost.
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Because it had only been elected as

a

result of its power

abuse during the previous elections,

because

its

presidential candidate had lost, and because it was trying
to

revise the constitution,

the PCP questioned the AD's

legitimacy to continue its mandate. 70
the PS

for allowing the AD to remain

It

in

also criticized

power.

The PCP

even chastised President Eanes and the Council of the
Revolution for misjudging the situation.

Meanwhile,

it

warned that the economy worsened and the strikes would
continue,
coup"

and that the AD had relaunched its

to end democracy.

"subversive

Because the changes which the AD

proposed and the PS supported were drastic and required

consultation with the people, the PCP insisted that new
elections be held. 71

On February 12 and May 11,

party staged general strikes.
In

a

including

7^

brilliant tactical move,

Parliament
a

a

1982 the

the PCP proposed to

series of laws dealing with maternity,

law to permit abortion on demand.

Because the

PCP had never shown great concern for any of these issues

beforehand,

7^

the proposals were obviously geared to create

divisions within the AD and destroy the alliance.

the

PS

Since

was supporting the AD's attempts to revise the

constitution,

the PCP also hoped that the proposals would

cause divisions within the PS.
increase support

for the

party,

The

laws might

also

especially from the

.

.
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young 74
In

June,

the PS leader Mario Soares also called for

general elections after the constitutional

revision and

announced that the PS would officially break relations
with
the PCP as a result of the latter' s meddling in PS
internal
affairs.

7^

The PCP denied the charge and criticized the PS

for waiting until

after the constitutional revision to

bring down the government.

The revisions passed in October

included government appointment of military heads and the

replacement of the Council of the Revolution with

a

Constitutional Tribunal to judge the constitutionality of
legislation

7

f

.
,

Increasingly,
party,

the PCP

resulting in Soares'

attacked the PS as

allegation,

rightist

counterattack that the PCP

considered the PS to be its major enemy. 77
PCP denied the

a

it was

Although the

clear that the PCP was

trying to destroy the PS and attract as many socialists to

itself while encouraging the creation of
manipulatable party to replace the PS.

a

new,

more

This suggestion was

voiced after the December 1982 local elections and became
more commonplace throughout 1983.
The PCP

analyzed the local elections as an important

victory for the left
It

(the PCP received almost 20 percent)

announced that the PS electoral increase,

.

from 26

percent to almost 30 percent, did not mean people supported
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the PS program but only that they were tired of
the AD's

policies as also reflected
abstentions.

in

the

large

increase

The configuration of parties

left

a

in

void

which could accommodate new parties to attract the support
of the abstainers. 78

When Balsemao offered his resignation to President
Eanes as

result of splits within the AD,

a

mobilized to prevent the creation of

new AD government.

a

announced that the fall of the government was

It

of the workers'

struggle.

To appoint

the PCP

a

a

result

new AD government

would be to ignore the results of the AD defeat in the
recent local elections. 79
a

As if to demonstrate that it was

force to be reckoned with, the PCP continued its support

for

strikes and demonstrations,

while praising the

president's dismissal of the government and his call for
new elections in April 1983.

As

80

election day approached,

the PCP

reminded the

people of its decisive moves which brought down the AD
Because the PS would ally with the right and

government.

continue the policies of the AD government,
voters that

a

reminded

vote for the PS would not be a vote for the

The party was extremely anti-PS throughout the

left. 81

electoral campaign.
declared

it

a

82

After the election the PCP again

great victory for APU

although the PS won

a

(it

received 18 percent),

relative majority of the vote

(36

382

percent).

After three years of rightist policies
against
the workers, the AD had been defeated and
the nation was

at

the crossroads once again.

The PS

could choose to return

to democratic policies or continue the rightist
policies of

the AD.

83

The PS rejected discussions with the PCP to form

a

coalition government and instead formed one with the PSD.
The PCP criticized the PS and treated it as a member of the
right.

To increase the difficulties between the coalition

partners,

the PCP reintroduced its abortion proposal in

Parliament and supported strikes and demonstrations.

84

The

PCP maintained that unity must continue if the workers were

to prevent

additional measures by the PS/PSD government

against their interests.

The party continued to argue that

either the PS pursued democratic policies, which would only
be possible

if

Soares did not head the party,

or

parties would emerge to fill the void on the left.

new
The

only solution to the economic problems would be to create

a

government of "National Salvation" with the participation
of the PCP. 85
At its Tenth Congress in December 1983 the PCP divided

the reactionary forces'

attempts to destroy democracy into

five phases:

attempts to profit from the November 25, 1975
"revolts" and install a new dictatorship were

1.

unsuccessful because the constitution was
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successfully implemented.

the PS, PS/CDS, and Presidential governments
attempted the change through counterrevolutionary
legislation.
2.

3. the AD attempted to implement a subversive
coup plan but failed after the defeat of its
presidential candidate.

the AD with PS support revised the
4.
constitution but was then defeated by the
continued worker struggle.
5.

the PS/PSD continued the AD policies. 86

The PCP also announced that Soares'

candidacy for president

in 1985 was unacceptable and that he was a candidate of the

right.

The party insisted that the PS/PSD government had

to be dismissed prior to the presidential elections. 87

Organization

.

The years which followed the November

coup attempt were very active years in its organizational

After months of expanding its membership during

sphere.

the revolutionary period and allowing loosely disciplined
and ideologically diverse individuals into its ranks,

the

PCP mobilized to strengthen the party's organization.
Strong organization was

a

Marxist-Leninist party,

it

the party had the time to

major pillar of an effective
declared.

insure that every cell

commission was organized according to
With three major elections and

held in

1
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After November 25,

a

and

Lenin's principles.

national congress to be

and only seventy percent of PCP militants

^

.

participating actively within the organization,

this goal

was considered especially important. 88

Throughout the year the attention which the party

placed on organization was obvious,
Militante articles.

especially in

According to the PCP,

it

0

had to end

the adventurous views which plagued many sectors of
the
party.

It

had to erase ultra-leftist

from the "cassette,"

ideas and support

the term often used by non-communists

to describe the pre-recorded minds of PCP members. The best

way to reach this goal was not to focus on ideology over

organization but to work on both simultaneously with
special attention to organization.

help the organizational drive;

reality was more important.

concrete organizational

With

sectarianism would be eradicated
In

Theory alone would not

a

strong organization,

8 9

order to achieve an organizational

facelift the

party insisted that the members participate actively within

the party,

attend meetings regularly,

recruit new members,

pay their dues,

and read the party press

.

Organizational improvements required increased meetings at

every level of party organization,
Boards of Regional Organization

from the cell to the

(DORs)

.

The topics

for

discussion were the party's program, statutes, and analyses
of the political

situation in the long and short-term.

Organization meant the increased election of assemblies

secretariats to improve internal communication and
discipline.

This would require the formation of new cadres

and qualitative improvement of existing cadres,
at

the

intermediate level.

especially

with an effective,

strong

organization the principles of "democratic centralism"
could be assured; ideological purity would follow.

91

Throughout the period the party emphasized the need to

follow its members'

progress so that they would develop

into good militants.

The party was having a difficult time

holding on to new members,

receiving dues from many,

keeping track of them when they moved.

92

and

The party also

emphasized the need for the PCP to increase its revenue and
in

1977

launched

in part

a

campaign to collect 50 million escudos,

to help the party build

a

new headquarters in

Lisbon. 93
Of high priority was the need to form new cadres and

follow their progress.

Additional

intermediate cadres,

which linked organizations at the bottom of the hierarchy

with those at the top,
intermediary,

municipal

were especially

lacking.

By

the party meant cadres who worked at the

level.

It

considered the

formation of

intermediate cadres essential to decentralize the party

structure and relieve the pressure on the District
Commissions which were not close enough to the people

at

the local level to understand their particular problems.

94

.
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This would help explain the constant party
attention
to developing Municipal Commissions.

Since the party was

weak in most regions of the country outside the industrial

areas and the Alentejo,

the Municipal Commission was its

link to the people and the small scattered cells.

95

Through the Municipal Commissions the party hoped to learn
more about the particular problems in

a

given municipality

so that it could elect individuals through APU to the local

government,
peoples'

it

improve the local conditions,

confidence. 96

hope to

change

and gain the

Only by improving its image could

the

beliefs

which

decades

anticommunism had instilled in local residents.
In addition to the focus

of

97

on the Municipal Commission,

the party continued to emphasize the importance of the

factory cell

-

the most

Leninist party.

The

important organization of

PCP

a

continued to espouse the

importance of participating within the cell and had several

campaigns to strengthen their organization

the concern with the company cell,

9^

was an

Accompanying

interest

in

strengthening the links between the cell and the unions and
with the Worker's Commissions.

The latter continued to be

valued highly because of their unitary character.
Another way to strengthen the party was to continue
its recruitment of new members.

At the Eighth Congress in
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the party declared that it had 115,000 members

1976,

in terms

of age,

sex,

or

sectoral distribution,

basically remained the same.

99

but

the party

After 1977 the party had

several membership drives which increased the party's

militant's to over 200,000

in

1983,

excluding the 25,000

members of the Portuguese Communist Youths

-

JCP

(the

two

autonomous youth organizations, Union of Communist Students
and Union of Communist Youth,
JCP)

merged in 1979 to form the

The drives always emphasized the need to attract

.

additional youths,

women,

and small and medium farmers

which portrays the party's weakness in those areas. 100

It

was clear that the PCP was especially concerned with its

inability to rejuvenate the party. 101

As early as 1978 the

two communist youth organizations claimed to have 27,000

members which shows the severe decline facing the PCP.

10 ^

A major issue discussed after 1975 in 0 Militante was
the importance of the "base" organizations: the grass-root

Popular Assemblies, Worker Commissions

(distinct

from the

party cells or party-dominated syndical committees in the
firms),

Farmers'

Leagues,

and so

forth. 103

Many of these

organizations emerged independently of the PCP during 1974

and

1975,

usually with extreme-left support and

organizational help.

Because they had much more internal

democracy than the PCP organizations, the party resented
the

competition

from the popular organizations;

since

.
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populist views were

often contagious,

organizations made

it

the

grass-root

more difficult for the PCP to

discipline its own members. 104
After the November 1975 setback to the extreme left,
the party saw its chance to infiltrate and control the base

organizations,

which explains the party's increased

emphasis on them after 1976.

elections approaching,

if

organizations could prove

votes.

The official

organizations

was

a

With the December 1976 local

handled correctly,

the base

valuable asset to attract local

reason for infiltrating these

(the party does not use the word infiltrate)

that these non-partisan organizations provided an

atmosphere in which its participants learned the strength

and importance of unity.

The

organizations were an

important safeguard to insure that democracy continued in
Portugal 105

The party continued to devote considerable attention
to the agricultural

south.

It

sector both in the north and in the

called for an increase

peasants to the party.

the recruitment of

Because peasants in the north had

long tradition of individualism,
ant icommunism,

in

a

self-sufficiency,

and suspicion of organization,

the PCP

emphasized the importance of forming Farmer Leagues.

Small

and medium farmers would be more apt to join them than they

would communist organizations.

The

leagues were to give
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special attention to concrete problems
and their solutions.
They were to improve marketing procedures,

attain

fertilizer at favorable prices, and so forth. 106
In

addition,

the party organizations were to become

more flexible in their approach to the peasants.
that quasi-workers dominated in the north,

work in the fields after

a

day at the

local

Realizing

returning to
factory,

the

party restructured its local organizations accordingly,

holding meetings

at

more convenient times,

transportation for those who lived far away,

providing

and so forth.

Because anticommunism was especially strong in the north,
the party organizations would have to adapt to the

conditions,

in

local

extreme circumstances becoming

quasi -clandestine .107
In

the

south,

the

PCP

focused on the problems

surrounding agrarian reform and on strengthening its

organization within the collect ives

.

1 0 8

The party's

communique that every party organization, from the district
commissions to the

parish commissions,

had to devote one

of their best cadres exclusively to agricultural

issues

shows the party's concern with this sector. 109
The party's Ninth Congress in late 1979 did not reveal

any

major change in party policy except for an increase of

the CC permanent and alternate members to 133. 110

The

Tenth Congress of December 1983 also increased the size of

1

"

the CC to

party.

165 with many young members

to rejuvenate the

More significant was the creation of

a

5

member

Permanent Political Secretariat which was
headed by Cunhal.
It was rumored that the new secretariat
had been created to
smooth the leadership transition whenever Cunhal
decided to
step down, possibly resulting in a collective
leadership.

The PCP

also altered other leadership organizations:

increasing sizes,

adding women to the Secretariat and

Political Commission
suspected "Eurocommunist s

(Politburo),
.

1 1

Many of the party's usual

throughout this period.

It

sectarianism within the party,
unity,

and purging some

concerns continued
called for an end to

for

the maintenance

of

for the avoidance of bureaucracy, 112 and for the

increased recruitment of Catholics. 113

Conclusions

.

The

post-revolutionary PCP had

similarities and differences with the revolutionary PCP.
The party did not alter its long-term strategy

when given the opportunity to do so.

Instead,

for power

it continued

to reject the Eurocommunist path in favor of the Stalinist

approach

(see

chapter eight for elaboration)

.

The tactics

and short-term strategies were adapted to the new political
situation,

but the basic analyses upon which the orthodox

leaders based the nation's transition to socialism remained

.
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the

same.

Why the party did not change

revolves around the leadership's'
social,

economic,

its

strategy

backgrounds and their

and political analyses of Portuguese

society which we will discuss in chapter eight.

Clearly the PCP recognized that the revolutionary
period was over.
It found itself on the defensive in
almost every area of activity.
MFA,

the news media,

Its

influence within the

and government bureaucracy had been

sharply reduced after the November 25 purges.

which was

a

The MFA,

last hope to rekindle the revolution,

became

moderate and progressively relinquished its involvement in

politics.

Nevertheless,

strategy for power as

a

the PCP continued its dual

parliamentary and revolutionary

party

Within Parliament the party continued to criticize the
parties to its right and left,

the governments'

recuperation

policies,

working class,

while simultaneously calling for

capitalist

and their measures against the

front government of the left with the PS.

a

united

The PS, however,

looked to the right instead of the left for its alliances.
Nevertheless,

initially the PCP did not antagonize the PS

minority government in hopes that it might one day convince
it

to form an alliance.

Not until August of 1977 did the

party stop supporting the PS and call for its resignation

from power.

From that point on the PCP realized that an

alliance with the PS was not
attentions elsewhere.

it

likely and focused its

also called for the maintenance

of a strong MFA role in politics.
it

Like a democratic party,

participated and tried to reap maximum advantage
from

the elections.

Outside of parliament,

the PCP was

revolutionary party on the defensive;

a

conservative

it

waited for

conditions to ripen so it could launch its offensive anew.
While it waited,

it

strengthened its power base through

various tactics.

The PCP moved to

conquests of the revolution.

In

consolidate the

the agrarian

reform and

nationalized industrial sector the party braced itself for
the offensive from its right.

regions and sectors where

it

It

tried to expand into the

was weakest,

especially the

north and Auronomous Islands populated by small and medium

farmers.

Although its competitors on the right and left

launched an offensive against PCP-dominat ed unions,

the

party counter-attacked and actually expanded its union
base.
it

It used its

influence to remind the government that

could create an unfavorable labor atmosphere if

desired.

Meanwhile,

expecting that the PS

measures would drive additional workers
Intersindical camp,
the late seventies.

it

so

austerity
into the

the PCP minimized union offensives

in

The PCP also improved its organization

quantitatively and qualitatively,

continued to battle its

.

opponents on the left,

and infiltrated all

society as it waited for

a

sectors of

change in the political

atmosphere
Throughout this period the party continued to
simplify
complex problems into black or white solutions.
The PS was

either with the PCP and the people for democracy,
or it was
with the PSD and CDS for dictatorship.
Most problems were

analyzed in the "you are with us or against us" format.
The party's analyses consistently offered a one-sided
perspective.

The elections were always analyzed from the

standpoint of the party,
people.

the

left,

democracy,

or

the

Favorable results were blown out of proportion

while unfavorable results were minimized,
altogether.

The party

or

ignored

read partisan conclusions into

elections which were non-partisan, such as the presidential

election of 1976.

But most of all,

the party came to conclusions for

which it had little, if any, supporting evidence.

stated that the

1
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The PCP

legislative elections were

victory for the left and that the people voted for

a

a

big

PS/PCP

government; but one could just as easily have concluded, by

combining the electoral results of the PPD and PS, that the

elections showed

a

victory for the political center.

How

could the party prove its conclusion that the electoral
shifts to the right in the legislative elections were as

a

result of rightist propaganda and
fraud?

These tactics

portray how the party distorts its analyses
to present the
results it would have preferred, rather than
the

results it

actually found.

Of, course,

this is politics,

and parties

to the PCP's left and right carried out similar
practices.

Increasingly,

to

its

the PCP exploited its opposition status

maximum potential.

The

party's stance

in

relationship to the parties to its right, including the
PS,
became hostile.

It

was evident

from the party's rhetoric

during the constitutional revision that

it

interested in forming an alliance with the PS.

By 1983 the

was not

party was treating the PS as its primary enemy.

Having

succeeded after the revolution in eliminating its
competition to the left, it was logical that its next focus

would be its other major competitor, the PS, on its right.

The goal was to weaken the enemy by portraying the PS
as

an ally of the right.

In

this way the PCP hoped the

socialists would eliminate Mario Soares as their party
leader.

The PCP also hoped to attract PS members to the

MDP or PCP,

or to

instigate splits within the PS.

these strategies did not have positive results,

tactic was to encourage the creation of
parties which might offer

a

a

When

the next

new party or

more acceptable alternative for

PS members than the APU parties offered.

The emergence of
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the "Greens" and the Democratic Renovator
Party

were

(PRO)

hoped to succeed in this role.

After every possible governing coalition
was
attempted,

the only untried alternative was

with the PCP.

The PCP,

however,

parliamentary politics.
as

much as possible,

coalition

does not really care for

It exploits its

but

a

parliamentary role

given Cunhal's disdain for

"bourgeois democracy" the party's ultimate strategy for
power is not parliamentarian.
a

Stalinist party.

As stated before, the PCP is

Rather than play the Eurocommunist game

to slowly increase its percentage of the electoral vote,

it

prefers to wait for the continued economic deterioration
and for conditions to ripen allowing
toward socialism.

a

few more

steps

Because in the past the PCP has always

profited most from backlashes to right-wing coup attempts,
the party hopes that deteriorating conditions will result
in a right-wing coup allowing it to renew its offensive. 114

Given that Portugal does not have

a

large middle-class to

support bourgeois democracy this would appear to be
reasonable strategy.

However,

if the party maintains

a

its

orthodoxy and conditions do not ripen in the short or
the party's

medium-term,

tactics will lead to disaster.

Already the party is failing to attract the young who see
the PCP as

the times.

a

conservative party unwilling to change with

Increasingly,

the PCP

is

concerned with the
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rising average age of its militants, which
explains why the
party added many young militants to the CC
and other
leadership organs in the Tenth Congress. The party
is also

failing to attract women,

as

well as small and medium

peasants to the party, which together make up
the population.

a

majority of

More intellectuals are leaving the party

than are joining it. In short, unless the party drastically

alters

its

strategy,

in

the

long-term it is doomed to

become less significant.

For the present,

the party continues to make good

showings in the elections and its influence in the unions
is

crucial.

The party's strength is based on the triad of

maintaining the nationalized sector,

the agrarian reform,

and some worker control of the industries.
long-term the party does lose influence,

If

in

the

that would not

appear to effect the current leadership which preserves

a

centralized Stalinist organization and Leninist view of

revolution.

The

role of the party is to patiently wait

until the conditions for revolution return.

Meanwhile the party continues to strengthen its
organization at every level and to infiltrate society.

It

strengthens its hold on the unions through Intersindical
and fights attempts to create parallel organizations among

the workers.

It

continues to attack the country's

integration into the European Economic Community as well as
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the European Parliament.

The party also criticizes every

government's economic program,

as

well as every agreement

with the International Monetary Fund. 115

to

hold large demonstrations

(especially in the eighties)
that much more difficult.

The PCP continues

and support

strikes

to make any government's task

.

! !

!

,

.

!

398

Endnotes

Documentos Politicos Do Comite Cent ral Do PCP Vol
3
Edicoes Avante, 1976), Pp. 231-250:
Fo^-analyses
of politics since November 25, 1975 see the
Bibliography
and check the Portuguese press throughout the period
1

-

(Lisbon:

2.

Ibid.,

3.

Avante

!

,

January 22, 1976, P.

4

.

Avante

!

,

January 28, 1976.

5

.

Avante

!,

6.

Avante

!

7

.

Avante

!

8

.

January 15,

1976.

,

February

1976.

,

January

5,

2.

1976.

8

For a good analysis of the MFA'

Thomas
9.

278.

P.

B r u n e a u

Avante

Politics

,

January 22,

,

Comite Central Do PCP

,

1976;

Vol.

s

role in politics see

and

Nationhood:

and Documentos Politicos Do
(Lisbon
Edicoes Avante,

3

^

:

1976), Pp. 284-285.
10.

Avante

11.

Ibid

,

January 22,

and Avante

;

,

1976.

January

1976.

1,

12. Alvaro Cunhal, As Eleiyoes Para A Assembleia Da
Republica (Lisbon: Edicoes Avante!, 1977), Pp. 16-26.
13.

Ibid.

14.

Ibid.

15.

Avante

Pp.

,

,

195-206/ and Avante

March

14,

,

March

11,

1976.

1976.

As Eleicoes Para A Assembleia Da
Pp. 21-22
1977)
Republica (Lisbon: Edicoes Avante
16.

Alvaro Cunhal,

!

17.

Avante

!

,

March 16,

1976.

,

,

! !!

399
.

Interview of Alvaro Cunhal In Expresso

,

April

3,

1976,

Avantel,

April 26, 1976.
For an analysis of the
see Tom Gallagher, Portugal: A Twentieth-Century
rpretation (Manchester: Manchester Univer sity Press

".ions

20.

Ibid.

21. Avante

May 20,

,

1976.

22. Avante!
May 13, 1976; and Alvaro Cunhal, Entre Duas
Elei<coes (Lisbon: Ediccfes Avante!, 1978), Pp. 31-33";
,

23. Avante
24.

25.

July 1976.

1978),

Ibid.

29.

Ibid.

30

.

Ibid.

31.

Ibid.

32

Ibid.

,

Entre Duas Eleicoe s
69-91.

Pp.

Bruneau, Op. Cit

.

.

1976.

3,

Alvaro Cunhal,

27. Avante

28

June

0 Militante ,

Avante!,
26.

,

August

.

,

7,

P.

*

(Lisbon:

Edicoes
*

79.

1976.

33. Barbara Stallings, "Portugal and the IMF: The Political
Economy of Stabilization, " in Jorge Braga de Macedo and
Simon Serfaty, Portugal Since the Revolution: Economic and
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
Political Perspectives
,

1981),

Pp.

101-135.

34.

Avante

,

August 19,

35.

Avante

,

October 14,1976.

0 Militante
(Extraordinario)

36.

,

1976.

September 1976,
Do PCP

(Lisbon:

Pp. lj-4; VII Congresso
Edicoes Avante!, 1974);

!!
!!!!!

.

!

400

and VI11 Congresso Do PCP (Lisbon:
Edicoes Avante!, 1977).
37. Avante
September 30, 1976.
,

38. ^yili

39.

Congresso Do PCP

0 Militante
r

^

iln/°
1976; and

,

(Lisbon: Edicoes Avante!,

January 1977,

p.

25.

ctoral results see: Avante!, December 16
January and February 1977.

Q Militante ,

41. Alvaro Cunhal, Uma Politica Ao Servico
*
Edicoes Avante!, 1978).

42.

Avante

1977),

August

,

and September 23,

7

Do

Povo

+

23,

(Lisbon-

'

1976.

43. Alvaro Cunhal, Uma Politica Ao Servico Do Povo
(LisbonEdicoes Avante!, 1978), Pp. 330-331.
44.

45.

Avante

July 16,

,

1976.

Alvaro Cunhal,

Avante!,

1978), Pp.

Entre Duas Eleic oes
185-203.

46.

Stallings, Op. Cit

47.

0 Militante ,

48.

Avante

,

October 27,

49. Avante

,

December 16, 1977.

50.

0 Militante ,

51. Avante
Pp. 26-27.

,

f

(Lisbon:

.

August 1977, Pp. 22-32.
1977.

February 1978, Pp. 29-32.

October

3,

1978;

and 0 Militante

52. Avante

,

August 24 and September 14,1978.

Avante

,

June

54. Avante

,

October 19,1978.

55. Avante

,

November 23,1978.

56.

Avante

,

March 29,1979.

57.

Avante

,

October 11,1979.

53.

Edicoes
r

3,

1979.

,

May 1978,

!!
!!!!!!

58.

0 Militante

59.

Ibid.

60.

Avante

,

December

61.

Avante

,

January 24,

62.

Avante

,

August 21,

63.

Avante

,

September

64.

Q Militante

65.

Ibid.

66.

Avante

,

,

May 1978.

January 1980.

,

,

1979.

13,

1980.
1980.
1980.

4,

August 1980, Pp. 25-32.

August 30, 1980.

67. Avante
December 11,
see Bruneau, Op. Cit..

1980.

,

68.

Avante

,

February

69.

Avante

,

August 28,

70.

Avante

,

September 17,1981.

71.

0 Militante ,

72.

Avante

,

For more on the elections

1981.

14,

1981.

August 1980, Pp. 25-32.

February 15 and May 11,1982.

Maria Armanda Reis, "0 Que Diziam Os Partidos Ha Quatro
Anos," Diario Popular March 3, 1982, P. 8.
73.

,

74.

Avante

,

February

75.

Avante

,

June

76.

Avante

,

October

7,

77. Avante

,

October

14,

78.

Avante

,

December 16,

79.

0 Militante

80.

Avante

,

,

9,

1982.

11,

1982.
1982.
1982.
1982.

January 1983,

February

10,

1983.

,

!
!

Avante

,

March

10,

1983.

82. Avante

,

March 31,

1983.

83. Avante

,

April 28,

1983.

84.

Avante

,

June

85.

Avante

,

86. Avante

,

81.

2,

1983.

November 10, 1983.
December

18,

1983.

Ibid.

87.

VIII Congresso Do PCP (Lisbon: Edicoes Avante',
1977)
see Q Militante February 1977 oh how to organize
an
assembly.

88
P

•

-

41 '

,

89.

0 Militante

90.

See,

91.

0 Militante ,

August 1976,

92.

0 Militante

February and March 1980.

93.

0 Militante ,

94.

0

August 1976, P. 18.

,

for example,

,

Militante

0 Militante

April 1977,

P.

P.

,

December 1975, Pp. 4-5.

18.

8.

January and June 1978,

,

August

May 1981.
95.

1980
96.

0

Militante

,

April and September 1978,

1979,

and

and January

.

0 Militante ,

May 1981.

97. 0 Militante
June 1977,
1978, and January 1980.
,

98. 0 Militante
May 1984.

99. VIII
P. 47.

,

Pp.

22-23; April and September

December 1978, April 1979, April 1982, and

Congresso Do PCP

(Lisbon:

Edicoes Avante!,

100. On membership drives see: 0 Militante
March 1982, and June 1984.
101. Avante

!

December 18, 1983.

1977),

J

,

September 1977,

.

"

!!

403

102. Avante
103.

18-22
105.

,

March

0 Militante
°

1978.

December 1975,

,

Militante

9,

P.

Janu ary 1976,

'

P.

Pp.

8—9

107.

0 Militante , January 1976,

108.

Q Militante August 1976,

Pp.

5-8; December 1975,

Pp.

,

Pp.

Congresso Do PCP

8-14.

Pp.

,

XI
47.

16-17.

Pp.

109. 0 Militante February 1976,
8-9.

HO.

February 1976,

8;

Ibid.

106. 0 Militante, February 1976,

P.

11.

(Lisbon:

5-8/ December 1975,

Edico'es Avante',
T

'

Pp
^

1979),

111. Pedro d' Anunciaca'o, "0 Que Moudou No PCP," Expresso
December 24, 1983, P. 3; Rogerio Rodrigues, "Congresso do
PCP no Porto: A Sucessao Com Tranquil idade, " OJornal,
December 23, 1983, Pp. 8-9.
,

112.

0 Militante August 1979.

113.

O Militante September 1977.

,

,

114. Jose Pacheco Pereira, "Vacuo, Ritual,
Semanario December 10, 1983.
,

115. Avante

,

June

7

and April

7,

1977.

E Pes De Barro,

"

CHAPTER

7

THE PCP'S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Although organizational strength alone does not insure
that any party will be successful in

society,

a

it

is

one

of the most important factors in distinguishing a
communist

party from non-communist parties
system.

in

nation's party

a

The strength of a communist party as compared to

other parties is largely

a

result of the organization and

internal cohesion which bind it together based on Lenin's

principles and often reinforced by

a

"democratic centralism."

in

Therefore,

Stalinist view of

this chapter we

discuss the PCP's organizational structure from its
directive organs to the cells.

We

also discuss

leaders and important concepts such as

its major

"democratic

centralism.

The Organizational Structure

At the PCP's Tenth Congress held in December of 1983,

the party declared that it had

a

membership of 200,753

excluding the 25,000 members of the Portuguese Communist
Youth (JCP)

.

This was a significant increase when compared

with the estimated maximum of

April 25,

1974

coup.

3,

000

The party's
404

at

the time of the

social

composition

2

3

consisted of 45.7 percent industrial workers,

white-collar employees,

15.6 percent

merchants,

11.7 percent agricultural workers,

"miscellaneous"

scattered professions,

19.8 percent

(domestics,

artisans,

small and medium industrialists and

fishermen,

and

so

intellectuals and technicians,

forth),!

5.3

percent

and 1.9 percent

farmers.

Age distribution within the party ranged from 1.8 percent

under the age of twenty,

thirty years old,

23.7 percent between twenty

and

47.7 percent between the ages of thirty

and fifty, and 26.8 percent above the age of fifty.

Of the

total membership 20 percent were women.

The membership

figures publicized at the Tenth

Congress can only be accepted as
strength.

a

general measure of party

Given the party's concern with members who were

not paying their dues

(50

percent at the Tenth Congress)

for its inability to locate militants that had moved,

,

for

the enrollment of individuals without their knowledge by

commissions wishing to fill their membership campaign
quotas,

for problems delivering membership cards to its

militants,

and for only three out of four of its members

actively participating in party organizations, the number
of

militants which the party claims

are

probably

exaggerated.

The

social

composition statistics are equally

unreliable because of the categorization of its members'

professions.
as workers

It

is clear that many

individuals classified

ceased to be workers decades ago.

such as Dias Lourenco,

Francisco Miguel,

Individuals

and Georgette

Ferreira have been party functionaries for
decades and
should not,
workers.

except in a very special sense,

be considered

Some individuals who are categorized as workers

might be better described as intellectuals. 4

Because the

party places

in

so

much emphasis and pride

proletarian party,
portrays

a

it

is

a

understandable that the PCP

majority of its members as workers.

for example,

being

The party,

considers white-collar employees to be very

close to agricultural and industrial workers,

making the

party's worker majority 77.2 percent of its members. 5
The

statistics also demonstrate the PCP's continued

problems in attracting women, the young, and farmers to the
party.

Although women increased from 20.5 percent in 1979

to 21.6 percent

in

1983,

their membership still needed to

be increased to match their share of the population which

exceeded fifty percent

.

6

The party had difficulty shedding

K

its conservative image which was not attracting the young.
It

again increased the size of the

CC,

young members on it to eradicate the

putting primarily

image that the

leadership organs were run by old militants from the
clandestine period.

The party

also continued attempts to

expand into regions where it was especially weak,

such as

those dominated by small and medium farmers.

party was successful to

that

a

limited degree,

Although the
it

was evident

still

it

had much work to do to destroy the
anticommunist barriers which the years of dictatorship

built in those areas.

Organization

.

7

Countering criticisms that the PCP is

Stalinist party lacking internal democracy,
given its disdain for Eurocommunism,
it

is

this,

especially

the PCP

insists that

the most democratic party in Portugal.

As proof of

emphasizes its statutes,

it

organization.

program,

The internal democracy,

and internal

it claims,

is at its

peak in the months preceeding the party congresses.

party'

a

The

positions are discussed in advance at the lowest

s

levels of party organization by the militants who propose

changes and elect representatives to the congress.
addition,

because the party claims that

organs are elected from the bottom

up,

its

8

in

directive

the members have

strong control over policies.
This is how the party claims its internal organization

functions,

but it is

just a facade

for the top leadership

which bureaucrat ically controls the members from the top
down.

Rather than the militants electing representatives

to the party congress

which

in

(who

elect the Central Committee,

turn elects the Political Commission,

the
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Secretariat,

the Permanent Political

Secretary-General,
3),

Secretariat,

and other directive organs

-

the

see figure

the top leaders have always directly and
indirectly

controlled the selection of the directive organs,
including
the Central Committee.
Ever since its emergence from
the

clandestine period,
the organization.

after April

25,

directive organs,

the orthodox leaders have controlled

Although new members who joined the PCP
1974

have been added to the expanded

the ex-clandestine

leaders have always

controlled the names of the individuals nominated for
leadership positions and continue
of

reliable,

orthodox leaders.

exists within the PCP,

a

hierarchical selection

A Eurocommunist tendency

but it is not allowed positions of

power as was demonstrated by the recent withdrawal of
Osvaldo de Castro from the Central Committee.

9

In keeping with the actual structure of the party,

we

will discuss its organization not according to the official

bottom-up flow of directives,

but will

reverse the order

begining with the units at the top and working our way down
(see figure

4

.
)

10

The position of Secretary-General, which Alvaro Cunhal

has held since 1961,
the PCP.

is

the most powerful position within

Although he claims to hold the position only as

long as he has the confidence of the members,

that his control of the party is firm.

it

is

clear

As in the past, his
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rule will remain unchallenged.

The Secretary-General plays

key role in formulating official PCP
policies on the
evolution (or non-evolution) of party ideology
a

and in the

selection of members of the other directive organizations.
The

Secretary-General is the primary spokesperson for the

party and as such plays

a

major role by articulating its

policies at press conferences,
as

through speeches,

and often

the official representative of the PCP to communist

parties in other nations.

11

The next most powerful position in the party is the
Permanent Political Secretariat.

The creation of this new

organ was unexpected and did not receive much direct
mention within the party press. 12

composed of Alvaro Cunhal,

The five member organ is

Carlos Costa

(often

considered

the second most powerful and one of the most orthodox men
in

the party)

,

Carlos Brito

(the

third most powerful

communist and the leader of the parliamentary group),
Domingos Abrantes

charge of the syndical

(in

sector),

Octavio Pato (in charge of the party's functionaries).

and
Its

major purpose may be to smooth the leadership transition
with emphasis on collective leadership when Cunhal decides
to

step down.

Secretariat,

Given the expanding membership of the CC,

and Political Commission,

the Political

Secretariat can also play an important role in centralizing

major decisions among

a

tight,

reliable,

orthodox group
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while allowing

facade that the leadership organs are

a

changing with the times.

The

next

Secretariat,

members.

organization in the hierarchy is the
composed of eight

It

(Budget

Affairs Section,

Commission),

and the

the

International

Information and Propaganda

It directs the rest of the organization below.

The Political Commission
18

and two alternate

responsible for the Commission for

is

Budgetary Control

Section.

full

(Politburo)

is

full members and seven alternate members.

composed of

It is charged

with analyzing the political situation between meetings of
the Central Committee.

It

subordinate organizations,

is also

responsible for several

such as the Parliamentary Group

(composed of the communist deputies)

,

the Economic Affairs

Commission, Agrarian Reform Commission,

Cadre Commission,

the Central Commission for Organization (with

a

subordinate

organization similar to the Regional Commission but
responsible
Commission,
Commission,

for

emigrants'

concerns),

the Syndical Commission,

the

Ideological

the Local Government

the Small and Medium Farmers

Commission,

and

the Information Commission.

Although the party congress is considered the supreme
organ of the PCP,
is

a

it

is not as all-powerful as claimed.

It

ceremonial event which approves decisions made

beforehand by the top organs.

Theoretically,

the Central
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Committee governs the party between congresses but
by the
time it analyzes the nation's political situation,

these

organs have already made important conclusions.
it

the CC which elects those organs,

is

Although

including the

Secretary-General, the selection of its members is top-down
and has also been discussed beforehand.

According to the party statutes, the CC is the second
most important organ.
are to be held,

It

determines when party congresses

including extraordinary congresses

feels that they are necessary.

It

is

if

it

responsible for the

political,

ideological,

party.

oversees the selection and distribution of the

It

cadres,

and organizational work of the

the implementation of policies,

of the budget,

the administration

the creation of the organs necessary to

effectively implement its organization, and the maintenance
of solidarity with other communist parties throughout the
However,

world.

in

reality the CC is not as powerful

the party statutes would have us believe,

as

because the

decisions have often been passed down from the other top
organs 13
.

The next

level below the CC consists of 13 Regional

Organizations whose role is to direct organizational
activities for their region.
is

Each of these organizations

responsible for the hierarchical breakdown within its

own region.

The number of these organizations has expanded

414

to

accompany the increases

in

party strength.

Regional Organization is directed by
DORs.

Board known as the

The thirteen Boards of Regional Organization

Lisbon

(DORL),

(DORLEI),

(DORT)

,

Alentejo
Madeira

by

a

Each

its

Setubal

Santarem

(DORSA)

Beira Litoral
(DORA),

,

Minho

(DORBL)

Algarve

(D0RAM).14

(DORS),

,

Porto
(DORM),

(DORP),

,

Azores

(which

is

in

(DORBI),

(DORAA)

Each organizational Board

Assembly

Leiria

Tras-os-Montes

Beira Interior

(DORAL)

are:

is

,

and

elected

turn elected by

representatives from other organizations below the Regional
Organization). 15

Some Regional Organizations also oversee

Coordinating Organizations and Special Organizations formed
to meet special needs. 16

Below the Regional Organizations are the District

Commissions which correspond to the political
administrative division within the country.
a

In many cases

Regional Organization also acts as the District

Commission
Santarem)

if

(for
it

example,

Lisbon,

Setubal,

Porto,

encompasses only one district.

Leiria,
In

the

Autonomous Islands the District Commissions are called
Island Commissions.

It

is

up to the District Commissions

to coordinate and oversee the activities of the Municipal

Commissions and other subordinate organizations within
their district. 17

Beneath the District Commissions are the Municipal

Commissions.

As

of

the

municipalities lacked such

a

Tenth

Congress

commission

53

(although many of

the commissions which did exist were not

their full potential)

only

functioning to

According to the PCP, the Municipal

.

Commission is of special importance to relieve overburdened
District Commissions of their responsibilities, and tighten

the

party's

links

with the masses.

Because party

organizations are few and weak in areas where the PCP has
the least support,

the Municipal Commission plays an ideal

role in expanding party influence and coordinating activity
in

those areas.

There special attention is devoted to

creating cells in the important industries. 18

Beneath the Municipal Commission is the Parish
Commission.

Many are still lacking in the weaker organized

areas of the nation.

The Parish Commission

considered

is

especially important in organizing unitary Commissions of
Residents to deal with rental problems and other issues

facing residents.

It

is

expected to play

key

a

role in

expandng the party's influence in local areas by resolving
local problems.

The support

of recreational

activity and

culture is seen as an additional way in which the Parish

Comission can expand the influence of the party.

The Local

Commission and Zone Commission become important subordinate

organizations to the Parish Commissions where there are
large populations or large areas.

In

addition,

the party

.

also has Professional Organizations

(for doctors,

and so forth), and Sector Organizations

According to the party,

1

the

lawyers,

9

most

organization within the PCP is the cell.

important

All militants are

to participate primarily through the cell in their
place of

employment.

Any place of employment that is important or

has 100 or more workers should have

within the factories,

ports,

warehouses,

(latifundios)

,

offices,

garages,

and so forth.

a

cell. 20

mines,

cities,

Cells exist

ships,

schools,

villages,

ranches

Participation in neighborhood

cells is acceptable as long as they are not the militant's

primary cell of activity.

When the cell reaches

a

size too

large to efficiently accommodate all of its militants
(usually 100 or more members)

during its regular meetings,

the cell is divided further into nuclei.

The nuclei are

usually based on the different departments or sections

within the firm.

cell,

and the

organization.
assembly elects

The various nuclei as a whole make up the

"assembly"
Given the
a

is

large

the

cells'

size of the

cell,

the

secretariat to govern the

cell

and

maintain close relations with each of the nuclei.
is

superior

The cell

to meet regularly to discuss the party's policies,

and

to insure that its members understand and implement them. 21

By studying the problems which face the masses

and reporting these to its superior organs,

around it

the cell acts

as

the ears and eyes of the party.

and other party publications,

It

distributes Avante!

collects dues,

and recruits

new members. 22

addition to the party organizations discussed

In
above,

the

we should also discuss party Work Centers which
are

social

meeting places

sympathizers,

and

-friends."

considered

very

important

a

for

the

cafe where

influences.

PCP

The Work

aspect

organization for several reasons.

for

all

of

Centers are
the

They offer

workers can meet

members,

a

party's

substitute

free of alien

If militants socialize at the Work Center they

are more aware of important activities occuring within the

party as well as of the party's latest policies.

The

Center also symbolizes the party by showing non-militants
the organization and strength of the PCP.

The centers are

open to all who are friendly to the party,

and act as

problem resolution centers as well as centers for the
recruitment of new members. 23
In

addition to the party'

s

formal organization,

as

a

Leninist party the PCP attempts to control groups beyond
its

reach by creating popular unitary organizations

(ancillary organizations)

around specific issues.

cases these organizations are mere extensions
party's policies.

In other cases,

In many

of

the

they are autonomous but

highly influenced by PCP members or sympathizers.

The

Portuguese General Confederation of Workers
Intersindical is
It

a

-

(CGTP)

good example of such an organization 24
.

is the largest union confederation in the
nation and is

clearly controlled by the PCP

Portuguese Communist Youth
(MDM)

,

The Greens

Democratic Movement

alliance),

Additional examples are:

(JCP),25 Democratic Movement

(Ecological Movement),

Portuguese

(MDP - its partner in the APU electoral

League of Small and Medium Farmers, 26

Portugal-USSR Association,
Culture,

.

Popular Collectives

and Recreation, 27 and so forth.

of Sports,

The PCP attempts

to influence through infiltration those organizations which
it does not create,

parallel

and if unsuccessful, eventually creates

organizations.

After 1975 the PCP especially

focused on infiltrating grassroots organizations such as
Worker's Commissions,

Resident Commissions,

and Popular

Assemblies to reach individuals who did not normally have
contact with the PCP. 28

After 1975 the PCP,
parties,

its

similar to other communist

became increasingly bureaucratic as

organizational hierarchy.

it

expanded

Increasingly the party

became laden down with bureaucratic procedures;

criticisms

were heard concerning cadres becoming sectarian.

The

bureaucracy constantly screened its members for
information,

not only to keep in touch with the views of

the masses,

but

also to keep track of what

individual

members thought.

An example of this is the informational

questionnaire which the party distributed to all of its
members

.
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Because the revolution was essentially over after
November 1975, the party focused on strengthening its

organization.

It

began by simultaneously improving the

organization from below as well as from above.

At first it

focused on the cells at the bottom and on the Regional

Organizations and District Commissions at the top.
Although the cells were to be of concern every year with
various campaigns for their expansion and improvement,
within

a

few years the top organizations were succesfullly

organized and the party focused
organizations,

on

the

intermediate

such as the Municipal Commission 31
.

the party's organizational drives after 1975,

the

30

it

During

stressed

importance of not only creating the intermediate

organizations and cadres which were especially lacking in

the party's

organizational structure,

but

also on the

importance of all organizations holding regular meetings,

assemblies,

and strenghtening the cellular structure with

nuclei and secretariats if necessary.

Democratic Centralism

.

The PCP considers democratic

centralism to be one of its most important guiding
principles.

It

is

discussed in detail

in

the party

statutes and is considered one of the
PCP's pillars of

strength.

According to the PCP,

what makes

it

organization more successful and stronger
than other
parties' is its militants' adherence to
democrat!
centralism.
The PCP expects all of its members
t
participate in analyses and hold extensive discussion
and
criticism of the party's positions.
It is upon these
open

discussions that it bases its declarations
is the most democratic party in the nation.

allowed while

a

-

that the PCP

Full debate is

decision is being made on policy but once

the directive organs have made a decision,

the debate is

cut-off and all militants, whether they agree or disagree,
are expected not only to accept the decision but to defend
it

in public with vigor.

This is what the party considers

the submission of the minority to the majority.

Internal

cohesion is an iron rule and intraparty divisions are not

tolerated 32
.

Democratic centralism also includes election of all
directive organs beginning at the base and rising through

the entire hierarchy.

The leadership organs must then

report their activity to the militants and listen closely

to

the comments and criticisms of its policies.

"centralism"

organization,
minority,

is

a

result

the

of the

The

strong hierarchical

submission of the majority to the

and the discipline and coherence which keeps the

party strong.

The

"democracy"

is

that

all

of

the

directive organizations are theoretically
elected from the
bottom up.
theory discussion is untethered within
the

m

party,

and the militants have total control
of the

direction of the PCP.33

Theoretically,

a

major problem with democratic

centralism is that dissent is not allowed after
has been made.

It

a

decision

is difficult for a committed "bourgeois-

democrat to accept an organization which gives
the
leadership such total control, even if theoretically

the

militants ultimately hold the reigns of power in
their
hands.

Throughout time,

public or private)

leadership organizations

(whether

have made incorrect decisions.

During

the time many incorrect decisions were in effect,

only a

minority's consistent struggle changed the policies in the

long term.

Although communist organizations like to

portray themselves as infallible,

they also make mistakes.

Because democratic centralism makes it much more difficult
for dissenters within the party to uncover and eventually

change the incorrect decisions, party mistakes are often
more disasterous.

It

is

true that this type of structure

leads to the creation of an organizationally strong party

able to compete more effectively than other political

organizations.
organization,

Whether democracy can survive such an

even

a

Eurocommunist one,

is

the question.

To the PCP,

the benefits

of democratic centralism and

collectivism will always outweigh the loss
of individual
freedom and "bourgeois" democracy.

A "true" democrat is

less doctrinaire and more pragmatic.

Somewhere

a

balance

exists and that should be the ultimate goal.

Although theoretically the party organs are elected
from the base up, in reality power is
distributed
differently.

Because the orthodox members have maintained

firm control of the party ever since they emerged
from

clandestinity,

because they create and present the list of

Central Committee and other organizational candidates to

the congresses and assemblies,

in

effect the leadership

knows the character of the organization even prior to the

elections.

Debate is allowed within the party but the

topics to be debated are passed down the hierarchy and

placed on the agenda by the hand-selected leaders of each
assembly.

While it is true that party policy is discussed,

especially before each congress, and that the militants can
be critical,

they must

first be recognized to

speak;

must deal with the pressure from fellow militants,

they

from the

leaders of the assembly, and from the representative of the

superior organization who is present to keep discussion in
line with party policy and who pays

dissent and dissenters.

After

a

close attention to

few attempts within the

same or at different meetings to voice an opinion counter

to that

accepted by the party,

the average militant

learns that it is best to remain
silent.
recorded and one wants to avoid
reprimands.

soon

Dissent

is

The average

militant rarely questions the leadership's
decisions
anyway.

while theoretically debate is welcomed,

it

is

as

much to see how the positions of the
party may relate to
the concrete problems which the masses
face and how to best

implement the decisions,

as

it

is

to

potential dissent and internal divisions.

keep track of
Votes via secret

ballot would decrease leadership control of
its militants,
so elections are open to maximize peer
pressure and keep
individuals in line.

Leadership

At the age of 73,

.

participation within the

PCP,

after a long history of

Alvaro Cunhal continues to

hold tight control of his organization.

age

of

he

18

Lisbon. 34

joined the PCP while

In 1942,

In
a

1940-41

law student

in

of the party.

of the

PCP's present

As he labeled himself in his 1950 trial which

sentenced him to

11

years in prison for communist activity,

"the adopted son of the proletariat."

father was

the

leading role in the reorganization of

which formed the basis

character.

he was

a

at

he became a member of the Secretariat,

and in 1961 was elected Secretary-General

Cunhal played

1931,

a

Because his

lawyer-painter-writer and Cunhal received

a

.

.

Master's degree in law,

his

origins were neither peasant

nor worker but petit-bourgeois.

prison during eight

of

He

spent

which he was

13

years in

solitary

in

confinement

Although he is the most orthodox of the leaders of the

major Western European communist parties,
puppet of the Soviet Union as many claim.

believes in his orthodoxy.

views with the Soviets'
Soviet Union,
him.

the

He

is

It

is

is

not

a

Cunhal strongly

the similarity of his

which leads him to support the

but not necessarily
not

he

Soviet dominance over

only a major leader at home,

international communist movement.

but also in

His orthodoxy has

been especially useful to the Soviets in their struggle to

maintain cohesion in
the Eurocommunists

.

a

movement threatened by division from
To

conclude that Cunhal is

a

Soviet

puppet is to ignore his independent decisions during the

Portuguese revolution and especially in 1975 when the
Soviets reportedly tried to slow Cunhal'

s

revolutionary

strategy because it ran counter to detente and other Soviet
strategies
In many ways Cunhal' s ideology is still locked in the

past.

His perception and analyses

of modern Portuguese

revolutionary conditions have not altered radically from
his experiences and analyses of revolutionary conditions in

the

forties.

To Cunhal,

although some conditions have
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changed which require tactical shifts,

the major conflict

the same conflict which led to the
creation of the
Communist Information Bureau (Cominform)
is

in

1947.

The

world is still divided into two camps:
American Imperialism
on one side, with its arms race, and
the Soviet Union
and

Socialism in the other, with its goal to achieve
the
fullest of democracies.

criticized Titoism

In

as

those days Cunhal strongly

well

as

the

experiments

in

social-democracy being practiced by the Spanish and
Italian

Communist Parties.

To Cunhal

there is no middle ground,

which helps explain why political analyses in Portugal
are
in black and white that always reject a middle-ground 35
.

Although Cunhal holds the reins of power very tightly,
he

cannot lead the party alone.

The orthodox colleagues

which he has carefully selected to help him control and
lead the party, come from a generation which was profoundly

affected by decades of difficult clandestine existence and
by long prison terms.

In

the last congress,

the most trusted of his comrades

formed

a

Cunhal and

new Permanent

Political Secretariat to help in the leadership transition

which will

Costa,

follow Cunhal'

s

the second of the

Secretariat,

is

eventual resignation.
five members

in

Carlos

the Political

considered by many to be the second most

powerful leader in the party and

a

possible successor to

Cunhal if the attempt to collectivize the leadership fails.

Costa is 57 years old and escaped with
Cunhal in 1960 from

Peniche prison.

He

spent

15

years

prison and is

in

presently in charge of the local government
sector.
Brito, the leader of the parliamentary group,
a

close rival of Costa and for that reason,

orthodox,

he

conservative.
in prison.

in

is

considered to be

Carlos

is considered

although still

somewhat

less

He is 53 years of age and spent eight years

Domingos Abrantes, 51 years old, spent 11 years

prison and presently is in charge of the syndical

sector.

Octavio Pato is the fifth member and is in charge

of the functionaries of the PCP.

spent nine years

in

He is sixty years old and

prison.

Other leaders are also

considered important power brokers such as
Vilarigues,

Blanqui Teixeira

(in

Sergio

charge of 0 Militante

)

,

and Jorge Araujo, but the five mentioned above appear to be
in the best position to lead the party. 36

The PCP also has

its

share of political

celebrities

who are very popular within and outside of the PCP.
However, popularity is not comensurate with power; many of

these personalities

have either been dropped from

leadership organizations or never been allowed into them
for their suspected beliefs

Castro,

for example,

Eurocommunism.

Osvaldo de

was a member of the CC but was dropped

from that organization

he

in

for his

liberal views.

had been gaining too much individual

Apparently

support

from

militants who belonged to the organizations
headed by the
Leiria Board of Regional Organization.
After being
nominated as a candidate from Leiria during

the

Parliamentary

elections on two separate occasions,

being replaced by the hierarchy with

a

more

and

orthodox

communist on both occasions, leaders higher up
moved him to
a different region and dropped him from
the CC
Other
members of the Eurocommunist "tendency" are Vital
.

Moreira,

currently

a

member of the Constitutional Tribunal,

Jorge Leite,

a

member of parliament.

individuals are very popular,

and

Although these

because their views are not

trusted by the orthodox leaders, they do not hold positions
of power within the organization.

Conclusions

The organizational structure of the party, the leaders

which control it, and democratic centralism are all crucial
elements in explaining the strength of

well as its ideological line.

a

communist party as

The way

in which

it

is

structured, compounded by democratic centralism, allows the

leaders almost total control of the entire organization.
This

is

the key to understanding why the PCP is not

Eurocommunist party.
Italian Communist Party,

a

What makes it different from the
for example,

is

the

leadership

.
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which brings to the PCP an ideological
orthodoxy which the
Italian communists rejected several
decades
ago.

The roots

of the PCP's orthodoxy and its
comparison to Eurocommunism
will be the subject of the next chapter.

The

organizational strength of the PCP gave
leading edge in the party system which
developed
April 25,

191 A.

it

a

after

Although the revolution in Portugal is

over,

the PCP is stronger organizationally today
than it
has ever been in the past.
Problems exist in the

quality

of many of its militants,

but overall the PCP remains the

strongest Portuguese party in organizational terms.

organization alone and control of most syndicates

Yet
in

Portugal does not make the PCP the party gaining the most

electoral votes.

As

long as democracy continues,

electorate still determines

However,

a

the

party's ultimate strength.

because the PCP has never expected to come to

power democratically,

electoral strength,

it

is

organizational strength,

which it deems of value.

not

This is

another reason for its divergence with Eurocommunists

.

!!
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CHAPTER

8

IDEOLOGY: THE PCP, ORTHODOXY, AND EUROCOMMUNISM

In this chapter we discuss the PCP's ideology,

commitment to

a

and its

Stalinist form of organization and Marxist-

Leninist path to socialism rather than the path which
the

Eurocommunist parties have pursued.
chose this path,

Because the PCP never

the focus here is not on an extensive

discussion of Eurocommunism but on the PCP's rejection of
that position.

A full discussion of Eurocommunism would

have to examine not only the roots of this variant of
communism but also the crisis which Eurocommunism faces
today: the French Communist Party

(PCF)

has moved away from

Eurocommunism, the Spanish Communist Party

into three political groups,

Party

(PCI)

has

lost

Eurocommunist strategy.

(PCE)

has split

and the Italian Communist

electoral support despite its
Although we discuss many of the

issues related to Eurocommunism below,

a

full

analysis of

the variant would have to be more detailed and is not
necessary for our purposes in this chapter.

For almost two decades,

scholars

interested

in

communism in general and Western European communism in

particular have discussed the impact of Eurocommunism

on

western democracies and on the struggle to achieve
socialism in Western Europe.
432

Although many scholars have

criticized the inaccuracy of the term
"Eurocommunism,

Western Europe,

the French Communist

Italian Communist Party
Party

(PCE)

are

(PCI),

Party

(PCF)

- 1

,

in

the

and the Spanish Communist

recognized as being or having been

Eurocommunist parties.

Labeling

a

party Eurocommunist

generally means that the party has chosen

a

path to

socialism which differs from the path which orthodox,
pro-Soviet communist parties continue to pursue.

Briefly,

the Eurocommunist party differs from the Marxist-Leninist
party in that it is often critical of Soviet policy as well
as

the Soviet road to socialism.

The Eurocommunist party

generally rejects long accepted classic analyses concerning
the path to socialism,

proletariat."

of

de-emphasizes the revolutionary conquest

It

power in

including the "dictatorship of the

favor of the electoral

transition to socialism.

It

also de - empha s i z e s the

devotion to working-class interests,
the party's

and democratic

and instead broadens

attraction to the expanding middle classes

whose votes are necessary for
struggle for power.

a

successful electoral

Eurocommunism may also include

liberalization of "democratic cent ralism
'

.

a

"2

The PCP's perception of Eurocommunism does not differ

According to Cunhal,

among the

major pillars supporting Eurocommunism are the

"historic

from the above analysis.

compromise" and

a

policy of "national

independence,"

3

^
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especially in relation to the Soviet Union.

PCP's

independence,

To defend the

Cunhal argues that the party also

follows similar policies.

The similarity of the PCP's

interests with Soviet interests are merely
coincidental

.

The PCP: A M arxist-Leninist /Stalinist Organization

Despite

its

disdain during the

Eurocommunism when

it

was

Seventies

espoused as

alternative to Soviet-style socialism,

democratic

a

the PCP

openly criticized the Eurocommunist parties.

for

rarely

Although the

PCP found itself on the defensive and was often forced to

justify its orthodox strategy,
discussions of Eurocommunism.

it

preferred to avoid

When confronted,

that Marxist-Leninist parties did not

it

argued

follow dogmatic

theory but adapted it to the conditions they faced within
their own nations on the basis of "scientific socialism."
It

hinted that its fraternal partieswere still committed to

Marxism-Leninism but had chosen the Eurocommunist path as

a

mere tactical shift to face the evolving conditions within

their societies.

The PCP used the same argument to deny that it was

copying Eastern European-style socialism.

It

emphasized

that Portugal had its own particular circumstances which
required its own unique approach to socialism: the approach
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which the party was implementing.

Differences existed, but

because political democracy could not be
separated from
economic,

social,

and cultural democracy,

be many similarities

in

its

there would also

transition to socialism.

The

principal means of production would become the
property of
all the people.
Everyone would have a right to employment,
to an education, to health care, to living quarters,
rest.

The exploitation of man by man would vanish.

Because

and to

5

ideologically the PCP has not changed

significantly since the Sixties,

a

discussion of party

ideology since that time will help us distinguish the

differences and similarities between the PCP and the
Eurocommunist parties.

April 25,

1974,

While tactics did change after

the party rejected a general

shift toward Eurocommunism in

ideological

favor of maintaining its

Stalinist organization and Marxist-Leninist analyses of
political developments.

According to Cunhal, the Salazar/Caetano dictatorship

would not be defeated as

a

result of its own internal

contradictions or international pressures but only

as

a

result of the people's struggle of which the PCP was the

vanguard.

Because monopoly capital was more concerned with

exploiting national resources than modernizing the nation,
he concluded that Portugal would continue to be the least

developed of the Western European nations.

The country was

^
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polarized,
side,

with monopoly capital and latifundistas
on one
and the proletariat (industrial workers
and
rural

salaried workers), peasants (small and medium
agriculture),

urban petit-bourgeoisie,
bourgeoisie,

some

sectors of the medium

and intellectuals on the opposite side.

The

unity of the latter democratic groups would lead
to

a

"Democratic and National Revolution" that would bring down
the dictatorship and destroy monopoly capitalism.

6

Cunhal emphasizes that the PCP is totally committed to

Marxism-Leninism,

which provides the means to convert all

nations to socialism and resolve their gravest problems.

The Marxist-Leninist doctrine is

a

dynamic,

flexible,

non-dogmatic ideology which embraces different socialist
tactics as the world continues to evolve.

The reason for

Marxist-Leninist flexibility and applicability to nations

with varying conditions is that "scientific socialism"
teaches its disciples how to analyze domestic situations in
terms of an eventual evolution to socialism.

According to Cunhal,

because monopoly capital

dominates the economies and polities of Italy,

France,

the

Eu r o c ommun

parliamentarian

i s t

(bourgeois)

parties

democracy.

still

Spain,

and

adapted to
In

contrast,

monopoly capital and the latifundios were greatly weakened
in Portugal after April 25,

1974;

so the PCP was not bound

by the constraints which led the Eurocommunist parties to

.
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choose the slow,
to socialism.

in

evolutionary "bourgeois democratic" path

The PCP's Marxist-Leninist path had
resulted

radical transformation that not only altered
the
political structures but also affected the socio-economic
a

structures.

Because the level of economic,

social,

and

political development among the European nations differed,
the paths toward socialism also had to differ.

8

Since Portugal did not have a large middle class,

Eu

r o c

ommuni st

strategy which de - emph a s

i z e

d

a

the

working-class influence in favor of middle class votes was

inappropriate.

Because the largely agrarian society was

still moving toward development and industrialization,

blue-collar worker was still

a

major force within the PCP

nation moved toward post-industrialization,

If the

party might have to consider

the

the

broadening its electoral

appeal to the middle classes as traditional industries fell
into crisis, but that was not the case.

To

Cunhal,

underdevelopment meant that future

industrialization increases would expand the working
classes even more and polarize some of the political groups

which were allied with the workers during the first phase

revolution.

of the

9

Nevertheless,

the PCP continued to

espouse a wide basis of support trying to appeal to as

broad

a

mass of Portuguese classes as possible.

than criticize the petit-bourgeoisie as

a

Rather

class and risk
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losing the bourgeois support

it

had,

the party attacked

specific groups which were aiding monopoly
capital and
latifundistas to recoup the losses of the revolution
Underdevelopment,

high illiteracy rate,

a

.

10

and lack of

democratic tradition were among the factors which convinced
Cunhal that western-style liberal democracy would not work
in

Portugal.

He insisted that to be similar to the other

Western European nations Portugal would have to reinstate

monopoly power, capitalist recuperation, and monopoly state
capitalism, which would run counter to PCP theory.

Because

monopoly capital still dominated in the nations where
Eurocommunism had taken root, he implied that Portugal had
moved closer to socialism than had those nations.

1 !

The party's devotion to Marxism-Leninism portrays the

orthodoxy which Cunhal and his comrades at the head of the
party have.

Unlike the party's early defensive arguments

concerning its rejection of Eurocommunism (because each
nation had to choose its own path to socialism according to
its domestic conditions)

,

by the eighties,

when faced with

the limited successes of Eurocommunist strategies,

became offensively critical of Eurocommunism.
lessons

the PCP

Cunhal drew

from the crises which struck the Eurocommunist

parties,

and especially from the divisions which weakened

the PCE,

to prove that

the PCP was pursuing the

strategy toward socialism.

He

correct

declared that once

a

^

c
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communist party dropped its Leninist character
to become
only Marxist, it was no longer a communist
party but a

social-democratic party.

the PCI,

for example,

Although Cunhal refused to label
a

social-democratic party,

consider it heavily influenced by
positions. 12

Octavio Pato,

one

soci a 1-

he did

demo c r a t i

of the top PCP

leaders,

criticized Eurocommunism as another bourgeois attempt to

divide the international communist movement.

The

compromises which the Eurocommunist parties made in nations

still dominated by monopoly capitalism could affect their
ultimate socialist goal: to end the exploitation of man by
man 13
.

At

the

PCP's

Tenth Congress

in

1983,

the

PCI

representative was the only one to be greeted with total

silence rather than

a

offensive criticism.

With Eurocommunism in crisis,

standing ovation,

a

sign of PCP
Cunhal

boasts that the PCP's own strategy has been correct all
along.

Of what

use had been the years

proletarian internationalism,

snubbing

criticizing the Soviet Union

and other socialist bloc nations,

the working class,

of

decreasing the role of

and weakening democratic centralism?

After all of those years of reforming the parties' Leninist
character, the result had been

a

decline in their electoral

strength because of the prostitution of the party by
bourgeois politics.
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Cunhal

insisted that the Eurocommunist parties should
not separate Marxism from Leninism. 15 Socialism
could

only

reached through revolution and the vanguard of the
working class, which the Eurocommunist parties rejected.
be

They replaced the working class vanguard role with
the

vanguard role of the intellectuals and urban bourgeoisie.
They rejected the worker-peasant alliance and replaced it

with an alliance of heterogeneous classes.

Rather than

criticize parliamentarianism as the Leninists did,

they

embraced "bourgeois democracy" and rejected the
revolutionary path to power led by the working class.

In

many ways the Eurocommunist parties became similar to
social democratic parties. !6
Once a

communist party diminished the role of the

working class,

emphasized Cunhal,

essential objectives,

it

began to revise

systematically criticize historical

experiences in the construction of socialism, and lose its

Mar xi st -Len in i s t

character.

working-class nature;
objectives,

preserve the party's

To

its Marxist-Leninist

ideology,

social composition, and structural organization

had to be preserved.

The

shift

from the factory cell to

the neighborhood cell weakened the party's working-class

character.

Because workers were less often affected by

adverse bourgeois influences than were intellectuals,

communist party had to maintain

a

a

majority of workers in

.
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its

directive organs.

Non-workers could develop

working-class consciousness, but not

as

a

naturally as

workers i^
.

Cunhal insisted that

a

communist party which was

influenced politically and ideologically by the bourgeoisie

lost
class

its working-class character which was essential for

independence.

The adoption of reformist views,

and

the break with the international working class and other

communist parties destroyed the

party. 18
parties,

He

independence of the

emphasized that like the Eurocommuni st

the PCP also faced tremendous pressures

from the

bourgeoisie to undermine its class independence.
bourgeoisie wanted to destroy the PCP'

foundation by

s

The

Marxist-Leninist

forcing it to abandon the

principles which the Eurocommuni st s abandoned.

six

major

The PCP

refused to abandon its Marxist-Leninist character,
friendly relations with the
proletarian internationalism,

its

Soviet Communist Party,
the preference for socialist

solutions to the nation's problems,

democratic centralism,

or its praise for the Soviet Union and the other socialist

countries
In

(The

1 9

his

recent book,

0

Partido Com Paredes De Vidro

Party With Walls Of Glass),

Cunhal

discusses

Eurocommunism, Marxism-Leninism, and the comportment of the
ideal communist and communist party.

He claims that what

s

442

makes the communist militant and the communist
party
different from other individuals and parties is
their
"moral superiority, "20 their complete dev otion to
their
goal of socialism and the end to the exploitation
of man by
man.
This commitment, and the devotion to the collective

rather than the individual comes from deep within the
communist 21
.

The party continued to draw from its past,

and

glorified its role and experience during the clandestine

period as giving

the exclusive right to determine the

it

needs of the working class.

It

emphasized that

a

Marxist-Leninist party needed to be quick and flexible when
it

analyzed changes and implemented solutions,

case on April 25,

1

974

part of the essence

and November 25,

was the
This was

of being a Marxist-Leninist party.

Although the past was important,

than the present.

1975.

as

it was not more important

New problems often required new

solutions 22
.

Eurocommunism In Crisis

One of the major criticisms which the Eurocommuni s t
face from orthodox communists as well as social-democrats,

and which they have not adequately resolved,

rejection of Leninism,

is

that their

abandonment of the "dictatorship of

the proletariat," criticism of the Soviet Bloc,

of

democratic habits,

and so

acceptance

forth makes them almost

indistinguishable from social-democratic parties. 23

discussed above,

As

the

crises which shook the

Eurocommunist parties in the eighties allowed the PCP to
become offensively critical of Eurocommunism.
Despite

their compromises toward

Marx

i s

m-Len

i

n

i s

m

the

,

Eurocommunist parties seem as distant from power as does

the PCP.
the

Of the three Eurocommunist parties,

least

committed to Eurocommunism.

Eurocommunism from 1975-1978,

The PCF'

s

embraced

abandoned it from 1979-1980,

and embraced it again from 1981 to 1984,

anew.

It

the PCF is

only to reject it

Secretary-General George Marchais'

approval of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was

break with Eurocommunism.

In April

1981

a

clear

the PCF vote

decreased by more than 25 percent of its usual showing in
the

first

round of the presidential elections to 15.3

percent of the votes and did only slightly better in the

parliamentary elections in June of that year with 16.2
percent.

In the

1984

European Parliament elections,

the

PCF vote decreased to just over 11 percent, and in the 1986

parliamentary elections, it polled only 9.79 percent. 24
In

Italy,

from 1977

to

1979 Eurocommunism's appeal

began to wane as the PCI saw its electoral percentages
decrease from 34 percent in 1976 to 30.4 percent in 1979.

s

444

In

the 1985 municipal and regional elections,

the party

decreased from its 1980 showing and lost some of
the major
cities, such as Turin, Naples, and Rome, which
it had

conquered in the Seventies.

Now lacking

a

charismatic

Secretary-General equal to Enrico Berlinguer who died in
1984,

the rank and file is unsure of the PCI's direction. 25
As to Spain, the PCP has especially drawn lessons from

the internal divisions which the PCE faced in the eighties,
a

culmination of internal divisions which had surfaced

years before. 26

Although

Secretary-General Santiago

Carillo and his followers inched toward Eurocommunism over
the -last two decades,

they maintained a Stalinist model of

organization and Leninist
centralism."
the party's

conception of "democratic

Their views were often not liberal enough for
liberal Eurocommunist wing,

the

"renovators,"

who argued that the move toward Eurocommunism was only
public relations gimmick.

a

Because organizationally the

party was still dominated by Carillo'

s

autocratic rule, the

renovators insisted that the PCE had to overhaul the
party's organization,

eliminate "Stalinism," and create

a

new type of "democratic centralism."
Carillo'

s

transformation of the PCE to

party also annoyed the "traditionalists."

a

Eurocommunist

Because of their

belief in democratic centralism and party unity, the
orthodox wing of the party reluctantly accepted Carillo'

embrace of Eurocommunism.

However,

Marxist-Leninist/Stalinist party with
on

they preferred
a

decreased emphasis

the parliamentary path to power and

a

return to the

party's original working-class ideological foundations.
other words, they preferred
In the

long-term,

a

a

(In

party similar to the PCP)

.

the conflicts among these three

groups tore the PCE into three distinct political
organizations.
The internal divisions destroyed the
party's unity from the leadership to the rank and file.

A

party which had won 10.8 percent of the vote

in

decreased to only 3.8 percent in October of 1982.

Although

its membership had risen from 15, 000

in

1979

1975 to a high of

201,757 in 1977,

it suffered successive decreases to 80,000

in February

1985.

additional

of

It

10,000 to

is

estimated to have lost an

12,000 members since then,

as

individuals joined the political organizations set up by
the "renovators" and "traditionalists "27
.

To

prevent the

"renovators"

leadership at the PCE'

s

from contesting his

Eleventh Congress in 1985,

and

substituting his pro-reformist archrival Vice-Secretary
General Nicolas Sartorious in his place,

initiative and resigned.

his

own

successor,

In

Gerardo

Carillo took the

this way he hoped to choose

Iglesias,

working-class background and was

a

who has

a

strong

Carillo loyalist.

Because Carillo and his followers would still be

in

the

s

446

Executive Commission and Central Committee,

he expected

that Iglesias would defer to him in major
policy decisions.

However,

Iglesias had his own solutions to the
problems

which faced the PCE.

He

soon

rejected Carillo's

paternalism and moved closer to the renovators'
positions 28
.

The PCP's position vis-a-vis Eurocommunism was
strengthened when it reminded its members of the damages
that can occur to a communist party that ignores democratic

centralism by allowing internal unity to break down,
factions to emerge,
policies.

and the bourgeoisie to influence its

Because the factions within the PCE were not

dealt with immediately,

in time they infiltrated leadership

positions and the executive organs of the party.

Without

the strong unity and collective decision making which
strong communist party needs,

executive organs.

a

divisions emerge within the

Once unity breaks down among the

leadership, the rank-and-file members reflect the divisions

and endanger the party's

cohesiveness 29
.

The PCE'

experiences must have influenced the PCP's decision to
demote followers of its Eurocommunist tendency at its Tenth
Even though the party knew the action

Congress in 1983.

would lead to external criticism and rumors, occasional
speculation over

a

few individuals is better than allowing

them to become entrenched within leadership positions and

gain individual strength and support which would
cause much
graver consequences in the long term.
The PCP is trying to prevent similar occurances
within

its

own organization.

Carillo

The autocratic leadership which

imposed within the PCE resulted in the

dissatisfaction of the "renovators."

autocratic ruler himself,

Because Cunhal is an

by turning to

collective

leadership he is hoping not to personalize his rule so that

widespread dissatisfaction,

if

it

focused on only one individual,

emerges,
It

will not be

will be much more

difficult to replace an entire Permanent Political
Secretariat than one Secretary-General.

Collectivity and Collective Leadership

Since

its

Tenth Congress,

the PCP

has moved to

strengthen its organization by placing special emphasis on

collectivity.

This move is supported by the party's

attacks against Eurocommunism which, in relaxing democratic

centralism and moving toward bourgeois politics,

also

deemphasized collectivity at the expense of individuality.

Through

its

collectivity,

emphasis
the

on

collective leadership and

leadership hopes to eliminate any views

that the party or Cunhal is autocratic and Stalinist.

The PCP's conception of democracy is different from
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the western democratic tradition of individual

Instead,

the PCP

rights.

focuses on collective above individual

rights which justifies its adherence to democratic
centralism and the new focus on collective responsibility
and leadership.

At

all

levels

of

organization

a

new

emphasis on collective leadership, including discussions of
it

prior to

when the party did not have

1961

a

Secretary-General, appears to be setting the stage for such

leadership to replace Cunhal when he steps down.
However,

30

even when Cunhal no longer is Secretary-General,

he will continue to monitor his succession through his firm

hold on the party as

Secretariat.

It

a

member of the Permanent Political

will be much more difficult for

a

collective leadership to radically alter his legacy than if
one

individual took the reins and,

like

Iglesias,

turned

out different than expected.

Cunhal'
members

s

recent book appears to be preparing the

for the

future,

as

it

smooths the transition to

avoid political infighting and sudden shifts within the
party,

makes constant references to the collectivity as

opposed to individuality, refers to the Permanent Political
Secretariat as

a

collective leadership body,

and moves to

create ideological purity within the party.
experiences are important but it is their role as

the party's

Individual
a

collective experiences which count.

part of
31

In

"

keeping with the emphasis on collectivism throughout
the

party organization,
individualism is

a

sign of freedom.

makes the individual
of his
Not

Cunhal chastises the belief that

a

Because individualism

"slave to himself" and

"prisoner

own limitations," collectivity is true freedom.

only the PCP's collective experiences

but

a

also

the

experiences

throughout the world,

of

the

are

32

important,

communist parties

which is another reason why

a

communist party has to maintain links with its
"brothers

.

33

The PCP has always maintained tight control of its

history and traced its policies to the past.
on

collectivity and collective leadership

different.

Cunhal

S e cr e t a r y -

Gene r a 1

collective.

The emphasis
is

not

any

insists that even while he has been
,

the

leadership has really been

Because of the party's difficult clandestine

existence and the numerous arrests of its leaders,

maintained

a

collective

leadership after the

it
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reorganization. A collective leadership is strong because
it can maintain stability despite major changes within the

organization 34
.

Cunhal emphasizes that

a

collective leadership helps

the party to continue its gradual change.

successful in controlling the change,
to be

In order

to be

such leadership has

flexible and adapt to varying conditions.

This

450

requires the connection of the entire
rest of the party.

It

leadership to the

also requires the renovation of the

leadership with new blood.

If

change to the leadership

organs is not gradual, when the change comes it will be
too
abrupt and all-encompassing.

Older leaders have to make

way for younger leaders prior to their incapacitation by
old age or death.

natural law.

as

a

result of

The party must not age." 35

It is clear,

of

"The human being ages

therefore, that the PCP has no intentions

abandoning its Ma r x i s t - Le n i n i s t ideology or

Stalinist views.

The

Ma r x i s t - Len i n i s t

its

party brings

together three distinct entities: the vanguard party,

the

working classes, and the popular masses,

and combines them

prepare for the revolution.

reason why

to

The

a

distinction between these three groups is often difficult
to uncover is that the masses, the working class,

militants are often indistinguishable, with

belonging to the working class,
member of the middle

a

and party

militant also

and an intellectual or

class having

a

"working class

consciousness ."36

Conclusions

Even though the PCP

party,

it

is

clearly

a

Marxist-Leninist

confronts many problems also faced by the

.
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Eurocommunists and often applies similar solutions.
Despite its disdain for Eurocommunism, in many instances
political observers in Portugal have concluded that the

similar tactics are an indication that the party will
evolve toward Eurocommunism 37
.

They po i nt/

the party's strategy at the local level,
to

for example,

to

which is designed

attract new voters to the PCP by showing communist

"moral

superiority"

honesty,

their devotion to their jobs,

-

uncorruptability

,

their

and efficiency in meeting local

concerns
Given our discussions concerning the party's devotion
to Marxism-Leninism and its

Stalinist organization,

it

is

clear that only in the very long run can we expect any far-

reaching change.

The mere

fact that

a

party resorts to

similar strategies or tactics in certain circumstances does

not

mean the

Eurocommunism.
to

party

is

necessarily headed toward

The PCP has always emphasized its adherence

international

communism and the lessons which the

communist parties of the world have to offer each other.
It

is

no mystery that

despite ideological differences and

varying conditions from nation to nation, many similarities
also exist.

Sydney Tarrow,

for example,

describes the problems

which the PCI encountered when its policies,

designed for the industrial north,

which were

clashed with the needs

0
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of the agricultural

south. 38

The PCp ran

infe0

similar

problems when it attempted to develop policies which would

harmonize with the industrial zones, the latifundio
dominated agricultural south

(with

land-holding patterns

similar to Italy's south), and the rest of the nation which
was comprised of minifundio landholding patterns by highly

individualistic,

small and medium peasants.

The party's

strategies were basically designed for the industrial
enclaves of the nation, especially around Lisbon and Porto,
and were then adapted to embrace a largely spontaneous

movement of farm occupations in what is considered the
agrarian "red belt"

in the Alentejo.

Although the party

did attempt to integrate the conservative northern peasants
into

socialist strategy,

its

the policies were clearly

contradictory to the views of the conservative peasants in
the

long term.

movement"

in

The

contradiction of imposing

a

the Alentejo and industrialized zones,

"war of position"

in

the north soon

surfaced. 39

reaction by the northern conservative peasants was
factor in ending the revolution
On

face value,

medium farmer,
merchant,

"war of

of the

.

The
major

4

the PCP's courtship of the

of the

a

and a

small and

small and medium industrialist and

intellectual,

and of other groups which

belong to the middle-classes might confuse the observer
into

asking how this is different

from Eur ocommuni st

.
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tactics.
of

The difference is that the PCP claims
a majority

its members belong to the working
class

from the rank-

and-file all the way up to the leadership
organs.

As

a

Marxist-Leninist party the PCP insists that its work
is
geared to helping the working class, which requires
a
majority of its members to belong to the working class.
Once the party allows

majority of intellectual

a

middle-class individuals to rule the party,

will be headed toward bourgeois

it

and

claims

it

democracy and

Eurocommunism
There are several reasons why the PCP does not have

strong Eurocommunist tendency.

a

The students of the sixties

who might otherwise have been attracted to Eurocommunism
were drawn either to orthodox communism or to ultra-leftist

ideologies.

Because of the intense competition between

these two groups,

support

a

there was

little ideological space to

Eurocommunist view.

Because the dictatorship

prevented knowledge of major ideological debates such as
Trotskyism,

Titoism,

and the Twentieth CPSU repurcussions

from entering the nation,

the same debates which shook

other communist parties to their roots did not affect the
PCP.

The party

is

so

Stalinists that any

firmly dominated by old time
Euroco

mmu n i

st s

or

suspected

Eurocommunists are not allowed into positions of power.
The major reason why the PCP is the most

41

orthodox of

the Western European communist parties can
be traced to its
leadership.
In chapter three we noted that, except for
the

brief "rightward shift"

from 1957 to 1961,

the current

orthodox leaders have had firm control of the party since
the 1940-41 reorganization.

The difficult life which they

experienced during the clandestine years, and their
confinement to long prison terms, reinforced their
unwavering commitment to proletarian internationalism and
Marxism-Leninism.

Because Spain is not radically different from its

Iberian neighbor,

a

strategy similar to Spanish

Eurocommunism could be applied in Portugal.

However,

Cunhal and the top leadership have always insisted on the

PCP's orthodoxy as the only possible strategy given the
domestic political and economic climate.

claim that Portugal

is

To

support his

different from Spain,

emphasizes that Spain initiated

a

Cunhal

political democratization

and liberalization but the change has not reached the

social and economic sectors as they have in Portugal. 4 ^
During Carillo's leadership from 1960 to 1983,
as

organizationally Stalinist

however,

used his

as

the PCP.

the PCE was

Carillo,

firm control of the party to lead it

toward Eurocommunism,

while Cunhal kept the PCP firmly

rooted in Marxism-Leninism.

The splits which recently

weakened the PCE strengthened the PCP's orthodoxy, making

a
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timely shift to Eurocommunism out of the question.

.

.
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CONCLUSION

Although studies of the Eurocommuni st parties
PCE,

and PCF)

abound,

been largely ignored.
on the PCP's

April 25,

(PCI,

systematic research on the PCP has

A few journal-length articles focus

role during the Portuguese "revolution" of

1974

to November 25,

but analyses since

1975;

then have been short,

sporadic,

and confined to the

Portuguese newspapers.

The

that the party has

fact

rejected the Eurocommunist path to power cannot justify the

paucity of research devoted to the PCP.

Our goal has been

to fill this void.

As the various chapters demonstrate, this analysis has

been broad-based to contribute not

only to

a

wider

understanding of the PCP's strategy for power but also to
the general

field of comparative politics.

This study

includes several levels of analysis beginning with the
comparative theory of political parties and the analysis of

the Portuguese political system before focusing on the
PCP's history,

tactics,

and organization.

In

the end we

return to the broader field of comparative politics by
discussing Eurocommunism.
The

PCP

continues as

a

force to be reckoned with

inside and outside of parliament.

Outside it controls

several of the ancillary organizations as well as most of
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the unions,

which gives it the strength to mobilize mass
demonstrations on short notice.
Inside it has continued

to

receive between 15 and 20 percent of the vote at

a

time

when the Eurocommunist parties have seen their electoral
percentages decline.

For this reason alone an analysis of

the PCP's electoral success despite its Stalinist character

warrants closer examination.

success results

from its

The

PCP

argues that

its

rejection of the bourgeois

Eurocommunist path to power.

Therefore,

in the context

Eurocommunism this analysis provides
perspective on the strategy which

a

a

of

different

communist party should

pursue in a liberal democratic regime.
Because the PCP has consistently played an important
role in Portuguese politics, this analysis also contributes
to our understanding of the political

We

saw

that

the

PCP's

concept

system in general

of

.

power must be

distinguished from the concept which the liberal democratic
parties embrace.

Throughout

its

long history the party's

tactics have accompanied the transformations within the

political system,

but

in

the

long run its ultimate goal

remains to seize control of the state and create an Eastern

European-style government.
1975

Its tactics

revolutionary period failed;

orthodox,

Stalinist warriors

during the 1974-

but the party,

led by

from the clandestine period,

has continued to follow the Leninist approach rather than

l 6

the Eurocommunist approach.
If the Eurocommunist parties were not currently
faced

with their own crises, the internal and external pressures
for tactical changes by the PCP might be greater.

But the

Eurocommunist tendency within the party has always been

weak and has grown weaker as
recent defeats

a

result of Eurocommunism's

other Western European nations.

in

The

pressures for change have been diffused by the orthodox
leaders as they prepare for the gradual transition of power

from the

"old"

Stalinists to their hand-picked "new"

Stalinist comrades.
In the

long term,

the lack of change within the party

may lead its power base to gradually weaken as

democracy becomes
the

"static"

democracy,

a

liberal

tradition and the Portuguese abandon

party for parties which have adapted to

but we should not

change tactics on

a

ignore the PCP's ability to

moments notice.

It has

done so in the

past and can continue to do so in the future.
The party is gambling that the political and economic

crisis in Portugal will not be resolved by the "system"
parties thereby strengthening the

"anti-system" party's
in

the

opposition it can avert responsibility for the crisis.

If

appeal to the masses.

As

long as the PCP remains

the problems eventually lead to

a

non-democratic solution,

the PCP is prepared to either play an influential role

(if

l
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the solution is

left-wing)

the solution is
forces)

.

a

or

slip into clandestinity

(if

right-wing backlash by the reactionary

No matter what the future may hold the PCP will

continue its struggle for power regardless of the stakes
involved or the size of its power base.

One of the party's

strengths has been its consistent resilience.

During the height of Eurocommunism

(mid-seventies)

there was much discussion in scholarly circles concerning

the

evolution of the Eu r o c ommun i s t parties.

Some

questioned not in which direction they could change, but
how they could change.

Can a party which considers itself

Marxist-Leninst abandon the characteristics which make it

revolutionary party?

If

not,

how can

a

a

party which

professes to be Marxist-Leninist simultaneously claim to be
a

democratic party?

Although the PCP asserts its

commitment to Marxism-Leninism,

it

incompatible with liberal democracy.

denies this
However,

is

when

compared to its other tactics, its competition in electoral

politics and other democratic institutions

is

of

low

priority. Power to the PCP is meaningless according to the

liberal-democratic notions of the word.

By power,

the

party envisions total control of Portuguese society.

The

democracy it envisions is not liberal democracy,

but

communist "democracy" which values collective rights over
individual rights.
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After April

25,

1

974

the

,

PCP's

Eurocommunism was virtually impossible.

acceptance of

As the strongest,

most organized party to emerge from the dictatorship,

party had

the

clear advantage in the nation's politics.

a

Given the firm control which the orthodox leaders held on

the party,
parties,

the PCP's

strength vis-a-vis other political

its respect among the people for its long years of

struggle during clandest inity
which it formed with the MFA,

and the close relationship

,

it

inconceivable that the

is

orthodox leaders would have chosen any path which diverged
from Marxism-Leninism.

the Autonomous

Although the conservative north and

Islands would not have accepted communist

domination without

a struggle,

the conditions did exist for

the party to seize power by force.

perspective,

From a Marxist-Leninist

given the political situation

(especially

after the left-wing backlash which followed the aborted

right-wing coup of March
necessarily make

a

11,

1975),

the party did not

bad strategic choice.

Although

it

misjudged the opposition and strength of the conservative

north and the moderates,

how could the orthodox leaders

have chosen any other path when power seemed so close at
hand?

While proponents of Eurocommunism existed within the
party during this period,

positions of power.

they were

few and were not

in

They could not have argued their case

when faced with

potential revolutionary situation.

a

The

PCP's political competitors were the moderating forces to
its right,

especially the socialists who preferred

democratic path to power,

and the radicals to

a social

its

left,

especially ext reme- le f t i st s who preferred increased
revolutionary activity.

Because as Marxist-Leninists the

PCP leaders claimed to be revolutionaries, the major threat

was

from the left.

Increasingly,

the PCP was confronted

with radicalism in its own ranks spawned by the activities
of the ultra-left.

tactical change,
to

it

Indeed,

was

for

if pressure was mounting

for

increased radicalism to prove

its members that it was as committed to revolution as

was the ultra-left.

With orthodox leaders at the head of

the party and the threat from the ultra-left, moderation of
its policies to the right

question.

(Eurocommunism)

was out of the

Although the PCP preferred moderated, controlled
not the anarchic type which the ultra-left was

revolution,

bound to create, the clear choice was "revolutionary."
Because from the point of view of the PCP there were
so many advantages to support its tactical decision,

it

is

difficult to consider its rejection of Eurocommunism and

adherence to Marxism-Leninism

as

crucial decision had to be made,
25,

1975

a

mistaken move.

If

a

it was after the November

left-wing coup attempt abruptly halted the

"revolution"

and not before.

However,

the party remained
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firmly in the hands

of

its

orthodox leaders.

continued as Marxist-Leninists in the hope that
which lacked
a

a

They
society

a

strong democratic tradition would return to

potentially revolutionary situation.

point that the party gambled.

It was

that

at

The decision was to bluff

acceptance of the new democratic experiment while

it

strengthened its organization and infiltrated society in

preparation for the next revolutionary situation.
Given that the PCP has not changed its orthodoxy,

question then becomes: can it be expected to change?

contemplate how the PCP might change,

implementing can be expected.

If we

the short term

in

only the cosmetic type changes which

the

it

is

currently

Because the current

Permanent Political Secretariat will continue to control
the party's direction for at least the next generation, and
the PCP's Eurocommunist "tendency" is not

a

threat,

even in

the medium term little change can be expected within the

PCP.

To

change radically,

qualitatively change

its

the

leaders,

PCP

would have to

which can only be

expected in the long term.
We have concluded that as long as conditions remain
the

same,

the PCP cannot

change.

As

long as the nation

continues its progress toward industrialization,
support

for the PCP

white-collar workers

from blue-collar workers
in

the service sector

as

broad

well as

(such as bank

tellers)

will continue.

The party is

also entrenched in

the "red belt," among the agrarian workers of the
Alentejo.

When combined with its domination of various ancillary
organizations,

especially of the unions, the party is much

stronger than the 15-20 percent of the vote it receives in
elections.

We cannot measure the strength of a communist

party that does not expect to come to power electorally by

electoral percentages alone.

Unless circumstances change radically and become
revolutionary,

the PCP

faces

a

long,

gradual

position" if it is to reach power democratically.

"war of
Although

it has a stable basis of support among the groups mentioned

above,

it

will have to attract additional members and

sympathizers if it intends to reach power via parliament.

But

the

PCP

is

democratically.

not

dedicated to achieving power

It has never had a

"democratic" tradition

and will not develop one in the short term.
As the past

has

shown,

although the PCP

portray itself as infallible,

it

likes to

does make mistakes as

proven by its tactics during the summer of 1975 and during

the presidential

elections of 1976.

It

should not be

assumed that the strong control which the orthodox leaders

have

on

the party,

control of

a

the PCP's strong organization,

the

majority of the labor unions, and its dominant

position in many ancillary organizations makes the party

all powerful.

points out,

As Annie Kriegel,

an expert

on the PCF,

party's strength is not measured by the

a

massiveness of its membership size but instead by the
homogeneity of its ideology, cadres, and organization.!
Because the PCP has

large membership which

a

it

has

succeeded in making more homogeneous over the last few
years,

it

is

quite strong.

However,

the party has made

mistakes in the past and history often repeats itself.

Time

is

continues,

the party's enemy.

the

longer democracy

longer people will have to establish

democratic tradition.

become

The

With time,

accustomed to

parliamentarianism,

which will

a

new generations will

liberal
force the

democracy and
orthodox PCP to

the political sidelines or to evolve toward Eurocommunism
(and face contradictions similar to those which the current

Eurocommunist parties face)
further.

.

Every year democracy sets in

Although entry into the EEC and the European

Parliament may not benefit the nation economically, it will
help it politically by strengthening democracy.

However,

because democracy

and does not yet have

only twelve years old

strong tradition,

a

lost for radical change.

is

2

all hope

is

not

As long as the economic problems

and political instability continue, the PCP can still reap

benefits.

If

conditions get bad enough,

the PCP hopes to

profit whether the reaction is from the left or the right.

After all, the party's major advances have been as

a

result

of aborted right-wing coup attempts.

Because time is running out for radical change,

and

democracy is slowly becoming entrenched, the party must
make contingency plans in case conditions for revolution do
not return.

The Tenth Congress of 1983 and Cunhal's recent

book 3 are laying the ground work for those plans.

While

the party is not altering its orthodoxy but strengthening
it,

the PCP is also aware that it must expand its influence

if it

is to

survive.

Its members are becoming older,

and

attrition will weaken the party unless it can revitalize it
with new blood.

The party's

focus on collectivity and

collective leadership and on gradually easing younger
"orthodox" members

into leadership positions is surely

designed to deal with this crisis.

The de-emphasis on

leadership is to protect the party from the

individual

individual who appears to be orthodox but is masquerading
or has

a

change of heart once he or she reaches the most

powerful positions.
Party

(PCE)

The

lessons of the Spanish Communist

have not been forgotten.

Collectivity gives

the party time to promote young "orthodox" leaders while
surrounding them with enough "old line" orthodox leaders to

prevent radical change should the former's theoretical
beliefs turn out differently in practice.
It is clear that these changes are only cosmetic.

The

power is still held by the orthodox members as is evident
by their creation of the Permanent Political Secretariat as

the ultimate watchdog of the new "collective

experiment.
leadership,

This

new organ will

leadership"

collectivize the

prevent radical change within the party,

and

maintain firm control in the hands of the orthodox leaders.
It

is

no accident

that all of its members are hardline

orthodox leaders who have played crucial roles in the

party's direction since the clandestine years which
followed the reorganization of 1940-1941.
The PCP is changing, but the change is organizational,

not

ideological.

preventing

a

It

is

strengthening its orthodoxy and

shift to Eurocommunism.

In

its

favor it can

point to the current crisis of Eurocommunism and especially

the problems which the PCE has

Unless the PCP

faced.

radically alters its tactics in the long term, however,

it

will not be able to attract new members and sympathizers in
the numbers needed to keep the party at its current level.

The party

recruits.
April

1974

has
Its

already exhausted its easy supply of
increase from less than 3000 members

to 200,000

in

1983 was done

in waves.

In

in

the

first wave were the sympathizers who remained on the
sidelines during the clandestine years.

The second wave

was created by the revolutionary process which followed the

aborted right-wing coup attempt of March

11,

1975.

The new

members

joined because they believed the PCP was uniquely

qualified to bring socialism to the nation or because they
were opportunists who wanted to reap the benefits of

a

party that was very powerful at the time and had many jobs
and services to distribute to its supporters.

wave

joined the party after the November

25,

The third
1975

jolt

ended the revolution and moderated the nation's politics.

Most of the new members had always been committed to the
nation's transformation to socialism,

but had belonged to

extreme-leftist groups which disbanded in the aftermath of
the revolution.

They found the PCP to be the next best

alternative for achieving socialism once hope of victory
via their parties was dashed.

4

The members from the last

two waves would be likely to support change within the PCP;

long as the orthodox leaders continue their firm

but as

control of the party, change is impossible.

Already the PCP is failing to attract the youth to the
As long as it continues to attract a consistent 15

party.
to

20

percent of the vote,

minimal.

However,

internal repercussions will be

in the long term,

if the party continues

to

face problems attracting the youth and new members,

if

its

begin.

electoral percentage falters,
Its

and

internal unrest may

uncontested strength in the unions is already

beginning to waver.

The

PCP

had always

been very

successful in mobilizing members of the CGTP-Intersindical

for political

about 1982,

without

strikes and as

a

show of strength.

workers went on strike,

fear of reprisals.

slowdown,

Since then,

cautious to follow Intersindical

'

that their jobs will be at risk.

and so forth

workers are more

"suggestions"

s

Until

for

fear

The party is still very

powerful in the unions but more cautious in mobilizing
workers for political protests through Intersindical. 5

Because

party

the

refuses

to

Marxist-Leninist approach to socialism,

change
its

its

conquest of

power in Portugal cannot be via parliamentary politics.

It

will continue to participate in domestic politics,

as

other Marxist-Leninist party would,

not be

its tactical

but that will

For this reason,

focus.

any

the size of its

electoral support or party membership will be of less
importance than the party's qualitative support.
orthodox leaders would rather have

of

a

The

smaller party made up

indoctrinated members committed to the party's

Marxist-Leninist tactics and "democratic centralism" than
to sacrifice the purity of the party for more members and a

larger share of the vote.
The PCP will continue to be a Marxist-Leninist party.

Comparable to Annie Kriegel's conclusions concerning the

PCF

,

6

the

PCP

"counter-society,"

existing within

is
a

a

and

will

continue

to

be

a

miniature Eastern European society

liberal democracy.

Like the PCF,

it

often sheds its skin by demoting,

punishing,

or purging

members who do not adhere to democratic centralism or do
not

commit themselves to the collective rather than the

individual.

This has

especially been true since the

divisions which emerged in its neighbor the PCE.

Also comparable to the PCF,
circle"

and an

the PCP has an "inner

"outer circle."

ancillary organizations,

The members

sympathizers,

of

the

and other

individuals on the fringes of the party (including inactive
and less doctrinaire PCP
and the active militants,

form the inner circle.

members)
cadres,

form the outer circle;

and leaders of the party

Because the members of the outer

circle are less dedicated than the members of the inner
circle, the party will dispense with the former if it finds
it necessary to strengthen its homogeneity and tighten the

circles

^

.

As a Marxist-Leninist party,

pursue

a

"dualist"

the PCP will continue to

strategy for power,

working within the

democratic political arena and outside
simultaneously.

of

it

The party will be active in the "hard" or

radical opposition as illustrated by the "revolutionary
vanguard"

role and Kriegel's

"counter society." 8

It

will

also be active in the "soft" or moderate strategic pole, as

illustrated by George Lavau's "popular tribune" function
(acting as the representative of the victims of capitalist

.

society)

and as

a

participant in democratic politics.

9

These dual strategies often lead to contradictions in the

party's policies.
function,"

The PCP,

in

fulfilling Lavau's "tribune

tries to represent the grievences of other

social groups as part of its tactical maneuvers to broaden
its support while playing the vanguard role of the working

class

"revolutionary
vanguard"

1

I

"government
party"

hard

•soft

"counter
society"

Figure

I

I

5.

"popular
tribune"

Hard/Soft Poles

Source: Adapted from Ronald Tiersky,
French Communism, 1920-1972
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), P. 368.

One of the major differences between the PCP and other

Western European communist parties
contradiction between the parties'

more

is

that

the

dualist nature in the

advanced nations focuses on the party

as

a

revolutionary vanguard
is

(because a revolutionary

virtually nonexistent,

situation

especially as these societes

enter the post- indust r i a 1 phases).

For the PCP the

contradiction focuses more on democratic politics because
it not only considers itself revolutionary,

but still hopes

that revolutionary conditions will develop.

Because the

PCP's rhetoric continues to be more revolutionary than its

activity,

and because it attempts to prevent assimilation

into a liberal democratic system

(soft

pole)

at

the same

time that it participates within it, the PCP will find that
in the

long term its dualist strategy will clash with its

revolutionary vanguard role

(hard pole)

if

Portugal

continues democractic.
It will be interesting to follow the PCP's progress to

see if any shifts emerge in the very long term,

of social pressure,

or whether the

preserve the party's orthodoxy.

as a result

current leaders can

For the time being the PCP

is firmly attached to "democratic centralism" and is doomed

to future decay as it continues its "ordinary Stalinism.

1,10

.

"

.
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